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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the attitude of countries of the developing world to
international commercial arbitration. It argues that their perception of arbitration in
international trade is that the process does not favour them. In an attempt to explain that
perception it identifies several possible reasons, ranging from the character of arbitration as
a means of settling disputes, to the judicial treatment of awards in which the states have
been involved. The treatment of the subject is structured to correspond largely with the
three separate stages of the arbitration process. Chapters one and two address the legal
character of arbitration and its underlying philosophy. The reservations of many developing
countries are explained in terms of the differences in the understanding of the nature and
purpose of arbitration between, on the one hand, the countries concerned and, on the other
hand, the western systems on which the international model is based. Chapter three
addresses the conduct of arbitration proceedings under the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Mukilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA) as examples of institutions created specificafly with the arbitration of
commercial disputes involving developing states in mind. The chapter argues that both
institutions are one-sided, thus contributing to the misgivings of the countries concerned.
Chapter four deals with the problem of the proper law of state contracts as recently evolved
by arbitration tribunals. It notes that there has been a shift from traditional principles of
conflict of laws, resulting in the isolation of the transactions from the only systems of law
with which they ordinarily would have the closest connection. It points out that the trend is
guided by policy not principle. It criticises the trend on that and other grounds. Chapter five
deals with the enforcement of awards. We point out in that chapter that little at that stage
of the process suggests a trend unfavourable to developing countries.
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INTRODUCTION
Arbitration dominates all other methods of settling disputes in international
trade for various reasons.' The conventional view is that it is cheaper, more speedy,
private (and therefore confidential) and flexible. 2
 It has been the chosen method of
settling disputes between businessmen across Europe for well over four centuries.3
That, however, has not been the case for most developing countries. Their involvement
with international commercial arbitration is relatively recent. As in the entire domain
of international law, one of the most conspicuous features of their participation is the
protest against the existing order as developed in Europe. 4
 Referring to that order,
Professor J.H.W. Verzjil, according to R.P. Anand, "... asserts with a due sense of
pride " that it "... is not only a product of the conscious activity of the European
mind, but has also drawn its vital essence from a common source of European beliefs,
and in both of these aspects it is mainly of Western European origin." 6
 The result is
that the product of the European mind is always the object of resentment and rejection
whenever it is not, or appears not to be, favourable to the interests of the other group
of countries which, for historical reasons, are also the subject of the same order. Even
in those parts of the developing world where the exposure to international arbitration
'For its proclaimed advantages and disadvantages see generally Born, Garry B. International
Commercial Arbitration in the United States: Commentary and Materials, Kluwer, Deventer, 1994, pp.
5-9.
2Kerr, "International Arbitration v. Litigation" (1980) JBL, 164.
3Schmitthoff, Clive Commercial Law in a Chan ging Economic Climate, 2nd Edn., Sweet and
Maxwell, London, 1985.
4Third World Attitudes Toward International Law, (ed. by Snyder, Frederick E. & Sathirathai,
Surakiart), Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987.
5"Attitudes of Asian-African States toward certain Problems of International Law" in Third World
Attitudes Toward International Law, ibid. 5, p. 6.
6lbid, citing Verzjil, "Western European Influence on the Foundations of International Law" (1955)
I Int'l. Relations, 137. The European influence is present in both meanings Professor Verzjil attributes
to the term "foundation". He uses the word to mean an institution or establishment, and to refer to the
ethos, "the complex of inner beliefs or convictions and the outer social and economic factors" (ibid)
upon which the entire body of international law is based.
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has been relatively longer, such as in Latin America, there remains a worrying
reluctance to accept the process7, blamed on what José Siqueiros describes as a
longstanding "suspicion of European and North American colonialism", 8 arising from
the use by the former colonial powers of claims commissions "to achieve the ends of
diplomatic intervention."9 Writing on the reaction of Asia and Africa to international
law, Professor Michel Virally warned in the 1960s that the substance of the
"international law" being pressed for by the Afro-Asian countries had little in common
with the traditional principles of that law. The new states, he said:
témoignent d 'une mefiance extreme, non toujours exprimée avec clarté,
mais partout perceptible. Le droit international, affirinent-ils, ne leur
a été d'aucun secours pendant leur lutte pour l'independence. Bien au
contraire, ii a constamentjoué contre elle, en accumulant les obstacles
a l'établissement de rapports nouveau avec l'ancienne métropole.
L 'independence acquise, estiment les mèmes delegues, le droit
international apparalt encore comme le meilleur allié du néo-
colonialisme, en consolidant des positions économiques etrangeres et
en empêchant la formation de rapports vraiements égalitaires, sur la
base du profit muruel, entre pays parvenus a des niveau de
développement tres dfferents.'°
The same reaction is still manifested against the present state of international
71n fact Paulsson attributes the distrust by developing countries of international arbitration
principally to South America "... for the simple reason that until the watershed decade of 1955-65, other
developing regions were mainly coloni[s]ed and therefore had no voice with which to raise protests
against decisions imposed from abroad": "Third World Participation in International Arbitration" (1987)
2 ICSID Rev.,-FILI, 19, note 1.
8"Arbitral Autonomy and National Sovereignty in Latin America", in Lex Mercatoria and
Arbitration, (ed. by Carbonneau, Thomas), Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1990, p. 183.
9lbid. There is some acknowledgment that the climate in Latin America is improving: Layton,
Robert "Changing Attitudes toward Dispute Resolution in Latin America" (1993) 10 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n.,
Part 2, 123; Nadn, Grigera "Arbitration in Latin America: Overcoming Traditional Hostility" (1989) 5
Arbitration International, 137; Garro "Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Jurisdiction of
Ajbitral Tribunals in Latin America" (1984) 1 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., 305; although the pace of the change
is rather insignificant for a region with over 100 years of exposure to the process, when compared to
the speed of change taking place elsewhere.
'°"Le Dépassement du Droit: Le Droit International en Question" (1963) 8 Archives de Philosophic
du Droit, 146 p. 150.
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arbitration of commercial disputes, which, like international law, also strongly reflects
the unique genius of the European mind. The criticism remains the same: that the
entire environment of international commercial arbitration in all respects and at all
stages of the process is heavily weighted in favour of western countries. The
suggestion that the system of arbitral justice put in place by international arbitration
institutions and Western practitioners is impartial and fair to all is denied
categorically. In a study on state contracts and international arbitrations carried out for
the Hague Academy of International Law, Bernard Audit expresses the view that "...
the reluctance shown to arbitration [by the developing world] arises, to a great extent,
from the fact that it is felt to be the practice of a club of initiates from which the
representatives of developing countries would be largely excluded." But the
reference to a group of "initiates" suggests that even western lawyers are excluded,
given the relatively small number of international lawyers involved in the practice of
commercial arbitration.' 2 The relative absence of representation from the developing
world, however, assumes particular significance in their perception of the institution,
especially when that is associated with what is regarded as a deliberate (although
unestablished) western effort to undermine their contribution.'3
Afro-Asian jurists took the view in the 1970s in Kuala Lumpur, Baghdad and
Doha that the already established arbitration institutions:
had their own rules for conduct of arbitrations which did not work out
particularly favourably for the developing countries, particularly in the
matter of venue, choice of arbitrators, as also fees and charges leviable
by the institutions concerned. Since most of these institutions
11Transnational Arbitration and State Contracts, Hague Academy of International Law, Centre for
Studies and Research in International Law and International Relations, 1988, p. 83.
'2William W. Park, an international authority on the subject of commercial arbitration, makes a
reference in passing (probably insignificant, but nonetheless informative,) to "the international arbitration
mafia", an indication that the field remains dominated by a small number of practitioners: "National
Legal Systems and Private Dispute Resolution" (Book Review) (1988) 82 AJ]L, 616, p. 624. For a
socio-legal study of the dominance by this relatively small number of influential practitioners and
academics of the field, see Dezalay and Garth, "Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing
International Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business Disputes" (1995) 29 Law & Soc.
Rev., 27. I am grateful to Professor John Adams for this excellent article.
' 3Sornarajah, infra note 29 p. 9; Arfazadeh, Homayoon "New Perspectives in South East Asia and
Delocalised Arbitration in Kuala Lumpur" (1991) 8 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 4, 103 p. 121.
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functioned under the auspices of chambers of commerce and other
associations of trade, it was difficult to visualize the manner or the
means by which practical steps could be taken to effect modification
of the rules of such institutions to bring them in conformity with the
interests of the developing countries.'4
In Kuala Lumpur in particular it was noted by the Afro-Asian committee of jurists that
"... the majority of international commercial arbitrations were conducted by existing
arbitral institutions ... the rules of some of those arbitral institutions in developed
countries did not provide adequate procedures to protect the interests of parties from
the developing countries."5
In some quarters the process is even regarded as "foreign", such that the Arab
attitude, for example, is accounted for by Samir Saleh on the basis that "[i]nternational
or foreign arbitration is generally held on foreign territory according to foreign rules
of procedure and substantive laws and before a majority of foreign arbitrators"6
(emphasis added). The suggestion there is that international arbitration in commercial
matters is necessarily "foreign" to the Arab party. Gerold Herrmann also notes that in
the Arab countries the attitude is one of "... hostility, disillusion or distrust
although he qualifies his admission by adding that the attitude has been so only for
some time and, if it still is, only to some extent as it is "... gradually giving way to
a more positive attitude of acceptance and active participation." 8
 Herrmann
nevertheless agrees with Professor Mezghani' 9 that the new Arab acceptance is
'4Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Re port of the Seventeenth, Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Sessions held in Kuala Lumpur (1976), Baghdad (1977) and Doha (1978), Secretariat of the
Committee, New Delhi, p. 136, cited by Sornarajah, M. infra, note 29 P. 8.
' 5lbidp. 141.
' 6"The Settlement of Disputes in the Arab World: Arbitration and other Methods - Trends in
Legislation and Case Law" (1986) 1 Arab L.Q., 198, p. 199.
'7"Presentation of the UNCITRAL Model Law' in Euro-Arab Arbitration ifi: Proceedin gs of the
Third Euro-Arab Arbitration Con gress, Amman (ed. by Kemicha, Fathi), Graham & Trotman, London,
1991, 165, p. 166.
'8lbid.
Proceedings of the First Euro-Arab Arbitration Conference, Tunisia, 1985, references in Herrmann,
ibid. note 1.
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dictated by necessity2° and therefore, in our view, inconsistent with the fact that
arbitration is a consensual process excluding any form of coercion and based on the
freedom and equality of the parties. Necessity may be a good reason for submitting
to the process but it does not genuinely inspire acceptance of it. The specific form of
coercion in this case arises from having to bargain from a weaker position, the
experience of the Arab party in that respect being similar to that of other countries of
the developing world.2'
Thus, whereas parties from the developed world perceive arbitration in
international trade as providing an impartial and convenient system free from the
prejudices and bias of national tribunals and courts, parties from the developing world
still regard it as a condition they must accept to qualify for foreign investment and
technology? It seems that in those circumstances, and given an alternative, the
parties from those countries may not opt for arbitration at all. As Samir Saleh points
out, "... it is only when left with no alternative - and racked by apprehension - that an
Arab party will comply with an arbitration clause." 23 Thus, notes Saleh, "[i]f he is
the more powerful party economically, he will try to ensure, when the contract is
being drafted, that any arbitration clause incorporated into it is governed by local
domestic laws."
It is thus possible to note, even at this stage, that for this group of countries
the very basis of arbitration in international trade as a consensual process is from the
out-set seriously flawed. This has no doubt significantly contributed to their perception
of the process. Several other conceptual factors, to which we refer later, have also
contributed to the same perception. It is, however, also possible at this stage to
appreciate the link between that perception of arbitration in international commercial
matters and the frequent rejection by these countries of arbitration clauses when a
20Thid.
21Asante, below.
Asante, Samuel K.B., "The Perspectives of African Countries on International Commercial
Arbitration" (1993) 6 Leiden Journal of International Law, 331.
(1986) I Arab L. Q
., p. 199.
pp. 199-200.
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dispute eventually arises. Underlying the rejection of the clause is the feeling that the
submission to arbitration was not regarded as negotiated freely; it is regarded as
imposed. For that reason, after the the dispute has arisen, the Arab party "... will
sometimes attempt to have it declared null and void by the courts in his own country.
Depending on the circumstances, he will dispute the arbitrator's jurisdiction, if in
extreme panic, will attempt to challenge them."
While commenting on the role of the arbitrator and judge during the
anniversary celebrations of sixty years of International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
arbitration, judge Kéba Mbaye, then a judge of the International Court of Justice,
observed that "... for a while the notion that there is a system of international justice
will not be shared by some countries, notably those of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, who still see arbitration as a foreign institution imposed upon them."27
That perception is still prevalent today. Professor Mamud Sornarajah, one of the
most articulate proponents of third world concerns in this field, notes that the trading
nations of the west "... have had the most experience in international commercial
arbitration and have evolved rules and patterns which, to a large extent, ensure their
existing dominance." 29 "The charge has been made", he says, "... that international
commercial arbitration as it now is has been designed to promote European trading
interests	 "30
Jbidp. 199.
26The experience of each region differing only slightly. In addition to the concerns expressed by all
the countries as a whole, Latin American apprehensions are further based on the particular
circumstances giving rise to the Calvo Doctrine: see Shea, Donald Richard, The Calvo Clause: A
Problem of inter-American and International Law and Di plomacy, University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, 1955; Siqueiros, op. cit. note 8.
'Commentary" on "The Complementary Roles of Judges and Arbitrators in Ensuring that
International Commercial Arbitration is Effective", in 60 Years of ICC Arbitration: A Look at the
Future, ICC, Paris, 1984, 257, p. 295.
28See for example Asante, supra note 22.
"The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World Viewpoint" (1989) 6 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 4,
7, pp. 8-9.
30Ibid. For a general treatment of the state of international arbitration with developing countries see
Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, Longman Singapore
Ltd., 1990, The International Law on Forei gn Investment, Grotius Publications, Cambridge University
Press, 1994.
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II
In assessing the question of the attitude of developing countries toward the
institution of arbitration, two broad approaches are used. The first approach is
essentially quantitative. It consist in demonstrating how the system works against the
interests of countries of the developing world in relation to obvious quantifiable
factors such as the venues of arbitrations, the nationalities of the members of the
tribunals and of the parties in dispute, the origin and location of the administering
institution, (in the case of institutional arbitrations), the nationalities of counsel and
other experts, the outcome of the disputes, etc. That is the approach reflected in the
concerns of Afro-Asian jurists as expressed in the passages cited earlier.3 ' The
reservations of African countries, for example, including lawyers and the business
community as a whole, is expressed by Samuel K.B. Asante in terms that arbitration
in commercial matters is "... essentially a distant and alien system, located in a foreign
country, administered by foreign experts and applying foreign law with little
appreciation of the conditions in African countries ... it is essentially a proceeding
whose outcome African parties are powerless to affect." 32
 The attitude of the Arab
world is the same,33
 with that of Latin American countries being expressed in similar
terms.3'
That approach to the issue has received some attention. 35
 Asante for example
31Supra, texts to notes 13 & 14.
32(1993) 6 Leiden journal of International Law, p. 339.
33Saleh, (1986) 1 Arab L. Q
. , 198.
Nattier, "International Arbitration in Latin America: Enforcing Arbitration Agreements and
Awards" (1986) 21 Tex Int'l L. J., 397; Abbott, Alden F., "Latin America and International Arbitration
Conventions: The Quandary of Non-Ratifications" (1976) 17 Harv. J. Int'l. L., 131.
35See for example Paulsson, op. cit. (1987) 2 ICSID Rev.,-F.tLJ, 19; "North-South Arbitration"
(1984) 50 Arb, 37; Naón, Horacio A. Grigera "ICC Arbitration and Developing Countries" (1993) 8
ICSID Rev.,-FILJ, 116; Sempasa, Samson L., "Obstacles to International Commercial Arbitration in
African Countries" (1992) 41 ICLQ, 387; Abbott, supra.
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has lamented the complete absence of African lawyers in international arbitration,36
questioned the absence of arbitrations taking place in cities of the developing world,
including the participation of the same countries in the creation of arbitration
institutions and rules, etc. 37
 Arbitrations conducted under the auspices of the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) reveal startling
statistics. 38
 The Centre has thus far entertained about 28 arbitration proceedings, at
least 25 of which involve countries of the developing world, principally those of
Africa, Asia and the Middle East. 39
 As of 31 March 1994 about 34 tribunals had
been constituted with over 102 appointments, just about 28 being from countries of
the developing world. (Many arbitrators have been appointed more than once.) The
International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration Statistics are identical.
Even supporters of the Euro-centred consensus on arbitration have sometimes
also found the imbalance reflected in such figures disturbing. Jan Paulsson admits that
"... if international arbitration aspires to universalism, one would expect that the
quantitative and more importantly the qualitative evolution of Third World
participation in arbitration will be accompanied by something of a southward drift of
the place of arbitration." 4° Referring to the case of a typical investment contract
involving, for example, the government of Togo, Paulsson notes that the government
Con:ra, Professor Pierre Lalive, who thinks that "the lack of expertise in developing countries
regarding international arbitration is rapidly disappearing, as evidenced, for instance, by the example
of Algeria, whose national companies are known to have acquired a great deal of experience and skill
in arbitration techniques, sometimes with the assistance of expensive American Law firms, and now
more than a match for many foreign investors", (emphasis added): "Some Threats to International
Investment Arbitration" (1986) 1 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ, 26, p. 35. The irony is that the prospect of an
expensive arbitration is precisely intended by the investor as a threat to secure otherwise difficult
concessions (Jaslow, Graig A "Practical Considerations in Drafting a Joint Venture Agreement with
China" (1982) 31 Am. J. Comp. L., 209), which itself is a basis for the reluctance by the countries to
submit to arbitration.
(1993) 6 Leiden Journal Int'l. L. 339.
See ICSID Cases, Doc. ICSJD/16/Rev., Washington, 31 March 1994.
With the exception of recent adhesions, Latin American countries rejected the Convention in bloc
in protest that it usurped the domestic jurisdiction of local courts, in a powerful statement of protest
known as the famous "El no de Tokyo": Broches, Aron "The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States" (1972) 136 Hague Acad. Courses,
331, p. 348.
°(l987) 2 ICSID Rev.,-F1LJ, p. 43.
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must:
find it difficult to understand why it is that the foreign partner can send
a team of energetic promoters to spend many weeks operating out of
a hotel in Lomé to prepare a project and obtain government approval
in principle; to come back again for other sessions, if necessary; then
return for several rounds of contract negotiations and be prepared to
spend many years executing the contract locally through an operating
company duly established under local law - but insist that if an
arbitration arises it has to be heard, say, in Zurich. Something here is
disturbing, as though an entire region of the world were dismissed
when envisaging the hypothesis of things getting really serious.4'
"In asking for a situs of arbitration in his region", Paulsson points out,
the Third World negotiator is in many instances being perfectly
reasonable. When the entire centre of gravity of an investment contract
- from its negotiation to its performance - is in an African country, and
it resulted in the creation of an enterprise whose physical plant,
corporate records and personnel are located in that country, the concept
of arbitration in Europe or North America may be not only artificial
but truly burdensome.42
The response to the quantitative critique is therefore, generally, that more
should be done to eliminate the material imbalances: for example train more
arbitrators from, and locate more proceedings in, developing countries.43
In this dissertation, however, we will not be concerned with the quantitative
approach to the study of the attitude of developing countries.
The second approach is qualitative. Its focus is on one or both of two aspects
of arbitration. The second aspect concerns the character of the substantive and
procedural rules of law applicable in arbitrations in general and in cases involving
developing countries in particular. The treatment of that aspect consists in examining
4tJbid.
42Jbjf p. 44.
43Audit, op. cit.
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the content of the rules and, in the context of our subject, to establish whether the
rules are inherently incapable of responding adequately to the needs of the group of
countries we are concerned with and, if so, why. Such a study would be based on the
basic objective character of the rules, the political, economic and social setting in
which the rules were evolved and are expected to operate, including their underlying
policy objectives. Next, the study would be directed to consider, still within the
context of our subject, whether on the assumption that the substantive and procedural
rules are capable of responding to the needs of developing countries, nevertheless, in
their application to arbitrations involving those countries they are worked out to
produce an outcome which is invariably not favourable to developing countries. In that
case the criticism would be judicial or arbitral bias vis-à-vis the countries concerned.
We are not also concerned with the substantive aspect of the second approach.
The logical first aspect of the second approach is to examine the nature of the
process of arbitration itself; the concept, its principal doctrines and principles, its
institutions, its methods and its entire philosophy as an adjudicatory process. The
purpose, within the context of our "thesis", is to establish whether in its present
conception of those elements and in its practices the process sufficiently responds to
the aspirations of developing countries. That aspect is the focus of our study. We
regard that as the first logical step in the treatment of a topic such as ours since it
constitutes the central element of arbitration and, moreso, since every study of the
institution must begin with what it represents.
We start from the premise that arbitration in international commercial
transactions is not looked at with much favour in the developing world on the ground
that it does not favour them. We address the hypothesis from three angles to reflect
the different stages of arbitration, while, however, bearing in mind that the study is
limited to the character and methods of the institution. Chapters one and two are
concerned with the nature of commercial arbitration. Chapter one examines arbitration
as understood in the west; the concept, its legal character, its doctrinal and
philosophical basis. The law and practice of arbitration in international business
remains, as noted earlier, entirely of western origin in its basic principles and in the
way they have been developed. We are therefore bound to begin from there. We do
not consider all aspects of western arbitration. The specific issues raised in this chapter
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are significant in our study in that they provide the basis for the differences drawn in
chapter two with the understanding in other cultures of the nature and function of
arbitration as an adjudicatory procedure. They are also sufficiently representative of
the extent of the different attitudes to the functioning and function of arbitration as an
alternative process of settling disputes in the two groups of countries we are concerned
with. The theme of chapter one is centred on the contractual nature of commercial
arbitration.
As we point out in chapter two, however, arbitration as understood elsewhere
is not necessarily, and in some cases, not at all based on contract. Even in those cases
where it is initially explained on the basis of a contract, as in Islamic law, the contract
is not regarded as binding unless the arrangement is brought to the notice of a judge
and confirmed by him. It is merely a "permissible" contract which remains revocable,
contrary to western contract doctrine. We point out that this perception is, to a
diminishing extent, still present in Europe itself although increasingly regarded with
disfavour. Next, we point out that the attitude in cultures of most parts of the
developing world in approaching an arbitration is entirely different. As we indicate in
chapter two, the arbitrators, the parties, their advisers (if any) and the society as a
whole go to arbitration in the hope of "dissolving" a dispute, or, as we indicate, to
"settle" and not to "decide" their differences. The other attitude, so deeply rooted in
the western European approach to arbitration and to adjudication as a whole as being
a "fight",4 ' is absent in the cultural element in the treatment of arbitration elsewhere.
Asante notes that in Africa, for example, the focus and appeal of the arbitration
That attitude may also be explained on account of what William Park sees as "a trend toward
"lawyeri [s] ing" in non-judicial dispute resolution", especially arbitration: op. ci:., p. 616, note 1. After
noting that the training of lawyers has much to do with this, John Sims of the C. I. Arb. says that as
a result lawyers "come to arbitration knowing nothing of its possibilities, thinking of it in terms of
litigation and assuming that the processes of litigation, which they are used to and feel comfortable
with, automatically apply": "Will ADR Kill Arbitration?" (1995) 61 Arbitration, 171, p. 172. In a book
describing and analysing a failed attempt in the United States to build a system of justice Out of the law,
Jerold S. Auerbach also concludes in respect of arbitration that it "began as an effort to tame the
"growing monster" of litigation by "the gentle practice of arbitration". [citing Sturges, Wesley A.
"Reduction of Costs by Arbitration Procedure", (9 June 1927) 84 Paper Trade J., 49] "But the rule of
law, and the role of lawyers and judges in its preservation, easily survived its newest challenge. [That
challenge being the attempt in arbitration to elude the law altogether.] In fact, the monster nibbled at
arbitration until the similarities were more conspicuous than the differences.": Justice Without Law?,
Oxford University Press, New York, 1983, p. 114. It seems impossible in the present climate to
conceive of commercial arbitration (domestic and international) which excludes a central role for
lawyers. The issue nevertheless remains one worth pursuing.
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process still lies in the informality of the proceedings; "[t]his ingrained idea of the
essentially informal character of the traditional African arbitration", he points out,
collides sharply with the modern concept of international arbitration. It
comes as a surprise to many African lawyers and executives to reali[s]e
that a party to international commercial arbitration has to navigate
through a bewildering and complex maze of arbitration institutions,
rules and procedures, with rigid formalities and set deadlines,
Modern arbitration has all the characteristics of a formal adjudication,
a far cry from the informality associated with traditional customary
arbitration.45
Asante does not fail to indicate that "[t]he highly technical nature of this process again
reinforces the idea of an alien system", therefore, the closer arbitration is brought
to litigation, the less attractive it becomes to the African mind.
The same is valid for most of Asia. The Asian attitude also comes across as
an aversion to litigation and to rigid law, 47
 the very things which the informality and
suppleness of arbitration should ordinarily avoid. Kumiko Oyama says of the Japanese,
for example, that they "embrace arbitration with some reluctance. In fact most of them
would prefer to sell snow cones in hell before arbitrating."48 Yoshiyuki Noda also
says that to the Japanese mind "the law is something that is undesirable, even
detestable, something to keep as far away from as possible."49
That factor, we think, accounts to a large extent for the reluctancce by
participants from the developing world to embrace international commercial
arbitration. We suggest by way of conclusion to both chapters that to attract better
participation from the developing world sufficient attention should be given to the
430p. cit. pp. 34 1-342.
Ibid.
47Lubman, Stanley B & Wajnoski, Gregory C "International Commercial Dispute Resolution in
China: A Practical Assessment" (1993) 4 Am. Rev. mt. Arb., 107.
"Recent Developments in Japanese Arbitration Law: An Introduction to the Draft Arbitration Law
of Japan" (1993) 10 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 2, 55, p. 56.
49lntroduction to Japanese Law, (translated by Angelo, Anthony H), University of Tokyo Press,
1976, p. 159.
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other perception of arbitration and of the role of adjudication as a whole. We agree
with Gabriel Wilner that the effort must go beyond merely "... educating the
governments and the business and legal circles [in developing countries] of the
advantages of the process."5°
Chapter three considers the neutrality of international arbitral fori. We
examine the cases of ICSJD and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) as examples of international institutions set up specifically with the arbitration
of contracts involving third world countries in mind. As indicated earlier the chapter
is not concerned with the quantitative issues relating to ICSID and MIGA, such as the
location of tribunals and the nationality of the arbitrators. It deals with the more
fundamental question of the underlying philosophy and the structure of both
Conventions. It should be noted that both institutions are concerned with arbitration
at its second stage, i.e., the process itself, or its administration, as in the case of the
ICSID. The issues raised are examined through the provisions of the Conventions and
in the light, so far, of the interpretation of the provisions by arbitration tribunals and
academic writers. The purpose is to demonstrate that as devices created to respond to
the specific problems of foreign investments, a matter of particular concern to
developing countries, both Conventions are to a large extent open to the criticism of
being one sided, contrary to the conventional view. The focus is therefore on those
specific provisions usually presented as neutral, or as intended specifically to benefit
host states of foreign investments, or as striking the correct balance between the
interests of all parties concerned. We conclude that in most respects neither of the
Conventions contemplated the possibility of the investor being in breach in the
performance of a contract and, thus, leaving the state party as much in need for
protection as the investor.
Chapter four treats the conflict of laws methods designed specifically for
application to investment contracts. We criticise, as did F.A. Mann several decades
ago,5 ' the new trend in international arbitration to ignore the traditional principles of
50"Accept.ance of Arbitration by Developing Countries" in Resolving Transnational Dis putes Through
International Arbitration, (ed. by Carbonneau, Thomas E), University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville,
1984, 283, PP. 285-86.
5tflThe Law Governing State Contracts" (1944) 20 BYIL, 11.
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private international law in contracts involving the governments of the countries we
are concerned with. We begin by setting out the traditional principles of private
international law applicable to contracts generally, only to note the rejection of the
same principles in the specific case of state contracts, so as to avoid the application
of host state laws. The special regime of conflict of laws rules now applied to state
contracts is, according to its proponents, justified by the unique character of those
transactions.52
 We however question why the unique character of the contracts is
recognised only to exclude the application of the only systems of law with which they
bear the closest and only significant relationship but not to recognise the underlying
basis of the undertakings to which the contracts relate as important instruments of
economic and social development and, as a result, the overriding authority of the state
to call for a modification of the contracts, if necessary, to respond to specific and
sometimes immediate domestic economic and social priorities. The new conflict of
laws trends call for the application of international law to the contracts even where the
parties have expressly chosen the domestic law of the host country. 53 For example,
according to one ICSJD tribunal, the law of the receiving country must remain "...
subjected to control by international law" even where the parties indicate a choice for
the local law and notwithstanding that it is "... paramount within the territory of the
host state.IM It should be noted that such approaches to the issue are guided by
policy and not law. The particular policy involved in this domain has to do with a
self-imposed arbitral mission to establish standards for the protection of investments
abroad.55
 Whether that is a desirable policy would in all cases have to take account
52McNair "The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations" (1957) 33 BYIL, 1.
53Revere Copper and Brass v Overseas Private investment Cooperation (OPIC), award of 24 August
1978 [1980] 56 ILR, 258.
54Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v liberia, award of 31 March 1986 (1994] 2
ICSD Reports, 343, p. 358; to which F. A. Mann responded in the context of the debate regarding the
existence of the lex mercatoria, that, "[w]here the parties have expressly or by necessary implication
agreed upon the law applicable to their contract or where ... the contract clearly has a close connection
with a particular legal system, no one, it is hoped, will allow any room at all to a different legal system
whatever it may be.": "Introduction", in Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, op.cit., p. xix.
35As is made obvious, for example, in the awards of Réné-Jean Dupuy and judge Pierre Cavin as
sole arbitrators respectively in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Company
(TOPCO/Calasiatic) v Libya [1979] 53 ILR, 420 and, Sapphire International Petroleum v National
Iranian Oil Co. (N1OC) [1967] 35 ILR, 136.
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of other factors which, in the present context of international trade law are, in our
view, well beyond the jurisdiction of an arbitration tribunal.
In chapter five we examine some issues arising in the recognition, enforcement
and execution of arbitration awards. We reach the conclusion that trends at this stage
of the arbitration process do not support our original hypothesis that present trends in
arbitrations concerning developing states do not favour them. As a result our original
position must be limited to the extent dictated by that factor. Although the question
of enforcement and execution is of primary importance in arbitrations since, if not
voluntarily complied with, an award is not worth more than the document it represents
unless compliance can be compelled, our "thesis" nevertheless remains valid. As
Broches once pointed out in the context of the Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes, what had primarily been lacking in state arbitrations and
therefore in more urgent need was not so much the absence of the means of ensuring
execution of more or less predictable decisions, as the absence, in the first place, of
what could be regarded as neutral fori for the judicial determination of the matters in
dispute?6
 It has therefore generally been felt that the existing mechanisms for the
judicial enforcement of awards involving parties from developing countries do not call
for an urgent international response, especially as the difficulty arising from the
immunity of states against execution, the only real obstacle to the enforcement and
execution of awards against states, is receiving adequate attention through domestic
judicial and legislative reforms.57
ifi
The meaning of developing countries is one we take for granted in the
dissertation. With the exception of a few European countries which have for specific
"Aspects Proceduraux de L'Arbitrage entre un Etat et un Investisseur Etranger dans Ia Convention
du 18 Mars 1965 ...", in Investissements Etran gers et Arbitrage entre Etats et Personnes Priv&s: La
Convention B.I.R.D. du 18 Mars 1965, University of Dijon, Pedone, Paris, 1969, PP. 129-30 and infra,
chapter three.
'See for example the United States Federal Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 as amended in 1988
and 1990; UK State Immunity Act 1978; Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 1985.
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purposes been regarded as such, 58 most countries seen as developing can be
identified with relative ease. They are all young states although many are relatively
older.59 They were also once regarded as the "third world" 60
 because politically they
saw themselves as not belonging to any of the sides in the former East/West divide.
For the same reason they were also referred to as the "non-aligned countries". The
countries have also been described as the "third world" for economic reasons since,
as a bloc, they constituted the least advanced of the three groups of countries.
Although collectively regarded as underdeveloped, separately, however, they
display great disparities in their internal political organisations and, of greater
importance to us, in their levels of economic development. These economic disparities
have made their collective classification as developing countries difficult in that they
give rise to further categories and sub-categories within the same group of countries.
Relying on the per capita income, the World Bank in its 1990 annual report, for
example,6 ' reclassifies the countries into three sub-groups: "low-income", "middle-
income" and "high-income" oil exporting countries. It creates a further sub-category
of "severely indebted" countries within the "middle-income" countries. The "high-
income" oil exporting countries belong mainly to the Arabian or Persian Gulf with
huge petroleum deposits, enabling some such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Brunei to
have per capita incomes by far exceeding those of the most advanced industrial
countries. But for the fact that the per capita income is not regarded as the only
indicator in classifying a country either as developing or not, those particular countries
could on that ground be excluded from the group of developing countries.
Similarly, the U.N. General Assembly in 197062 created another sub-category
of "least developed countries" among the developing countries, on account of their low
Greece, Portugal and Spain are treated as developing member countries for the purposes of the
Convention establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MIGA.
The Latin American Republics are generally older, having for the most part gained independence
over one hundred years ago.
6°We use the following words to refer to the same group of countries: "the third world", developing
countries", "less developed", "less advanced countries", "the underdeveloped countries", the "south" etc.
61 Annual Report, World Bank, Washington, 1990, pp. 24-29.
62See Resolution No. 2724 (XXV Session) of 15 December 1970.
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per capita income,63
 low literacy rates and very low contribution of manufacturing
industry to the gross domestic product. The list of the countries is constantly under
review by the General Assembly of the U.N., which either withdraws from the list
those countries whose situations have improved in respect of the stated criteria or, as
is most often the case, by adding to the list more countries from among the general
list of developing countries as their economic performances get worse.
Following the spectacular performance of a few developing countries with a
growing industrial base, a new category has come to be recognised since the 1970s
as the "newly industrialised countries". Their emergence complicates the
classification of developing countries by introducing a peculiar set of characteristics
not common to the rest of the developing world. They have a more advanced
industrial sector, have carved out a substantial share of the world's industrial exports,
and have as a result increased their gross domestic products; they no longer rely
exclusively or heavily on industrial crops and mineral resources for their export
earnings and so on. There is no doubt, however, that on other indicators they remain
and are still considered developing although constituting a class of their own.
Regardless of the differences that exist between and within developing
countries they all share a set of characteristics, reduced to social poverty and political
instability, including a weak standing in the international political scene, for some,
disproportionately to their size and potential. Historically most of the countries were,
until recently, the colonies of an advanced country. Geographically the countries are
all situated in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America, such that if an east-
west straight line were drawn arbitrarily through the centre of the globe these
countries would be seen to occupy approximately the whole of the southern half of
the surface. That separates the countries from the developed economies of the northern
half, hence, the collective reference to them as the "south" and to the developed
countries as the "north".
In the dissertation we are concerned with all those countries geographically
capable of being delimited to the economic "south", with such obvious exceptions as
63Then stated as $100 at 1968 value.
64Roughly Brazil, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea.
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Australia, Japan and New Zealand.
We also use the terms "commercial", "business", "international trade",
"investment", etc., in their broadest sense.
Iv
We are aware of the limitations of some of our conclusions, especially where,
as in arbitrations with parties from the developing world, those conclusions are based
almost entirely on arbitrations regarding public contracts. Unfortunately the
inaccessibility of material on ordinary arbitrations in international trade transactions
involving third world private parties, usually justified on the ground that arbitration
is a private process, means that we are unable to take them into account in our study.
It is a matter of regret that material on that category of arbitrations is, - at least as far
as we are concerned, - to be regarded as not yet within the domain of academics. It
is therefore possible that when they become available a closer study of the awards, in
particular, may disclose trends modifying or inconsistent with some of the conclusions
we reach.
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CHAPTER ONE
MODERN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CONCEPT AND NATURE.
In this chapter we consider some essential aspects of commercial arbitration
and their significance for the subject of the dissertation. The purpose is not to examine
in general the principles of arbitration since that in itself is not the aim of this
dissertation. Rather, we outline the basic principles of western arbitration and highlight
what those principles represent for the concept as a whole as a background to the
differences which will be drawn between it and the same concept as understood in
many parts of the developing world. The objective is to show that arbitration as
developed in the West is based on certain principles of law regarded as basic to the
Western notion of justice and that, as an alternative to domestic courts in the
settlement of international trade disputes, modern international commercial arbitration
reflects exclusively those principles. It is yet to accommodate other approaches to
arbitration. That, we think, accounts in some degree for the reluctance with which the
process is accepted in the other parts of the world.
I. The Nature of Western Arbitration
Much has been written on the controversy surrounding the nature of
arbitration.' At the centre of the controversy is the need to explain the basis on which
'See for example Lew, Julian D.M., Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A
Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards, Oceana Publications, New York, 1978, Chapter 2, especially
the extensive references in the notes. The literature on the subject is abundant in French, especially in
France, Belgium and Switzerland where the issue for a long time received considerable attention from
academics, reaching its peak in the 1950s and 1960s: see for example Klein, Frederick-Edouard
Considerations sur L'Arbitrage en Droit International Privé, Helbing & Lichtenhain, Bale, 1955;
Rubellin-Devichi, Jacqueline Essaie sur Ia Nature de L'Arbitra ge: Droit Interne et Droit International
Priv6, L.G.DJ., Paris, 1965; Kassis, Antoine Problèmes de Base de L'Arbitra ge en Droit Compare et
en Droit International Tome 1: Arbitra ge Juridictionnel et Arbitrage Contractuel, L.G.D.J., Paris, 1987.
For a rare but thorough treatment of the issue in England, see Samuel, Adam Jurisdictional Problems
in International Arbitration: A Study of Belgian, Dutch, English, French, Swedish, Swiss, U.S. and West
German Law, Schuithess, Zurich, 1989.
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such a parallel and private method of dispute settlement gained acceptance in law.
what gave rise to it and how to characteris it. So far four views have been advanced
to explain the legal character of the concept. First, it is said that it is in the nature of
a judicial process. According to this view arbitration is comparable to the process of
an ordinary court, although of a private character. It is therefore justified on the basis
that it achieves the same goal as the formal judicial process. The second view regards
arbitration as based on a contract. It is said to arise from an agreement between those
involved, which determines both the authority and the scope of the tribunal's powers.
Its legal basis is therefore contractual. The third view considers arbitration to be of a
mixed character in that it arises from a contract but is conducted to resemble a court
process and ends in an award comparable to a judgment. It therefore combines
contractual and jurisdictional characteristics. The fourth view, suggested in 1965 by
Jacqueline Rubellin-Devichi,2
 treats arbitration as a separate and autonomous
institution.
A. Arbitration as a contract: "arbitrage contractuel" or "arbitrage
juridictionnel"?
In reviewing each of the four views, it is useful to refer, first, to a distinction
suggested by some writers in continental Europe between a strictly contractual
arbitration and the conventional arbitration of continental civil procedure codes and
Arbitration Acts in England and elsewhere in the world. We must state that we are,
in this dissertation, only concerned with the second type, the conventional arbitration.
However, we will have to refer briefly to the "arbitrage contractuel" of continental
jurists for clarification.
The strictly contractual arbitration is what is described by French civilian
writers as the "arbitrage contractuel". 3 As with most concepts of civil law based
2Supra.
3Similar concepts exist in Italy, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands: see de Vries, Henry P.
"International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts" (1982) 57 Tul. L.
Rev., 42, pp. 48-49; Habscheid, Waither, "L'Expertise-arbitrage: Etude de Droit Compard' in
International Arbitration: Liber Arnocorum for Martin Domke, (ed. Sanders, Pieter) Martinus Nijhoff,
The Hague, 1967, 103.
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systems, its origin is traced to Roman law.4
 It is contrasted with the second type, the
"arbitrage juridictionnel" (otherwise known as the "arbitrage du code de procedure
civile"), which is the ordinary arbitration as understood and practised world wide.
According to one of the principal writers on the "new" concept of "arbitrage
contractuel", the two types of arbitration are similar in that they are both founded
originally on an agreement, either in the form of a submission by the parties to the
reference or an agreement to submit to future disputes. 5 Another similarity is that the
decision of the third party is binding in both cases. In the case of an "arbitrage
contractuel" it is binding on the basis that it is a contract. It is binding in the case of
an ordinary arbitration because the parties have accepted to be bound in advance of,
or during, the submission or because the agreement to refer to arbitration is regarded
in law as containing an implied and enforceable undertaking to abide by the award
when made.
The circumstances in which an arbitration will be regarded as of the second
category, the traditional type arbitration, are well known. There would be an
underlying contract in existence between the parties in the arbitration. The contract
will usually include an arbitration clause referring all disputes, if and when they arise,
to arbitration. The reference could take the form of a submission, in which case the
arbitration agreement is made after a dispute has arisen. The situation is not exactly
the same in an arbitration of the first type, the "arbitrage contractuel", (otherwise
known as "l'arbitrage du code civil"). Both Kassis 6 and René David7 mention, as few
examples of the second type of arbitration, the case of an average adjuster in maritime
salvage operations 8 and of "quality arbitrations", where all the third party is required
4See Kassis, supra; Lane, P. M. M. "The Appointment of an Arbitrator - Contract or Status" (1994)
Arb. & Disp. Resolution L. J., 91.
5Kassis, ibid.
6lbid, pp. 42 and 43.
7"L'Arbitrage en Droit Civil, Technique de Regulation des Contrats", in Mélan ges Dédiés a Gabriel
Marty, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse, 1978, 383.
8As to whether an average adjuster performs the duties of an arbitrator in English, and presumably
many common law jurisdictions, see Tharsis Sulphur and Copper v Loftus (1872) L.R., 8 C.P., 1 and
the doubts expressed by the House of Lords regarding the correctness of the decision in that case in
Sutclffe v Thackrah [1974] A.C. 727, p. 757 (Viscount Dilhome), and particularly by Lord Salmon,
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to do is to determine whether goods sold correspond with the sample or with the
contract description or are merchantable and, in general, cases where the third party
is required to make a determination in an expert capacity. The latter will involve, for
example, the determination of the price or the true market value of an item of trade,
or the amount of an indemnity due to an assured by the insurer.
According to the continental writers, a major difference between the traditional
form of arbitration, i.e., arbitration within the meaning of an Arbitration Act and the
suggested "arbitrage contractuel" is that in the latter the underlying contract is in a
material respect not complete until the third party has determined the issue submitted
to him, such as the price or value of the subject matter of the contract. Another
significant difference between the two forms of arbitration is that in "arbitrage
contractuel" the parties' only remedy for breach of the arbitration clause or submission
to arbitration is contractual, lying rather in an action for breach of contract, whereas
in an arbitration under a civil procedure code or an Aribitration Act in England the
defaulting party can also be compelled to arbitration by a stay of any proceedings
brought in breach of the agreement. Similarly, the parties' only remedy for failure to
comply with the determination of the third party in an "arbitrage contractuel" is also
to bring an action for breach of contract and not for the enforcement and execution
of the "award" of the third party which, technically, is not more than a term of the
underlying contract. For that reason that form of arbitration is also known as
"l'arbitrage du code civil" and governed by the principles of the law of contract to the
excluding rules of civil procedure, which would be applicable to ordinary arbitration.
The decision of the third party in an "arbitrage contractuel" is enforceable by action
and not as an award. As Antoine Kassis puts it:
[ill s 'ensuit que les conclusions du tiers qui indiquent la solution du
litige s 'incorporent a la convention des parties pour former un tout
contra ctuel régi entièrement et exciusivement par le droit des
obligations contractuelles tel que le definissent les regles du Code
CiviL Ne bénéficiantpas d'un caractère juridictionnel, les conclusions
du tiers ne sont pas susceptibles des recours ouverts contre la sentence
who regarded the Tharsis case as wrongly decided.
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rendue dans un arbitrage [contractuel]. Pour la même raison, elles ne
pouront pas faire l'objet d'une ordonnance d'exequatur du juge
étatique pour être susceptibles d'executionforcee. Si l'une des parties
refuse de se conformer aux conclusions du tiers, 1 'autre n 'aura
d'autres resources que de recourirs, par une action de droit commun,
au juge des contrats, celui qui est competent pour connaItre des litiges
relatfs aux contrats en general. Ce juge traitera les conclusions du
tiers comme faisant partie de la convention des parties. Le jugement
qu 'ii rend aura les mêmes effets que tout jugement rendue par lui en
matière contractuelle et sera susceptible des mêmes voies de recours.9
The characteristics of the "arbitrage contractuel" are, therefore, that (1) the
parties accept to submit an issue to the determination of a third party; (2) the
determination is binding on them and enforceable; (3) it is enforceable as a contract
and not as an award and, for that reason, (4) it is not subject to judicial review as the
award in the traditional arbitration. Since the role of the third party in an "arbitrage
contractuel" usually requires him to determine a material term of the contract, the
"arbitrage contractuel" assumes that in most cases there is no dispute, as such, to be
decided. A dispute may not arise until the determination of the third party. In fact in
most of the examples often given the parties submit to the decision of someone else
in order to avoid a dispute! In the words of René David, "[l']intervention du tiers
est souvent prevue en dehors de toute contestation, et précisément pour eviter tout
litige ...
The fifth characteristic of the suggested form of "arbitration" is therefore that
there need not be a formulated dispute. There lies, as we point out below, its
difference with English arbitration.
Both writers refer to valuation and certification as typical examples of a strictly
contractual "arbitration" in English law. There are obvious similarities between the
"arbitrage contractuel" (or "arbitrage du code civil") of French and Swiss writers and
the valuation and certification of English law, such as that the determination of the
9Réflexions sur IC Règlément D'Arbitrage de Ia Chambre de Commere Internationale: Les
Deviations de L'Arbjtrage Institutionnel, Paris, L.G.DJ., 1988, p. 18.
'°Supra p. 384.
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third party in both cases is not subject to review" and that it is binding, although not
as an arbitration but as a contract, in accordance with the principles of the common
law of contract. These are principles evolved by the courts (as in England) or as
codified and interpreted by courts in civil law jurisdictions in mainland Europe and
elsewhere.
However, the suggestion that a certification or valuation is an "arbitration", no
matter how refined the concept of arbitration may have become to a continental
civilian lawyer, is one which in English law should be treated with some care in the
light of the two House of Lords decisions in SutciWe v Thackrah'2 and Arenson v
Arenson.' 3 Both cases decide that a reference to a third party for a settlement,
however characterised, should contain a formulated dispute if it is to be regarded as
an arbitration. That requirement makes out valuation and certification as activities of
a different character from an arbitration. It is true that Lord Simon of Glaisdale in
Arenson v Arenson contemplated the possibility of an arbitration at common law,
' the exception of an allegation of fraud and improper motive there is a very limited
jurisdiction of the court to quash an expert determination in English law, confined to cases where the
expert made a fundamental mistake. Bernstein and Reynolds state, on the authority of the Court of
Appeal decision in Jones v Sherwood Computer Services [1992] 1 WLR 277, that for the challenge to
succed it must be shown that the expert had departed from his instructions in a material respect:
Handbook of Rent Review (Looseleaf, February 1995 up-date), Sweet and Maxwell, London, para 11-
53. He must simply have failed to do what he was asked to. It will therefore have to be established:
(i) precisely what where the instructions to the expert as to what he was to value ... (ii) demonstate
that the expert had made a mistake ... (iii) demonstrate that in making the mistake the expert had, in
a material respect, departed from the instructions as to what he was to value.': ibid.
It seems that the fundamental mistake being referred to will only arise if the expert completely
fails to address the issue submitted to him. if he addresses the issue, his determination will remain
binding even if wrong, and there will be no jurisdiction to quash it. The Court of Appeal stated in that
case that:
[o)n principle, the first step must be to see what the parties have agreed to remit to
the expert, this being ... a matter of contract. The next step must be to see what the
nature of the mistake was, if there is evidence to show that. If the mistake made was
that the expert departed from his instructions in a material respect - e.g., if he valued
the wrong number of shares, or valued shares in the wrong company, or if, as in
Jones (M) v Jones (RR) ... the expert had valued machinery himself whereas his
instructions were to employ an expert valuer of his choice to do that - either party
would be able to say that the certificate was not binding because the expert had not
done what he was appointed to do.: [199211 WLR, p. 287 (emphasis added).
The Court declined to quash the expert determination in that case because it thought that the accountants
had done precisely what they were asked to.
12[1974] AC. 727.
'[1977J A.C. 405.
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different from one under the Arbitration Acts.' 4 Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in
Sutc4ffe v Thackrah also recognised that "[t]here may be circumstances in which what
is in effect an arbitration is not one that is within the provisions of the Arbitration
Act",'5
 such as where a valuer, an architect or a surveyor is required by agreement
of the parties concerned to act as an arbitrator. Lord Morris accepts the possibility that
there could be an arbitration even in cases where "... there is no arbitration to which
the provisions of the Arbitration Act [of 1950] apply ..." but where the parties "...
informally agree to refer a disputed matter to the decision of some person of their own
selection ...", thus placing that person "... in the position of a quasi-arbitrator ••'16
That might give rise to an arbitration in common law.
A question therefore arises regarding the circumstances in which such an
exceptional "arbitration", not falling within the Acts, can be regarded as an arbitration.
In Sutclffe v Thackrah and Arenson v Arenson the issue was addressed by the House
of Lords in terms of the circumstances under which a certification and a valuation
could be regarded as an arbitration to determine whether a certifier and a valuer enjoy
the same immunity as an arbitrator. The law Lords appeared not to be at pains in
stating what, in English law, those conditions should be. The general rule is that the
third party must have been acting in a judicial capacity. It must be shown that there
was "(a) a submission to him of a formulated dispute or of a matter where there must
necessarily be assumed to be a difference and, (b) a decision binding on the
parties." 7
 For the third party to be regarded as acting in a judicial capacity, it is not
his description as an "arbitrator", "valuer", "certifier" or "expert" that matters. What
is relevant is the nature of the function he is required to perform, eveiything
'4!bid p. 422. The existence of arbitration at common law is not in dispute since only arbitration
agreements in writing are within the provisions of the various Acts. An oral arbitration agreement
remains valid and is governed by the common law. The question here is whether apart from arbitration
in common law, for which the requirements (with the exception of writing) are the same as arbitration
under the Acts, there exist another form of "arbitration" with its own requirements.
'3lbid p. 752, or within the common law.
'6fbjd p. 744.
' 7Submission of Counsel in Surchffe v Thackrah, p. 733; approved: pp. 736 (Lord Reid), 745, 747
& 752-53 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest), 753 (Lord Hodson); Arenson v Arenson, pp. 422 & 424 (Lord
Simon of Glaisdale), 428 (Lord Wheatley), 439 (Lord Salmon), 442 (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton).
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depending, as usual, on the circumstances of the case. Thus, Bernstein and Reynolds
say that if, with the consent of the parties in dispute, the third party is appointed "...
to hear evidence and submissions from [the parties], and makes his determination on
that basis",' 8 he may be acting in a judicial capacity and therefore entitled to the
same immunity as an arbitrator. "On the other hand", they say, "... a person expressed
to be appointed as an arbitrator but whose function was merely to inspect some goods
and to decide the question in dispute by applying his expertise to the facts disclosed
by that inspection",' 9 might not be exercising judicial functions and might therefore
be liable in negligence. In both cases the House of Lords declined to treat an
architect's certification and an auditor's valuation as arbitrations for failure to meet
the first requirement, since in neither case was there a formulated dispute. On the
contraly, the submission to a certification by an architect for the amount of work done
by, and money due to, the contractor from time to time in the first case and, in the
second case, to the valuation of shares by an auditor to enable their sale to the
chairman of the company concerned were regarded by the House of Lords as a means
of avoiding future disputes.
Surclffe v Thackrah and Arenson v Arenson therefore suggest that in English
law certification and valuation are not an arbitration unless the submission contains
a formulated dispute 2° and the expert certifier or valuer proceeds to hear evidence
in a judicial manner, in which case, his decision on the matter will be fmal and
binding.2 ' Where those requirements are satisfied the role of the expert valuer or
certifier becomes similar to that of an arbitrator and make his determination subject
' 80p. cit. para. 14-12.
!9fbjd
20See especially Clarke, D. N. and Adams 3. E, Rent Reviews and Variable Rents, 3rd Edn.,
Longnian, London, 1990, pp. 176-182, particularly pp. 175-6 where the authors examine whether it is
essential that there is a real dispute in which each party to the submission has formulated conflicting
views for the determination of the third party or it is sufficient that there is a "mere failure to agree".
Elsewhere, it has been suggested that a "... mere lack of agreement is not adequate. A situation where
parties neither agree nor disagree about the true position does not amount to a dispute.": Mururu,
Norman: "Anatomy of a Dispute" (1991) 57 Arbitration, 262, p. 262; see also Lord Simon of Glaisdale
in Arenson v Arenson, supra p. 424, where he states that "[lit is not enough that the parties who may
be affected by the decision have opposed interests - still less that the decision is on a matter which is
not agreed between them."
21 Contra, the dissenting opinion of Lord Kilbrandon in Arenson v Arenson, pp. 429-432.
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to the same rights of appeal as may be available in a normal arbitration. Those rights
or processes will not be available against the decision of a valuer who is not acting
as an arbitrator in the circumstances referred to above.22
So, whatever be the position in civil law systems, and although the existence
of an "arbitration" other than within the provisions of the Arbitration Acts is possible
under certain circumstances, the "arbitrage contractuel" of French and Swiss legal
jurists fmds no support yet in both English doctrinal and judicial thinking and we will
not be concerned with it here. 23 We will be concerned with the other category, the
"arbitrage juridictionnel" which, like the other type, is also based on a contract but
differs in that it involves a process that is judicial in character. That is the
conventional arbitration (or "arbitrage juridictionnel") as understood in common law
and under a "code de procedure civil". It also happens to be the arbitration of
international trade and economic relations.
B. The Contract Theory of Arbitration
The first of the four views mentioned earlier treats arbitration as a contract. It
is said to be based on an agreement by two or more persons in dispute to have their
differences settled by a neutral third party. The agreement is said to arise from their
desire to see the dispute resolved in a manner and following rules determined by them
or their appointees on their behalf. When seen in that sense the process is entirely
theirs in that it is created and controlled by the parties. It is the parties' intention that
In common law Canada the distinction between arbitration and valuation was drawn initially on
the basis of the existence or absence of a dispute. Subsequently it was extended to include a search for
the actual intention of the parties in submitting to the process. According to McLaren and Palmer, "if
the intention was to hold an inquiry similar to proceedings involving the courts of law, then it would
be an arbitration; if what was desired was the eliciting of an opinion without such a procedure it would
not.": The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration, The Carswell Comp. Ltd., Toronto, 1982, p.
4
As stated above English law, without doubt, recognises an expert determination (such as in rent
review cases) and what are known as "contractual" or "fast tract" adjudications where, for example, the
adjudicator is required to determine the amount of an interim payment in a construction contract. These
cases are regarded in English as contracts, no more: see Lord Denning in Campbell v Edwards [1976]
I WLR 403, p. 407 and may well be the same as the French "arbitrage contractuelle", so that it is the
use of the word "arbitration" by the civilian text writers in this context that may lead to confusion in
English law.
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appoints the arbitrators, determines the issues to be resolved and sets out the procedure
for the 'arbitrators. In general the contract, like all other contracts, is based on and
regarded as the expression of the parties' will, provided that in doing so they stay
within the limits of the law.
The view that an arbitration is a contract is built on a number of factors, all
pointing to the control which the parties themselves, more than the courts or the
legislator, have over the process. To begin with, in a normal commercial transaction
the parties are not compelled to arbitration. They would initially have volunteered into
this particular method of settlement. It is also the fact that the parties have agreed to
be bound by the award of the tribunal, when made, that renders it enforceable against
them. If the parties chose to treat the determination as not binding, it will not have
that effect, in which case it might not even be an arbitration at all. It may be regarded
as a mere attempt at a friendly settlement.
The fact that ordinarily the parties cannot be compelled to arbitration probably
explains why in most systems specific performance was not regarded as a practicable
remedy for failure to comply with the obligation to arbitrate. It was said that not even
the generosity of equity could "... entertain a suit to compel parties specifically to
perform an agreement to submit to arbitration." 24 Even today specific performance
is not available in English law and the second draft bill of the proposed new
Arbitration Act for England and Wa1es does not also make that remedy available.
It is not even mandatory for an English court to compell submission to arbitration
against a party bringing proceedings in disregard of an agreement to submit to
arbitration, so that the advisory committee in its draft Bill thought it appropriate to
recommend a change26 mandating the making of such an order unless the agreement
is void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. An award of damages is also
unlikely as a practicable remedy for breach of the undertaking to proceed to
'Simpson, Sidney P., "Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts" (1935-35) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev.,
160, citing Selden J., in Greason v Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491, P. 496 (1858). Writing in 1916, Alfred Hayes
thought that "the doctrine that equity will not specifically enforce contracts for arbitration or valuation"
had been established more than one hundred years earlier, although perhaps not firmly: "Specific
Performance of Contracts for Arbitration or Valuation" (1915-16) 1 Cornell L. Q
. , 225.
Consu1tation Paper on Recommendations for an Arbitration Bill, July 1995.
26Jbjd Clause 12(4).
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arbitration. 27 Redfern and Hunter also say that damages are practicable because of
the difficulty of quantifying the loss sustained. 28 The solution, in those circumstances,
has been for the courts to order a stay of any other proceedings within the terms of
the arbitration agreement and to leave the parties with no other option than to proceed
with the arbitration.29
However, as the example of the UNC1TRAL Model Law and domestic
legislation patterned on it demonstrate, specific performance of an arbitration
agreement now seems to be the rule in many jurisdictions. 3° The Model Law
mandates a reference to arbitration by the domestic court on application by one of the
parties to the arbitration agreement where the other party brings proceedings in court
in disregard of the agreement. Article 8 states that in those circumstances the court
"shall, if a party so request, ... refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." The use of
the mandatory "shall" indicates a difference with the discretionary "may" of Article
4 of the English Act of 1950 and clearly points to a determination to specifically
enforce the agreement by compelling arbitration. That had long since been the position
in the United States where, under Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act 1925, it was
made mandatory for the courts to stay court proceedings pending arbitration in
accordance with the agreement. Further, under Section 4, an aggrieved party can apply
to the competent court for an order directing that the arbitration proceed as provided
27'• since, unless the plaintiff has been put to expense by reason of the defendant's refusal to
arbitrate, he can recover only nominal damages at law": Simpson, op. cit., p. 161.
28Redfern, Alan & Hunter, Martin: Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd
Edn., London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1991, p. 5.
See for example Article 8(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration requiring the competent court of the country adopting the law to refer the parties back to
arbitration. For examples of the adoption of the 1.JNCITRAL Model see the Nigerian Arbitration and
Conciliation Decree 1988 Section 4(1) and the Canadian Federal Arbitration Act, Article 8(1).
3°One must point out, however, that the absence of specific performance as a remedy in English
law, for example, is now only of little significance since with appropriate court assistance the other
party can still proceed to arbitration and obtain a default award enforceable against the recalcitrant
party. Most domestic laws provide default procedures for the appointment of the second or single
arbitrator (as the case may be) where one party fails to cooperate.
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for in the contract, thus ensuring specific performance of the agreement.31
If the undertaking is honoured and the parties cooperate in the arbitration, in
important respects, the law does not interfere with their freedom to direct the conduct
of the process and its outcome. They define the issues to be resolved, they appoint the
members constituting the tribunal, they determine the scope of the tribunal's
jurisdiction (which they may further limit or terminate altogether), they set out the
procedure and decide what material to accept or exclude in evidence. In general,
however, the trend is to confer the tribunal with wide powers to decide on all or most
of those issues. For that reason the award itself has sometimes been regarded as an act
of the parties themselves, brought about through the agency of the tribunal. The
parties can further vary the award if they choose to do so.
Thus, the parties retain control at all three stages of the process: they bring it
into existence, they determine the procedural and substantive issues and, eventually,
the outcome of the arbitration. It is particularly this capacity to exercise overall control
of the process and the fact that it is the agreement of the parties which makes this
possible, including an agreement to be bound (or what the law regards as such), that
strengthens the contractual nature of the process.
C. The Jurisdictional Theory
Another view regards arbitration more as a judicial activity than as a process
based on contract. It sees in arbitration a clear analogy with the formal judicial
process. Reference is made to the similarity with the practice of ordinary courts of law
in civil and judicial matters in support of the judicial character of arbitration. It is
treated as judicial in that it is essentially a "method", i. e., a procedural means of
settling a dispute.
The jurisdictional theory begins with the position that adjudication is an
activity that is within the sovereign functions of the state, to be exercised by one of
its organs. Arbitration, in Kenneth Cariston's words, "involves a delegation of the
31 For an overview of the specific enforceability of an arbitration agreement in the United States see
Born, Gary B., International Commercial Arbitration in the United States. Commentar y and Materials,
Kiuwer, Deventer, 1994, pp. 183-191.
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power of the state." 32 Therefore,
[t]he statement that arbitration is a creature of the parties, that its
occurence, form, and scope are dependent on the will and consent of
the parties, is but part of the truth. Although the arbitration agreement,
as any agreement, is consensual, within its limited compass, it is also
in varying degree, depending on the law of the particular jurisdiction,
a delegation of the power of the state to private parties for their private
ends.33
The process thus depends for its existence on the law of a given state, which
sets out the conditions for its validity and certain minimum procedural requirements,
including standards of fairness. The state delegates part of its judicial functions to the
arbitral process on the assumption that the attainment of the private ends promoted in
arbitration "wifi also subserve public interests" with the advantages of arbitration
over litigation in relation to matters such as speed, privacy and cost being taken for
granted. For that reason the arbitrator enjoys a similar immunity to a judge in the
performance of his task. He exercises judicial functions, albeit primarily in the interest
of the parties in dispute, and although appointed by the parties, who can revoke his
authority, the arbitrator does not act as their agent. He retains and is required to
exercise his functions in full independence.
That independence is dictated by the nature of the judicial function. It is
decisional, since the determination is made on the merits of the case, instead of as a
compromise. Thus, in many respects, an award has the same characteristics as the
judgment of a court, which is also handed down as a decision, rather than as a
compromise solution. When made the award is, like a judgment, final, thereafter
constituting res judicata. The parties cannot re-open the issue. It then becomes
enforceable against the defaulting party in the same way as a judgment of the court.
The jurisdictional theory is therefore based on the view that these important
characteristics of an award, together with the fact that the process itself originates in
32"Theory of the Arbitration Process" (1952) 17 Law & Contemp. Probs, 631 P. 635.
"Ibid.
Ibid.
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the state's willingness to delegate a degree of its judicial functions, make arbitration
closer to a jurisdictional than a contractual institution.
D. The Hybrid and Autonomous views
The dominant and probably more correct view of arbitration is that it has a
mixed character. It is brought into existence by the agreement of the parties but the
process itself is in many important respects judicial, both for the lawyer and the
disputants. In the words of Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter: "[i]t begins as a private
agreement between the parties. It continues by way of private proceedings, in which
the wishes of the parties are of great importance. Yet it ends with an award which has
binding legal force and effect and which, on appropriate conditions being met, the
courts of most countries of the world will be prepared to recognise and enforce. The
private process has a public effect, implemented by the support of the public
authorities of each state expressed through its national law."35
For the disputants what this means is that although the process is theirs and
under their control initially, (by virtue of a contract), its outcome could be of immense
consequences, affecting their interests within and across national boundaries as they
seek to enforce, execute or resist the award if not voluntarily complied with. This is
so because in most respects the award of the arbitrator is in international and domestic
laws given the same effect as the judgment of a court. For the rest of the public the
institution of arbitration retains considerable interest in the way it is transformed from
a private arrangement to an outcome with a public character, usurping in the process
functions which are appropritely those of the state. The interest in the process must
therefore lie in the fact that in resorting to, and in authorising it, both the parties and
the state respectively confer immense public powers to a principally private institution.
For the hybrid theory, the jurisdictional and contractual elements of arbitration
become "... so interconnected that it [is] impossible and undesirable to try and separate
the procedural and contractual parts of the institution. Since no distinct segment of the
arbitral process [is] strictly one or the other, it distort[s] the nature and hinder[s] the
350p. cit. p. 8.
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development of arbitration to apply the rules relating to either procedure or contract
to any part of the arbitral process." According to Rubellin-Devichi, "... all that the
mixed theory achieved was to make arbitration and the rules applied to it
"protelforme" or infinitely variable. A different approach was necessary to produce
arbitral law geared to the reality of the institution."37
As we know it, the reality of the institution in its present character is that it
was created entirely by the business community, which found it a convenient means
by which to settle disputes. 38 Writing in 1934, Wolaver said that it was then "very
common to say that commercial arbitration had its beginning with the practices of the
market and fair courts and in the merchant gilds", 39 and with that Schmitthoff
agrees.4° Citing Rubellin-Devichi, Julian Lew states:
it is the businessmen themselves who, through pragmatic
experimentation, have been responsible for the development of
arbitration. Yet they have done it outside and irrespective of the law;
indeed the law has, in large measure, followed existing practice. So for
example, autonomy of the parties in determining the law to govern both
substance and procedure in arbitration is based not on the contractual
or jurisdictional character of arbitration but on the political 'necessities
of the institution'. Equally both arbitration agreements and awards are
enforceable, not as contract nor as a concession on the part of the
enforcing sovereign state, but rather as an essential requirement for the
smooth functioning of international commercial relations.4'
Samuel, op. cit. p. 68.
Op. cit. p. 234, cited by Samuel, ibid pp. 68-69.
38Lord Parker The Development of Commercial Arbitration The Lionel Cohen Lectures, The
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1959; Sayre, Paul 'Development of Commercial Arbitration Law"
(1927-28) 37 Yale L. J., 595; Wolaver, Earl S. "The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration"
(1934-35) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev., 132; Kellor, Frances "Western Hemisphere Systems of Commercial
Arbitration" (1946) 6 Univ. Toronto L. J., 307.
39Thidp. 133.
40Commercial Law in a Chan ging Economic Climate, 2nd Edn., London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1981.
41Lew, op. cit. note 1 p. 60.
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Those factors, according to Rubellin-Devichi, give the institution its distinct and
autonomous character. The distinct character of the process calls for greater focus on
the objectives of arbitration than on the legal basis of the institution itself. The role
of arbitration in international commerce is to further the objectives of international
trade. That approach has the advantage of teffing us more about the process.42
As Adam Samuel points out, however, 43 the trouble with that view is that it
does not explain the basis of the institution. "[I]t is necessary to know what arbitration
is from a structural angle before we can design rules to fulfil its needs." In a way,
the autonomous theory of Rubellin-Devichi puts the cart before the horse and therefore
accounts for little about the legal character of the institution.
The prevailing view of arbitration remains that it is a mixed jurisdictional and
contractual process. 45 The growth of the doctrine of party autonomy dictated,
however, that more emphasis be put on the agreement of the parties as the controlling
e1ement, thus giving disproportionately more weight to the contractual component
of the institution47 and its emphasis on the intention of the parties.
II. The Role of the Parties' Agreement in Arbitration
In 1952, Soie Mentschikoff identified what she considered as the four essential
elements of American arbitration. There is little doubt that what she wrote about
American arbitration is also true of arbitration in the rest of the Western
hemisphere.49
 She said of the first element that arbitration "... is resorted to only by
42Samuel, supra.
43Ibid p. 70.
44Ibid.
45Redfern and Hunter, op. cit. p. 8.
Schmitthoff, Clive "Defective Arbitration Clauses" (1975) JBL 9.
47Eiseman, Frederic "L"arbitrage-partie" in International Arbitration: Liber Ainicorum Martin
Dornke, supra 78, p. 79.
"The Significance of Arbitration - A Preliminary Inquiry" (1952) 17 Law & Contemp. Probs., 698.
49David, René L'Arbitrage dans le Commerce International, Economica, Paris, 1982.
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agreement of the parties." 5° It is a consensual arrangement arising from the "will" of
the parties and deriving its validity in law therefrom. In referring to the agreement of
the parties in an arbitration in those terms, Mentschikoff was only stating the obvious
as it has always been recognised that an arbitration exists, and the entire institution
as now known depends, on the consensus of those resorting to it 5 ' since, with the
exception of compulsory arbitrations (invariably statutory), the parties to the process
may choose not to submit to it. No one can be compelled to arbitration if he did not
consent to it initially.
The principle that an arbitration is based primarily on the parties' intention
fmds support in judicial opinion, in academic writing on the subject and in statutes
world wide.52 Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter consider the agreement of the parties
to an arbitration as "the foundation stone of modem international commercial
arbitration"53 as no arbitration will take place without the consent of the parties
involved in the dispute. In an article in 1986 Alan Redfem treated the agreement of
the parties to an arbitration as going to the "heart of the process" TM since, with the
exception of compulsory statutory arbitrations, unwilling parties cannot be compelled
to resort to it. In fact in the article Redfern highlights the overriding importance of the
consent of the disputants in all arbitration proceedings by reference to one of the now
well known Pyramid cases55 in which the Court of Appeal of Paris, 56 and later the
50Supra, p. 699. The other elements, with which we are not particularly interested for now, are: that
arbitration is not a method of compromising disputes but of deciding them; that the arbitrator is a
neutral third party unconnected to the parties in dispute; and that the decision of the the arbitrator is
regarded as final and binding even before the award is made.
51David, supra.
2So generally held is the view that one need look no further than in a textbook on arbitration or
on the law of contract or civil procedure for authority.
530p. cit. p. 5.
"International Commercial Arbitration, Jurisdiction Denied: The Pyramid Collapses" (1986) JBL,
15, p. 16.
53Southem Pafic Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICC award No. 3493
of 16 February 1989 [1983] ]LM, 752; [1984] 9 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n., 111 (excerpts).
Decision of 12 July 1984 [1985] 10 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n., 113.
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French Supreme Court,57 reversed an ICC award on the ground that the government
of Egypt was not bound by the arbitration clause to which it was not a party, 58
 to
illustrate the point. Unlike litigation, therefore, one party cannot by unilaterally
initiating the process compel the other disputant to a settlement by arbitration. The
entire institution is thus based on the principle that the process is consensual in nature
and that, in the absence of that consensus, it will not come into existence. So firmly
is the point now established that the late Professor Schmitthoff was able to treat it as
the "first and foremost" principle of law on the subject.59
III. The Importance of the Agreement in the Practice of Modern
International Commercial Arbitration
The idea that an arbitration has its origin and exists only by virtue of the
agreement of the parties concerned is not merely an abstract principle of western
arbitration theoiy. It is of primaiy importance in arbitration practice. In the absence
of an overriding rule of an applicable national law, it is the most important ground in
domestic and international aribitration to give effect to an arbitration and for enforcing
an award. National laws look to the intention of the parties to uphold an arbitration
clause in a contract or a "submission" to arbitration. The position in domestic laws and
in international conventions is to deny recognition to an arbitration or an award
resulting from it if there is no valid agreement. In the absence of such an agreement,
express or to be implied, the process will be set aside.
A. Its Importance in Major International Instruments
The New York Convention's widely used enforcement regime cannot be relied
57Decision of 6 January 1987 [1988] 13 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n., 152.
But see ICSJD awards on jurisdiction of 27 November 1985 and 14 April 1988, including the
annulment award on jurisdiction of 14 December 1989 [19911 16 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n., pp. 19, 28
and 40 respectively, where an ICSID tribunal accepted jurisdiction. The award on the merits of 20 May
1992 is reported in [1993] 8 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ., 328.
(1975) JBL, 9.
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upon unless there is a binding arbitration agreement in writing signed by the parties
to the proceedings. 6° The Convention applies both to the agreement and the award
resulting from it. 6 ' Under the Convention recognition and enforcement should be
denied if it is established under the relevant law 62 that no valid agreement ever came
into existence.63 This is a requirement to be satisfied by the party against whom
enforcement is brought if he challenges the award. As if to reinforce its regime, the
Convention invites the courts of a contracting state to give effect to the arbitration
agreement or an award made pursuant to it once evidence of the agreement is
supplied. In a sense it is necessary that the arbitration agreement should, like any
other lawful agreement made by consenting parties, be observed. It seems that was at
least one of the objectives of the Convention, i.e., to facilitate the enforcement of
arbitration agreements and awards made thereunder, in territories other than where the
agreement and award are made.65 The identification of the agreement will therefore
be a decisive element in determining whether or not to enforce a New York
Convention award. In fact, it seems that once the existence and validity of the
arbitration agreement is established in a New York Convention case, a domestic court
of a signatory state is required to give effect to the resulting award unless there are
overriding domestic public policy concerns, since the court cannot review the merits
of the award.
The New York Convention was intended to replace the Geneva Protocol of
1923 and Convention of 1927 by providing a unified and more effective enforcement
regime than those which were available under the Protocol and Convention. Both were
applicable to separate stages of the process of arbitration. The Protocol was applicable
'°Article IL
61 Articles I and fl.
62Which, in terms of the Convention, will either be the law to which the parties have subjected the
agreement or the law of the place where the agreement was made: Art.V(1)(a).
63Article V(1)(a).
Article 1V(1)(b).
65Js,,j Territory of Curacao v Solitron Devices, 356 F. Supp. 1 (1973); affirmed 489 F. 2d 1313
(1973, 2d Cir); certiorari denied 40 L. Ed, 2d, 763.
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to arbitration clauses and the Convention applied to awards made in respect of such
clauses.- They provided as a condition for enforcement and recognition that the
proceedings and award should have come into existence pursuant to a valid agreement
or submission to arbitrate. The Geneva Protocol and Convention had their own
inadequacies which the New York Convention was intended to improve uponP The
effect of the New York Convention is that, in the absence of an agreement, a party
relying on an alleged arrangement to arbitrate might be denied recourse to the only
important international enforcement mechanism.67
The emphasis on the need for an agreement as an essential requirement is truly
generalised. The 1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
treats the absence of the agreement as the first ground on which an award may be set
aside by a court of a signatoiy state. Article IX(l)(a) is almost in the same terms as
the corresponding provisions of the New York Convention. It allows an award to be
set aside if the arbitration agreement is "... not valid under the law to which the parties
have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where
the award was made." Article 25 of the Washington Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes, (ICSID), provides that a tribunal set up under the Convention
shall have jurisdiction to hear a dispute referred to it only when the parties have given
their consent to submit to the Centre. The Centre was set up in 1965 to provide an
appropriate neutral setting for the settlement of disputes between private foreign
investors and the governments of the countries in which they invest. Prior to the
Convention, there was no proper international forum to which a private person could
directly bring a claim against a defaulting host state, since the private investor
(individual or corporate) has no legal personality in international 1aw. The
van den Berg, Albert Jan The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform
Judicial Interpretation, Kiuwer Publishers, The Hague, 1981, pp. 7-8.
67Articles V(1)(a) & IV(I)(b).
The existence of such bodies as the International Chamber of Commerce and its Court of
Arbitration in Paris and the London Court of International Arbitration were regarded as private
institutions serving the needs of traders only. Paul Szasy says that "[a]lthough there [was] no formal
obstacle to submitting to the International chamber of Commerce or to the Inter-American Commercial
Arbitration Commission, governments [were] often reluctant to do so in connection with major
investment arrangements, in view of the basically private commercial orientation of these
organizations.": "Using the New International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes" (1971)
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Convention allows an investor (individuals and corporate) such access when arbitrating
within its provisions.
Having regard to the consequences on the sovereignty of the host state of the
Convention, the Centre cannot accept a referral to it in the absence of a binding
agreement. Although the Convention does not expressly mention the absence of an
agreement as a ground for annulment of an ICSJD award, it is quite obvious that the
requirement is covered by Article 52(l)(b), under which a party may request the
annulment of the award if the tribunal exceeds its powers. Such a tribunal will clearly
be acting in excess of its jurisdiction, if any, where it purports to make an award in
circumstances where it can be successfully argued that there was no agreement to
arbitrate.
Elsewhere in the Convention there are many provisions, for example, those
relating to the procedure for the commencement of the proceedings and to the form
of the agreement, which are intended to ensure that such situations do not arise and
also to deal with them if, exceptionally, they did. Article 25, which deals with
jurisdiction, provides that the Centre will entertain a request for arbitration and the
Convention shall apply only when the parties to the dispute have consented in writing
to submit to arbitration under its provisions. The absence of an agreement expressed
in writing will therefore invalidate any arbitration purportedly made pursuant to the
Convention.
Article 25 also forecloses the possibility of a direct challenge to the Centre's
jurisdiction by making it impossible for a party to contend, for example, that the
underlying contract did not contain an arbitration clause, since it is required to be in
writing. The Convention does not cover arbitration agreements orally expressed. This
leaves the possibility of such challenges arising only indirectly, in cases where the
person challenging does not deny the existence of the agreement but argues that his
consent was vitiated (by alleging fraud for example), or that he was never a party to
8 East African L. J., Part 2, pp. 128-29. And, in any case, a state's undertaking to submit to arbitration
by the ICC will not have the same significance in international law as one arising under an international
treaty, such as the ICS]]).
55
the main contract or the agreement to submit to arbitration, if made separately.69
Such challenges are extremely difficult to predict, and, in any case, do not directly put
in doubt the existence of an arbitration agreement. It is only a matter of legal
technicality that its validity is questioned in those circumstances.
The UNC1TRAL Model Law on International Commercial arbitration
emphasises the importance of the agreement by also requiring it to be in writing. The
Model Law represents a proposal for modernisation of domestic laws on commercial
arbitration in line with the new needs of international trade. 7° It is hoped that its
adoption, either wholly or in substantial part by many countries should lead to the
uniformisation of domestic laws on the subject, in the overral interest of intenational
trade.7 ' Under Article 7(1) of the Law an arbitration agreement may either take the
form of an arbitration clause in a contract or a separate agreement. The importance
of the agreement is re-emphasised in the provisions dealing with judicial review of
awards, under which an agreement can be set aside if inexistent or invalid under its
proper law, or the law of the place where the award is made.72
B. Its Importance in Domestic Systems
The arbitration agreement assumes even greater importance in national laws
on domestic and international arbitration. No national law will compel parties to
arbitration or hold them bound to an award unless it has first of all been decided
Challenges to the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal have been made unsuccessfully on the ground
that the particular investment contract did not contain an ICSJD arbitration clause: see Southern Pacific
Properties (Middle East) LtcL v Egypt, awards on jurisdiction 27 November 1985 and 14 April 1988
[1991] 16 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n., pp. 19 & 28. In that case the ICSID arbitration tribunal accepted
jurisdiction exclusively in reliance on Egyptian government legislative provisions intended as an
incentive to attract investments. There was no arbitration clause binding on the state in the contracts
themselves. In reaching that conclusion the tribunal, in our view, adopted an unduly permissive
interpretation of the Convention's provisions on jurisdiction.
'°For a general view of the Model Law and its history, see Holtzmann, Howard M. & Neuheus
Joseph E., A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration : Legislative History
and Commentary, Kluwer, The Hague, 1989.
71 Hermann, Gerold "The UNC1TRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration:
Introduction and General Provisions" in Essays on International Commercial Arbitration, (ed. by
Sarcevic, Peter), Graham & Trotman, London, 1989, 3.
72Article 34(2)(a)(i).
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whether they have consented to it. It may be interesting to note how, like the
international conventions, most national legislation in the area are drafted on the
assumption that the agreement of the parties in-built in the concept of arbitration. Few
domestic legislation expressly mention the agreement of the parties as a requirement
for validating the arbitration agreement. 73 It is assumed that the inference is implicit
and that, in any case, it is too obvious to be stated expressly. In fact the English
arbitration Act of 1950, which consolidates the previous statutes codifying the
common law on the subject, does not even provide for the absence of the agreement
as a ground for setting aside an award, although that should not be in doubt. The
reason is self-evident once arbitration is regarded primarily as a contract and therefore,
in principle, should of necessity involve an agreement. Rather, English law refers to
the arbitration agreement obliquely by requiring it to be in writing 74 to bring the
provisions of the Arbitration Acts into operation. It seems that having taken for
granted that the agreement of the parties is inherent to the nature of arbitration, the
UK legislator was only concerned with its proof, the need for the agreement as a
separate requirement of the process being largely to be implied. It is then used as the
basis either to stay court proceedings brought in disregard of the agreement, if it
exists,75 or to deny enforcement of an award made pursuant to an inexistent or
invalid arbitration agreement. The practical importance of the agreement is therefore
not be doubted
French law, on the other hand, expressly provides for the challenge of an
arbitration award made in the absence of an arbitration agreement or in reliance on a
void agreement or one which has lapsed. 76 French law further, and expressly, requires
the party seeking enforcement to provide evidence of the original agreement to submit
73Whereas in domestic systems characterised by codes and statutes the requirement is stated
expressly in respect of contracts generally: See for example Articles 1108 (French civil code), 1 (Swiss
code of obligations), 89 (Egyptian civil code).
74Arbitration Act 1950, Section 32; Arbitration Act 1975, Section 7.
75Arbitration Act 1950 Section 4.
76Articles. 1484 (for domestic awards) and 1502 (for international arbitrations, pursuant to Article
1504).
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to arbitration," thus emphasising its significance. In Sweden, Section 20 of the
Arbitration Law of 1929 states that an award shall be void "if there was no valid
arbitration agreement".
Since one of the advantages of the process as a method of resolving disputes
lies in the speed and effectiveness with which the award is capable of enforcement,
it is usually at this stage that the practical importance of the parties' consent becomes
evident. An important inquiry at that stage will be centred on finding the arbitration
agreement since no national court will lend its assistance to enforce the award if, at
the end of the inquiiy, the submission to arbitration is inexistent or invalid. So, for
example, under Article 1502(1) of Book IV of the French code of civil procedure,
recognition and enforcement should not be granted if the arbitrator had entered the
reference and made an award in the absence of an agreement. An award rendered
pursuant to an agreement which has lapsed, or otherwise become invalid, faces the
same consequence. In Germany, Article 1041(1) of the code of civil procedure
provides for the setting aside of an award made to give effect to an agreement which
is not valid or, a fortiori, did not exist. Similarly, Article 20(l)of the Swedish
Arbitration Act of 1929 treats any award as void if it was handed down in the absence
of a valid arbitration agreement.
IV. The Assimilation of Arbitration into Contract:
A. The Theoretical Background
We have already noted how reliance was placed on the idea of contract to
explain the legal nature of arbitration in Europe. Most writers have stressed the view
that arbitration rests on a contract. 78 Consent is said to provide the basis of the
obligation to resolve differences through arbitration. By committing themselves to
arbitration the parties make a contract which is binding on them. The making of the
contract amounts to no more than the exercise of the freedom to enter into agreements.
Aiiic1e 1477(2); so does the United States FAA, Section 13.
78Redfern and Hunter, op. cit.; Huys, Marcel & Keutgen, Guy L'Arbitrage en Droit Beige et
International, Bruylant, Brussels, 1981.
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Kenneth Cariston said in 1952 that the
fundamental legal assumption of arbitration is that it is an allowable
extension of the sphere of contract. For if parties may contract
concerning the affairs of their daily lives, save only in the forbidden
domains of illegal and crmnnal enterprise, they may by the same token
settle their disputes through contract. And if they should be unable to
reach agreement as to the resolution of their dispute, they may instead
agree to call upon third parties to decide their dispute with finality.79
The United States Congress House Committee Report on the draft of the U S
Federal Arbitration Act 1924 had earlier indicated that "[a]rbitration agreements are
purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting
party live up to his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when
it becomes disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same
footing as other contracts, where it belongs" 80 (emphasis added).
The theory that a contract is the expression of the freedom of the contracting
parties is said to be the product of the 19th century. 8 ' It had its source in the political
and economic philosophy of the period and that immediately preceding it. It was the
outcome of a philosophy that asserted and gave much importance to the will of the
individual as the basis of the social order, resulting, in the domain of contracts for
example, to the theory that it is the will of the parties that creates all contracts and,
therefore, upon which their validity and continuous existence must depend. The
political philosophy of Hobbes and, later, Rousseau, had taught that men are free and
equal and that they are essentially individuals who, each for his own personal benefit,
have accepted to live in society. 82 Society is the sum of individual wills, each
individual conceding part of his personal liberty in return for the protection he gets
(1972) 17 Law and Contemp. Probs, pp. 631-32.
8068 Cong., 1st Sess., House of Rep. Report, No. 96, cited by Frank 3. in Kulukundis Shipping Co.
v Amtorg Trading Corporation, 126 F.2d, 978 p. 985 (1942, Court of Appeals, 2d Cir.).
81Atiyah Patrick S. The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979;
Essays on Contract, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, Essay No. 2.
82Gordley, James The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1991, pp. 214 et seq.
59
from the others.83
 Referring to the family, which Rousseau regarded as the only case
of a society which is the direct result of nature, he stated nevertheless that if its
members remain united, they "... continue so no longer naturally, but voluntarilly
...", the family itself as a unit being maintained only by agreement of its
members.85 This state of affairs, Rousseau thought, "... results from the nature of
man. His first law is to provide for his own preservation, his first cares are those
which he owes to himself ..." But Rousseau also saw the contradiction and danger
inherent in asserting that man totally alienates his liberty to the collective will to
derive a greater benefit from the latter for, he asks, "... as the force and liberty of each
man are the chief instruments of his self-preservation, how can he pledge them
without harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes to himself?"87
Rousseau offers the solution in the form of an alternative statement of the same
dilemma as being: "... to find a form of association which will defend and protect with
the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each,
while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as
before." In any case each individual trades part or all his liberty only because he
intends it, the initial capacity of each to enter the social contract existing in his free
will, acquired from nature upon birth.
In the domain of economics it was stressed that free enterprise was the best
means of ensuring progress. Individuals should be left to undertake the production of
goods freely, with the state providing only a minimal regulatory framework. The
market place will function better and produce more efficiently if individuals are given
the liberty to operate in the market without restraint, each person knowing how best
83Rousseau, "The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right" in The Social Contract and
Discourses, (Trans. by Cole, G.D.H.), Everyman's Library, London, 1973, Chapter 6, pp. 191-192.
84lbid.
Ibid.
lbid.
Ibidp. 191.
88Thid.
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to protect his own interest.89
The new philosophy quickly gained acceptance in legal theory. It took several
forms, one of the most important of which is the principle of freedom of contract.
Contracts freely consented to are only one of several ways of giving expression to the
freedom of the wifi. According to the French writer, Boris Starck, "Un lien
d'obligation ne peut naItre que s'il a été voulu. Vouloir être oblige et n 'être oblige
que parce qu'on le veut, c'est encore une manifestation de la volonté." 9° The result
of the influence of jurists like kant, Salleils, Savigny, Domat and Pothier is that it
came to be accepted that in matters of contract the will is the only basis of the parties'
mutual obligations.9'
For arbitration, to the extent that it was regarded as an extension of the law of
contract, the dominance of the "will" theory and freedom of contract both meant that
parties could choose to avoid the formal and regular machinery of state justice in civil
matters by opting for the private process. And if in doing that the parties act in
accordance and within the limits of what is accepted to guarantee the social order, the
state should enforce the agreement because it is in the public interest to do so.
Carlston further observed that it is well in the interest of the state:
to ensure not only that promises involving social relations shall be kept
but also that decisions of disputes by non-judicial bodies shall be
binding upon parties who have appropriately consented thereto.
Moreover, experience as well as logic is said to dictate the acceptance
of the arbitration process as a valid social instrument, for it is a custom
hallowed by centuries of social usage reaching even into recesses of
Greek mythologyY
An immediate consequence of this development, generally, and in the area of
contracts and arbitration in particular, was the increasing emphasis on individualism.
Rosenfeld, Michel "Contract and Justice: The Relation between Classical Contract Law and Social
Contract Theory" (1985) 70 Iowa L. Rev., 769.
90Droit Civil: Obligations, 1. 2, Contrats et Ouasi Contrats, 3nd Edn., Litec, Paris, 1989, p. 4.
91 Planiol and Ripert Droit Civil Tome VI: Obligations, 2nd Edn., LGDJ, Paris, 1952, Part 1, pp. 19-
22.
flQp• cit. p. 632, referring to Wolaver, (1934) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev., 132.
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criterion, then contracts must remain binding only if they meet that requirement, only
if they are fair and just at the time they are made and at the time of performance.
The law maker in many jurisdictions has recognised that fact by introducing
legislation directed at parties in arrangements which fall short of what is fair and just
in some cases. It is a common practice in domestic legislation.
Implications for International Arbitration
For international arbitration, the importance of this development in disputes
involving parties from the less developed world (time and again the weaker parties),
especially the states, is that as a requirement for making the process also attractive to
the countries arbitration tribunals should appreciate the fact that certain principles of
law to which the members of the tribunals are by their training well disposed, are not
immutable. From time to time the justice of the case will require that those principles
be adapted to reflect the difference (in fact) of the bargaining positions of the parties.
The case of Klöckner v Cameroon'°3 was a perfect example of how the recognition
of those changes was appropriately recognised by an international arbitration tribunal
although unfortunately denied on appeal by another.'°' The development also
dictates the need for arbitration tribunals to appreciate the fairness in the contractual
arrangements not only when the contracts are made, but also during performance.
The Klöckner award was concerned with the construction in Cameroon of a
fertiliser plant by Klockner, a German multinational. The firm agreed to supply a
factory on a turn-key basis and to manage it. In analysing the obligations of Klöckner
and the government of Cameroon, the first ICSID tribunal appropriately acknowledged
that owing to the government's reliance on the German partners in all respects, from
the drawing up of the feasibility studies to the provision of expertise both in the
supply and in the construction of the plant, including the technical and commercial
control of the firm set up for the purpose of managing the factory, the foreign partner
remained under a continuous obligation of good faith to the government. Klockner's
'°3ICSID award of 21 October 1983 [1994] 2 ICSJD Reports, 3 (in excerpts).
'°4Annulment award of 3 May 1985 [1994] 2 ICSID Reports, 95.
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superior position and the government's reliance thereon were reflected in the
negotiations and in the letter of the contractual arrangements. According to the
tribunal,
[tJhis was a joint venture between KlOckner, a multinational European
corporation, and a developing country. The plant to be built was an
example of imported modern technology and engineering. Cameroon
had no experience in manufacturing fertiliser products. The factory was
to be acquired with the government's guarantee of payment; its output
being of major importance for the country's agriculture, and agriculture
being in turn the very foundation of Cameroon's economic ambitions.
Cameroon counted on Klockner to supply all that was necessary to
ensure the success of the project. Klockner had carried out the initial
feasibility study. It had designed the plant and carried out the technical
studies. KlOckner had undertaken to organi[s]e the long-term financing,
over ten years, of the project. It built or bought from others all the
machinery and all the material. It coordinated the work of supplies and
sub-contractors. It was to execute, operate, and manage the project,
procure necessary raw materials, and organi[s]e the marketing of
output. By accepting - and indeed seeking out - these responsiblities,
Klockner had taken on a serious obligation. KiOckner claimed to be
capable of supplying all the knowhow, all the material, and all the
management skills necessary to ensure the project's success, the
Government's only role being to supply a site and to guarantee
payment of the contract price.'°5
The obligations of the parties were expressed not in one, but in a number of
agreements, including a "Basic Agreement" creating a local joint venture, SOCAME,
KlOckner holding 51% of the shares. Another agreement provided for KiOckner to
supply the factory for which SOCAME was created to manage, the government
guaranteeing SOCAME's repayments of the price of the undertaking. The "Basic
Agreement" provided for Klockner to retain exclusive responsibility for the technical
91994] 2 ICS]]) Reports, 3, p. 26.
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and commercial management of SOCAME for at least five years in the hope, (as far,
it seems as the government was concerned), that within that period SOCAME would
be in a position to begin the loan repayments itself)°6
 A subsequent agreement
between Klöckner and SOCAI¼4E (already under Klöckner's control) was signed
amending the price and conditions of payment. It also assigned the government's
rights to SOCAME (under KlOckner's management) without, however, releasing the
goverment from its obligations to KlOckner. Thereafter all arrangements between
KlOckner and SOCAME were, in fact, contracts between Kiockner as managing
partner and itself.
Under those circumstances it should not have been surprising that when the
multinational failed to disclose certain material facts to the government at different
stages of the transaction, and also failed to manage SOCAIvIE profitably, the
arbitration tribunal held, rightly, - in our view - that the government could not be
liable to Klöckner for the cost of the supply of the plant as guarantor of SOCAME's
loans. In the view of the tribunal, the government had:
trusted Klöckner. KlOckner expected that its conduct would be judged
by high standards. It promised its partner, if not an unconditional
guarantee of the factory's profitability at all times, at least very
pronounced frankness and loyalty. Klöckner had a particularly strong
obligation to keep Cameroon informed of any facts that might have a
crucial influence upon the Government's decision to assume, and to
continue assuming, the very onerous financial engagements upon which
Klöckner now seeks to rely.
KlOckner failed to live up to these obligations. We do not hold that this
failure was due to a fraudulent intent. But we conclude that Klöckner's
failure demonstrated less than a full measure of frankness, of candor,
vis-à-vis its partner, and that what it did not disclose to its partner may
have been decisive in the Government's decision whether or not to
'°'Paulsson, "North-South Arbitration" (1984) 50 Arbitration, 37, p. 39. Paulsson was counsel for
the state in those proceedings.
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pursue the project.'°7
The tribunal thus held that the German firm had not fulfilled its own part of
the contract and that it had acted in bad faith through out. It "took for granted that the
principle according to which a person who engages in close contractual relations,
based on confidence, must deal with its partner in a frank, loyal and candid manner
is a basic principle of French civil law"° 8
 (assumed to be the same under
Cameroonian law, as the proper law of the transactions, since the relevant system of
the law of Cameroon was found by the tribunal to be based on French law).
Unfortunately the award was annulled by a review committee on precisely that ground.
According to the annulment award, the first tribunal should not have taken the duty
of good faith for granted, without specific citation of relevant authority in French
law.'°9
 In the committee's view, the first tribunal did "not claim to ascertain the
existence (of a rule or principle) but asserte[d] or postulate[d] the existence of such
a "principle" which the tribunal assume[d] or [took] for granted"° (emphasis in
original) to exist in French law and to be of universal recognition."
The fact, however, is that the principle is now so widely accepted by French
text writers"2
 not to require citation of any particular authority." 3
 Its acceptance
'°[ 1994] 2 ICSID Reports, pp. 26-27.
'°8lbidp. 58.
'°[ 1994J 2 ICSID Reports, 95, p. 124.
°Ibidp. 121.
lUThe appellate committee itself admitted that such a duty does in fact exist by reason of the
principle of good faith of Article 1134(3) of the French civil code although it was not willing to apply
it because, in the committee's own words, "the conditions of its application in positive law" have not
yet been clearly worked out. That is intended as a reference to the absence of precedent for the
application of that principle on the particular facts of the case: ibid. p. 124. But the development of
French law has not been based largely on precedents like the common law; on the contrary it has
always drawn extensively on the writings of jurists (Ia doctrine), who have never retreated from what
in their view is correct in principle simply because of the absence of direct precedents. In fact, in the
field of international commercial arbitration itself, the development of the theory of
"internatjonaljsatjon" of state contracts (infra, chapter four) is not based on any authority at all. It is the
invention of arbitrai practice going only as far back as the late 1950s. On the relevance of arbitral and
judicial precedents in arbitrations see Klaus, Peter Berger "The International Arbitrator's Application
of Precedents" (1992) 9 Journ Int'l. Arb'n., Part 4, 5.
"2Wle admitting that French law recognises that a party in a dominant position is under duty in
some contracts to inform the other party, Delaume, however, agrees with the ICSfl) appellate committee
that there is no support for the duty in French law but, nevertheless, thinks that the time may have come
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by the appellate committee in the Klöckner arbitration would have been a step in
support of the need in those particular arbitrations to reflect the relative strengths
referred to earlier of the contracting parties.
V. The Effects of Assimilating Arbitration into Contract:
A. A Primary Duty to the Disputants
The assumption that unlike a domestic court which is duty bound to the public
at large, an arbitration tribunal owes a duty primarily to the disputants, follows from
the very character of a contract as a relationship intended to bind only the parties
concerned. It should, in principle, therefore only be of benefit to the parties in the first
place. We have already pointed out that the emphasis is on the agreement of the
parties; it gives rise to the process and can also terminate it. Since the process is
created entirely by the will of the disputants, it is regarded as an essentially private
institution which the parties can model and remodel as they wish. The emphasis on
the parties' will may lead to the result that arbitral justice is by, and for, the parties
in dispute and not necessarily objective as when a court of law determines an issue
by reference to the law and on considerations of the interests of the wider public. The
arbitration agreement is the most important source of the tribunal's powers and it is
compelled to do justice only in accordance and within the limits of the powers
to "... reassess, in the context of economic development agreements of long duration, traditional notions"
to bring them in line with the demands of international trade: "The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria and
State Contracts", in Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law Merchant, (ed. by
Carbonneau, Thomas E), Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1990, 77, p. 89.
"3The duty to collaborate ("Ic devoir de cooperation), which is what was in issue in the KlOckner
award, consists in not withholding information which might disable the other party from realising his
expectation from the contract, particularly when, as in that case, it is a joint undertaking: Starck, op.
cit p. 399, para. 1144; although the the application of the principle in practice will depend on the nature
of the transaction and the facts and circumstances of the particular case: Terre, Simler and Leguette,
Droit Civil: Les Obligations, Précis Dalloz, 5th Edn., 1993, paras. 416 & 430. Like Delaume, many
authors have stressed the relevance of the principle to international transactions of the kind involved
in the Klockner award: Morin, "Le Devoir de Cooperation dans les Contrats internationaux" (1980) 6
Dr. Prat. Comm. Int'l, 9; Picot, "L'Obligation de Cooperation dans L'Exdcution du Contrat" (1988) JCP,
I, 3318; Bdnabent, "Rapport Français", in La Bonne Foi, Travaux de L'Association Henri Capitant, Vol.
43, Litec, Paris, 1992, 291. See also Mestre, "D'une Exigence de Bonne Foi a un Esprit de
Collaboration" (1986) Rev. Trim. Dr. Civ., 100; contra, Rudden, Bernard, op. ci:. (1985) Rev. Trim.
Dr. Civ., 91.
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conferred upon it by the parties. The tribunal can only decide on that which the parties
have agreed and in a manner directed by them. It cannot apply a principle or rule of
law or a different perspective of what it considers to be appropriate on the facts of the
dispute if to do so would be against the aspirations of the parties. The objective justice
of the case and the effect of the decision on the rest of society are secondary
considerations since a duty is owed primarily to the disputants and only incidentally
to the public at large. This is consonant with the fact that arbitration is a private
dispute resolution mechanism, since an institution which is private in nature cannot
have as its main purpose the discharge of functions of a public character.
(1). A Trend Supported in International Practice
This perception of the role of arbitration is reinforced by recent trends in
arbitration law world wide. More and more the parties and tribunals constituted by
them or on their behalf are given wider powers than before to retain control over the
process. At one time it was thought that judicial review of the merits of arbitration
awards was desirable in the public interest to ensure conformity and consistency with
the law. But as arbitration has come to be regarded over the years - wrongly or not -
as a private justice mechanism affecting essentially the interests of those concerned,
it has become conventional in domestic and international law to exclude judicial
review of arbitration awards on the merits, and to allow review only on a limited
number of procedural grounds (infra, chapter five).
(2). A Trend Supported in Domestic Law
The trend also fmds support in domestic laws on arbitration. English law, for
example, abolished the case stated procedure in 1979114, thereafter allowing parties
the choice in international arbitrations to exclude appeals on the merits" 5
 except in
"4Arbitration Act 1979, Section 1.
"5Section 3. Exclusion agreements apply to domestic arbitrations only if made after the
commencement of the arbitration: Section 3(6).
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respect of certain specified transactions (insurance, commodities and shipping"6).
All three exclusions were originally retained in the draft of a new arbitration bill for
England as circulated in February 1994 by the Department of Trade and Industry),"7
but not retained by the second draft of the Departmental Advisory Committee issued
in July 1995.118 France passed new legislation in 198l" and, consistently with
what was already common practice there, totally excluded appeals on the merits, with
Switzerland following in 1988.120 As far back as 1965, however, the World Bank
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between foreign investors and
investment receiving States (all developing countries) had already done so by
excluding annulment by an ICSJD "Ad hoc" (appeal) Committee of a Convention
award other than on a limited number of procedural grounds.'2'
An extreme, if somewhat misguided, form of this trend was introduced in
Belgium in 1985 when a law was enacted providing that Belgian courts may not
entertain an action to set aside an award unless one of the parties is a Belgian or
domiciled there or, in the case of a corporation, has a place of business or is
incorporated in Belgium. 122
 The wording of the law suggests that the section applies
even to an award rendered in Belgium itself once it is characterised as "international"
"6SecIiOn 4(1), unless the exclusion agreement is made after the commencement of the arbitration:
Section 4(1)(c)(i). Exclusion agreements regarding the same type of contracts have no effect in domestic
arbitrations: Section 4(1)(c)(ii).
7Consultation Document on Proposed Clauses and Schedules for an Arbitration Bill, reprinted in
(1994) Arbitration International, 191.
" 8Consultative Paper on an Arbitration Bill and Draft Clauses of an Arbitration Bill, July 1995.
"9New code of civil procedure, Book 1V Part 2.
'°Swiss Law on Private International Law, December 1987.
'21Article 52. The consequences for ICSID arbitration of not complying strictly with those provisions
are critically discussed by Michael Reisman, following two Ad hoc Committee awards in Klockner and
Amco: see "The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSII) Arbitration' (1989) Duke L. J., 739.
But see Broches, Aron "Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards" (1991) 6 ICSII) Rev.,-FILJ.,
321. The Amco award is reported in [1993] 1 ICSID Reports, 509.
'22Article 1717(4) of the Belgian Judicial Code.
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by reason of it involving foreign parties.' The judicial precedent to that trend had
however been set in France in 1980, where the Paris Court of Appeal, no doubt under
the spell of the over liberal attitude to arbitration, declined to entertain the challenge
of an award'2 ' made in France on the ground that the arbitration was not subject to
French law because the parties and the transaction had no connection with France and
the arbitration itself had not otherwise been attached to the French legal order.'
The danger with this trend is that it could easily lead to a breakdown in the only
control mechanism in arbitral justice,' 26
 by creating awards which cannot be set
aside anywhere. Increasingly, however, the attitude adopted is that the state should
make limited interference with the process, presumably because the justice of
arbitration is the justice of the parties involved.
Meanwhile dispute resolution before now was a matter of public responsibility
in Europe. In the Anglo-saxon world the courts regarded the final settlement of
disputes as a state prerogative to be exercised by them and would recognise no
attempt by private parties to evade their jurisdiction. In England and the United States,
for example, the arbitration agreement was seen as an attempt to oust the courts of a
jurisdiction they were jealously determined to retain.' 27
 Thus, an agreement which
purported to exclude the parties from recourse to the courts to determine their
contractual rights and obligations through arbitration was said in Thompson v
Charnock" not to be "sufficient to oust the courts of law or Equity of their
'The Belgian Law was received with mixed reactions: see van Houtte "La 101 BeIge du 27 Mars
1985" (1986) Rev. Arb., 29 (favourably) and Paulsson, "Arbitration unbound in Belgium" (1986) 2
Arbitration International, 1 (qualified).
"Gotaverten Arendal v libyan National Maritime Transport Co., (1980) Rev. Arb., 524.
But see Article 1502 of the new French code of civil procedure which sets out the grounds,
pursuant to Article 1504, for the challenge of an international award in France. No court in France will
make a similar ruling today. See also Gaillard, "Arbitrage Commercial International", in Juriclasseur
de Droit International, Vol. 11, Fase. 586-10 pp. 9 et seq, paras. 29 & 31.
1260n control mechanisms in arbitration, see Reisman, Systems of Control in International
Ad j udication and Arbitration: Breakdown and Repair, Duke University Press, Durham, 1992.
'27See the judgment of Frank J. in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corporation, 126
F.2d, 978 (1942 U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Cir.), where the judge goes to considerable length to
account for that hostility.
1288 Term Rep. 139 (1799); 101 E.R. 1310 [1799].
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jurisdiction."29
In Scott v Avery' 30 the doctrine that parties could not contract out of the
jurisdiction of the courts was justified on grounds of public policy.' 31
 On the
prevailing view arbitration by its nature involved the exercise by private persons of
a judicial function which in principle should be administered by a public constituted
body such as a court of law. As the process was said to be based on two elements,
one contractual and the other judicial, the latter was also said to remain within the
exclusive domain of the regularly constituted courts. The exclusive character of the
court's jurisdiction, as a matter of public policy, overrode the contractual element of
arbitration and, hence, the prohibition against all attempts to evade the reach of the
courts by submission to arbitration in exclusive terms for a fmal solution. As late as
1922 the Court of Appeal of England was still of the view that to allow parties in an
arbitration to oust the jurisdiction of the courts by agreeing to exclude judicial review
of their award on the merits by way of the then case stated procedure was contrary
to public policy. The prerogative of the Regent's courts could not thus be shut out:
"[t]here must be no Alsatia in England where the King's writ does not run", said Lord
Justice Scrutton)32
 Lord Justice Banks added that it was necessary that the law (by
which he meant the courts) should retain sufficient control over the arbitrators
to prevent and redress any injustice on the part of the arbitrators, and
to secure that the law that is administered by an arbitrator is in
substance the law of the land and not some home-made law of the
particular arbitrator or the particular association. To release real and
effective control over commercial arbitrations is to allow the arbitrator,
or the arbitration tribunal, to be a law unto himself or themselves, to
give him or them a free hand to decide according to law or not
according to law as he or they think fit, in other words, to be outside
'101 E. R., p. 1310, per Lord Kenyon, C.J.
130(1856) 5 HL Cas, 811; 10 E.R., 1121 [1855-56]; [1843-60] All E R, 1.
' 3tFor a critique of the use of public policy in that situation see Williams, Glanville L. "The
Doctrine of Repugnancy - II: In the Law of Arbitration" (1944) 60 LQR, 69.
' 32Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] 2 Q.B. 478, p. 488.
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the law."33
In France the law distinguished an agreement to refer an existing dispute (a
submission) from an agreement to refer a future dispute to determination by
arbitration. The old code of civil procedure expressly recognised the "submission" by
providing for its validity that certain requirements be met but failed even to
mention the arbitration clause (the "clause compromissoire). In the circumstances the
courts held that an agreement to refer future disputes to arbitration, when they arose,
was not lawful and could not be enforced either on grounds of public policy or, by
assimilating it to a submission ("compromis"), for failure to comply with its
requirements.' 35
 It may be that had the statute not expressly recognised the
"submission" by providing the conditions upon the fulfilment of which it would be
upheld, the French courts would have disregarded it on grounds of public policy, on
the basis that it constituted an attempt to shorten the arm of the courts.'36
One should to note, however, that the French attitude was not followed all over
the civilian world under Napoleonic influence.' 37
 It was argued,' 38 convincingly
in our view, that the position taken by French courts was neither correct in law,
statutory or at common law ("droit commun"), nor did it reflect the customs and
practices then prevalent in France. Johnson argued in Québec that neither law,
principle, nor policy prohibited the use of arbitration clauses (the "clause
compromissoire") as the decided cases seemed to suggest in France. Relying on the
older authorities he argued that the "clause compromissoire" (the arbitration clause in
' 33Ibid. p. 484.
Articles 1006, 1012, 1017 and 1028 of the old code of civil procedure.
' 35Cassation, 10 July 1843, Sirey, I, 561; Dalloz, I, 343. They were probably not wrong in view of
the subsequent development noted below.
Even today France, in principle, retains the most anachronistic attitude toward a submission to
arbitration of future disputes (the "clause compromissoire") which, under Article 2061 of the civil code,
is to be regarded as null and void unless otherwise provided for by legislation: "Ella clause
compromissoire est nulle s'il n'est dispose autrement par Ia loi." For a critique of Article 2061 see
Jarrosson, Charles "Perspectives D'Evolution du Droit Francais de L'Arbitrage: La Clause
Compromissoire" (1992) Rev Arb, 259.
7See its treatment in Belgium, below.
See Johnson, Walter Seeley The Clause Com promissoire: Its Validity in Ouebec, Montréal, 1945.
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contemplation of a future dispute) fell well outside the domain of procedural law and,
therefore, did not have to comply with the provisions of the then civil procedure codes
both of France and of Québec requiring, under Article 1006, that a submission to
arbitration should specify the subject matter of the dispute and the appointed arbitrator,
in default of which the submission would be void. The "clause compromissoire" was
governed by the general principles of the common law of contract, which would have
upheld its validity. It therefore remained a valid common law contract. Johnson thus
argued that it would have been most illogical to suggest that "a substantive civil law
contract, the clause compromissoire, is illegal because the Code of Procedure requires
that a different contract, the compromis, must be made in a special form."39
It is therefore not surprising that in Belgium, where the same provisions were
in force, the Court of Cassation consistently declined to follow the French practice.
It regarded such clauses as binding either as any other term of the contract in which
it was expressed or as an independent contract if expressed separately, governed by
ordinary common law principles of contract law.' 4° In three old cases decided almost
at the same time as the French courts rejected the validity of the "clause
compromissoire",'4 ' the Belgian Court of Cassation held consistently that an
agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration was not void for non compliance
with the requirements of Articles 1006, 1012, 1017 and 1028 of the Belgian code of
civil procedure (which were the same as the corresponding articles of the French code,
word for word).
In Société des Bèlges Réunis c. Vanelsem,' 42 an insurance company sued an
assured for, it seems, outstanding premium. The defendant requested a stay of the
court action and a reference to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the policy.
The court rejected the defendant's plea and ordered payment of the amount due on the
ground that the clause in the policy referring future disputes to arbitration did not
Ibid. p. 21.
°See Bernard, Alfred L'Arbitra ge Volontaire en Droit Privé, Ets. Emil Bruylant, Brussels, &
L.G.DJ., Paris, 1937, pp. 86-91.
'41 See Societe des Belges Reunis c. Vanelsem, Pasicrisie, 1850, Part 1, p. 81; De Doninck c.
Cagniart, Pasicrisie, 1879, Part 1, p. 418 and, Dugniolle c. Ceulemans, Pasicrisie, 1888, Part 1, p. 100.
'42Ibid.
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comply with the requirements of Article 1006. On appeal, however, an appellate court
of Anvers and the Belgian Court of Cassation held that Article 1006 only applied to
a submission to an already existing dispute, the "compromis". Article 1006 did not
govern submissions to future disputes, which had not expressly been outlawed by
legislation. It therefore remained valid under the common law and did not offend
public policy. The position of the Belgian courts was correctly stated by the appellate
court of Anvers in terms adopted by the Court of Cassation and repeated consistently
in subsequent appeals. The court stated:
Attendue que Ia clause compromissoire n 'est prohibé par aucune loi;
qu 'elle est même expressément admise dans le cas déterminé par I 'art.
332 du C. de comm.; que le legislateur, en portant l'art. 1006 du C. de
proc. civ., n 'a pas eu en vue que le compromis; qu 'ii a Pu exiger les
conditions spéciales de ce contrat pour la validité de Ia clause
compromissoire; dont les termes généraux le plus souvent, notamment
dans les entreprises, rendent impossible la precision des contestarions
a naItre, le choix anticipé des arbitres le mieux a même pour en
connaItre, et que cette convention n 'étant point interdite expressément
par la loi, est obligatoire si, comme dans I 'espèce, elle réunit les
conditions essentielles requises par l'art. 1108 du C. civ. pour la
validité de tout contrat.'43
The Belgian attitude would have appeard easier to reconcile with the doctrine
of party autonomy.
B. Inconsistent with Freedom of Contract?
It is important to note that irrespective of how it might have developed in the
different western jurisdictions, the doctrine that parties could not by agreement exclude
the powers of the courts to enter a dispute and adjudicate on the parties' respective
rights was inconsistent with the growing influence of freedom of contract. in the three
Belgian cases referred to above the Court of Cassation implicitly recognised the point
by relying on party autonomy as one of the grounds for rejecting the suggestion that
' 43Pasicrisie, 1850, (Cassation) part 1, p. 83.
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the arbitration clause (as distinguished from the submission) was not valid under the
law of that country.'4'
The question then was whether the position in Anglo-American law on the
same point (and French law, although to a lesser extent, since the French system at
the time recognised the right of the parties to contract out of the courts in the case of
the submission of an already existing dispute) was going to remain unchanged in the
face of the increasingly assertive principle of freedom of contract.
Scott v Avery itself was only concerned with the validity of an agreement to
submit to arbitration as a pre-condition to resort to the courts for a fmal determination
of the issues. It had been argued for the defendants that no action could be brought
against them until the dispute had been determined in arbitration proceedings as
provided for under the contract. The House of Lords upheld the defence on the ground
that the agreement was not an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. It was
only a condition precedent to the right of the plaintiff to have recourse to the courts,
if need be for the cause of action only arose upon the making of an award in an
arbitration."
Looking back, it is now obvious that the House was there indicating what way
the law would develop in the future. Lord Campbell stated that "... it would be a most
inexpedient encroachment upon the liberty of the subject if he were not allowed to
enter into such a contract".' Coleridge J., one of the judges requested to advice the
Lords, expressed doubts as to whether the principle that parties could not contract out
of the courts was satisfactory although on the authorities he was bound to treat the
principle as settled law.'47
Neither was it truly offensive to public policy.'48 In Scott v Avery itself no
attempt was made to justify the rule on grounds of public policy. According to Lord
Campbell, what the cases (including Thompson v Channock) seemed to have decided
'"Alfred, op. Cit.
"1O E.R., pp. 1136 & 1138.
'"10 E.R., p. 1138; [1843-60] All Eng Law Reps., 1, p. 6.
'iO E.R., p. 1133.
'"Williams, op. cit. (1944) 60 L.Q.R., 69.
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was that an action could still be maintained notwithstanding the existence of an
agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration. That did not necessarily render the
arbitration clause void. It remained valid but the courts could simply not deny a party
the right to have the same dispute determined by an action in court.' 49
 In fact
Glanville Williams denies that an agreement to refer future disputes or a submission
to arbitration could possibly be against public policy, for, that would have been
inconsistent with two other principles of law, the first being that an arbitration
agreement was effective to the extent that an action for damages could be brought for
its breach. The second rule was that if an award was made before the authority of the
arbitrator was revoked the award was enforceable. As Glanville Williams put it,
"[t]hese two rules would be inconceivable if an arbitration agreement were regarded
as contrary to public policy."5°
A passage of Lord Campbell in Scott v Avery sets out what would have been
the correct explanation for the rule as far as the courts were concerned. The law Lord
stated that the rule
probably originated in the contests of the different courts in ancient
times for extent of jurisdiction, all of them being opposed to anything
that would altogether deprive every one of them of jurisdiction'5'
Where an action is indispensable, you cannot oust the Court of its
jurisdiction over the subject, because justice cannot be done without the
exercise of that jurisdiction. That is all, and there is no doubt about
that. This is the foundation of the doctrine that coutrs are not to be
We should remember that even today it remains a matter of discretion in England whether the
courts will stay court proceedings brought in disregard of an agreement to submit to arbitration: Section
4(1) Arbitration Act 1950 which states that a court "may" and not "shall" stay court proceedings brought
in breach of an agreement.
' 5°supra p. 71.
'51Contra, Derek Roebuck, who describes the conventional view based on the contest between the
courts for jurisdiction as a "myth" and that on the contrary "[t)he truth seems to be that from the earliest
times the courts worked in comfortable symbiosis with arbitrators": "The Myth of Judicial Jealousy"
(1994) 10 Arbitration International, 395. (3lanville Williams, supra, p. 70, had already indicated that the
contest for jurisdiction had "lost its intensity" by the time of the "earliest recorded statement of the rule
in 1743 ...', such that Lord Campbell's statement of its origin should be taken with care.
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ousted of their jurisdiction.'52
Both justifications would however have lost their validity with time. If the
courts had persisted with the hostility' 53 to arbitration, the resultin increase in
commercial litigation would have given rise to unmanageable delays and certainly
have reflected badly on the machinery of the courts, thereby defeating their purpose.
In the process the courts have been promoting recourse to arbitration as a means of
diverting pressure from themselves and to improve the administration of justice.
Courts and arbitration have become partners in the same endeavour, not competitors
for jurisdiction.
Subsequently the hostility toward arbitration was abandoned,' TM
 in essence as an
undue infringement on the doctrine of party autonomy and on freedom of contract.
Thus, in the absence of illegality and subject to the clear intention of the parties,
which in Scott v Avery for example was not in dispute, there was no ground to
disregard an arbitration agreement. It then became the rule that other than in
exceptional circumstances the intention of the parties must be upheld. The
development in favour of party autonomy was fast and it has long since been the
position in all major systems that the parties can by agreement evade the courts. The
courts themselves have upheld that view and have been supported world wide in
domestic legislation requiring them to defer to the jurisdiction of an arbitrator where
a party brings court proceedings in disregard of a submission to arbitration.' In fact
it is mandatory in the United States.
15210 E.R., p. 1138.
' 531an MacNeil also takes the view that the picture painted of U S judicial and legislative hostility
to arbitration during this period is not correct and that, on the contrary, the system was largely
supportive of arbitration: American Arbitration Law: Reformation, Nationalization, Internationalization,
Oxford University Press, New York, 1992.
See for example the arbitration Act 1884, Section 1.
'"See for example UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 8(1); U.S. Federal Arbitration Act, Section 3;
English Arbitration Act 1950 Sectio 4(1); Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Decree 1988 Section
4(1).
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A development similar to that in England was also taking place in France.'56
Freedom of contract has prevailed. There has been limited public interference
with arbitration through the courts, sometimes intended to show that ultimately they
remain in control, although in the main to lend their assistance to the smooth
functioning of the process. There has been considerable legislative intervention, but
rather in favour of making the parties greater masters of the process. In the main,
therefore, the parties retain control from submission to award, particularly as they can
also revoke the authority of the arbitrators at any time during the proceedings.
The global acceptance of party autonomy also promoted the contractual
element of arbitration by diminishing in significance the judicial element. Once the
analogy was drawn between private contracts and private justice, arbitration being
regarded as falling under both, it became easier to accept the will of the parties as
controling even when used in the pursuit of wholly private interests.
This conception of arbitration as an essentially private process intended
primarily to serve the interests of individuals with limited consideration for the
interests of the wider public differs sharply, as we argue in chapter two, from the
perception of justice and, through it, of any organised means of redressing wrongs in
many parts of the developing world.
C. The Agreement is Irrevocable
The principle that unless a contrary intention is expressed the agreement to
submit to arbitration is irrevocable is, again, the result of its essentially contractual
character. Contracts, once made, are binding on the parties. Since an arbitration
agreement or submission is a contract it must as all other contracts be binding. One
of the parties cannot unilaterally modify or terminate the agreement unless he is
allowed to do so under the contract, since arbitration agreements are enforceable as
such. Should one of the parties default in his obligation to submit to arbitration the
other party can sue for damages for breach of contract, although he may only recover
nominal damages. A better remedy would be to compel, by indirect means, the
See David, René L'Arbitrage dans Ic Commerce International, Economica, Paris, 1982;
Carbonneau, Thomas "Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of its Remedial and
Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce" (1984) 19 Texas Int'l. L. J., 33.
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recalcitrant party to arbitration by giving effect to a valid agreement or submission.
Section-4(1) of the English Arbitration Act of 1950 allows a party to apply to the
High Court for a stay of proceedings brought before the court by the other party in
default of the arbitration agreement. If appropriate, the court will make an order to the
same effect, thus effectively compelling the party in default to have the dispute
determined by arbitration. The same provision was re-enacted verbatim in the
Arbitration Act of 1975, which gave effect in English law to the provisions of the
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1958. In addition the 1975 Act makes the reference to arbitration by the
courts mandatory.
It is not clear whether the court can in reliance on the same section stay
proceedings "not originally brought before any court" as required by Sections 4 and
1 of the 1950 and 1975 Acts.' 57
 It may be that this situation would be assimilated
to a case where there is a simple refusal by the party in breach to proceed with the
settlement by arbitration, in which case, if he would have been the plaintiff in the
proceedings, he may have to abandon his claim. If he were not the plaintiff, under the
law, the claimant may proceed to arbitration and obtain an award by default against
the recalcitrant party (respondent in the arbitration) with an order of a competent court
to enforce the award on its terms.
In France Article 1458 of the new code of civil procedure requests the courts
to decline jurisdiction whenever there is a valid arbitration clause or submission in
respect of the matter brought before them. Meanwhile in Germany the courts are
required under Article 1027 of the code of civil procedure to dismiss any action
brought for any claim which ought to have been settled by arbitration.
The New York Convention and other international instruments on the subject,
including institutional rules of arbitration, contain similar provisions.' 58 The
UNCITRAL Model Law (Article 8(1)) directs a court before which proceedings are
brought in disregard of an arbitration clause to refer the parties to arbitration. Article
8(2) goes even further by allowing arbitration proceedings to be commenced or
It can, in the United States, under Section 4 of the FAA.
See for example Article VI(3) of the European Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration.
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continued even while the issue is pending before the relevant court. This appears to
be one of the unique features of the UNC1TRAL initiative. It is unique in that it opens
the possibility for the arbitration tribunal and the competent domestic court to consider
the validity of the arbitration agreement concurrently notwithstanding the risk of
conflicting decisions. It has been decided by the courts in France, for example, that
arbitrators can proceed with the hearing of the main claim in the arbitration
notwithstanding pending annulment proceedings of a preliminary award made in the
course of the same arbitration.' 59 That of course raises the important question
regarding the effect and extent of such a provision, especially in the light of the
overriding supervisory jurisdiction of domestic courts over the validity of an
arbitration clause. Broches says that its purpose is to protect the arbitration
proceedings against dilatory tactics: "[a] party should therefore not be precluded from
initiating or continuing arbitral proceedimgs by the fact that the matter had been
brought before a court."°
That reinforces the security of arbitration clauses by recognising the fact that
a party may not by indirect means frustrate an undertaking to arbitrate without the
consent of the other party. It also preserves the dignity of the process. Moreover, the
authority given the tribunal to proceed with the arbitration although there may be
proceedings in court regarding the jurisdiction of the tribunal is consistent with the
"competence / competence" doctrine which gives the tribunal the authority to rule on
its own jurisdiction (under Article 16 of the Model law for example) subject
nevertheless to the final review of the competent court.
D. The Process is Irrevocable
It follows from above that a party cannot withdraw before the proceedings are
concluded unless he is released by the other party to the arbitration agreement. If he
cannot unilaterally revoke the agreement, much less can he stop the proceedings
'59Gatoil v National Iranian Oil Company, Court of Appeal decision of 17 December 1991 [1993]
Rev Arb., 281 and Sociéré Industrial Erport-Import v Société GECI er GFC, decision of 9 July 1992
[1993J Rev Arb, 303.
°Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Kiuwer,
Deventer, 1990, p. 48.
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already in progress. The parties consent not only to the initial submission but also to
the entire course of the process. A party is therefore bound by the arbitration from
agreement to award. Failing a proper release or in the absence of a settlement by both
parties terminating the proceedings, a party will be at fault if he resiles at any time
before the award is made. It remains the law that consent by the parties to arbitration
is valid both in respect of the submission and of the conduct of the proceedings.
By consenting to arbitration the parties are also deemed to have accepted, in
advance, that the award resulting from it will be final and binding. The English
Arbitration Act of 1950161 makes clear that by submitting to arbitration the parties
are deemed to have accepted that the award will be final and binding on them. That
is an implied undertaking, given in advance, from which the parties are not allowed
to default. Thus, unlike the practice in the customary system of some developing
countries,' 62
 no further consent is required for the award to beome binding.
Under the widely used enforcement regime of the New York Convention the
courts of a contracting state are requested to enforce an award immediately upon
presentation of an authenticated copy and upon proof of the original agreement or
submission to arbitration. The domestic regimes of many countries are similar in
requirements to that of the Convention. Invariably what is required is no more than
a genuine copy of the award supported by some evidence of the original
agreement.' 63
 Leave will then be given to enforce the award if not successfully
challenged. In many countries the award is assimilated to a judgment of the court and
enforced in the same way.1M
It is important to bear that aspect of western arbitration in mind since, as we
indicate in the next chapter, it differs with the practice in some other parts of the
world. It is obvious that in the western understanding of arbitration there will be no
need for the process if one of the parties could withdraw without constituting a breach
'61Seon 16; see also Article 1040 of the German code of civil procedure.
See the case of Nigeria, infra, chapter two.
I63	 for example Articles 1477 and 1499 of the new civil procedure code of France applicable
respectively to domestic and international awards in that country.
'International Execution Against Judgment Debtors, (ed. by Campbell, Dennis), Sweet and
Maxwell, London, 1993.
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of contract in the traditional sense. It would be remembered that the position of the
law prevailing in the common law jurisdictions after Vynior's case' 65 was that
parties could withdraw from the arbitration proceedings at any time prior to the award.
Conclusion
The usefulness of an award depends on whether it can be enforced. That is
why there is such a strong domestic and international legislative framework to secure
compliance with arbitration awards properly made) That framework is well in line
with the fact that the award is the outcome of a process based on contract and,
therefore, binding. When we come to examine arbitration as understood elsewhere we
discover that in some cases the the agreement is not binding, and that in others both
the agreement and the award are not binding. The usefulness of arbitration in these
systems does not lie in the importance placed on its binding character (since it might
technically not be binding) or in the way in which compliance with its outcome is
enforced, but on the overrall perception of the process and the manner in which it is
conducted to lead invariably to a voluntary compliance with the settlement. That is
only possible because the participants view it not as a means of attributing fault and
thereafter declaring rights, but as means of healing a crack in the social order, caused
by the dispute from which the arbitration arose. This other perception of arbitration
in part underlies the attitude of parties from the developing world to international
arbitration in its present form, particularly when applied to contracts of a certain type.
The fact that international arbitration has failed to address this feature of
arbitration as understood elsewhere (including some countries with advanced
economies in Asia such as Japan) leaves the institution open to at least one line of
criticism: it is not global in its conception.'67 It has failed to incorporate other
characteristics of arbitration as known in the other group of countries. We address
those characteristics in chapter two.
1658 Co. 80a, 81b (1909); 76-77 ER, 595 & 597.
The principal international enforcement instrument being of course the New York Convention of
1958.
167David, Rén "David on Arbitration in International Trade" in The Art of Arbitration: Liber
Amicorum Pieter Sanders, (ed. by Schultsz and van den Berg), Kluwer, Deventer, 1982, 89, p. 92.
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CHAPTER TWO
ARBITRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CONCEPT AND NATURE
In the previous chapter we examined the nature of modern western commercial
arbitration by looking at some of its main characteristics. We concluded that although
it is a private dispute resolution mechanism, often free from the rigour in formality
and substance involved in litigation, it remains a basically adjudicatory process in
which the tribunal is expected to reach a decision as to the respective rights and
obligations of the parties out of conflicting claims. We will below examine in a
similar light the character of arbitration as understood in many developing countries.
We conclude here that it is not necessarily adjudicatory in most of these countries. In
the process we highlight the differences in the same institution between the two
systems. These differences, we suggest, explain in part why arbitration has been
accepted in the countries concerned with only little enthusiasm. The differences exist
in the concept as in the practice of the process. They also reflect a fundamental
difference between dispute resolution in the customary dispute settlement models of
these areas and those of Europe.
I Arbitration and Dispute Settlement in Developing Countries:
A The Conflict between the Individual and the Collective
In the first chapter we indicated, with reference to the western model, that
there is a difference between the individuals who make up a community and the
community itself, which provides the basis for the coffesponding difference between
the private interests of the individuals and the general interest of the community.
Although the difference was not expressed in general terms applicable to all societies,
that it exists is not in dispute. 1 However, what at any given time will amount to the
'Johnson, Conrad D "The Idea of Autonomy and the Foundation of Contractual Liability" (1983)
2 Law and Philosophy, 271.
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public interest and to what degree it should or should not prevail over the private
interest also varies from one society to another. The difference is dictated partly by
the members' shared perspective of the role of the individual in society. It is also
dictated by other factors, such as the level of material advancement in tecnology, of
the economy, and in social facilities.
In Europe, individualism was partly the product of industrialisation. Liberalism
in social, political and economic thought, and particularly about the role of the
individual in society, were also in part the product of the new means of production
and accumulation of wealth. We noted that private arrangements were regarded as the
best means of producing goods and securing progress. 2 The intervention of the state,
if at all, on behalf of the rest of the community was to be minimal. Private
arrangements and private interests should in all circumstances be upheld, unless the
public interest was affected in a material way, and there were compelling reasons why
they should not be given effect to. The interest of the general public became of
secondary importance and, in any case, its success depended on the extent to which
individuals were free to pursue private goals. It was the belief that it would not be in
the interest of the public if the state, acting for the community, were to interfere
excessively in privately arranged deals. What was just and fair for individuals was,
through them, also fair and useful to the rest of the society.
In many developing countries that scheme is reversed. The emphasis shifts
from the individual to the general. 3
 The collective interest is paramount and
individualism submerged. The group interest takes precedence over private interests
and justice is regarded from the point of view of what is primarily in the public
interest.4
 In these societies the "social contract", if such a thing is recognised,
precedes the private contract if not in time, certainly in importance. The validity of
any private arrangement (contractual or not) is measured by reference to its public
utility. This might have been so because in the main the needs of the individual were
2Rosenfeld, Michael "Contract and Justice: The Relation between Classical Contract Law and Social
Contract Theory" (1985) 70 Iowa L. Rev., 769.
3Allott, "African Law" in An Introduction to Le gal Systems (ed. by Derrett, J. D. M.), Sweet &
Maxwell, London, 1968, 131.
'Onuoha, Bede, The elements of African Socialism, Deutsch, London, 1965.
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seen as part of the needs of the wider community to which he belonged. All property,
including land, farms, the product of the farms and even children were regarded as
belonging to the conmiunity. There was limited private ownership, so that the
elements of individualism were absent. There was no mass production and no
dependence on it, on trade and on accumulated wealth. On the other hand there was
economic and social dependence by members of society on each other. The
interdependence was bound to give rise to a collective way and a collective
perspective of life. It is this collective perspective of life which in part explains the
above difference in the relationship between the position of the individual and that of
the group in Europe and in developing countries.
B. The Philosophical Background
We have already observed how the idea that an arbitration is a contract was
based on the doctrine of freedom of contract, which arose out of the political and
economic thought of 18th and 19th century Europe. The politics of Thomas Hobbes
had treated the individual, instead of the group, as the ultimate and as the basic unit
of society. All human activity was considered as the product of the individual's will.
We found this not only in Hobbes but also in Kant5 , according to whom the free will
constitutes the only source of legal obligations and of justice. Although Jean Jacques
Rousseau emphasised the "social contract", he spoke of it not as an overriding social
order but as the outcome of the manifestation of the will of individual members of
society to ensure that the property and liberty of each are protected. The social order
would therefore be nothing other than the aggregate of the individual will of the
members who constitute it. The social contract exist because individual members of
society have consented to its creation, with its continued existence explained on the
ground that future generations, by falling to exercise their right of revocation, are
assumed tacitly to have approved of it.
In third world communities, the existence of society is not accounted for on
5The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Princi ples of Jurisprudence as a
Science of Ri ght, (translation by William Hastie), Edinburgh, Clark, 1887.
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the basis of a contract, be it a "social contract". Society, it has been argued, 6
 is the
product-of nature and not of any free will. The society is viewed not as an aggregate
of individuals, each with his own personal rights and liberties, all grouped together in
a "contract" but rather in terms of groups, with the family, instead of Hobbes' and
Rousseau's individual, being treated as the basic social unit. 7
 The village, the clan and
the tribe are treated as the larger groups. Today, that Unit would be extended to
include the modem state, brought about by many years of foreign rule. These units are
all part of one social organism and held together not by any contract but, initially, by
nature through the bond of kinship8
 (for the family) and subsequently through the
influence of other social and natural factors (in the case of the village, the clan, the
tribe and the state). Whereas Rousseau and Hobbes saw society as an aggregate of
individuals, third world communities see and treat the society itself as the basic unit.
The society is an aggregate of itself. The separate identity of its individual members
disappears or is simply regarded as never having existed, in preference for the
collective identity of the society, against which every individual action is subject.
What then emerges is the dictatorship of the society over its individual
members. Private arrangements become subject to the interest of the rest of the
community which is considered paramount. It is community interest which validates
or invalidates all private arrangements. It provides the standard by which private
bargains are tested and upheld or rejected. The freedom of the individual does not
arise independently but it is acquired from society which confers it.
In 1940, Hans Kelsen criticised the principle of party autonomy on that
ground.9
 He rejected the theory that contracts are in themselves capable of creating
rights. If they did, it could only be by delegated legislation. It is only by fiat of the
law maker that party autonomy is conferred with the power to creat rights and
obligations or to modify previous ones. Since party autonomy is not self-generative
of rights, but does so only by virtue of its having been permitted by the law, it cannot,
6Onuoha, op. cit.
7lbid
8lbid
9"La Théorie Juridique de Ia Convention", (1939-40) 9-10 Archive de Philosophie du Droit, 33.
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on its own, provide a sufficient basis for the rule that contracts are binding. In a sense,
contracts are binding not so much because the parties have volunteered to it but
primarily because the society, having found it to be in its own interest to do so, has
conferred upon contracting parties the power to create circumstances binding on
themselves. As concerns arbitration, Kenneth Carlston observed that if the general will
(represented by the state) does not prohibit arbitration, it is the assumption that the
private aims pursued will also serve the public interest.'0
 This power is conferred by
public authority to be exercised consistently with the public interest. Thus, even where
party autonomy is conceded, it must still be made subject to the general will from
which it arises. Individualism and the supremacy of the will become secondary to the
general will.
II. A Different Perception of Adjudication and the Role of Arbitration:
The Collective View of Justice
Once the role of the individual is thus undermined, the community's perception
of justice is bound to change. The nature of arbitral justice administered is also bound
to reflect that conceptual background in that, in the relationship between group and
private interests, the group stands out victorious. Whenever in conflict with the general
interest, individual rights and freedoms, no matter how fundamental they may be, are
bound to be compromised. This does not suggest that the law had little regard for the
position of the individual. Keba Mbaye says that "... while only the group counts as
against third parties, the individual is far from being entirely deprived of rights within
that group." "However", he notes, "even within the group, the role of the individual
as such is relatively minor in Negro-African legal relations." Referring to A. N. Allott,
Mbaye goes on to say that "[e]ven those who hold that in the African system the
group does not wholly absorb the individual, admit that this is true." Allott himself
regarded the view that African Law was essentially one that gave precedence to group
'°"Theory of the Arbitration Process" (1952) 17 Law & Contemp. Probs., 631.
""The African Conception of Law", in International Enc yclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol II,
Chapter 1, p. 143, para. 242.
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rather than individual interests as a sweeping generalisation, although he also conceded
much truth in it:
[a]s with so many generalisations, there is some truth in these. African
Laws were undoubtedly dominated to a degree unmatched in modern
individualist legal systems by group and community rights and powers.
But African Laws did accord legal capacity to individuals to hold
interests in property, to negotiate with each other, and to appear as
principals in litigation. These rights and powers were often conditioned
by the prior rights of the communities of which their holders formed
part"2 (emphasis added),
although he added that the same, it could be argued, is true of modem laws. Allott
concludes, although with the same reservation as above, that "... African Laws, with
their strong organisation of tribe, family, age-grades, societies and other associations,
undoubtedly emphasise the corporate and collective, at the expense of the individual
element in social life and law ..." (emphasis added).
Thus, breaking a contract for example, is regarded not only as a wrong done
to the other contracting party but primarily as a disruption of an existing social
order.'4
 The imbalance thus created has to be restored by a process which emphasises
the greater need for harmony in society than to upholding the private rights of the
particular individual on whose side the law might appear to be.' 5
 There should be no
individual winner or loser. There remains only the group as winner. On the other
hand, if the harmonising process breaks down, there will also be only one loser,
personified in the same group.
The implications for the dispute resolution process then become what in the
words of Yoshiyuki Noda, writing on the conception of law in China and Japan,
considers as a question "... not of deciding which case is better founded, but of
making both parties [and a fortiori the middleman] understand what is their duty in
'2Supra p. 147
'3lbid
'4Holleman, J. F. Issues in African Law, The Aflican Studiecentrum, The Hague, 1974.
'5Ibid
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order to restore the peace they have disturbed." 6
 "What matters", the same writer
says, "is not for each party to prove his case, but for each to reflect whether the
position complies with the dao." 7 Similarly, according to Allott, reconciliation or
restoration of harmony lies at the basis of the very notion of African adjudication:
[t]he job of a court or an arbitrator is less to find the facts, state the
rules of law, and apply them to the facts than to set right a wrong in
such a way as to restore harmony within the disturbed community.
Harmony will not be restored unless the parties are satisfied that justice
has been done. The complainant will accordingly want to see that the
legal rules, including those which specify the appropriate recompense
for a given wrong, are applied by the court. But the party at fault must
be brought to see how his behaviour has fallen short of the standard set
for his particular role as involved in the dispute, and he must come to
accept that the decision of the court is a fair one. On his side he wants
an assurance that once he has admitted his error and made recompense
for it he will be re-integrated into the community.'8
In his reflections on the Far Eastern and African conceptions of law, Professor
René David more carefully and forcefully sets out the position in words which we
would do better to quote extensively than to paraphrase. While reflecting on the other
view of the western notion that the principle and rule of law, strictly complied with,
are the hallmark of the proper administration of justice, David says that attitude
is not only strange, but absurd and shocking in the eyes of a very large part
of humanity. The [Far East and Black Africa] reject the idea of law as a
principle. For the peoples of these countries it is sadly necessary in some cases
to pronounce a sentence, to impose a solution to someone who has not
respected the rules in use in society, but the delivery of a judgment providing
a sanction cannot be regarded as normal; still less does it deserve to be
' 6"The Far Eastern Conception of Law", in International Enc yclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol.
II, Chapter 1, p. 128, para. 208.
' 7lbid; the dao is the Chinese view of life that emphasises the importance of harmony.
' 8Supra p. 145. J.D.M. Derrett, the editor of the collection of articles, agrees that the view
corresponds to the traditional Indian view of litigation: ibid.
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advocated as a desirable means of settlement in human relationships. Disputes
and crimes are looked on as sicknesses disturbing the proper functioning of the
social "body". These accidents should be treated as such; they do not call for
authoritarian solutions; conflicts, when thay occur, must be not resolved, but
"dissolved" by conciliation procedures. In all circumstances, the essential is to
restore harmony, for harmony among men, linked to the harmony of the
cosmos, is something which must be ensured if it is desired that the world live
in peace according to the natural order. At the end of a lawsuit there must be
neither victor nor vanquished. A solution cannot be really good if it is
imposed.
Thus an ideal of social peace and harmony is opposed to the ideal of the rule
of law which dominates [western] (and [moslem]) thought. The broad and
generous wisdom of [Africa] and the [East] sees in the foreground not the
rights and interests of individauls, but their obligations and the needs of both
sides, and many factors are taken into consideration to make both sides accept
a solution, whose merit lies in its "just", not in its "legal" nature. Justice
requires that the incident which has occured be liquidated fully and finally, so
that peace and harmony may be restored
The law only looks at part of the problem. Seeing that it leaves aside this
essential concern with the harmony of the body social, it cannot be considered
as good. In the [West] and in [Islam] it is the object of study and veneration,
but it is looked on with scorn in [China, Japan and Korea]. Traditionally,
neither lawyers nor schools of law are to be found in these countries. The
courts are deserted; honest men do not resort to them; .... Everything must be
settled outside by conciliation .... Even arbitration is rejected; nobody wants
a procedure resulting in a sentence which is imposed on the parties without
their acceptance
The same idea reigns in [black Africa] and in [Madagascar]. In these countries,
likewise, people do not understand how, except in the case of certain crimes,
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there can be a solution to litigation without the acceptance of those concerned.
The [African] traditional courts are conciliation bodies; a case is never fmally
closed, and can always be reopened so long as those concerned have not
agreed to the solution proposed. The President of the Supreme Court of
Senegal tells of the Africans' total incomprehension when faced with the
justice of European inspiration whose decisions, to them, always appear
repressive in civil matters, because they are not conciliatory.'9
It is thus possible even at this stage to say that for international commercial
arbitration, the above conception of the role of adjudication dictates a change in the
prevailing theoretical and practical approaches to the international arbitral process,
now completely built on the western model, to accomodate the other attitude
particularly when it involves parties from those parts of the world. What might be of
more significance is the recognition of that other approach as a serious alternative to
the perception of arbitration both in domestic and international arbitration. For
example, in the foreign investment area and the domain of state contracts generally,
the need to look beyond what type of relationship should remain between the
investment communities and host states and to maintain a healthy climate certainly
call for a modification of the present philosohpy and trends in international arbitration.
The late Professor David also recognised that approach as most appropriate even in
the context of international law itself. He stated that it is clearly a mistake to attempt
to develop international law on the concept of vested rights; "1 'essentiel est ici", he
said, "d'assurer la paix et, au délà de cet objectjffondamental, d'organiser une
cooperation, profitable a l'humanité dans son ensemble, entre des nations reconnues
solidaires."2°
ifi. The Nature of Arbitration:
A. Whether it is a Contract
9"Introduction", in International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol. II, Chapter 1, pp. 5-6,
paras. 7-9.
20L'Arbitrage dans Ic Commerce International, Economica, Paris, 1982, p. 29.
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With that in mind it becomes necessary to ask whether in these countries
arbitration is based on a contract. It may happen that in many respects the customary
practices of many of the developing countries show some similarity with the practice
in the West. For example the hearing may be in private and the composition of the
tribunal completely determined by the parties themselves. In the main, however, there
are significant differences between arbitration in the West and what has been regarded
as the same process in many of the countries. These differences explain some of the
fears entertained by those involved in the process from the developing world. The
differences arise from the fact that whereas in the West the rules governing the
process have been developed by the law and in the case of commercial arbitration
further shaped by business practices, again with the support of the law, in developing
countries the process remains essentially a matter of approach and perspective.
One of the main differences is that customary arbitration in many developing
countries is not based on contract. It does not necessarily arise from the agreement of
the disputants to submit their differences to a third party either immediately, or in
advance, in anticipation of a dispute.
In the first place, resort to arbitration may not arise from a consensual
arrangement. In an article on the conciliation boards set up under the 1958 Ceylon
Conciliation Boards Act, 2' Goonesekere and Barry Metzger observed that an
arbitration before a local tribunal did not always arise from a voluntary submission of
the parties to a third party. It was not necessary that such an agreement should have
been reached in advance. The process could be initiated by one party, usually the
complainant, who brought his claim before a competent third party, leaving it to the
latter to summon the defendant to appear and answer the complaint. J. N. Matson
makes the same observation in respect of customary arbitration in Ghana. The same
practice is noted by A. N. Allott, who states in respect of Akan customary law in
Ghana that in many cases the arbitrator (especially where he was also vested with
21 "The Conciliation Boards Act: Entering the Second Decade" (1971) 2 Journ. Ceylon Law, 35.
"The Supreme Court and the Customary Judicial Process in the Gold Coast" (1953) 2 ICLQ, 47.
"Kwasi v. Larbi (1953) A.C.164 - Akan Customary law of "Arbitration" in the Gold Coast",
(1953) 2 ICLQ, 446.
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political or other form of customary authority over the disputants) merely summoned
the attendance of the defendant after the plaintiff's request. Thus, he says, "... the
original bringing of the complaint to arbitration does not always rest on the agreement
of both parties." The first moves in the process did not therefore rest on a prior
agreement, as it was not necessary that all the parties should have consented in
advance.
In Islamic law, however, a "submission" to arbitration is classified as a
contract.' At first sight the legal nature of arbitration in Islamic law could as a result
be explained on grounds of contract. However, to a large extent, it remains a contract
of an unusual character in that it is still not recognised as binding as all other
contracts. The process can be brought to an end either by agreement of both
contracting parties (since it is consensual) or, strangely, by a unilateral act of any of
them. According to El-Ahdab, a view attributed to the Imam Shafi'i holds that
"awards are only enforceable if the parties agree and thus arbitration would not have
a jurisdictional nature, [binding character?] but would be closer to conciliation."26
This is so because Moslem law, like the Roman law,27
 has not evolved a general
theory of contract,28
 so that only certain specified contracts in Islamic law are
binding.29
 Arbitration does not fall into any of the specified categories.
Second, according to Samir Saleh3° and Sayed Hassan Axnin, 3 ' arbitration
24Ibid p. 469.
Amin, Sayed Hassan: Commercial Arbitration in Islamic and Iranian Law, Vahid publications,
Tehiran, 1984.
26E1-Ahdab, Abdul Hamid, Arbitration with the Arab Countries, Kiuwer, Deventer, 1990, Part 1,
Section I.
27See Prichard, A. M. Leage's Roman Private Law, 3rd Edn., Macmillan & Co., London, 1961.
Prichard says that "[tihe Romans had no unified law of contract, just a system of several distinct
contracts", ibid p. 315. Alan Watson also states that "[t]he Romans did not develop a general theory
of contract. Every contract had a separate birth and a specific raison d'être": Contract of Mandate in
Roman Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961, p. 1; see also Didsdi, Gy Contract in Roman Law: From
the Twelve Tables to the Glassators, Akadémiai Kiadd, Budapest, 1981, p. 79.
El-Ahdab, supra p. 25.
30Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: A Stud y in Sharia and Statute Law, Graham and
Trotman, London, 1984.
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in Islamic law is said to be of the nature of a contract of agency, from which a party
can withdraw unless it has been made for the benefit of a third party or confirmed by
a judge. This view, which is shared by all the Islamic schools of jurisprudence except
the Malikis, stems from the fact that the authority of the arbitrator, unless confirmed
by a judge, is revocable by any of the parties at any time before the award is made.
E1-Ahdab states that under the "Medjella (the first civil codification of Moslem law
under Ottoman rule) the appointment of arbitrators "could be revoked at any time
unless the court had authori[s]ed or approved their appointment. 32
 In this case,
arbitrators became delegates of the judge and their appointment could no longer be
revoked."33
 In fact Amin states that in the Shi'i school the authority of the arbitrator
is, at the will of any of the parties to the proceedings, revocable at any time even after
it has been confirmed by a judge?' That seems unique to the Shi'i school. In the
other schools, in the absence of the continuing consent of both parties, the authority
of the arbitrator to proceed with his function ceases unless prior to entering the
submission he had previously been confirmed in that role by a judge of a regular
Islamic court, whereupon his authority to proceed on the reference becomes a
delegation of the powers of a judge and irrevocable by the parties.35
Finally, we are also informed that "[a]rbitration agreements do not oust the
jurisdiction of the courts because they are not binding. Thus, if one of the parties
resorts to the courts despite the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the courts can
decide upon the dispute without taking into account the existence of the arbitration
agreement. "
31Supra.
32The authority of the arbitrator remained revocable under English law for a long time following
Vynior's case, 8 Co. 80a, 81b (1609); 77 ER, 595 & 597 until the beginning of the 19th century, when
it was abolished by the Arbitration Act 1889, Section 1.
330p. Cit. p. 19.
34Supra p. 35.
35El-Ahdab, supra p. 19.
Jbid p. 26.
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Saleh notes37 that arbitration clauses (as distinguished from a "submission")
are not even referred to in Sharia jurisprudence. As in the old Belgian and French civil
codes arbitration is only referred to as a submission of an existing dispute to a
settlement by a neutral third party. It would in the circumstances be that an
undertaking to submit to arbitration before the existence of a dispute is void in Islamic
law, not only because it is not recognised by the Sharia, but also on account of its not
being capable of compliance with the conditions prescribed for the validity of a
reference after the dispute has arisen. The requirements are stated by Saleh 38 to be:
(a) that there should be a dispute in existence; (b) that the parties should give their
consent to the reference of the dispute to arbitration; (c) an acceptance of the
designated arbitrator(s) to enter the reference and (d) that the dispute should be
determined in accordance with the principles of Islamic law. We are only concerned
with the first three requirements since the fourth does not arise until after the dispute
has been decided by the arbitrator.
Since an arbitration clause cannot meet the first requirement it cannot be
enforced. Saleh seems at first to suggest that in that case the clause may be treated in
the same way as an ordinary term of the contract and upheld as such. 39 However, the
same author immediately dismisses the suggestion on the ground that by providing for
an arbitration clause the parties would be relying on a future and unknown event as
a condition upon which the operation of that clause depends. Such a condition will be
regarded as void since Islamic contract law frowns against uncertainties. 40 Saleh
points out that
[i]f, as it is believed, the settlement of a dispute is considered the main
object of an arbitration agreement, in inserting an arbitration clause the
parties would be agreeing on the intervention of a future and unknown
'Supra pp. 48-49.
!bidp. 21.
39Ibid, p. 49. It may be worth recollecting that in chapter 1 we noted how, faced with the same
problem, the Belgian Court of Cassation consistently upheld the arbitration clause on the ground that
even if it was not regulated by the Code of civil procedure, an arbitration clause (the "clause
compromissoire") is in any case consistent with the principle of party autonomy (see the cases referred
to in chapter 1, note 139 ), contrary to the attitude of the French courts and writers on the same issue.
40Saleh, supra p. 50.
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event. This uncertainty, save for a few exceptions in future sales
restrictively recognised by the Hanafis, would be a ground for the
annulment of the arbitration clause, and it would be considered "batil"
(null and void). If the existence of a dispute is considered a non-
fundamental element of arbitration, a mere suspensive condition on the
occurrence of which the arbitration clause - valid ab initio - would
become enforceable, the arbitration clause can be challenged on another
ground: arbitration contracts are among the contracts which cannot be
conditional according to the Hanafi and Shafi'i schools. Furthermore,
the very concept of a suspensive condition does not exist in the Maliki
and Hanbali schools.4'
Saleh further submits that if the object of an arbitration clause is the same as
an undertaking to refer an existing dispute, it would be against the policy of the law
to uphold the former while treating the latter as a merely permissive contract ("jaiz")
which can be revoked by any of the parties. If the "submissiom" is expressly
recognised by Sharia as being by its nature revocable, then, a fortiori, the arbitration
clause inserted in a contract or expressed in a separate document and providing for the
settlement of a future dispute (unknown to Islamic law) cannot be regarded as
irrevocable. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the policy of the law, which is to
subject all references to arbitration (being an exceptional exercise of judicial power),
to specific conditions laid down by law and controlled by the courts. The absence of
those conditions will render a submission void. Therefore to treat an arbitration clause
more leniently would, according to Saleh,"... be contrary to Shari'i's essential nature
••,u42 since it will amount to giving an agreement to submit to arbitration of a future
dispute greater legal effect than a submission to an existing dispute simply by
"invoking the multivalent and all-purpose maxim pacta sunt servanda"43 (italics
added).
Apparently, Islamic law gives the two main stages of the arbitration process
41IbW
42Supra p. 50.
43Ibid
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separate treatments. Whereas the arbitration agreement itself is not regarded as
binding, the award, on the other hand, is binding. This is so because that system treats
the award as comparable to a judgment, thus rendering it final, binding and
enforceable against the parties. For Saleh, the implication is that although one party
can withdraw from the process at any time by revoking the authority of the arbitrator,
he forfeits that opportunity once the award is made.' So, although Islamic arbitration
may start in law as a non-binding arrangement, it assumes considerable significance
after an award is made. As far as the arbitration agreement itself is concerned the legal
effect of not treating it as binding in Islamic law is that it is probably not a contract
in the modem sense.45
The fact that arbitration is in these systems not regarded as founded on a
contract has many consequences which reflect on the differences between the concept
as understood in the practice of modern international commercial arbitration and in
many developing countries. One of the effects is that both the agreement and the
process itself are revocable. One of the parties can revoke the agreement or withdraw
from the process without being in breach of contract. In many of the systems this right
to resile exists at any time before the award is handed. Contrary to the weight of
judicial opinion in some jurisdictions in Africa, such as Ghana, Professor Allott has
shown that such is the practice among the Akan of the same country. It has also
been shown that the same right exists in the arbitration practice of many other groups
in the same country.47
B. Not an Arbitration?
If arbitration in these systems is not necessarily a contract, the question that
arises, as Allott indicated in relation to Ghana, is whether in dealing with "arbitration"
Supra p. 76.
45E1-Ahdab, p. 26.
(1953) 2 ICLQ, 446.
47Koranteng-Addow, G., Customary Arbitration in the Legal System of Ghana, Ph.D. Thesis,
University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1974.
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we are referring to the same process with the same legal regime and the same effects
in law in Europe as in developing countries.' Has arbitration got the same meaning
in the two groups of countries?. The question has been raised and discussed at some
length in respect of Ghanaian customary law.49
The Privy Council, the ultimate court with appellate jurisdiction over the
former British colonies and dependencies, had, on an appeal from the West African
Court of Appeal sitting in Ghana, delivered an opinion on the character and legal
nature of Fanti customary arbitration. 50 The issue was whether certain customary
proceedings which had taken place before a panel of elders in a locality in Ghana in
respect of title to a piece of land were in the nature of an arbitration and, if so, what
their legal effect would have been. An action had been started before a customary
court. It was withdrawn by the elders of the area and by agreement of the litigants
submitted to a panel of eleven elders for a settlement. At some stage in the
proceedings the appellants dissociated themselves from it and asked for the refund of
the sum of £12 which they had advanced to signify their consent to submit to the
proceedings. It is not clear whether the money was refunded but the appellants
thereafter withdrew from the proccedings and a decision was given in favour of the
respondents. The case came back before the customary court and the respondents
moved for the enforcement of the decision of the elders as having finally determined
the issue. The appellants objected partly on the ground that they had withdrawn from
the proceedings and were therefore not bound by the panel of elders' decision.
Before the West African Court of Appeal and the Privy Council it was
contended for the appellants that the proceedings were not an arbitration but a
negotiation for settlement and that, even if they had been an arbitration, it was an
arbitration by customary law which, it was submitted, was different from the type
known under English law and under English derived Ghanaian law. It was submitted
for the appellants that under the particular customary law it was right for a party who
(1953) 2 ICLQ, 446.
See Koranteng-Addow, supra; AlIott, supra; and Matson, supra. See also Elombi, "Customary
Arbitration: A Ghanaian Trend Reversed in Nigeria" (1993) 5 African Journal of Int'l & Comp. Law,
803.
50Kwasi v Larbi [1953] A.C. 164; 13 W.A.C.A., 76.
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had consented to such proceedings to withdraw before or after the award is given. The
Privy Council, affirming the West African Court of Appeal, rejected the appellant's
submission and held that since the parties had submitted to arbitration without
reserving the right to withdraw the appellants had not established that such a right, so
inconsistent with the basic conception of (English?) arbitration, existed in customary
law and that the appellants had therefore not made-out their case. The Board further
held that in the absence of evidence as to whether there was a right in customary law
to withdraw before the award, such a right did not exist. Presumably, the Board would
have upheld the appellants' submission on that point if there had been sufficient
evidence that the right to resile from an arbitration was recognised in Akan customary
law.
The Privy Council's decision in Kwasi v Larbi was invariably followed in
Ghana before independence and continues to represent the law there. 51 The then
Supreme Court of Ghana had, prior to that decision, evolved a new concept of
arbitration said to be "according to native customary law" out of a number of cases
involving the nature of customary arbitration in Ghana. 52 During and after
independence the Ghanaian courts and the West African Court of Appeal laid down
in a series of cases53 what they considered to be the essentials of customary
arbitration. The courts held that for such arbitration to exist it must be shown not only
that there is a voluntary submission of the dispute to the tribunal but also that there
is an agreement in advance by both parties that the decision of the tribunal shall be
fmal and binding.
In 1930 the West African Court of Appeal had attempted in Kobina v Obeng
Akese to lay down the general principles on which a court should proceed in setting
aside or upholding the award of an arbitrator. The general rule was stated in terms that
"... as the parties choose their own arbitrator to be the judge in the dispute between
51Kom, Enoch "Customary Arbitration" (1987-88) 16 Rev. Ghana Law, 148.
52See for example Ayafie v Banyea [1884] Fanti Law Reports, 38.
'3See for example Kobina Foli v Obeng Akese (1930) 1 W.A.C.A., 1; Assampong v Amuaku [1930]
1 W.A.C.A., 192; Ankrah v Dabra (1956) 1 W.A.C.A., 89; Bodu II v Caesar [1959] G.L.R., 411;
Nyaasemhwe v Afibiyesan (1977) 1 G.L.R.. 27, C.A.; Zogli v Ganyo (1977) 1 G.L.R., 297, C.A.
(1930) I W.A.C.A., 1.
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them, they cannot when the award is good on its face, object to his decision, either
upon the law or on the facts." 55 For that proposition, the Court of Appeal cited as
authority the statement of Maule J. in Fuller v Fenwick,56 an English case of 1846.
The material part of the statement is to the effect that the courts "... treat a reference
as an agreement by the parties to bring matters both of law and of facts to the
arbitrator and to consider his award fmal unless there is something upon the face of
it which is inconsistent ..." It is not clear whether in Kobina v Akese the court had
been dealing with a case of customary arbitration, for, although the arbitration
concerned a dispute between two local communities over title to a piece of land, the
appointed arbitrator was a judge of the Supreme Court of Ghana. No reference,
whether express or to be implied from the judgment, is made to suggest that the court
might have been dealing with arbitration in customary law. Meanwhile it is possible
to infer from the judgment that in stating its guiding principle the Court was referring
to English or Ghanaian statutory arbitration (which have always been similar). This
is evident from the fact that the former West African Court of Appeal in Kobena v
Abeng Akese cites an English authority in support without explaining how an English
decision with no connection with the colony could be authority for a principle of
customary law.
The judgment was relied upon by the same Court of Appeal in Kwasi v Larbi
although the court in Larbi assumed, wrongly, it is submitted, that its previous
statement (in Kobena v Akese) also applied to arbitration according to customary law
and local practices in Ghana. The Court also cited the case of Ekua Ayafie v Kwamina
Banyea57 as having laid down that "... where matters in dispute between parties are
investigated at a meeting, and in accordance with customary law and usage, a decision
is given, it is binding on the parties ••'t58, although there had been no evidence of
customary law itself in the scanty report of that case. When it was submitted to the
court that Fanti law differed slightly from Akan law (the latter being the relevant law
55!bid. p. 2, per Deane CJ.
16 L. J. C. P. 79.
[1884] Fanti Law Reports, 38.
58Thid.
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in Kwasi v Larbi) in that under Akan law, a party was entitled to reject an award, the
court rejected the suggestion on the ground that customary law is based on good
reason and that Akan customary law could not be so repugnant to good sense as to
allow a losing party in arbitral proceedings to reject the award when it was
disfavourable to him.59 Not surprisingly it is precisely on that point that the judges
of the Privy Council determined the dispute when the case came before them. While
declining to lay down any general principles as to customary law due to the scantiness
of material before it, the Privy Council nontheless thought that the right to resile was
inconsistent with the concept of (English?) arbitration and could therefore not be
upheld because the parties had given their consent to the submission. That original
consent was assumed to be binding on the parties through-out the proceedings and
after as is the case in English arbitration.
The better approach, we suggest, would have been to refer the case back to the
courts below or call more evidence for a fmding on the correct position under the
relevant custom. That approach would have been correct in law on account of the
position in Ghana and other West African statutory courts at the time, including the
Privy Council, to treat customary law as a question of fact and not of law, 6°
 in
default of which a court will have been required to adjourn for further inquiry as to
the correct position in the relevant custom. However, at the same time, it was also the
position that English law would have applied as the residual law in the absence of
local law (statutory or customary). In the present case the course adopted by the Privy
Council was quite straight forward although also misleading. It consisted, in the
absence of evidence on the custom, in treating the issue as if it were the same in
English law and, in the place of the unproven custom, to substitute the rule in English
arbitration law that initial consent of the parties, once given, is final and irrevocable.
We must note that in the particular case the custom was simply unproven. It
was not said that it did not exist, although in the absence of evidence, the Board was
willing to accept that it did not. The Board then went a step further and declared that
any other view, and in particular the idea that in custom the parties could still
(1956) 13 W.A.C.A. 81, p. 82.
60See Kobina Angu v Cudjoe Auah (1874-1928) P.C., 43; Amissah v Krabah (1936) 2 W.A.C.A.
30; Gbadainosi Adewoyin v Sanusi Adeniji (1956) 13 W.A.C.A. 191.
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withdraw, would be repugnant to the concept of arbitration. The underlying
assumption in that ruling is that arbitration is a contract and according to the rules of
the system under which the judges were trained, (which are not the same as those of
the customary laws they had had to deal with), contracts must be strictly complied
with from formation to discharge. Yet, as we indicate above, arbitration in these
systems is not binding in the same way as arbitration in the West or as contracts
generally and, therefore, not necessarily to be regarded as a contract. Even where it
is so considered, as in Islamic law, the contract may not be binding.
Kwasi v Larbi has been applied in many cases in Ghana6' with unfortunate
consequences for customary arbitration, since its appeal to those to whom it is
applicable has significantly dropped as a result. 62 The case was strongly criticised by
Professor Allott, 63
 who undertook the necessary inquiry and argued, with
considerable evidence gathered by himself on the field in support, that not only did
the right to resile before the completion of the arbitration exist and recognised under
the relevant custom, it was also the position that the proceedings before the panel of
elders was not an arbitration as understood in English law or under English derived
Ghanaian law.M Rather, it was what he describes as a "negotiation for settlement".65
According to Al1ott the right to resile under the customary law appeared so
inconsistent with the basic conception of arbitration only because the Privy Council
had failed to realise that arbitration under Akan law and under English law were not
the same. He further found that under Akan customary law the agreement to be bound
by the award came after and not before the making of the award. He concluded that
it was wrong to draw a distinction between arbitration under Fanti law and a
negotiation for settlement since an "arbitration" under Fanti law is no more than an
61See the cases referred to in note 53.
Kom, op. cit. p. 167.
63(1953) 2 ICLQ, 446
Mlbid; see also Abgosu, L. K. "Arbitration under the Customary law" (1983-86) 15 Rev. Ghana
Law, 204.
Ibidp. 475.
Ibid.
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attempt at a reconciliation. In other words arbitration as known in English law and
arbitration in Akan customaiy law are two different processes.
Allott is supported in his view by J. N. Matson, a one time judicial adviser in
Ghana who, while commenting on a decision of the West African Court of Appeal,67
also took the view68 that such a distinction as said to exist between customary
arbitration and an attempt at a reconciliation did not exist but that, if there were, it
would only be one of degree and not of kind. The view is shared by Hannigan,69
who also found that the parties must give their consent to the award of the arbitrator
before it can become binding and by Koranteng-Addow, who devoted an entire
dissertation7° to demonstrate that in many ways, particularly in respect of the time
when consent is effective to create a binding award, arbitration in Ghanaian
customary law is different from Ghanaian statutory arbitration, which is similar to
arbitration in English law.
Elsewhere, among the Nyakyuasa in Tanzania, it is said that "[t]he third party
listened to both sides and made his decision. It was not considered binding on the
parties."7 ' We should point out that the third party "made his decision" (emphasis
added). He was not merely conciliating in the modern sense. He was adjudicating. Yet,
among the Nyakyusa, his decision was not binding if the parties withdrew from it or
if they did not feel obliged. For, as Cariston further notes,
[they] would carry it out only if they agreed with it. If the third party
was unavailable to make a decision or his decision was not accepted
by the parties and the dispute still continued, resort was then made to
the village headman for a decision. Finally, appeal could be made to
67Gyesiwa v Mensah, W.A.C.A. Civ. App. No. 5W1947 (unreported).
(l952) 2 ICLQ, 47.
'9Hannigan, St. J. J., "The Impact of English Law upon the existing Gold Coast Custom and the
Possible Development of the Resulting System", (1956) 8 J. A. A., 128.
'°Customary Arbitration in the Legal System of Ghana, op. cit. (1974).
7tCarlston, Kenneth S., Social Theory and African Tribal Organization: The Development of Socio-
legal Theory, University of Illinois Press, 1968, p. 350.
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the chiefs court!
Kwasi v Larbi and the Ghanaian cases before and after that decision have not
been followed in Nigeria. The Nigerian Supreme Court has recently held that
customary arbitration is the settlement by compromise of a dispute based on the
voluntary submission of the parties to a non-judicial body with the freedom to resile
if the decision were unfavourable.73 The Court has consistently stated that for the
decision to be binding it has to be accepted at the time it is made and the right to
resile exists at any time before then. Kariby-Whyte, JSC, stated in Agu v Ikewibe that
the "suggested award ... becomes binding only after ... signification of its acceptance,
from which either party is free to resile at any stage of the proceedings up to that
point."74 The Supreme Court cited with approval the statement by T. 0. Elias 75 that
customary arbitration is based on subsequent acceptance (not prior agreement) of the
award by the parties, with the right of either party to withdraw from the proceedings
at any time before he has acknowledged his acceptance of the award. In Equere
inyang v Essien76 the Nigerian Supreme Court (then, - in 1957 - still a Court of
Appeal with fmal appeals to the Privy Council in England) had held that certain
proceedings conducted by a traditional council, i. e., an Imam Council, did not result
in a binding arbitration, as one of the parties had not accepted the decision of the
council. That decision could therefore not be relied upon to support a plea of res
judicata. Similarly the High Court of Owerri in Eastern Nigeria reduced the essentials
of a valid arbitration under the relevant customry law (Igbo) to the acceptance of the
"terms of the arbitration" and the acceptance by the parties to be bound by the
decision, such acceptance being given at the time of the award.77
72Ibid.
'3Agu v Ikewibe (1991) 3 NWLR, Part 180, 385 (S. Ct Nigeria); Ohiaeri v Akabezi (1992) 2 NWLR,
Part 221, 1 (S. Ct Nigeria); Awosile v Sotumbo (1993) 5 NWLR, Part 243, 514 (S. Ct Nigeria).
74Ibid p. 407; Ohiaeri v Akabezi, ibid pp. 23-24, per Akpata, JSC.
75The Nature of African Customary Law, London, 1956, p. 212.
76[ 1957J S.C.N.L.R.,1 12.
77Phillip Njoku v Felix Ekeocha [1972] 2 E.C.L.R., 199. Contra, Oline v Obodo (1958) 3 F.S.C.,
84, which, however construed, must now be considered bad law in the light of the decisions in Agu v
Ikewibe and Ohiaeri v Akabezi, supra.
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Islamic law does not also see arbitration in exactly the same way as Western
Arbitration. Already we have pointed out that under the majority of the Sunni schools
of Sharia jurisprudence, with the exception of the Maliki school, it is the general view
that since arbitration is a merely permissible contract (jaiz), it cannot be binding
unless confirmed by a judge of an Islamic court (quadis). Until such confirmation is
obtained any party can withdraw from the proceedings by revoking the authority of
the arbitrator. In such circumstances, where the validity of the process depends not on
the initial consent to the submission but on its continuous acceptance, it cannot be
described as a contract. To that extent, at least, the process differs from arbitration as
now understood in western legal systems.
That treatment of arbitration in some of the customary laws and in Islamic law
should not come as a complete surprise. Although the Privy Counsel in Kwasi v Larbi
describes the right to withdraw as "repugnant", the position in English law itself did
not change until relatively recently.78 Given the hostility of the courts toward an
arbitration agreement in England it became the law, following Vynior's case,79 that
a party could withdraw from the proceedings at any time before the award. Since only
nominal damages were available for breach of the undertaking to submit to
arbitration,8° it became the practice to ensure that the undertaking was made with a
penal bond, as in Vynior's case itself, or to obtain an order of the court confirming the
arbitrators, thus rendering it impossible for any one party to revoke the authority of
the arbitrator. 8 ' It may be interesting to note the similarity with the position in
Islamic law, where the authority of the arbitrator to proceed with the hearing did not
also become irrevocable until confirmed by a judge. The binding character of the
arbitration agreement did not become defmite in England until 1889 with the passing
of the Arbitration Act of the same year providing in Section 1 that "[a] submission,
unless a contrary intention is expressed therein, shall be irrevocable, except by leave
of the court or judge, and shall have the same effect in all respects as if it had been
78Arbitration Act 1889, Section 1.
8 Co. 80a, 81b (1609); 77 ER, 595 & 597.
80Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. 14, p. 189.
81Ibid.
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made an order of court." As if that were inadequate Paragraph (h) of the first
Schedule to the Act added that it is to be implied from the submission of the parties
that "[the award to be made by the arbitrators or umpire shall be final and binding
on the parties and the persons claiming under them respectively."
Yet, even the new development itself has not totally taken root. The legislator
in England, for example, still treats the binding character of an arbitration agreement
with some reserve. The UK legislator thinks that the rule should still admit of
exceptions in areas where it is appropriate, such that, under the Consumer Arbitration
Agreements Act 1988, a consumer retains the option to litigate a dispute in relation
to which he had already submitted to arbitration. The arbitration agreement as a result
becomes unenforceable against the consumer so that the discretion of the courts under
Section 4 of the Arbitration Act 1950 to stay court proceedings brought in disregard
of an arbitration agreement ceases to exist. 83 Professor Rhidian Thomas says of the
effect of the legislation that it is "... against the sentiment of the times for it detracts
from the philosophy of contractual sanctity and finality now strongly associated with
arbitration agreements ... for under its terms an arbitration agreement may be ignored
by a consumer without legal consequences."8'
IV. Conclusion: An Alternative
The difference between arbitration as understood in Europe and arbitration in
many developing countries lies in the character of arbitration and particularly in the
overall attitude to the function of adjudication generally. 85 Both have implications for
arbitration as an alternative form of dispute settlement. One implication is concerned
with the acceptance of arbitration in its present form in developing countries. Another
implication arises in relation to the contribution of developing countries to the
evolution of the concept and the practice of arbitration itself in international trade.
The provision is re-enacted as Section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1950.
83Section 1(3). The Act does not apply to international arbitration agreements: Section 2(a).
"Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act 1988" (1991) 57 Arbitration, 48, p. 48.
Fine, I. D. "Continuum or chasm? Can West meet East?" (1989) 6 Journ Int'l. Arb'n., Part 4, 27.
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Both implications are related in their bearing on the general attitude to the role of
adjudication. It would appear that the neglect or ignorance of the perception in many
developing countries of the function of adjudication accounts to a significant extent
to the attitude of third world parties to arbitration in matters of international trade.
On the question of the acceptability of modern international commercial
arbitration to parties from the developing world, much has been said regarding their
concerns on such issues as the absence of arbitration venues in countries of the
"south" and the appointment of counsel and members of arbitration tribunals of
nationalities other than of developed countries. 86
 Concerns have also been expressed
regarding the conduct of most arbitrations under the umbrella of institutions and by
reference to national or institutional procedural rules foreign to parties from the
developing world.87
 The question of the applicable substantive standards have also
been addressed from time to time in both academic writings and arbitration awards
although only in terms suggesting that developing countries will do better if they
adhered to the Euro-centred consensus on the content of those rules. According to
Paulsson, third world countries demanding for a change in the substantive legal
framework on the basis that they do not receive adequate protection should simply be
reassured that "... the traditional [western] analysis of the civil law of obligations do
not prevent due consideration of cases of manifest inequality in contractual relations
"88
Even the question of the contribution of the developing world to the
development of arbitration has been approached only in terms of their participation in
the creation and formulation of western inspired institutions and rules such as the
UNCITRAL Model Law, ICSID, and MTGA and the adoption by the countries of new
legislation consistently with Western inspired models, including their adherence, upon
attaining independence, to already established instruments such as the New York
Convention. In fact Gabriel Wilner says in disapproval that it is assumed, as a result.
See references in Introduction.
See for example Paulsson, Jan "Third World Participation in International Investment Arbitration"
(1987) 2 ICSID Rev., - FU.J., 19.
Ulbid p. 58.
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that the acceptance of arbitration by developing countries is merely a matter of
educating the governments and the business and legal circles there to the advantages
of the process."89
It is hardly contemplated that there could be an original alternative contribution
from the developing world, original if not in the substantive rules, at least in respect
of another perception9° of the process.
That alternative approach is the one which favours compromises, not
necessarily in the sense of a total disregard of the law, but in the sense of "... arriving
at a decision by ... 'giving a little and taking a little.' It does not mean that legitimate
clashes of interest are not resolved in a way that seems fairest to both sides, a process
that lies at the foundation of any attempt to evolve a rule of law."9'
Translated into arbitration, this approach will require the tribunal to pay
considerable attention to the continuing "co-existence of the parties." It is an
approach based on the assumption that the function of adjudication is not to "decide"
disputes but to "settle" them,93
 in the sense alluded to earlier. That, we think, is
consistent with the very idea of arbitration?4
 This approach is particularly relevant
to the area of state contracts and state commercial arbitrations, the principal source of
"southern" hostility to arbitration. The problems involved in state contracts are, as
Fatouros once put it,
not legal; they relate to a demand for a change of existing conditions,
not to the "proper construction" of the terms of an arrangement. In
"Acceptance of Arbitration by Developing Countries', in Resolving Transnational Disputes
Through International Arbitration, (ed. by Carbonneau Thomas), University of Virginia Press,
Charlottsville, 1984, 283, PP. 285-86.
On such a perception see Mnookin, Robert "Creating Value through Process Design" (1994) 11
Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 1, 125.
9'Mentschikoff, "Commercial Arbitration" (1961) 61 Col. L. Rev., 846, pp. 860-61.
David, International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol. II, Chapter 1, p. 7; Wolaver, op.
cit. (1934-35) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev., 132.
93Holleman, op. cit.
Mnookin, supra, p. says in that respect that the "key is to design an arbitration process in which
the parties' underlying interests are identified and explored. Obviously, to the extent that common
interests are revealed, the arbitrators may be able to create a resolution that serves those shared
interests."
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municipal law, this would be a field for legislation; in the absence of
an international legislative organ it will have to be the domain of
compromise rather than clear-cut solutions for or against, of variations
between shades of gray rather than contrast between black and white.
In the traditional language of international law, what is chiefly
(although not exclusively) needed is a procedure for conciliation, rather
than for judicial settlementY
The absence of that perception in arbitral justice in international commercial
matters strikes participants from most parts of the developing world. That partly
explains their reluctance to submit to arbitration after the dispute has arisen or after
an award, especially if disfavourable.
In a related context, Takeyoshi Kawashima, citing Jerome Frank, indicated how
"... an overwhelmingly large number of law suits in the United States are not appealed
to a higher court and that nearly 95 percent of the cases came to an end in the trial
court", and contrasted "[s]uch fmality ... to the comparatively large number of cases
appealed to in higher courts in Japan." "Presumably", he observes, "... this reflects
the reluctance of litigants to accept a court decision rendered and imposed upon them
without being convinced of the righteousness of its contents •"98 Kawashima then
goes on to explain the Japanese attitude on the ground that "... in the traditional way
of setthng a dispute the solution was, in principle, reached through agreement by both
parties. The notion that a justice measured by universal standards can exist
independent of the wills of the disputants is apparently alien to the traditional habit
of the Japanese people. Consequently, distrust of judges and a lack of respect for the
authority of judicial decisions is widespread through out the nation."
95"The Quest for Legal Security of Foreign Investments - Latest Developments" (1962-63) 17
Rutgers Univ. Law Rev., 257, p. 298.
"Dispute Resolution in Contempory Japan" in Law in Japan: the Legal Order in a Changing
Society, (ed. by von Mehren, Arthur Taylor), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1963, 41, pp. 49-50.
'1bid.
Ibid.
1bid.
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Somehow, this alternative conception should not be seen as entirely foreign to
Europe too)°° René David says that even in western countries, "... there is a popular
proverb which declares that 'a bad settlement is better than a good lawsuit'."°' That
may be so and it reflects a fundamental attitude in many areas in the developing world
to the function of adjudication, which, if taken into account in international
arbitrations, might go a far way in building genuine confidence in the developing
world in international commercial arbitration.
'See for example the process contemplated by Mnookin, op. cit.
'°'Supra.
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CHAPTER THREE.
ICSID AND MIGA.
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSJD, and
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Corporation, MIGA, are regarded as milestones
in the development of international arbitration. The creation of both institutions is
attributed to the movement during the 1950s and 60s towards the protection of foreign
private investments. The emergence of new states after the second world war and the
out-break of economic and political nationalism associated with that period produced
a wave of anxiety in capital exporting countries over the security of private
investments in receiving countries.' The need was felt to take measures aimed at
safeguarding private property acquired abroad from the unfair treatment of the
governments of capital importing countries. In the main the measures proposed were
substantive, usually in the nature of uniform codes of conduct to be adhered to by all
parties concerned. 2
 Some took the form of proposals for multilateral treaties providing
different regimes of investment guarantees to be provided by governments of both
capital exporting and receiving states. Such measures were initiated and promoted by
parties ranging from public international organisations 3
 to international private sector
bodies,4 including entirely private groups. 5
 They attempted to lay down principles
'Nwogogu, E.I. The Legal Problems of Foreign Investments in Developing Countries, Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 1965.
2Brandon, Michael "An International Investment Code: Current Plans" (1959-60) JBL, 7.
3See for example the League of Nations Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners, 1929;
the "Havana Charter" of the International Trade Organisation on the Treatment of Foreign Investments;
the United Nations General Assembly resolution 824(J.X) of December 11, 1954 Concerning the
Encouragement of Foreign Prvate Investment and the Secretary General's Report on the Promotion of
the Internatinal Flow of Private Capital (IT N. Doc. No. E13325 of February 26, 1960).
'See for example the International Chamber of Commerce draft code on the "Fair Treatment of
Foreign Investments" (LC.C. brochure No. 129 of 1949).
5See for example the 1957 draft code on the "international Convention for the Mutual protection
of Private Property Rights in Foreign Countries" by the Society to Advance the Protection of Foreign
Investments, published in (1960) 9 J. Pub. Law 113 and its April 1959 revised version entitled "Draft
Convention on Investments Abroad".
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and rules to regulate the treatment of investments made abroad by private persons6.
The measures were attempts to codify substantive rules deemed applicable in this area.
Such substantive rules and principles as were claimed to exist were not only
incomplete, but also unclear, and, not surprisingly, not free from controversy. 7
 As a
result there was a shift of emphasis from the search for strictly substantive rules to the
creation of procedural and appropriate mechanisms through which the parties could
by themselves evolve applicable substantive rules acceptable to their specific case.
ICSID and MIGA are two products of that endeavour. While ICSID provides legal
guarantees to the investor, MIGA provides security of a financial character.
We argue in this chapter that the creation of both institutions did not
adequately reflect the interests of developing countries, the states directly affected by
the purposes for which they were created.
I. The International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
The drafting history of the Washington Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes can be stated briefly. 8 The Convention was made at the initiative
of the World Bank. Pursuant to a resolution (No. 174 of 18 September 1962) of the
Governors of the Bank requesting the Executive Directors to examine the possibility
of establishing facilities for the arbitration of investment disputes, a report on the
Convention was prepared by the Executive Directors after extensive consultation with
legal and other experts from over the world in four regional meetings held at Addis-
6For a brief history and treatment of the various initiatives since the 1920s see Fatouros, A. A.,
Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors, Columbia University Press, New York, 1962, chapter five;
Sutherland, P. F., "The World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes" (1979) 28
ICLQ, 367; Balekjian W. H. "The Convention of the International Bank on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States" (1967/68) 37/38 Yearbook of the A. A. A., 108-
113; Nwogugu E. I., op. cit. pp. 135-138; Guldberg, Tatiana "The Settlement of Disputes between States
and Nationals of other States" (1966) 36 Yearbook of the A. A. A., 98; Schwarzenberger G. "The
Arbitration Pattern and the Protection of Property Abroad", in International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum
for Martin Domke, (ed. by Sanders, Pieters) Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1967, 313.
7Sornarajah M., International Commercial Arbitration, Longman Singapore Ltd., 1990, pp. 8-29.
8For a fuller description, see Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of other States, History of the Convention, Vol. 1, part 1, pp. 2-10.
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Ababa, Santiago, Geneva and Bangkok in December 1963, 1-3 and 17-21 February
1964 and April 1964 respectively. The Directors were also assisted in their task by a
committee of legal representatives designated by members of the Bank, which met
from 23 November to 11 December 1964. By another resolution (No. 214, September
1964) the report of the Executive Directors was approved by the Governors of the
Bank, who further requested the Directors to reformulate a Convention for the same
purpose. After a series of meetings, during which the Directors considered a number
of proposals for changes submitted by the General Counsel of the World Bank, the
Directors on 18 March 1965 formally adopted a resolution approving the text of the
Convention and requested the President of the Bank to transmit the text and its
annexed report to member governments of the World Bank. Copies were then sent to
Governors and Alternate Governors of member states of the Bank and the Convention
signed soon after by a number of states. The Convention came into force on 4 October
1966, thirty days after the 20th instrument of ratification was deposited, as required
by Article 68(2). Toward the end of 1995 there were 136 signatory states, including
122 ratifications.9
A. Stated Objectives
ICSID was meant to encourage the resolution of investment disputes through
arbitration. A statement by the General Counsel of the World Bank transmitted to the
Executive Directors had noted the inadequacies of the means then available for the
settlement of disputes arising out of transactions involving foreign investments.'0
Those limitations did not encourage the flow of capital to host countries for
development purposes. The need therefore arose for the creation of a structure
providing an appropriate alternative for the effective settlement of the disputes. The
report of the Executive Directors accompanying the text of the Convention" said that
9News from ICSID vol. 12 No. 2 (summer 1995).
'°History of the Convention, Vol. 2 part 1, pp. 1-2.
"Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of other States, submitted to Governments by Executive Directors and
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the Convention would create a centre offering facilities for conciliation and arbitration,
particularly as states and investors had indicated that it was "... in their mutual
interests to agree to resort to international methods of settlement." 2
 The Centre
would take account of the specific nature of the disputes falling within its jurisdiction
and it would, in particular, ensure that parties to the disputes could not unilaterally
revoke their consent to the arbitration process once they had submitted to it. It was
hoped that such a structure would "... strengthen the partnership between countries in
the cause of economic development" 3
 and thereby encourage the flow of capital to
meet their needs for it.
The failure of previous attempts had led to the belief that an approach based
on an international Convention which was essentially procedural would go a longer
way than the previous ones to avoid the difficulties arising from trying to establish
substantive rules on the subject. According to Aron Broches, the pioneer Secretary of
the Centre, a solution based on arbitration would be more appropriate than any other
approach in eliminating the "risk of confrontation of the host country and the national
State of the investor".' 4
 The view was taken that arbitration would be more
favourable not only because it was then - as now - believed to be more easily
achievable but also due to the flexibility of the process.' 5 There would be greater
capital flow generated partly as a result of agreement by developing countries to join
accompanying Report, Washington, 18 March 1965 para. 11.
para 10.
' 3lbid para 9.
'4"The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of other States (1972) 136 Hague Acad. Courses, 331, p. 343.
'5History of the Convention, Vol 1, Part 1.
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the Convention.
There was an underlying assumption that acceptance of commercial arbitration
by countries in need of foreign investments would reflect a positive change in their
attitude towards the treatment of foreign private capital. This would in turn dispel! the
fears of private investors for the security of their interests and as a result improve the
volume of capital flow to receiving states.
Unfortunately there was no corresponding assumption regarding the obligations,
if any at all, of investors in developing countries. In fact most of the codes for the
treatment of foreign investments referred to earlier (notes 2-5 and texts thereto) were
expressed in terms of "protection" to the investor only and that remained the primary
concern of the ICSID Convention itself. The view might have been taken that the fact
of investing in a developing country, by itself, constituted the transfer of a benefit by
the investor to the host country.' 6 If that was the assumption, it did not take into
account the prospect of considerable profit to the investor provided by the opportunity
of investing in the host country. Afterall why else would an investor have wanted to
leave the relative security and stable financial climate of his own economic system to
expose his assets to uncertain foreign risks? We argue that there was more to that.
The involvement of the World Bank was justified on the ground that the
movement of capital for development purposes is an objective related to the functions
of the Bank and, therefore, an initiative by the Bank to facilitate disputes arising as
a result of capital flows is an activity within its sphere.17
To meet it objectives Article 1(2) of the Convention provides that the Centre,
established by virtue of Article 1(1) of the same, is to provide facilities for arbitration
and conciliation. The facilities are made available to contracting states and private
investors, nationals of another contracting state, if in dispute, on the agreement both
of the private investor and the state involved.
One important feature of the Convention is that the Centre itself does not
engage in the settlement of disputes. It provides administrative and other support
'6Rodley, Nigel S. "Some Aspects of the World bank Convention for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes" (1966) 4 Canadian Yearbook mt. Law, 43. p. 44.
' 7Broches, (1972) 136 Hague Acad Courses, 331
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facilities for the conduct of arbitration but is not, like the I.C.C. and other institutional
bodies, directly involved in the settlement of any particular dispute. That is the
responsibility of arbitration tribunals and conciliation commissions set up under the
Convention to resolve specific differences arising within its scope. Although it is the
purpose of the Convention to provide a framework for the settlement of disputes, it
was also necessary that the mechanism provided should be sufficiently flexible to
enable the parties shape the process to meet the specific nature of their case. As a
result the function of the Centre is almost limited to keeping a list of arbitrators and
conciiators designated by member countries, from which the parties to a dispute can
appoint the members of a tribunal. The disputants are, however, not restricted to the
list in their selection. They are allowed to make appointments from outside the panel
held by ICSID.
However, the Centre remains the administering body of arbitrations within the
provisions of the Convention and, in addition, under Article 36(3), the Secretary
General of the Centre as its chief administrator makes a preliminary determination on
whether a particular dispute falls within the Convention. According to the Secretary's
office, he may refuse to register a request for ICSID arbitration if, on the basis of the
information available in the request, he finds that the dispute is manifestedly outside
the jurisdiction of the Convention.' 8
 Although this is not described by the main
stream as a judicial function, the fact that the refusal is, according to Professor
Georges Delaume (a former Secretary of the Centre), unappealable and should
therefore be exercised with caution,' 9
 suggests that the power should not be regarded
as a mere act of day-to-dayadniinistration. It certainly involves the exercise of a
judicial function and could inthe future assume immense significance.
B. Other Characteristics of the Convention:
1. Flexiblity
' 8See ICSID, Model Clauses, Doc. ICSJD/5/Rev. 1 of July 1981, p. 7. That is
consistent with the provisions of Article 36(3) of the Convention.
'9"ICSID Arbitration and the Courts" (1983) 77 AJIL 784 p. 790.
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The ICSID Convention is peculiar in a number of ways. Although it was
established primarily as part of the response to the treatment given to foreign
investments by host countries, the Convention itself does not claim to lay down any
rules of substantive law on issues arising in relation to private foreign investments. As
indicated earlier, previous initiatives to protect investments abroad by attempting to
lay down standards of treatment were all unsuccessful. Hence, and as concerns the
applicable law for example, the Convention shows a preference for flexibility by
accepting the principle of party autonomy. A tribunal constituted within the terms of
the Convention is directed to decide the issues before it in accordance with such rules
of law as agreed upon by the parties. 2° In the absence of choice by the parties the
tribunal is required under Article 42 to apply the law of the contracting state involved
in the dispute and such other rules of international law as may be relevant.2'
That the tribunal should settle disputes in accordance with rules chosen by the
parties is, however, appropriately in line with the overall scheme of the Convention,
intended in substance to provide investors and sovereign states a procedural machinery
to settle their differences. It was recognised from the out-set that its success would
depend on the willingness of contracting states and private investors to cooperate. The
scheme of the Convention reflects that belief by making the application of many of
its provisions subject to what the parties may otherwise agree. The parties are
allowed to exclude the application of certain provisions of the Convention by
agreement or, as under Article 42(3), to authorise the tribunal to apply provisions
which would otherwise not be applicable, including, as in the case of the applicable
law, to set a completely different standard to be followed by the tribunal in deciding
the dispute: Article 42(1).
The Convention does not also create an obligation for the contracting state to
20Article 42(1).
21The decision to include this particular default rule in Article 42 was unfortunate
in our view: infra chapter four.
See for example Articles 43 and 47 dealing respectively with the tribunal's
power to order production of documents and visit the locus of the relevant
investment(s), and to order provisional measures, which in all cases remain subject to
what the parties may otherwise provide.
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settle any specific dispute with a private person through arbitration simply by reason
of its being a party to it.23
 The combined effect of Article 25 and the Preamble of
the Convention is that a state comes under the obligation to refer a dispute to ICSID
arbitration or conciliation only if it expresses its submission to that particular dispute
to arbitration in writing. Recourse to arbitration under the Convention is therefore
available on a voluntary basis only. Article 25(4) further provides that a contracting
state may notify the Centre, and by implication the international business community,
of certain categories of disputes it would not want submitted to arbitration under the
Convention. That provision is intended to reinforce the point that submission to the
Centre is entirely voluntary, by allowing a receiving state to exclude from the ambit
of the Convention matters in respect of which it would not consider submitting to
arbitration, especially in disputes opposing the state to an individual. It was also
necessary to reassure capital receiving countries, in the face of their reluctance to
accept that individuals may proceed directly against them in a non-domestic tribunal,
that adherence to the Convention will not automatically compel them to arbitrate with
a foreign investor. The state's consent to arbitration could only bind it on a case by
case basis.
In a way the Convention was never intended to divest the states signing up to
it completely of sovereignty over all areas or matters of national concern likely to
attract foreign capital, although that assurance is merely artificial. It exists more in its
assertion than in its real significance. The usefulness of the assurance is negatived by
the fact that refusal by a contracting state to sign or otherwise agree to arbitration
under the Convention may lead to adverse inferences being drawn by the foreign
investment market against the state concerned. Already, the possibility of the
Convention giving rise to an internationally binding obligation was never in doubt. It
was the opinion of the Executive Directors" that adherence to the Convention might
be interpreted as holding out an expectation that Contracting [s]tates would give
favourable consideration to requests by investors for a submission of a dispute to the
Broches 'Development of International Law by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development" (1965) 59 Proc. Aim Soc. Int'l. L., 33, p. 35.
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Centre."24 Although in relation to that expectation it is pointed out in the report that
a contracting state may, under Article 25(4), declare by notification to the Centre the
classes of disputes it may consider unsuitable for arbitration under the Convention,
so as not to raise that expectation, such a declaration may be counter-productive
particularly if it includes a class or classes of disputes which would otherwise have
been brought under the scope of the Convention. Such a reservation may have the
same effect as an out-right refusal to consent to arbitration within the terms of the
Convention or a refusal to adhere to it. The opt-out of a class of arbitrable disputes
available under Article 25(4) does not therefore remove or in any way diminish the
expectation that is created when a developing state signs up to the Convention.
2. Capacity of an individual to proceed against a state under the
Convention
An important feature of the Convention is that it recognises, by granting to an
individual, the capacity to bring an action against a sovereign state in a non-domestic
situation. The traditional position in international law has been to deny an individual
access to an international tribunal in the event of a dispute between the individual and
a sovereign state. It is said that to grant an individual such status would be against
the doctrine of state sovereignty27 and will, in addition, confer to a foreigner
privileges not available to nationals of the state concerned. To obtain redress for
injuries done to it the aggrieved individual, corporate or physical, will be required to
request the government of the state of which it is a national to take up the case on its
'Accompanying Report of Executive Directors, para. 31.
Ibid para. 27.
26For the rule and its exceptions see the treatment in Brownlie, I., Principles of
Public International Law, 4th Edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 580 et seq;
Schwarzenberger, Georg, International Law, Vol. 1, 3rd Edn., Stevens and Sons Ltd.,
London, 1957, pp. 139 et seq; and Brown, A Manual of International Law, 6th Edn.,
Professional Books Ltd., Oxon, 1976, p. 64.
Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law, 3rd Edn., Grotius Publications, Cambridge,
1991, p. 504.
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behalf.28
 Such a situation was not thought particularly attractive in the area of foreign
investments and other business relationships involving sovereign states and private
persons as disputants. The state of the aggrieved individual may for various reasons,
some involving higher considerations of state, refuse to bring the claim on behalf of
its national or, having done so, decide to discontinue the case. 29
 On taking up the
claim of its national before an internationally constituted tribuanl the state is
considered to be the proper claimant30
 and the injury, though suffered by an
individual, is regarded as having been done to the state through the person of its
national.3'
The Convention considers that situation "unsatisfactory" 32
 as it leaves private
investors with no real forum or process to bring a claim against a host state in breach
of contract. It therefore makes such a process available to a private party through
Articles 1(2) and 25(1) governing jurisdiction, which provide that the Convention shall
apply to investment disputes between states and private persons of a foreign
nationality. In fact the entire scheme and purpose of the Convention is designed to
confer such capacity to the foreign national.
It was the view that the acceptance by contracting states of the capacity of a
private person to proceed against them will remove the fear of investors against
political risk as an obstacle to the transfer of more capital to host states for investment
purposes. The right conferred on an individual to proceed personally and directly
against a sovereign state would be a guarantee to investors that proper remedies can
be enforced against a contracting state in breach of its commitment, since the investor
himself would be in control of the decision whether or not to initiate proceedings to
lbid.
29Carabiber, Charles "L' Arbitrage International entre Gouvernements et
Particuliers" (1950) 76 Hague Acad Courses, pp. 235 et seq.
30Shaw, supra.
31 Schwarzenberger, International Law, supra p. 140.
32ICSJD, History of Convention, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 1.
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enforce compliance by the state.33
The extension of international capacity by this Convention to the individual
was of course made entirely for the benefit of investors. Its quid pro quo is said to be
in the provisions of Article 27, prohibiting the aggrieved investor from requesting
the diplomatic protection of his national government in the event of a dispute, a
question on which so much importance has been placed and to which we refer below.
Our view is that the quid pro quo for the host state said to exist in Article 27 does not
truly compensate for the loss of liberty which the submission to arbitration with an
individual entails for a sovereign state.
C. The Convention and Diplomatic Protection
The renunciation of that right by home states of investors, exercisable in favour
of their nationals based abroad, although arising in relation to a dispute with no
connection at all with the home state, is said to be one of the concessions to countries
receiving foreign investments for accepting the Convention. It is governed by article
27, which prohibits the state of the investor in dispute from interceding on behalf of
its national and the investor himself from requesting the diplomatic protection of his
own state. It had become the practice, in the face of politically inspired breaches of
contractual obligations towards foreign corporations, for the latter to request their
home governments to espouse their cause before international tribunals. 35 This was
the result partly of the lack of capacity by those corporations as individuals on their
own behalf to proceed against sovereign states and partly due to the absence of an
adequate enforcement machinery for any available remedies, however limited in scope
they may have been. In the result the practice was instituted by foreign corporations
to appeal to their home governments for protection. Such protection would be
provided by the home government through the exercise of some form of pressure on
the host state, either by instituting international proceedings on behalf of its injured
33Report of Executive Directors, para. 12.
Thid para. 33.
"See Brownlie, op. cit.; Schwarzenberger, International Law, supra.
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subject, or through some other forms of diplomatic action.
Not infrequently, however, and in their attempt to seek justice for their
nationals the home states resorted to self-help, leading to the use of armed
intervention. This resulted in abuses on many occasions, amongst the most notable of
which were the French and American interventions in Mexico in 1838 (and 1861) and
San Domingo in 1904 respectively, and the Anglo-German and Italian occupations of
Venezuela in 19021903.36 The fear that the practice by foreign governments to
intercede on behalf of their nationals was not limited to compelling them to submit
to a solution based on the application of acceptable principles of law led in South
American countries, for example, to the invention of the Calvo and Drago doctrines,
including the Calvo Clause.37 The Calvo and Drago Doctrines are well developed
legal devices intended to bar stronger states both on principle and by express
contractual provisions from resorting to force and other forms of undue pressure in
favour of their foreign based citizens.
Article 27 was therefore introduced in recognition of the fears expressed by
weaker countries. It provides that contracting states, upon signing the Convention,
undertake not to provide diplomatic protection or espouse the claim of a subject
concerning a dispute to which the host state has consented to arbitration under the
Convention. Being a renunciation of an established practice by the stronger states, it
was necessaly to obtain that undertaking by way of treaty, since the validity of Calvo
and Drago doctrines and the contractual devices created as alternative ways to give
effect to them was in turn denied by developed states. 38 The question was whether,
without a treaty or some other international undertaking by the state itself, it was
possible for an individual, by contract, to opt out of his right to diplomatic protection.
It was the position that whatever commitments the individual had made, once the state
had accepted the appeal of its national and entered the litigation, the state was
asserting its own right, whereupon, as regards the national himself, the matter became
For a detailed discussion of these incidents, see, Shea Donald R., The Calvo
Clause, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1955.
Ibid.
38Schwarzenburger, International Law, supra; Shea, op. Cit.
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res inter alios acta,39 thus rendering a Calvo Clause ineffective. But the home state
does not enter the scene until invited to do so by its national. There should therefore
be no reason, and it has not been explained why, in principle, the same national
cannot contract out of his own right to request the intervention of his home
government.
As far as the Convention itself is concerned the question remains whether
Article 27 is a genuine concession or merely a device to induce developing countries,
especially those of Latin American persuasion, to adhere to it. The orthodox view has
no doubt represented the provision as an appropriate "quid pro quo for ICSID
arbitration"4° or as one of the "special advantages for host States" 4 ' or, again, as
"one of the principal attractions of the Convention"42.
The concession is however excluded by the proviso of Article 27(1), under
which the home state retains the right to intercede for its national where the host state
fails to submit to the award. It is thus possible to argue that the concession was only
a façade, since Article 27(1) would not cover a contracting state where it defaulted
with its convention obligation to comply with the outcome of the arbitration, thereby
bringing into operation the proviso to that Article. In response Aron Broches has
argued43 that the host state may, prior to the award, refuse to co-operate in the
proceedings, whereupon, and in the absence of the concession provided by Article
27(1), the investor would be entitled under international law to invoke the protection
39Schwarzenburger and Brown, op. cit. p. 144. Although this may be valid for acts
affecting the physical integrity of the alien, it is doubtful whether that view is
consistent with the doctrine of party autonomy especially in relation to contracts.
4°Broches, (1972) 136 Hague Acad Courses, p. 374.
4!Amerasinghe,
 C. F., "Dispute Settlement Machinery in Relations between States
and Multinational Enterprises - With Particular Reference to the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes" (1977) 11 Int'l. Lawyer, 47.
42Szasz, Paul, "The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America" (1970-71)
11 Vand. 3. Int'l. Law, 257, p. 260.
(1972) 136 Hague Acati. Courses, 374-75.
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of his home government immediately without having to await the outcome of any
arbitration proceedings which, under the Convention, the investor is still bound to
institute. The real concession, according to Broches, would therefore lie in the
requirement imposed on the investor by the Convention to suspend his immediate right
to request the assistance of his home government until the award is made.
That, to say the least, would be no more than an appearance of a concession.
Broches himself acknowledges the efficient machinery provided by the Convention to
ensure that arbitration proceedings properly instituted under its provisions may not be
frustrated by the actions of an unwilling state in dispute with a private party. 45 The
combined effect of Article 26 and paragraph 6 of the Preamble on the one hand, and
Articles 38 and 45(2) (concerning the procedure adopted by the Convention in default
of the respondent state) on the other hand, ensures that once properly instituted
arbitration proceedings under the Convention are steered to overcome any undesirable
obstacles and to lead to a successful outcome. There would therefore be no need to
make recourse to diplomatic protection. The real obstacle to a Convention arbitration
and an award rendered in pursuance of it arises only at a later stage when execution
of the award is requested. In effect, notwithstanding the efficient mechanism set out
to guarantee the success of an ICSII) arbitration, Article 55 still preserves the
sovereign immunity of a state against execution of awards and judgments made
pursuant thereto, even though it provides a very speedy mechanism for the
enforcement of the same under Article 54(1) & (2).
It is precisely at the stage of execution that Article 27 becomes of immense
significance since the government of a contracting state acting in bad faith may refuse
to comply with an award not in its favour by claiming immunity against execution
even though it consented to, and might even have participated fully in, the arbitration.
It is also precisely at this stage that the significance of Article 27 becomes obvious.
In that case the right to claim diplomatic protection initially excluded by the first
paragraph of Article 27(1) is immediately re-instated in the proviso of the same. The
44This is not accurate since under international law the investor would first of all
have had to exhaust all the various remedies available under the domestic law of the
host state: Shaw, op. Cit. p. 509.
45Ibid p. 375.
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practice is, in effect, merely suspended. But its quid pro quo, the concession to the
investor giving him judicial capacity under the Convention to sue the state, is absolute.
Under no circumstances, including the wrongful conduct of the investor (such as his
refusal to comply with the award), can it be withdrawn.
It may therefore have been thought necessary, altough that is not often said,
to retain the practice of diplomatic protection since, under Article 55, a private
investor could avail himself of a favourable award in his hands against an unwiffing
host state only to the extent permitted by the domestic law of the place where
execution is requested. In those circumstances an appeal to his country for protection
would, for the foreign investor, become useful not only from a psychological point of
view as suggested by a German expert during the Geneva consultative meeting of
legal experts,' but also from a practical point of view. We refer to the advantageous
position both of the investor and the home state in resorting to diplomatic protection
with an award in hand below. Clearly an investor seeking redress is, legally and
otherwise, in a far better position if he has already obtained an award. Even the state
of which he is a national intervenes from a position of strength with an award in its
national's favour than without one. But where would that leave a host state faced with
an investor also acting in bad faith? That raises problems of enforcement under the
Convention, which we consider below.
We may only say at this stage that from the point of view of developing
countries the mere suspension of the practice of diplomatic protection meant that they
had obtained no genuine quid pro quo for their accepting, under Article 25, to allow
private investors direct access to an international tribunal. This also renders the
Convention unattractive to the countries, whereas, for the investor, the revival of the
practice of diplomatic intervention remains useful. Not surprisingly the Convention
was objected to, and boycotted by, Latin American countries in their overwhelming
majority on that and other grounds. Their attitude was bound to be so particularly in
the light of the in-roads then being made into the doctrine of immunity of states
against execution, the application of which was then under review in many
jurisdictions in favour of confining its scope to non-commercial activities. It was then
History of Convention, Vol.2, part 1, p. 432.
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obvious that those in-roads,47
 when they became applicable, would expose host states
to the jurisdiction and power of foreign courts to enforce and order the execution of
judgments against them and, in addition to the right to diplomatic protection, render
the host states more vulnerable to foreign investors than the reverse.
D. The Convention and the Enforcement of its Awards
1. Enforcement within the provisions of the Convention
While still bearing Article 55 in mind, reference should be made to Article
54(1), which requires contracting states to enforce an award rendered under the
Convention as if it were a final judgment of a domestic court of a member country
in which recognition and enforcement is requested. It has been said by Broches that
Article 54 was provided primarily with the interest of host countries in mind."
Broches further states, correctly, (in our view) that Article 54(1) makes it possible for
a host state to obtain a forced execution of an award in its favour in the territory of
any contracting state against an investor who is refusing to comply with the award.
That of course assumes that the investor has assets in a contracting state, which may
not be so, in which case the usefulness of Article 54(1) for the creditor state is
illusory. It was therefore not entirely correct to suggest, as did Broches, that the
provision is an appropriate response to the demands of developing countries made as
a result of the fact that under what was then the draft Convention there would be no
available remedy against a private investor who failed to comply with an award and
who had no assets within the jurisdiction of the claimant state.49
That provision is also regarded as exclusively in favour of a state party to an
ICSID arbitration on the basis, presumably to be derived from Article 55, that a
47The development was fully appreciated during the drafting history of the
Convention: History of the Convention, Vol 2, Part 1 pp. 342 er seq. 347 et seq. and
576 et seq.
(l972) 136 Hague Acad Courses, p. 349.
49Ibid p. 399.
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private investor cannot be entitled to an advantage corresponding to the state's
immunity against execution as preserved by Article 55. An investor is not a state and
cannot therefore enjoy immunity against enforcement or execution.
However, any advantages said to exist under Article 54 are more apparent than
real and, in any case, the grounds on which that provision can be considered as
conferring an advantage exclusively to host states are too narrow, in the light of the
terms of the Convention as a whole. The question here is the extent to which Article
54(1), as read alongside other provisions relating to the finality, recognition,
enforcement and execution of an ICSJD award confers a special advantage to
contracting states not available to an investor.
The answer to that question lies in the fact that the Convention recognises the
distinction between recognition and enforcement on the one hand, and the execution
of the obligations arising under an award, on the other hand. Both are governed by
Articles 54(1) and 54(3) respectively. Article 54(1) requires every contracting state to
recognise an ICSID award by assimilating it to a final judgment of its own domestic
court and to enforce the award as such a judgment. Article 53(1) then provides that
the award shall be binding on the parties and creates an obligation for each party to
the arbitration to comply with its terms. The argument therefore runs that where the
investor is the award debtor, there is no problem for the contracting state party to the
proceedings to forcefully execute the judgment entered in terms of the award by a
domestic court, in compliance with the duty imposed on the state of the enforcing
court to recognise and enforce the award under Article 54(l).50 On the other hand,
a foreign corporation might not be able to benefit from Articles 53(1) and 54(1) since
it is still open to the state to claim immunity against execution retained under Article
55(1).
That argument fails to take account of the full significance of the above
distinction. The regime of Article 54(1) is meant to govern recognition and
enforcement of the award. (This only involves the process whereby the award is
50Delaume says that whereas against an investor, "... an ICSID award is a final
title that is immediately executory", "[t]he situation may be otherwise if the non-
complying party is the contracting State party to the dispute, since a plea of immunity
from execution might effectively bar measures of execution against that state and its
assets": (1983) 77 AJJL, p. 801.
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assimilated to a similar and final judicial pronouncement of the municipal order of the
place where the proceedings for enforcement and recognition are instituted.) It is
admitted that the role of the domestic court in that situation is limited to verifying that
the award, as presented, complies with the requirements of Article 54(2).51 The court
may not go into the merits of the dispute or otherwise scrutinise the award since any
request for annulment, revision or interpretation (the only possibilities of challenge)
is limited to the grounds and procedure set out in Articles 51 and 52 and further
reserved to the exclusive consideration of an ad hoc committee of appeal, as provided
for under the Convention. It is more likely that as a whole national courts will find
it easier to comply with the requirements of Articles 53(1) and 54(2).
On the other hand, the regime contemplated under Article 54(3) leaves it to the
domestic courts and the law in force in each contracting state to determine the process
requiring the effective collection of the judgment or award debt against specified items
of property or assets of the award debtor. The actual taking of the defendant's assets
to satisfy the award debt in compliance with a judgment entered in terms of the award
by the appropriate local court is governed by the relevant local laws and procedures.
What is not often said52
 is that the laws and procedures in force in the contracting
state in which execution is requested must be applicable equally to the investor as to
the state in dispute. Both parties are exposed to the same defences against execution
as may be available under the relevant domestic law, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, (which at the time of the Convention 53
 was under review by writers, the
judiciary and the legislature in many countries with a view to excluding its application
31Broches, case comment (1990) Rev. Arb., 167 p. 170.
52Although, see Broches, (1972) 136 Hague Acad Courses, p. 405, where he
admits that those provision '... were drafted in such a manner as to be applicable
generally, and to be of potential benefit to investors as well", a fatal admission, since
it contradicts his own (and the conventional) view that the provision was made in
response to, and primarily in the interest of, host states.
53See Broches, "Aspèts proc&Iuraux de l'arbitrage entre un Etat et un investisseur
etranger dans Ia Convention du ..." in, Investissements Etrangers et Arbitrage entre
Etats et Personnes Privées. La Convention B.I.R.D. du 18 Mars 1965, University of
Dijon, Pedone, Paris, 1969, p. 131. (Hereafter "Aspèts Proc&luraux")
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to assets used by a state for commercial activities TM), being one of such defences
only. Any other defence available under the domestic law for the stay or refusal of
execution would at that stage be of the same benefit to the private party as the
doctrine of state immunity, if upheld, would be useful to the state party to the dispute.
The Paris Court of Appeal did not appreciate that important distinction in
December 1989 in the case of the State of Senegal v Soabi.55 Pursuant to an ICSJD
award in its favour, the Société Ouest Africaine de Bétons Industrièls, a Panamanian
company controlled by Franco-Belgian interests, applied for enforcement of the award
in France. The High Court of Paris entered a judgment for the enforcement of the
award (exequatur) in France. Senegal appealed against the judgment on the grounds
that it ignored the state's immunity against execution. The Appeal Court upheld the
appeal on the ground that although the government had undertaken to enforce the
award in Senegal, the state had not, pursuant to Article 55 of the Convention, waived
its immunity against execution and, further, that it had not been established that the
specific assets of the state against which execution of the award would be levied had
been used or intended for use for commercial and economic purposes. The Court
further held that in the circumstances execution of the award would have been
contrary to the "international" public policy of France.
That decision was criticised56
 for failing to give effect to the separate regimes
of Article 54(1) and Article 55(1) of the ICSJD Convention. Article 55 retains a state's
immunity against execution only in respect of execution, i.e., the actual seizure of the
award debtor's assets in satisfaction of the pecuniary obligations arising under the
award and not at the preliminary stage of recognition and enforcement. France was,
and remains, a member state. A competent French court would therefore not be in
breach of the Convention so long as it limited itself to enforcing the award under
For the change of government and judicial policy in the United States for
example see Flow Maririma Browning de Cuba v Motor Vessel Ciudad de Ia Habana,
335 F. 2d. 619 (1964, 4th Cir. Md).
55Decision of 5 December 1989 (1990) 117 JDI, 141; reversed by the Court of
Cassation, decision of 11 June 1991 [1991] Rev Arb., 637.
See the case comments by Gaillard, Emmanuel in (1990) 177 ID!, 144 and
Broches, (1990) Rev. Arb., 167; (1991) Rev. Arb., 638.
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Article 54(1). In fact, failure to do so may result in France, through its courts, being
in breach of its Convention obligation to ensure the observance within its territory of
the requirements of Article 54(1).
It has been pointed out by Broches 57
 that in refusing to enforce the award the
Paris Court of Appeal was deviating from a previous decision of its own on similar
facts and raising almost the same issue. 58 In Benvenuti and Bonfant v The
Government of Congo, 59 the Paris High Court had entered a judgment in recognition
and enforcement of an ICSID award in favour of Benvenuti, subject, however, to the
condition that no steps to execute the award or conservatory measure could be taken
against the assets of the award debtor situate in France without prior authorisation
from the Court. The High Court also held that the award neither failed to comply with
French law nor was it against public policy. Benvenuti applied for the condition to be
struck out or modified. On the refusal of the judge to do so,6° the company appealed,
on the ground that under the ICSID Convention of 1965 the jurisdiction of a domestic
court requested to grant an exequatur was limited to ensure the authenticity of the
award and, if satisfied, to execute it. It did not extend to matters regarding the
execution of the award and the immunity of the state against execution, since the grant
of an exequatur in recognition and enforcement and the execution of the award are
two seperate stages. The condition imposed by the High Court is not necessary if the
request is limited to enforcement. That submission was acceded to by the Paris Court
of Appeal. The Court stated that the question of immunity of the state could only arise
in relation to proceedings for execution and not at the preliminary stage of
enforcement.6 ' It was only in relation to an action brought for execution that issues
relating to the immunity of the state, preserved by Article 55, could appropriately bç
(1991) Rev. Arb., pp. 170-171.
Benvenuti Bonfan v Government of Congo (1981) 108 JDI 843 (CA)
59Jbid.
60Jbid.
61 See also Leboulanger, Phillipe (1992) Rev. Crit. Dr. mt. Privé, 331, pp. 3 32-3.
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considered.62
If the distinction is retained, a foreign investor applying for execution would,
depending on the relevant domestic law, be confronted with the defence of sovereign
immunity in exactly the same way that a state contracting party in whose favour an
ICSID award has been rendered will be faced with any available defence under the
laws governing the execution of judgments in force in the jurisdiction in which
execution is requested, hence, Broches' admission that the provisions were drafted to
be of benefit to all parties.63
Moreover, Articles 54(3) and 55 are worded in terms clearly recognising that
the immunity of states is not an absolute and automatic right under the Convention,
but an exemption which is available subject to the laws in force from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Thus, in jurisdictions were the exemption would not be available or, as
in many countries, highly relative in its application, the contracting state will be
reduced to the same level as the private foreign corporation; a result which might have
been desired but which could not, in the climate of the time, be achieved directly
owing to the resistance of developing countries.
What is more, the scheme resulting from Articles 25(1), 53(1) and 54(1)
significantly undercuts the thrust of Article 55. Under Article 25(1) a party cannot
withdraw its consent unilaterally. Taken on its own Article 25(1) may be read as
restricted to withdrawal of consent to the submission, i.e., to ICSID's jurisdiction only.
But Article 53(1) provides that an ICSID award is binding on the parties:
[t]he award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to
any appeal or any other remedy except those provided for in this
Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms of
the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed
62GiJial further points out that it was also wrong for the High Court to raise
questions of public policy and general compliance with French law, since that is not
also permitted under the Convention: "L'exdcution des Sentences du Centre
International pour Ic Règlement des Différents relatifs aux Investisséments" (1982) 71
Rev. Crit., 273.
63(1972) 136 Hague Acad. Courses, p. 405.
Broches, ibid pp. 404-405.
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pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention65
and Article 54(1) creates an obligation for the state to comply with the award:
[e]ach Contracting State shall recognise an award rendered pursuant to
this Convention as binding and enforce the percuniary obligations
imposed by the award within its territories as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that State ...
such that the undertaking to comply with the terms of the award has been accepted
as a waiver of immunity against both enforcement and execution, 67
 thus rendering
Article 55 ineffective.
In failing to recognise the immunity against execution as an automatic right
under Article 55, in preference to treating it as a relative exemption whose availability
and conditions of exercise would depend, under Article 54(3), on the laws in force in
each country, the Convention provided leeway to the courts in certain jurisdictions to
attempt, with some justification, to say that a valid arbitration under the Convention
constitutes a waiver of immunity against enforcement and execution of the award.
The District Court for the District of Columbia in the United States was persuaded in
65The relevant provisions being principally Article 5 1(3) & (4) dealing with the
stay of proceedings by the ICSID tribunal that rendered the award or a reconstituted
tribunal, and, a fortiori, where the award has been annulled pursuant to Article 52.
In fact, to the extent of which both provisions deal with the res judicata of an
ICSIJ) award, Andrea Giardina sees Article 54(1) as an unnecessary duplication of
Article 53(1): (1982) 71 Rev. Crit., 273, p. 277, note 12.
67Birch Shipping v Tanzania, 507 F. Supp, 311 (1980 Us DDC); but now of more
significance in the United States see the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act,
Section 1610(d)(6), as amended on 16 November 1988, infra; see also Farley,
"Commentary: The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of other Contracting States" (1966) 5 Duquesne L. Rev., 19;
Soley, "ICSID Implementation: An Effective Alternative ..." (1985) 19 Int'l Lawyer,
521.
Ibid; see also Société Norbert Beyrand France v Republique de Câte D'Ivoire,
Paris Court of Appeal decision of 9 July 1992 (1994] Rev Mb., 133, where the Court
held that submission by the State to ICC arbitration constitutes an undertaking,
pursuant to Article 24(2) of ICC Rules, to comply with the award and, on that basis,
a court could order conservatory measures against assets of the State held in France
as security for an award made against the State pending the outcome of proceedings
for its annulment.
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the Tanzanian case that a submission to arbitration, on its own, is sufficient to waive
the state's immunity against execution, relying on Section 1610(a)(1) of the United
States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which includes an exception
providing that a state's property used for a commercial activity shall not be immune
from execution if "the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid
of execution, or from execution, upon a judment entered by a court of the United
States or of a state ...." The submission to arbitration was treated by the court as
constituting such a waiver, although it would have been more appropriate to treat a
submission to arbitration as a waiver of jurisdiction, rather than of execution.
A United States court sitting today will be on safer grounds than the court that
decided the Birch Shipping case. As if to give statutory force to the decision, Section
1610(a)(6) of the Federal Sovereign Immunity Act as amended in November 1988,
provides that the property of a sovereign state used for commercial activities in the
United States is not immune from execution if
"the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award
rendered against the foreign state, provided that attachment in aid of
execution, or execution, would not be inconsistent with any provision
in the arbitral agreement.7°
Clearly Article 55 cannot be regarded as such a "provision" of the arbitration
agreement to prevent the execution of an award against the state concerned, and its
safeguard for any state involved in ICSJD proceedings with assets used for
commercial purposes in the United States is therefore lost. In fact the effect of Section
1610 (a)(6) is to make the very fact of submission to arbitration the basis for
execution against the host state, notwithstanding the attempt at preserving immunity
under Article 55. As a result the execution of an award against a foreign state in the
United States of America is easier than the execution of a court judgment, whether
Le:co v Liberia 650 F. Supp, 73 (1986, SDNY); Senegal v Soabi, supra;
Benvenuti & Bonfant v Congo, supra.
°28 United States Codes (U.S.C.)
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domestic or foreign!7'
What further renders the Convention more onerous for the host state than for
the investor is that failure by the host state to comply with its Convention obligations
under Articles 53(1) & 54(1) requiring it to accept an award made against the state
as binding and to enforce it constitutes a breach of a treaty both under Article 64 and
general international law.72 This is so because Articles 53 & 54, read separately or
together, create absolute obligations for the state. In that case, proceedings may be
brought against the host state by the state of which the investor is a national or by any
other member state party to the ICS]D Convention. 73
 Meanwhile an investor refusing
to comply with the award cannot be in breach of a treaty to which the investor is not
a party.
In those circumstances an attempt towards a genuine balance in the Convention
would have been to make the state of which the investor is a nationi responsible for
the award debt of the investor in the same way that it assumes the position of the
investor by reviving the right of diplomatic intervention, 74
 if the host state had
defaulted. It is doubtful whether this extraordinary mechanism to ensure the execution
of awards would have been put in place if investors were thought to be the principal
debtors. The absence of a corresponding mechanism to ensure that an award made
against a defaulting investor or one without sufficient assets suggests that it may not.
Such an obvious imbalance certainly commands little confidence from the point of
view of developing countries receiving investments.
The purpose of the Convention may also still been achieved and the confusion
created by Articles 53(1), 54(3) and 55 avoided by leaving out Articles 53 and 54
altogether, since the question of recognition and enforcement was already the subject
of another international instrument, viz, the New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958. A provision in the Washingtion
71Joly, Françoise "Etats-Unis: Une R6forme de 1988 Restraint le domain des
Immunitds des Etats Etrangers en matière D'Arbilrage" (1990) Rev. Arb., 607.
Delaume (1983) 77 AJIL p. 802.
73Ibid.
74By virtue of Article 27.
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Convention treating an ICSID award as a 'foreign award" for the purpose of the New
York Convention would have extended the New York regime to awards made under
the World Bank investment disputes Convention.75
 The UNCITRAL Model Law as
a whole adopts the provisions of the New York Convention.76
It is therefore highly probable that in drafting the enforcement provisions of
the Convention a more far reaching effect was intended than often expressly stated
and than was necessary to achieve the purpose of a Convention limited to providing
mere facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes, including the
availability of direct access by private persons to international tribunals. A quick
reference to the enforcement regime of the New York Convention, for example,
reveals that the ICSID provisions provide a simpler and a more effective scheme,
although only against one of the parties to the arbitration. The court requested to
enforce an ICSID award is compelled to do so upon presentation of an authenticated
copy of the award. There is no room at this stage to resist the award by the party
against whom enforcement is required. This is so because the Convention requires the
domestic court to uphold an ICSID award as a similar judgment of its own by
recognising and enforcing it. It is only at the stage of execution that an ICSID award
becomes exposed to the same challenges to which an award enforced under the New
York Convention regime would have been at an earlier stage.
2. Enforcement by Extra-legal Means
Of even greater importance is the psychological link between the Centre and
the World Bank. Although established under the the auspices of the Bank, with which
it has continued to retain an administrative link," the Centre is said to remain in
75The possibility of doing so was contemplated at the time of the Convention,
although not carried: see Broches, "Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID
Convention: Binding Force, Finality, Recognition, Enforcement, Execution." (1987)
2 ICSJD Rev.-FILJ, 229.
76Model Law, Articles 34 and 36.
"The Centre facilities are based at the Bank, The Bank President remains
Chairman of the Centre's Board of Governors etc.
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substance an independent structure completely seperate from the Bank in relation to
the conduct of any arbitration proceedings. It is obvious, however, that as against the
contracting state, the most effective guarantee of enforcement lies in the institutional
link between the Convention and the World Bank as its administering body "... since
the [s]tate may fear not being able to obtain further loans from the World bank."78
Broches pointed out that failure to observe its pecuniary obligations toward the
investor might bring the host state "into conflict with the capital exporting
community".79
 Since that link is only perceived in terms of the adverse consequences
to a host state that fails to comply with an award, and never in relation to the investor
as well, it would follow that the link was not necessarily intended to work to the
advantage of both parties to an ICSID arbitration, particularly of the host states. That
is one of the psychological aspects of the one-sidedness of the Convention. As early
as 1969 Broches, as the first Secretary of the Centre, had stated in relation to the
attitude of the Bank towards a state in default that:
[q]uant aux sanctions, plusieurs orateurs ont soulignés qu 'elles pouraient
exister avec l'intervention de la Banque Mondiale ... Nous nous efforcons
d 'etre très discrets et de ne pas exercer de pressions même morales sur les
pays qui sont des signataires potentiels de la Convention ou pour obtenir
l'application effective de la Convention par les Etats signataires. Mais ii se
peut que si un Etat viole une obligation très nette exprimée dans la
Convention, les organes de la Banque et d'autres institutions affihiees et peut-
etre la communaurefinancière et d'aide auront des reticences considerables
avant d'accueillir favorablement des demandes d'assistance de ce pays. Et
c'est une des raisons pour lesquelles nous avons pris l'initiative; nous avons
voulu eviter ainsi des situations tres delicates, devant lesquelles nous nous
trouvonsparfois lorsque des pays membres ou des investisseurs portent plainte
contre un Etat X et nous demandent d'arrêter notre aide et nos operations
financieres avec ce pays. Ce sont des situations delicates car 1 'ont se trouve
78Redfern and Hunter The Law and Practice of International Commercial
Arbitration, 2nd Edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1992, p. 418.
(1972) Hague Acad. Courses, p. 409.
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devant des revandications unilaterales; ii n 'y pas alors de decision impartiale
et nous sommes devant une situation très djfflcile, car nous ne voulons pas être
juge. Avec Ia Convention, si un Etat consent a la competence du Centre, s'il
y a eu sentence rendu contre cet Etat et que celui-ci n 'execute pas Ia sentence,
nous avons une situation tres nette et tres claire et les pro blemes de
conscience ne se presenteraient pas de la meme fa con ou ne se presenteraient
pas du tout. C'est pour nous la seule assurance indirecte.8°
In its mildest form, Shihata, the present Secretary of the Centre, expresses the
same threat in terms that "refusal by a state involved to comply with an ICSID award
would deprive it of credibility in the international business community. This is not a
risk8 ' that a state would be likely to assume lightly."82
It is thus made obvious that the decision by the Bank and its affiliated bodies
whether or not to grant a loan or some other fmancial facility to a developing country
receiving investments may be made subject to the attitude of the state in relation to
the extent to which it complies with a Convention award made against it. It has, as
a result, never been in doubt that the possibility that default by a developing state
might result in the World Bank taking a tougher attitude towards an application for
investment or other form of fmancial cooperation from the country concerned, was one
of the principal reasons for establishing ICSJD.83
 What seems clear also is that
failure to comply with a World Bank Convention award will result in more serious
consequences for the developing country, host state to investments, than a failure to
"Aspets Procdduraux", p. 129-30.
811t is in fact a threat. The state concerned may
states that it will find itself in direct conflict with
deft n yc probable que l'inexécution d'une sentence
généralement, la violation de la Convention de
consideration par Ia banque au moment de formuler
des Etans intéresseés": op. cit. p. 293.
not only lose credibility. Giardini
he World Bank: "(ill semble en
du CIRDI f!CSIDJ a, plus
Washington, seraient prises en
sa politique de credit a I 'egard
"Towards a Greater Depolitization of Investment Disputs: The Roles of ICSID
and MJGA" (1986) 1 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ, 1, p. 9.
83Fatouros, A. A., "Investisséments Efrangers et Arbitrages entre Etats et Personnes
Privées - La Convention BIRD EIBRD] du 18 Mars 1965" (1959) 59 Rev. Crit. Dr. mt.
Priv., 580
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comply with an ordinary non-Convention award. The only logical explanation for that
attitude - would have to do with the direct involvement of the World Bank as an
important source of investment financing to developing economies with the
establishment and administration of the Convention and its Centre. It is this form of
indirect and sometimes direct pressure which, it was believed, the Bank could bring
to bear on host nations.
Broches' statement also indicates that immunity against execution was not
seriously thought to be a major obstacle to execution of awards. It was the absence,
in the first place, of appropriate fori for the adjudication of those disputes which was
the controlling factor in the creation of the Centre. The World Bank was finding it
difficult to justify any form of pressure on a host state in the absence of a judicial
pronouncement. It would have been in conscience easier to respond to a request by
an investor already credited with an award than without one. Once an award is
obtained under what appears to be a neutral forum and the debtor state refuses to
comply with its terms, the stage would then be set, according to Broches, for the
World Bank to intervene as appropriate, being thus satisfied in conscience and
otherwise. In those circumstances the World Bank would be faced with "... une
situation très nette et très claire et les problèmes de conscience ne se presenteraient
pas de la même Ia con ou ne se presenteraient pas du tout. 84
Would the same considerations have applied in the case of refusal by an
investor to comply with the terms of an award rendered in favour of a host state?
Apparently that was not seriously in the minds of those closely involved with the
making of the Convention and nothing that has happened since the creation of the
Centre itself suggests otherwise.8
E. The Convention and Applicable Law
Of some concern to developing countries are the provisions of the Convention
4"Aspèts Procéduraux', p. 130.
See infra conclusion of dissertation.
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relating to the applicable law. Those provisions have often been presented as
reflecting the much acclaimed balance between the diverging interests of private
investors and host countries. It should be noted that the Convention was never
intended to deal with substantive questions of law relating to state contracts. It was
not also meant to address the question of whether there was need for the development
of a new corpus of substantive rules of law in the entire area of international
economic and trade law, as rendered necessary by the emergence of new States. 87 In
fact previous attempts at responding to the need to protect foreign investments and
directed at laying down such rules had failed in varying degrees. 88 The Convention
was therefore intended to address the problem from a completely different approach,
directed not to the substance, but to the procedure, and the provision of material
assistance and intellectual resources (limited almost entirely to making available a list
of conciliators and arbitrators) within an institutional framework. The choice of the
particular institutional framework was essential to ensure that whatever gains were
made would be guaranteed in an international instrument binding on the developing
states concerned as a treaty. 89
 As a result no attempt is made in the Convention to
lay down any rules of law on the transfer of foreign investment and the settlement of
disputes arising in connection thereof. The Convention leaves it to the parties to
determine, by agreement, what those rules should be in each case.
Thus, Article 42(1) provides, in the first place, that the tribunal set up under
the Convention shall apply the law indicated by the parties. That clause is in
recognition of the doctrine of party autonomy, on the basis of which parties to a
contract are allowed to select the proper law of the contract. Whereas that doctrine
is now considered settled in contracts between private parties, its extension without
modification into the domain of state contracts, the subject of the ICSID Convention,
Artic1es 42(1), (2) and (3).
See document presented by the General Counsel of the World Bank to the
members of the Committee of the Whole, SD Doc. 63/2 of Februazy 18, 1963,
History of the Convention, Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 73.
Ibid.
Broches (1965) 65 Proceedings ASIL, 33.
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has remained questionable on the grounds that the parties are not contracting on an
equal footing.9° The inequality is said to arise, in the first place, from the fact that
corporations are not regarded in the international plane as having the same standing
as states and, second, in that the corporations themselves are in bargaining terms, more
powerful in some cases than most investment receiving countries on account of their
immense capital resources.9 ' Sornarajah points out that these inequalities make it
inappropriate to extend the application of the principle of party autonomy to the area
of state contracts without a careful balance. But that imbalance may shift after the
investment as the state gradually asserts prerogatives associated with sovereignty
within its territory.
Whatever the relative strengths of the parties may have been prior to and after
the contract, in practice, the laws regulating foreign investments in many host
countries require the application of the law of the state concerned as the law of the
contract, and it is recognised that in the overwhelming majority of those contracts
provision is made for the application of the host state law. 93 It was also obvious,
having regard to the general investment climate of the time, and in the face of the
hostility of host states arising from the treatment given their national laws in the early
Middle East petroleum arbitrations, that they would not receive with favour any
attempt to set up a system that did not recognise the role of their national laws in the
settlement of disputes involving state contracts.
It is in recognition of that fact that the Convention provides for the application
of the law of the host state where, as happens quite frequently, the parties fail to
specify the law to be applied by the tribunal. This could be as a result of the
Sornarajah, M., International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State
Contracts, Longman Singapore Ltd., 1990, pp. 130-31.
91Ibid.
See for example the cases cited by Sornarajah, ibid p. 113; ICSJD, Investment
Regulations Around the World, 1983.
93Delaume, "State Contracts and Transnarional Arbitration" (1981) 75 AJIL, 784,
p. 798.
Article 42.
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difficulties associated with reaching agreement in the course of negotiating the
contract or, after a dispute has already arisen, on the content of that clause, given that
the parties would already have become aware of the potential of the clause to
determine the outcome of the litigation one way or the other. The absence of a choice
of law clause could also be the result of an oversight.
The Convention directs the tribunal under the second clause of Article 42(1)
to apply the law of the contracting state party to the dispute in the absence of a proper
law clause in the contract or a subsequent agreement indicating it. The law of the state
is referred to as the law of the place where the investment is made and where the
contract as a whole is located. That same law would in any case have been reached
by application of the ordinary principles of conflict of laws but would not be attractive
to investors since, as far as they were concerned, it would have been disfavourable.
To allay their fears, Article 42(1) further provided for the application of the relevant
rules of international law, together with the law of the contracting state. The ICSID
tribunal is therefore invited to have regard not only to the law of the host state (as the
"appropriate" proper law - so to say - of the investment) but also to such principles
of international law as it may find applicable.
As pointed out by Sornarajah, it was not until the 1950s that reference
began to be made to international law as the governing law of contracts between states
and private foreign parties. The purpose was to subject those contracts under a system
of law that would provide some degree of protection to foreign investment, then
believed not to be available under the domestic legal order of developing countries.
Previous attempts at doing so directly had not been succesful at all? 6 The framers
of the ICSID Convention thought that the same purpose could easily be achieved by
subjecting ICSID arbitrations to international law and securing the acceptance of
countries in need of investment in a treaty. That law, according to the Report of the
Executive Directors of the World Bank, should be understood within the same
meaning as that given to it by Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court
Supra p. 126.
See above, notes 1 and 2; Fatouros, A. A., "The Quest for Legal Security of
Foreign Investments - Latest Developments" (1962-63) 17 Rutgers Law Rev., 257.
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of Justice, while bearing in mind "... the fact that Art.38 was designed to apply to
inter-state disputes" onlyY Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice is limited to disputes within the domain of international public law. Whether
or not it was appropriate to extend the principles and rules of public international law
into the area of state contracts is a question we will examine later when we come to
deal with the question of the applicable law generally.
However, following a trend introduced by the early Middle East arbitrations,
it became possible, although without using exactly the same terminology ("... general
principles of law as recognised by civilised nations ..."), to bring state contracts within
the regime of international law.98
As far as the Convention itself is concerned, the wording of Article 42(1) still
left it open as a matter of construction to determine the relationship between
international law and the law of the state concerned. If both laws were inconsistent on
a specific issue, it would become necessary to uphold one against the other. The
course to follow in such a situation has not been in doubt. According to Broches, if
confronted with such a problem, the ICSID tribunal should:
first look at the law of the host State and that law will in the first
instance be applied to the merits of the dispute. Then the result will be
tested against international law. That process will not involve the
confirmation or the denial of the validity of the host State's law, but
may result in not applying it where the law, or action taken under the
law, violates international law. In that sense ... international law is
hierarchically superior to national law under Article 42(l).
A preference had already been indicated for that view long before the fmal draft of
the Convention itself. Broches had, as chairman of the regional consultative meetings
Report of Executive Directors, para. 40.
See for example Saudi Arabia v Aramco [1963] 27 ILR, 117; Sapphire
International Petroleum Co.v National Iranian Oil Company [1967] 35 ILR., 136.
(1972) 136 Hague Acad. Courses, p. 392.
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of legal experts,' thought that should be the correct position in the light of the
experience derived from the practice of arbitral tribunals in the past but did not
consider it necessary to "... state the position too specifically", 10 ' since that might
have attracted the hostility of receiving states, whose adherence to the proposed
scheme was indispensable to its establishment.
If this view were correct,'°2
 then, Article 42(1) carries the thrust of the entire
Convention far beyond its stated purpose. The Convention was never intended to deal
with the troublesome question of substantive rules of law whether directly or, as
Article 42(1) does, indirectly, by indicating a bias in favour of a particular system of
law, whether international or domestic. The contents of that system, as regards inter-
state matters or as applied to disputes involving private parties and states, has always
been questioned by developing countries.103
What is more, on the suggestion advanced by one delegation at the legal
experts consultative meeting in Bangkok'° 4
 and supported by another delegation'°5
that the decision to invest in another country also involved an implied submission to
the application of the laws of the host state as the governing law of the investment,
it was responded that apart from cases where national law was in violation of
international law, thus rendering the former inapplicable, it was also "... reasonable to
provide that an international tribunal will have the power to apply international law
See the proceedings of the Geneva meeting, Histor y of the Convention, Vol. 2,
Part 1, p. 420.
'°'Ibid.
'°2The view is not without support in all reported ICSID awards containing a
statement on the issue. See for example the opinion of the Ad hoc committee in its
annulment decision of 16 May 1986 in Indonesia v Amco Asia [1993] 1 ICSID
Reports, 509; Letco v Liberia (1987) 26 ILM 647 p. 658, where, inspite of having
noted the parties' express choice of Liberian law, the tribunal still took the view that
Liberian law is nonetheless "... subject to control by international law."
'°3Sornarajah, Op. Cit. chapter four.
'°4History of the Convention, p. 513.
'°Ibidp. 514-15.
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especially as the Convention was meant to establish a forum with an
international jurisdiction.'07
Therein lay the entire design of the Convention. In the absence of an
internationally accepted regime for the treatment of private foreign investment, it
became necessary to institutionalise by treaty - in effect a more authoritative source
of international law - a process already initiated by arbitral tribunals, (although not
without much resistance), to extend the application of international law into the field
of state contracts in the belief that it will provide better protection to foreign
invesments.'°8
 That is an issue we deal with in chapter four. We may only add for
now that, that belief, together with the conventional view of Article 42 as construed
by ICSID tribunals, completely distorts the simple objective of the Centre and the
Convention as expressed in Article 1(2): "... to provide facilities [emphasis added] for
conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between states and nationals of
other states in accordance with ..." the Convention's provisions.
Sub-conclusion
It has repeatedly been said'° 9
 that the fear of political risks undoubtedly
works to the detriment of the flow of private foreign capital. The establishment of the
Centre has been justified on that ground. What is not openly said, although it underlies
that belief, is the fact that it is the same fear of political risks which was the driving
Ibidp. 571.
'°7See also Lauterpacht "The World Bank Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes", in Etudes Gu ggenheim, 642 (1968); contra, Toope, Mixed
International Arbitration, pp. 238-52 (1990) and Schartzenberger, "The Arbitration
Pattern and the Protection of Property Abroad', in International Arbitration: Liber
Amicorum Martin Domke (Ed. Sanders), 1967, who all think that although the ICSID
Convention itself is an international instrument, tribunals constituted pursuant to it are
not international tribunals in the strict sense.
'°8Fatouros, (1959) Rev. Crit. Dr. mt. Privé, 580.
See for example Amerasinghe, C.F., "The International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes and Development through the Multinational Corporation."
(1976) 9 Vand. J. Int'l. Law, 795.
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force of the Convention. It was assumed to be the situation that assets invested in the
economies of countries receiving them were expropriated by the governments of the
same countries on political considerations only. That was the evil that the Convention
was meant to address and, if possible, cure. If that were the starting point, and it was
so one-sided, it was theoretically difficult to conceive how, in establishing the
Convention a proper balance could have been arrived at. In the circumstances, it was
obvious that in trying to reach that so much needed compromise, countries which were
already guilty of the course of conduct leading to the background of the Convention
would have had to make more far-reaching concessions than their private investor
counterparts. Also implicit in that initial position was the assumption that the absence
of such political risks, including the readiness of host countries to submit to the
arbitration of investment disputes, would work in favour of the flow of investment
capital. That might have been theoretically attractive although, in practice, it was
doubtful whether there was evidence in support of it. The Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency was, it seems, also influenced by similar considerations.
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II. THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY (MIGA)
A. BACKGROUND
The creation of an investment insurance scheme was being pursued by the
World Bank and the international business community at the same time as the ICSID
itself was under consideration. The ICSID was just one way the World Bank could
contribute to reduce the incidence of disputes arising out of foreign investment
transactions. The investment Convention created a centre to provide a setting for the
resolution of disputes within a legal framework. An award obtained pursuant to an
arbitration under the Convention is however not useful unless it is capable of
enforcement and execution. With the insistence of investment receiving states the
ICSJD Convention retained the immunity of host states against execution by subjecting
the execution of an award to the local law in force on sovereign immunity in member
states in accordance with Articles 54(3) and 55.
To an extent, therefore, the immunity preserved by Articles 54(3) and 55
limited the effectiveness of the ICSID mechanism in providing recourse to an injured
investor. One way to overcome that particular inadequacy was to set up, alongside the
dispute settlement framework, a fmancial mechanism for the speedy and effective
recovery of losses incurred in investments abroad. An international insurance scheme
providing fmancial cover to investors and involving the participation of home and host
states, including private investors, was thought appropriate. The scheme would involve
the creation of an international insurance institution possessing legal personality in
international and domestic laws to provide indemnity against a specified category of
risks of special concern to private investors abroad.
That was, and remains, a commendable idea except that those associated with
it did not at any stage consider the position of a developing state faced with an unco-
operating investor. The state would be as much in need of financial insurance as an
investor in the state's position. But the fmancial position of host states did not appear
to be an important consideration at the time, due, in part, to the evolution of the
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evolution of the investment protection climate prevalent during the period leading to
the establishment of MIGA.
(1). Investment Protection Treaties
Closely associated with the insurance scheme were what became known as
"Investment Protection Treaties", (both bilateral and multilateral), providing a
background for the insurance mechanism. These are international agreements between
the governments of capital exporting and receiving countries providing minimum
standards of treatment for private investments from the former to the latter. In
essential part they contain provisions designed to protect investments by nationals of
the states, parties to the treaties, against risks considered to be non-business related.
The contents of these arrangements would vary from treaty to treaty, although, in
general, standard provisions are to be found in all to cover such issues as
expropriation (with or without compensation), fair and equitable treatment, national
treatment, currency convertibility and transfer, and compensation for loss suffered as
a result of war or civil disorder. They would also make provisions for the acquisition
and ownership of property and include stabilisation clauses. With regard to dispute
settlement, a provision for arbitration would be included providing for the application
of international law, so as to remove any disputes from transactions governed by such
a treaty from national jurisdictions and laws.'
Initially investment protection treaties appeared in the form of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation Treaties (FCN5), which remained in place until the late
1960s, when they were gradually substituted by the bilateral investment treaties. 2 The
FCNs were concluded initially by the United States and Japan and later some
European countries with the objective of promoting the expansion of trade between
them. They were only gradually extended to include developing countries in the first
two decades after the second World War. Owing to the involvement of developing
'For a detailed study of Investment Protection Treaties see, The United Nations Centre on
Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties, (ST/CTC/65), 1988; UNCTC & ICC, Bilateral
Investment Treaties, (ST/CTC/136), 1992.
2UNCTC, ibid pp. 3 et seq.
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countries they also became regarded in the United States, in particular, as a means not
only of encouraging but primarily of protecting investment abroad by including
minimum standards of treatment to nationals of the states, parties to such treaties.
FCNs were said to be extremely broad in scope and dealt with matters as
diverse as the "... entry and freedom of movement, protection of persons, right to
counsel and prompt trial, ... national treatment in application of national laws,
enforceability of arbitration awards, protection of acquired property, right to lease and
purchase land freely, patents, trade marks, ... equal treatment, administration and
exchange controls, transit of goods and persons, import and export duties and taxes,
right to compete with local monopolies, consultation with restrictive business practices
"3
However, following the nationalisations and expropriations of the 1950s and
1960s, FCNs became perceived as widely inadequate for the protection of foreign
investments. They dealt only in a little manner with direct foreign investments, seeing
that they were not then as important as they became after the second World War. It
is said that the focus of FCNs was on trade and navigation and that "... purposes of
investment protection were merely incidental to the treaties. They were therefore
regarded as inadequate, especially as they were initially intended primarily for the
protection of individuals, and thus criticised for not dealing with such questions as
"creeping" or indirect expropriations and for containing poorly drafted arbitration
clauses.5
(2). National Investment Insurance schemes
As a result two new initiatives were introduced in the early 1970s and 1980s.
The first scheme was fmancial in character, in that it involved the underwriting by the
3fbid p. 4.
4Vandevelde, Kenneth J., "The Bilateral Investment Protection Treaty Program of the United States"
(1988) 21 Cornell Int'l L. J., 201, P. 203.
5Pappas, Athena J., "References on Bilateral Investment Treaties" (1989)4 ICSID Rev.- FlU, 189;
Bergman, Mark S., "Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: An Examination of the Evolution and
Significance of the U.S. Prototype Treaty" (1983) 16 N.Y.UJ.Int'I L. Pol., 1.
150
governments of capital exporting countries of non-business risk insurance. It took the
form of an investment guarantee offered to nationals of the home state investing
abroad. The guarantee is issued by a government agency which also administers the
programme of the issuing country. In the United States, for example, the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation was established under the Foreign Assistance Act in
1969 to offer cover against specified risks. The Export Credit Guarantee Department
in Britain was able to establish an overseas investment insurance scheme under the
Overseas Investment and Export Guarantees Act of 1972. Canada has been providing
cover through its Export Development Corporation (EDC) and Denmark has been able
to do same for Danish Investors in developing countries through the Danish
International Development Agency.
A feature common to all the national insurance schemes is that they all make
provision for the national agencies to become subrogated to the claims of their
nationals in dispute with a foreign government after the investor has received
compensation from his national guarantee scheme. Subrogation in the foreign
investment setting was intended to enforce compliance by the host state with any
claims embraced by the indemnifying government.
That arrangement soon ran into difficulties. In view of the fact that the debtor
would be a state or a state entity, it remained doubtful whether the assignment of the
investor's claim to the state of which he was a national, without the consent of the
defendant state, would have been sufficient to enable the subrogating government to
proceed with the claim. The host government might have" ... refuse[d] to recognise
the principle and object to the transfer of the claim from the individual investor to his
national state."6
 Further, it was also clear that a home state appearing as a subrogator
could not, by virtue of Article 25 of the ICSID arbitration Convention (the only
effective international mechanism for the settlement of such claims), proceed to
arbitration under the Convention. 7
 Article 25 limits the scope of the Convention to
disputes in which one of the parties is a foreign investor or a foreign based
corporation, or a company incorporated in the receiving state but which, for the
6Meron, Theodor, "The World Bank and Insurance" (1975) 47 BYIL, 301, at 309.
7lbid pp. 306-7.
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purposes of the Convention, the state has accepted to treat as a foreign corporation.
The Centre's jurisdiction does not cover disputes between states. That jurisdictional
limitation would not have made it possible for the subrogator state, upon paying the
investor, to bring arbitration proceedings or, if they had been initiated already, to
continue in the place of the substituted investor against the defendant state. In
particular, and as we noted before, the Calvo doctrine and the general attitude of
investment receiving states remained hostile to the intervention of foreign governments
in investment disputes. As Meron further observed, "... past experience [indicated] that
certain developing countries, and particularly Latin American States object in principle
to the operation of subrogation with respect to foreign investments on their territory.
They regard subrogation as contrary to their sovereignty and as politically dangerous
in that it transforms a dispute between a state and a foreign investor into a dispute
between two sovereign [s]tates"8
The effectiveness of domestic investment programmes was therefore bound to
be limited if, notwithstanding the express provisions of national insurance agencies to
become substituted to the claims of compensated investors, compliance by defaulting
states could not be compelled. As a result the second initiative was put in place
associating national insurance schemes with a network of what came to be referred to
as bilateral investment treaties, also containing subrogation clauses.
(3). Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT)
BITs are intended to complement the national insurance schemes. They include
provisions requiring the host state to recognise the transfer of the rights of the
investor, when he receives payment, to the indemnifying state, which is usually the
state of which the investor is a national. This will constitute a legally binding
international obligation on the receiving state, under which the home state will appear
in its own right instead of as a mere subrogator. Being an international legal
arrangement of a higher order, the BITs were intended to supplement and support the
domestic insurance schemes by creating a treaty obligation enforceable against the
8lbidp. 310.
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host state. The first BiT was said to have been signed between Germany and Pakistan
in 1959 and, by 1991, the network of those treaties had increased to about 45O. The
scope of the treaties is however not limited to the issue of subrogation. It includes the
entire issue of the treatment abroad of foreign investments and other forms of foreign
owned property.
The fact that the treaties increased in numbers and in scope may still not have
been regarded as having adequately dealt with the underlying suspicions of developing
countries regarding the right (as retained in the treaties) of states of which investors
are nationals to continue to intercede on their behalf. The retention of that right did
not help to depoliticise the already charged foreign investment climate. It was pointed
out that it was not the principle of subrogation itself that was being challenged by the
developing countries but the particular arrangements under which the capital exporting
countries became involved in the disputes by means of diplomatic protection.'° There
was therefore no reason why an international institution, involving the participation
of both developing and developed countries and therefore reflecting some degree of
neutrality, could not become an appropriate subrogator after compensating an investor.
(4). Objective of the MIGA
The creation of MIGA was therefore well in line with the above developments.
Like the Centre for the settlement of investment disputes, it was intended as a
response to a specific problem, that of protecting foreign investments with a view, it
is said, to encouraging its flow. That in itself is a worthy objective but the instrument
used, the MIGA, turned out to benefit investors only, without so much regard for the
interests of the countries involved.
As regards the protection of foreign investments, MIGA is intended to re-
assure investors with the guarantee of immediatedly available fmancial resources to
compensate for loss irrespective of the existence of an investment protection treaty.
The creation of the Agency would also overcome some of the other difficulties
9UNCTC and ICC, op. cit. note 1.
'°Shihata, "Towards a Greater Depolitization of Investment Disputes: The role of ICSID and MIGA"
(1986)1 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ, 1.
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associated with making a claim for compensation.
In the first place, its status as an international organisation would make it
possible in international law for MIGA to sue and be sued on its own behalf. That
would resolve the procedural difficulties regarding the direct access of foreign
corporations and individuals to international tribunals, since the private investor will
cease to become a party to any arbitration or litigation after it has been compensated.
For that reason Article 18(a) provides that
[u]pon paying or agreeing to pay compensation to a holder of a
guarantee, the Agency shall be subrogated to such rights or claims
related to the guaranteed investment as the holder of a guarantee may
have against the host country and other obligors. The contract of
guarantee shall provide the terms and conditions of such subrogation.
Article 18(a), as read with Article 1(b) conferring the Agency wth legal personality,
removes the investor from the dispute and therefore resolves the need to establish his
capacity in international law to bring proceedings against the host state. It further
resolves the absence of any other means of redress to the investor in the event that the
state of which he is a national declines to intervene on his behalf for reasons not
necessarily connected with his particular dispute.
Next, subrogation is established in international law as a right, in a manner
which allows the exercise of the investor's claim against the defaulting state without
requiring the diplomatic intervention of the government of the investor. The
involvement of home states, whether directly or through a national agency, did not
help to make relations between home and host states less confrontational. Relying on
grounds reminiscent of the Calvo doctrine, developing countries, especially those of
Latin America, regarded with hostility arrangements (even when embodied in bilateral
treaties) under which differences between a foreign corporate or physical person could
easily become transformed into an inter-state dispute." The establishment of a
neutral international institution free from control by any group of countries was meant
to be in response to that objection. The exercise of claims to which it shall have
become subrogated would be regarded with less disfavour than in cases involving the
"See Bergman, (1983) 16 N Y U J. Int'l L. Pol., 1.
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direct or indirect intervention of the government of the investor. Referring to the draft
articles -of agreement of a previous initiative by the World Bank to set up an
International Investment Insurance Agency (I.I.I.A.) in 1972, Theordor Meron
observed that "... the very raison d'être of the establishment of a multilateral insurance
agency was to make subrogation into a non-political, technical, non-confrontational
issue".'2
 The question as to who could bring claims against defaulting states without
provoking hostility of some kind became in part resolved.
The removal of these obstacles, it is believed, would encourage investors to
take advantage of investment opportunities available in developing countries, which
is the stated objective of MIGA. Since the existence of non-commercial risks was said
to discourage the flow of investment capital, MIGA would seek to achieve this
objective by issuing insurance guarantees to private investors, nationals of member
states of the Agency.
The new institution is also required to encourage the flow of capital to
developing countries in other ways. Under Article 23 of the Convention this additional
role should include the provision of services to member states in the formulation of
foreign investment policies, dissemination of information on investment opportunities,
research, technical advice and assistance, cooperation with other bodies involved in
the promotion of foreign investment and so on. The promotional activities should help
to strengthen MIGA's image as an investment promotion, and not necessarily as an
investment protection body, with the objective of benefiting one group of countries
only.
B. SOME FEATURES
(1). Membership and the Significance of the Link with the World Bank
Under Article 4, membership of the organisation is open to all member states
of the World Bank and Switzerland. The commentary to that Article points out that
no member of the Bank is under an obligation to join the Agency. That cautionary
note was in response, first, to a fear assumed to underly the Agency's creation and
2(1975) 47 BYIL, p. 312.
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points to one of the policy issues involved in the formulation of the Convention
concerning the Agency's link with the World Bank. It was reasonable, in theory, to
express some doubts as to the attitude of the Bank and the international investment
community as a whole towards a developing country which did not sign up to the
Convention and therefore failed to become a member state of the World Bank to
which the Agency's guarantee could apply. It is likely that although a country would
be under no obligation to join the Agency, the decision whether or not to invest in that
country by a foreign investor wishing to rely on the MIIGA insurance scheme might
significantly be determined by that fact. Thus, although the country could not directly
be compelled to join the Agency, it remains our view that the countiy would
nonetheless be under pressure to become a member if in failing to do so it became
seen as hostile to foreign investments.
In particular the fear was expressed that a country's relationship with the
World Bank could become affected by any dispute which that country might have with
the Agency as a member of the World Bank family, especially as under its standing
policies, the Bank was known for paying particular attention to unresolved investment
disputes.' 3
 The view that prevailed in response to that question was that the Agency
should be created as an autonomous institution' 4
 keeping its financial and other
operational activities separate from those of the Bank, although it was still thought
necessary to retain a minimum administrative link with it,' 5 notwithstanding that it
was also known, as in the case of the ICSJD, that an identical link had resulted in
practice to a stronger relationship than was anticipated.' 6
 But that is not altogether
so.
It has been suggested that the link between MIGA and the World Bank is
' 3Shihata, Ibrahim F. I., MIGA and Foreign Investment: Ori gins, Operations, Policies and Basic
Documents of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1988, p. 71
(Hereafter Miga and Foreign Investment)
"Article 1(b) of the Convention establishing the Agency gives it full juridical personality in
international and domestic laws, including the capacity to enter into contracts, acquire and dispose of
property and to institute legal proceedings in its own name.
'5lnstitutionally reflected in making the President of the World Bank cx officio chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Agency: Article 32(b).
' 6Shihata, Miga and Foreign Investment, p. 71.
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possibly more than symbolic - contrary to what was initially intended - on the basis
that the Agency has maintained a strong juridical and institutional association with the
World Bank.' 7
 It is clear, as Touscoz observes, that the Agency is not a subsidiary
of the World Bank, such as the International Finance Corporation, and that those
involved in its creation have been careful not to over emphasise the link between the
Bank and the Agency, preferring to highlight the view that "... MIIGA is designed to
be an autonomous institution which will operate on its own account and within its own
responsility while maintaining a symbolic but significant linkage with the Bank"'8
Shihata's admission that the link is significant is probably correct since the suggestion
that it is merely symbolic is disputed, for, as Touscoz further points out, it is more
than symbolic: '. . [u]ne lecture attentive des statuts et des O.R. [Operational
Regulations] fait toutefois apparaItre très nettement le rattachement de l'Agence au
"group" de Ia Banque; d'une part, l'Agence et le "group" sont lies juridiquement,
d'autre part l'Agence utilise un sysreme de ponderation de voix qui s'apparente a la
formule dite de "Brerton Woods'ç pratiquee par plusieurs institutions du "group'Y"9
Even if the link were merely symbolic, the psychological effect of that symbolism on
a host states should not be lost since an act by the state in disregard of the Convention
may invite a reaction from the World Bank, an important source of foreign investment
financing.
Furthermore it was specifically envisaged that the Agency will, at least at its
initial stages, establish administrative arrangements under which the facilities and
personnel of the Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the ICSID will
be available to the Agency. 2° Under Paragraph 5.20 of the Operational Regulations,
such cooperation could be extended to include "systematic consultation and exchange
of relevant information with the World Bank and the IFC, subject to safeguards
regarding the confidentiality of information available to each institution." The
'7Touscoz, J, "L'Agence Multilatérale de Garantie des Investisséments" (1987) 13 Dr. Prat. Comm.
mt., 311.
L8Shihata.
 (1986) 1 ICSJD Rev.,-FILJ, p. 14.
Touscoz, op. cit. p. 317.
Operational Regulations paras. 5.01 and 5.22-23.
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implementation of that paragraph will require maintaining a careful balance in the
flow of information between the Agency and the other institutions. It is difficult to
conceive how that would be in practice without prejudicing the required balance, given
that the consultation is intended to be "systematic", including, in particular, that the
Regulations also contemplate the overlap of personnel between the Agency, the Bank
and the other institutions referred to.
(2). Participation of Developing Countries
The need for that balance raises the question as to why, in the first place, it
was thought necessary to associate host states in the scheme. The central pillar of the
Convention creating the Agency is without doubt the recognition of the right of
subrogation, an arrangement which allows the Agency to pursue a member state after
compensating the investor. Although subrogation is a well accepted principle of
insurance law, a normal insurance contract is, however, an agreement between an
insurer and the insured. If it is a third party liability insurance the contract is for an
indemnity against the liability of the insured towards a third person. Otherwise it
would be a cover against loss which the insured himself suffers either as the result of
an act of himself, of a third party, or resulting from wholly extraneous circumstances.
In any case the third party is not to be treated as a party to the contract and will
normally not have been involved in the arrangement between the insurer and the
insured.
In the case of the International Investment Insurance Agency (ifiA) proposal
of the 1960s and lOs a staff memorandum of the World Bank on the principal
outstanding issues2 ' had reported on the extent to which developing countries could
be made to contribute financially to the proposed agency, both in respect of the initial
working capital, including administrative expenses, and to the payment of claims for
losses should the income of the agency fail to meet these expenses. The
Memorandum, based on the 1965 OECD "Report on the establishment of a
211BR]) International Investment Insurance Agency (lilA), Staff Memorandum on Principal
Outstanding Issues, (197?), reprinted in Meron, Theodor, Investment Insurance in International Law,
Oceana Publications, New York, 1976, 259.
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Multilateral Investment Guarantee Corporation", together with the Bank's own
previous drafts on the same issue, did not envisage the financial participation of
developing countries except as concerns administrative cost. It proposed a "common
working capital fund" to which all members (including developing countries) would
be required to contribute but its purpose limited to meet the administrative expenses
involved in the establishment and initial running of the proposed agency, pending the
availability of income in other ways. Although the Memorandum noted that the
view had been expressed in committee that all members of the proposed agency
should assume some responsibility for losses - with the liability of capital importing
countries being limited - it nevertheless confmed contribution to its working capital
to capital exporting members.
These proposals were then assumed to be well in line with the overall
circumstances necessitating the creation of an investment protection insurance scheme
for the sole benefit of investors and other attempts to deal with threats to foreign
investments. It was entirely consistent with the fact that the insurance mechanism was
to be instituted principally for the benefit of capital exporters, to whom the guarantees
of the proposed agency would be issued. On that basis it might also have been
reasonable to envisage the possibility of making calls upon those developing countries
which, eventually, also became capital exporters.
In the case of MIGA however it was thought undesirable to hold out the
Agency as a one sided organisation to be established primarily for the interest of
private investors. In referring to how to describe the objectives of the MIGA proposal,
Shihata observes that it had become necessary to depart from the approaches of
previous initiatives where "... the overall objective of the Agency became obscure and
its insurance operations were discussed as if they, and the protection they brought to
bear on the investments, were the ultimate objective of the proposal." 23 The concept
of investment protection itself was regarded as one sided, with the interest of investing
22See also Shihata, Miga and Foreign Investment, p. 43.
1bid p. 67.
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countries and investors being predominant, 24 a consideration which found favour with
previous attempts at resolving the threats to investments 25 but which had become
unattractive because it tended to cloud the view that was aimed at promoting the "...
developmental significance of investment protection."26 Meanwhile it was also
necessary to secure the confidence and good will of developing countries toward the
proposed agency so as to gain its general acceptance by them. It therefore became
important to "re-explain" the Agency's role by "... depicting it as an instrument of
international public policy serving common concerns, and not a one sided mechanism
for the protection of investors against actions of their host governments." 27 The
emphasis was, therefore, to re-explain, but not to review or re-assess the basis of
previous initiatives. Merely re-explaining the role of the new initiative was thought
useful in "depolitici[s]ing" the perception of the new institution and enhance its
contribution to the flow of investment resources from developed to developing
countries. In its essence, therefore, the "new" proposal was to remain the same in
philosophy and objective as previous initiatives but with the cosmetic change of
merely re-explaining to, and re-educating, developing countries that it is not.
It is said, further, that the Agency will play its depoliticising role by
eliminating the avenues of dispute between foreign investors and their home states on
the one hand, and receiving states, on the other hand. This will be made possible
first, by the conflict avoidance mechanism put in place by the Convention and, second,
as an intermediary, the Agency will replace the need for diplomatic intervention of the
home states on behalf of their nationals, thus eliminating the show of strength and
hostility then thought to be associated with that practice. 29 It will also encourage the
24Voss, Jurgen, "The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency: Status, Mandate, Concept, Features,
Implications" (1987) 21 J W T L, Part 4, 5.
Supra notes I and 2.
26Voss supra p. 23.
27Miga and Foreign Investment, p. 166.
Shihata, Ibrahim F. I., The World Bank in a Chan ging World, Selected Essays, (ed. Tschofen,
Franziska and Parra, Antonio R.), Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1991, p. 337 et seq.
Ibid.
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amicable settlement of disputes. Next, because it establishes a quick and effective
compensation scheme for losses resulting from ordinarily non-business related factors,
it will contribute to restore the confidence of investors and thus provide incentive for
further investments. On both sides, therefore, investment undertakings will be removed
from their excessively politicised context.3°
The Convention also introduces other mechanisms to safeguard against
conflicts, such as the requirement under Article 15 that the host government approves
both the issuance of the guarantee and the nature of the risk designated for cover. This
would have been preceded by a careful screening by MIGA of the particular project
involved to ensure that it is consistent both with the laws in force in the receiving
country and its development objectives. Thus, under Article 12, the Agency will not
provide cover for an investment project that fails to meet those requirements.
Another safeguard is said to be the fact that MIGA's insurance guarantee
scheme focuses on the investment and not on the nationality of the investor. Under the
Convention, the investment must be foreign but not necessarily the investor. MIGA
will therefore provide cover to local investors of the receiving state provided the assets
are transferred from abroad (Article 13(c)), thereby overcoming the objection against
treating foreign investors more favourably than those of the nationality of the host
state.
The participation of developing countries in the scheme, in our view, had little
to do with the above reason. It is more correctly to be explained on the need to put
in place a speedy and efficient machinery for the payment of claims by investors for
losses claimed to have been suffered. The particular obstacles against recovery for
which the Agency was intended to be a response were still numerous at the time of
its establishment. First, there was the question of the capacity of an individual in
international law to bring an action in an international forum for redress against a
state. The ICSID Convention was an attempt to remove that particular obstacle,
although to a limited extent. It failed to make it possible for a defaulting state to be
compelled to submit to the execution of a claim by preserving the immunity of the
30Shihata, (1986) 1 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ, 1.
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states against execution. The case of Letco v The Government of Liberia 3' is an
example of the extent to which in certain jurisdictions the plea of sovereign immunity
against execution could constitute a source of considerable delay in enforcing and
executing awards. In that case, Letco, a French company, was unable to execute on
Liberian Embassy assets in the United States a judgment entered by an American
court in the terms of an ICS1D award made in its favour on the ground that the state
was entitled to immunity from execution on the particular assets, (made up of tonnage
and registration fees and other taxes due the Liberian government from shipowners),
against which Letco had levied execution.
As a result the individual could only hope to rely on assistance through the
intervention of the state of which he is a national, which was achieved in mainly three
ways: either the home state made a direct diplomatic approach on behalf of its injured
national or it assumed the injury as a wrong done to itself and brought the claim
before an international tribunal on its own behalf. The third option was for the home
state to indemnify its national and become subrogated to his rights, then claim to be
compensated by the debtor state by any means. In all events the government of the
investor becomes involved in the dispute in a manner which has remained strongly
resented by capital receiving states, thus constituting a potential source of conflict
between countries on both sides of the capital movement process, without necessarily
resolving the concern of investors to be put back in funds.
The MIGA Convention resolves that difficulty by transferring the rights of the
claimant to the Agency after it has paid or accepted to pay the claim. The introduction
of an internationally established neutral body in the transaction insulates the original
claimant and the state of his nationality from disputes with the defaulting state. That
then removes the necessity to establish the claimant's capacity to sue the defaulting
state and the conflict in the relationship between the receiving state and the state of
the claimant, if it became involved in the dispute.
Of more significance, it overcomes the difficulty arising from the state's
inirnunity against execution since, as an insurance mechanism, the establishment of
the Agency makes it possible for the claimant to obtain compensation simply upon
3 'Civil Action No. 87-177, [1988] 3 ICSId Rev.,-FLLJ., 161 (DCC).
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presentation of what the Agency considers a justified claim, without the need for a
prior judicial process of any kind with its attendant setbacks. The agency will then
become subrogated to claims which the compensated investor might have against the
host country in accordance with Article 18(a).
(3). Subrogation and the Justification for the Participation of Developing
Countries
For the above scheme to be effective all member countries are required under
Article 18(b) to recognise the rights which the Agency might acquire as subrogator
pursuant to Article 18(a). But where the claim to which the Agency might be entitled
after being subrogated to the rights of the investor exists subject to arbitration between
the investor and the host country in a forum to which the Agency would normally not
have access, (such as the ICSID), the Agency may for that reason delay payment of
the claim until after the outcome of the arbitration. Paragraph 4.10 of the Operational
Regulations however permits the Agency to make a reimbursable advance payment
to the investor pending the outcome of the arbitration. Where the Agency acquires
rights in excess of the payment made to a claimant, it retains those rights but remains
under a duty to repay the excess, less expenses, to the investor. On the other hand,
neither the Convention nor the Operational Regulations make provision for the case
where, following a mistaken assessment, the Agency pays the investor in excess of his
rights or where the award in an arbitration of the claim to which the Agency should
have become subrogated is less than the amount advanced to the investor. In both
instances the investor is receiving more than his entitlements both under the contract
of guarantee with the Agency and the underlying investment contract with the host
state. In our view, the Agency should also be entiled to restitution of the balance
between what it pays and what it receives subsequent to the arbitration.
Shihata points out, however, 32
 that not every compensation or agreement to
pay compensation by MIGA will result in a claim to which the Agency may claim to
be repaid by the host state. Certain claims may result from covered losses (such as
Miga and Foreign Investment, p. 260.
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war risk) for which the host government will not be under obligation to compensate
the investor at all. Subrogation cannot create new or more rights against the host
countiy than those to which the investor himself is entitled. In such situations the case
for the involvement of developing countries and, in fact, of all parties in the scheme
is strong, since to encourage the flow of capital to developing countries it would be
reasonable to make calls on them to fund and otherwise assist in setting up a scheme
to compensate for losses arising entirely out of circumstances for which the parties
have no control.
But why fail to compensate the state as well where it suffers a loss for which
it is not to blame? The same cover should have been extended to host countries for
the same reason. The failure of the convention to do so is certainly an indication of
its underlying one-sided considerations.
The case for the participation of host countries becomes even more difficult
to understand as regards cases where the event giving rise to the loss can be pointed
to the actions, sometimes deliberate, of the host government itself. That will be the
case where, for example, it nationalises the investment or breaches a contract. Why
would a state want to nationalise or unilaterally seek to alter a contract to the
detriment of the other party and then negate that action by agreeing to a treaty
compelling the state to compensate indirectly, through a subrogation mechanism? The
only justification, in the circumstances, becomes what Seidi-Hohenveldern, referring
to the World Bank Staff Report of March 1962 on the Multilateral Investment
Insurance scheme, calls the "educational" effect of the participation of developing
countries in such schemes,33
 described in terms that "[i]f these countries were
required to contribute to the coverage of losses caused by nationali[s]ations in other
developing countries they would exercise a restraining influence within the Third
World group, so as to reduce the risk of making further such contributions." In
other words a state which is under Convention obligation to pay compensation within
a reasonable time, however indirectly, should soon realise the futility of a deliberate
breach or repudiation of contract or of otherwise dispossessing an investor.
""Subrogation under the MIGA Convention" (1987) 2 ICSLt) Rev.-FILJ, 111.
Jbid.
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That constitutes, together with the insurance scheme itself, what might be
regarded as the "deterrence" effect of MIGA as also reflected in the linkage of
membership of the Agency with membership of the World Bank, 35 enhanced by the
Agency's own strong juridical and functional links with the World Bank group as a
whole.36
 The orthodox view37
 on the link between the Bank and the Agency does
not emphasise its significance, although even supporters of that view have not failed
to refer to the Agency as belonging to the "World Bank Group", an expression with
no precise legal meaning, which nontheless associates the Agency with the authority
and influence of the Bank in the financial and capital markets.
C. Eligibility for the Guarantee
For cover to be issued by the Agency certain requirements must be met. These
requirements are spread across the Convention, although the principal ones are
provided for in chapter three entitled, "Operations". They touch on such matters as the
insurable risks, the nature of the investment for which cover is required, the
nationality of the investor and the category of the investment receiving state.
Under Article 14 cover is available only in relation to investments made or to
be made in a member state described as a "developing member country" for the
purposes of the Convention. The countries are listed in Schedule A of the Convention
and can be extended if new members are admitted to the Agency, or reduced, when
a member withdraws or is suspended for failing to fulfil its obligations under the
Convention.38
 Cover is limited to investment in developing countries to encourage
the flow of capital there. Paragraph 1.21 of the Operational Regulations allows the
Agency's guarantee to be extended, pursuant to Article 66 of the Convention itself,
See Chatterjee, S. K., "The convention establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency"
(1987) 36 ICLQ, 76.
Based on the provisions of the Convention (see for example, Articles 2, 3(b), 32(b), 35 and 56),
its Operational Regulations (Para. 5.20) and the involved association of the Bank in the creation of the
Agency: see also Touscoz, (1987) 13 Dr. Prat. Comm. Int'l, 311.
'See for example Shihata, Mi ga and Foreign Investment, p. 71.
Articles 51 and 52.
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to "dependent territories", which are defmed as territories for whose international
relations a member country of the Agency is responsible, upon designation by the
Board as a developing country for the purposes of Article 14
Article 13 requires the investor to be of the nationality of, or, if it is a
corporation, be incorporated or have its main place of business in the member country
other than the host country. Exceptionally the Board could extend cover to a national
or corporate person of the state receiving the investment, provided the assets are
transferred from outside the host country.39 Shihata explains the purpose of this
exception as being to "... enable MIGA to assist in reversing capital flight, a problem
of significant proportions to some developing countries, and it will help developing
country nationals accumulating capital outside their countries to invest them at home
with adequate protection against political risks"40
The Convention's definition of eligible investments is deliberately flexible so
that MIGA might be able to cope with different forms of investment not contemplated
by the Convention but which might come into being with time as business practices
evolve.4 ' Article 12 specifically refers to equity interests, medium and long term
equity type loans and guarantees and other forms of direct investments as may be
determined by the Board of MIGA, although Sub-sections (c)(i) and (ii) further make
it possible to bring within the scope of MIGA's eligible investments such other forms
as the use of earnings which could have been transferred outside the host country and
foreign exchange intended to modernise, expand or develop an existing investment.
Article 11 spells out the types of risk for which cover may be issued. Article
11(b) and (c) specify risks for which the Agency cannot provide a guarantee in any
event. In no case should cover be made available for devaluation or depreciation of
the host country currency. Cover cannot also be provided for loss resulting from
activities of the host government for which the investor is responsible or has
consented to or for any action of the host government occurring before the contract
of guarantee. The excluded risks are justified on the basis that they do not constitute
Artic1e 12(C).
40Miga and Foreign Investment, p. 119.
41 Shihata (1986) 1 ICSJD Rev.,-FILJ, 1
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"non-commercial" risks in the case of currency fluctuations, since they will normally
enter into the business calculations of the investor and, in cases where the actions of
the host government giving rise to the risk have been consented to by the investor or
arise in circumstances where the investor is to blame, on the basis that the investor
should not be allowed to claim compensation for a loss arising from his own wrong
doing or to which he has acquiesced.
The eligible risks are laid down in Article 1 1(a)(i) to (iv) and cover host
government restrictions on currency transfer into a freely usable currency,
expropriations (whether direct or indirect), and other forms of administrative actions
resulting in the dispossession of the investor, including the government's breach or
repudiation of contract'2
 and losses resulting from war or civil disorder.
(1). Major Classification of Risks Covered
The risks therefore fall under three main categories: cases arising from a
culpable act of the host government (restrictions on currency transfer, expropriations,
etc.); cases where the loss arises from factors which might not be entirely within the
control of the government (war and civil risks); and, ordinary breaches or repudiations
of contract by the host state, whether under circumstances which might also constitute
an expropriation or similar measure and liable to treatment as such, or on purely
commercial considerations.
For the second aspect of the third category of risk the character of the state as
a public body is of little relevance, since a wholly private enterprise might also fail
to honour the terms of the contract in similar circumstances.
Whereas the first two categories of risk are generally accepted as within the
range of political uncertainties against which the convention was intended, i.e., risks
described as "non-commercial", the extension of the eligible risks to cases of the host
government's breach of contract is an innovation of the MIGA Convention. Malcolm
Rowat points out that this cover was not available in national investment insurance
1 Artic1e 1 1(a)(iii).
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schemes until relatively recently.43
 That cover is an innovation in the sense that it is
not regarded as a politically motivated, non-commercial risk. Second, the risk is also
treated as "an addition" to the expropriation risk on the basis that although it was
known that an expropriatoiy measure could take the form of a breach of contract, (and
the Operational Regulations acknowledge that by allowing the guarantee holder in
those circumstances to base his claim on any of the available cover - Paragraph 1. 42),
a claim brought for breach or repudiation of contract will not be subject to the
limitations that apply to the expropriation risk cover even though the facts relied upon
will produce the same effect. That additional feature is also considered as indicating
the innovativeness of the breach of contract risk. In fact it must be pointed out that
the Discussion Paper submitted to the Executive Directors of the World Bank on the
"Main Features of a proposed Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency" (of May
1984) makes no reference to that particular risk at all.
The introduction of that risk in MIGA's scheme should have raised some
concern. More than much else it suggests, contrary to the conventional view, that the
agency cannot be regarded as reflecting the balance between the interest of all the
parties concerned. It completely failed to appreciate the difficulties of developing
countries. We therefore propose to consider that particular risk in detail.
(2). Breach or Repudiation of Contract Risk: Nature
The risk is intended to cover cases where the state refuses to perform the
contract or where the state's performance fails to meet the standard expected of it in
accordance with the terms of the contract.45 In particular it meets cases where, rather
than expropriate the investor directly, the state attempts to achieve the same objective
indirectly, by failing to perform the contract. The investor is none the less deprived
43"Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment Climate of Developing Countries: The cases
of ICSID and MIGA' (1992) 33 Harv. Int'l. L. J., 103.
44See Shihata, Miga and Forei gn Investment, p. 131.
45We constantly bear in mind that failure properly to execute a contract, whether deliberate or not,
cannot be regarded as unique to developing countries even in the restricted domain of foreign
investment transactions.
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of the benefits of the investment. The risk therefore arises in two ways. In the first
case the state could expropriate directly or otherwise interfere with the investor's
rights under the contract by, for example, a unilateral withdrawal of tax and customs
concessions and exemptions from royalties. An example of the factual setting in which
such breaches or repudiations of contract occur is described by Shihata in the
following terms:
[i]n the hydrocarbon and mining sectors in particular, the host
government may initially be dependent on the investor for the
exploration of indigenous resources. Once a find is made and
development begins, the investor's returns may increasingly seem to be
exorbitant as the risks originally undertaken will have all but
disappeared. The relationship between the investor and the host country
may then appear as an "obsolescing bargain", the investor obtaining
highly advantageous conditions in the initial negotiations and the host
country later pressing for changes in the agreement. Such changes
might be unilaterally introduced by the host government without
necessarily violating its domestic law or international law.
Where the change intended by the host country is in violation of its own domestic or
international law it might constitute an expropriation under Article 1 1(a)(ii). In that
case the Operational Regulations (Paragraph 1.42) permit the investor, in the
alternative, to bring a claim for compensation on the expropriation risk cover.
The second way in which a breach or repudiation of contract claim arises is
in circumstances where the state has acted purely on commercial reasons. For example
the investment undertaking as any other business venture may have become a total
failure and on that basis justify the decision of the state not to continue the project,
although in circumstances where it will remain in breach of contract. In fact in some
cases the private investor, too, might be happy that the project be brought to an end,
although under the existing contractual arrangements the state remains liable to the
Ibid, pp. 131-32.
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investor. In the Klöckner v Cameroon arbitration case,47 for example, which involved
a failed attempt by both parties to set up and, under the exclusive management of the
claimants profitably run a fertilizer plant in Cameroon, the principal claim was that
the government remained liable under a guarantee to pay the outstanding balance of
the price of the factory notwithstanding that the supply of the plant, including the
technical and commercial management of the company by the claimants themselves
had become a complete economic failure. Both parties were willing to see an end to
the project; the state, because it had already spent too much and for KlOckner, because
it had always been known to the company that the project would not be commercially
viable even under their exclusive management. In those circumstances the fact that it
might be a state repudiating the contract should not be material in determining
whether the risk should be covered by the Agency at all since, in similar
circumstances, a private party will not act or be expected to act differently. That
consideration renders the addition of that element of the risk difficult to justify. An
alleged breach of contract of that character is a distinctly commercial risk within
contemplation of reasonable business men.
(3). Justification for the Breach or Repudiation of Contract Risk
It is not clear why the cover was included in the Convention if it was so
obviously one-sided. From the background and drafting history of the Convention it
is clear that the proposed Agency was intended to issue guarantees against risks of a
"non-commercial" nature and Article 2, which lays down the guiding principle for
eligible risks, bears that out clearly. It provides that to meet its objectives the Agency
shall "issue guarantees, including co-insurance and re-insurance, against non-
commercial risks in respect of investments in a member country which flow from
other member countries" (emphasis added). That scheme is reinforced by Article
11(b), which permits the Board of the Agency to extend the cover under Article 11
as a whole to any other risks not referred to in Article 11(a), provided they are also
47Award of 21 Oct., 1983, [1994] 2 ICSJD Reports, 9 (excepts); Paulsson Jan. "The ICSID Klöckner
v. Carneroon award: The Duties of Partners in North-South Economic Development Agreements" (1984)
1 Journ. Int'l. Arb., 145 (excerpts).
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non-commercial in character. It has been suggested that cover under Article 11(b) will
be available for such other risks as acts of terrorists directed at the investor,
kidnapping, and politically motivated strikes.'
The genuine breach of contract risk is distinctly of a commercial nature and
should therefore be regarded as inconsistent with the underlying eligibility principle
of the Convention, as expressed in Article 2(a), but which it nevertheless overrides for
being a specific provision bearing on the same issue. Relying on the factual setting
under which the first category of a breach or repudiation contract claim might arise,
(i.e., where it could also constitute an expropriation,) Shihata justifies the introduction
of the cover into the Convention on the basis that it "... will seek to enhance the
reliability of contractual arrangements between host countries and investors. It will
strengthen the investor's confidence that his investment agreement will be protected
when his bargaining power declines as the investment matures." 49
 That assumes that
only a state can be in breach of contract, which is simply not correct.
(4). Critique of the Breach of Contract Risk
The objection with the breach or repudiation of contract risk is that it is
questionable whether it is in line with the purpose of a Convention intended to issue
guarantees for risks described as "non-commercial", in the sense that they will not
traditionally arise in the normal course of business and will therefore not be within the
contemplation of the MIGA guarantee holder. The reason for excluding the normal
business risks is that businessmen are more willing to assume such risk or obtain a
business insurance cover than for risks of a political nature. 5° The second objection
is that the private investor could also be in breach of contract, thus rendering the state
as much in need of protection as the private investor if the investor were in breach.
It therefore remains unclear why the cover was introduced or, at any rate, not
Voss, (1987) 21 JWTL, Part 4, 5; Operational Regulations, Para. 1. 53
Miga and Forei gn Investment, p. 131.
50Ocran, TM., "International Investment Guarantee Agreements and Related Administrative
Schemes' (1988) 10 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L., 341.
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limited to cases where the breach or repudiation will have the effect of an
expropriation. To counterbalance the one sidedness of that cover, the alternative would
have been to extend the cover by making it available to host countries in need of
protection against investors for breach of contract.
(5). Breach of Contract and Denial of Justice
The only other reason for introducing that particular risk appears under the
circumstances in which compensation for the cover is confined under Article 1 l(a)(iii)
and is appropriately described in the Operational Regulations as a "denial of justice".
A claim for compensation on the ground of breach or repudiation of contract will only
be acceded to where:
"(i) the holder of the guarantee does not have recourse to a judicial or arbitral forum
to determine the claim of repudiation or breach of contract or
(ii) a decision by such forum is not rendered within such reasonable period of time
as shall be prescribed in the contracts of guarantee pursuant to the Agency's
regulations, or
(iii) such a decision cannot be enforced."
The difficulty here is that the Convention assumes that a state cannot be the
victim of a "denial of justice". Article 11 (a)(iii) assumes that in any event a state that
suffers loss from a breach or repudiation of contract by the investor will still be in a
stronger position than the investor if the state were the party in breach. It is however
doubtful whether there are fewer obstacles for a state seeking redress before a judicial
or arbitral forum to which the private party also has access, such as the ICSID, in
relation both to the prosecution of the claim and the enforcement of a decision or
award made in its favour. 5 ' It is assumed that the conditions stated will provide
adequate guarantees against unfounded claims based on breach of contract.
First, the guarantee holder must satisfy MIGA that he has no access to a
judicial or arbitral forum to settle his claim for breach of contract. This requirement
5tSee for example Government of Kuwait v Sir Frederic Snow & Partners and Others (1981) 1
Lloyd's Report, 656, where the state involved was at considerable difficulty even to identify the proper
defendants for the proceedings it brought to enforce an award in its favour.
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will rarely apply since in practice, most contracts provide for the arbitration of
disputes. It is conceivable that the arbitration clause could become void or incapable
of performance, in which case, the investor wifi be put in a situation similar to the
absence of a judicial or arbitral forum. The absence of a neutral and independent
judiciary in the host country is treated in the Operational Regulations as capable of
constituting a denial of justice. The investor may also be unable to have his claim
determined where, under the arbitration clause as interpreted by a tribunal set up
thereunder or a competent court, the tribunal has no jurisdiction over the parties or the
subject matter of the claim. In that case the parties could only have recourse to the
judiciary of the state party to the dispute, which, if found not to be independent of the
executive, might give rise to a situation constituting a denial of justice to the investor.
The second requirement is that the judicial or arbitral decision is not rendered
within a reasonable period of time. What constitutes a reasonable time in each case
will be specified in the contract of guarantee. According to the Operational
Regulations that time shall be a period of not less than two years from the date when
the proceedings are initiated by the guarantee holder. The number of years to be
specified in each contract will of course depend on the nature of the contract and its
mode of performance. It will also depend on the nature of the event giving rise to the
claim, including the complexity of the factual and legal issues involved in the dispute.
Next, the decision of the forum must be incapable of enforcement. Under Para.
1.45 of the Operational Regulations, the contract of guarantee with the Agency will
specify the measures which the investor will be required to take to ensure the
enforcement of the award. This requirement will not be satisfied where he fails to take
those measures. A decision will be regarded as unenforceable and therefore constitute
a denial of justice if the measures to be taken do not result in enforcement within
ninety days or such other period as may be specified in the contract, or end in futility.
By analogy to the first requirement it should be possible to treat an unreasonable
impediment created by the host state to enforce a judgment or award as constituting
a denial of justice.
The Convention does not require in the first place that the award should be one
which is capable of enforcement. It is not clear, for example, whether the decision
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refusing enforcement by an independent judiciary at the place of enforcement52 will
be regarded by the Agency as a denial of justice irrespective of the grounds given for
refusal to enforce. In the ICC arbitration involving Southern Pacific Property, (a Hong
Kong company), and the government of Egypt5 3, the claimants had been denied
enforcement in the U.K.M but given leave to enforce in the Netherlands.55
 The
award had further been annulled by the Court of Appeal of Paris56, the place where
the award was rendered, on the ground that Egypt was not a party to the arbitration
clause and the annulment decision confirmed by the French Supreme Court, although
the case was subsequently re-submitted to an ICSJD panel which accepted
jurisdiction?7
 The question is whether, failing the ICSJD proceedings, and assuming
the existence of a MIGA guarantee, the Agency could in those circumstances still pay
a claim for compensation on an award which has been annulled by a competent court
at the place where it is made and denied leave to enforce in a second jurisdiction, but
obtained leave elsewhere. 58
 There is scope to suggest that MIGA might decide to
treat such cases as falling both within Paragraphs 1.44 and 1.45 of its Operational
Regulations since the measures to be taken by the guarantee holder to enforce the
award would have ended in futility or not have resulted in enforcement within ninety
days or any other period specified in the contract. The Regulations do not envisage
situations where the award is set aside or denied enforcement on any ground,
including its failure to meet minimium standards for the enforcement of an award.
Such an outcome should be avoided since the Agency might find it difficult
52Such as the refusal in the U.K. to give leave to enforce the ICC award in S.P.P. v Egypt. [1985]
10 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n., 504 (excerpts).
[1983] 22 ILM, 752.
ME1985] 10 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n., 504.
55Ibid p. 487.
Ibidp. 113.
See Decisions on jurisdiction of 27 November and 14 April 1988 and on an application for
annulment of 14 December 1989, [1991] 16 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n., pp. 19, 28 and 40 respectively.
The award on the merit is reported in [1993] 8 ICSID Rev.,-FLLJ., 328.
MThe French courts have for some time now consistently enforced awards annulled in the country
where they were made: see for a recent example Société Polish Ocean Line v Société Jolasry (1993)
Rev. Arb., 255, Court of Cassation decision of 1 March 1993.
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to justify compensation made for breach of contract in cases where the award has been
set aside or where there is a reasonable prospect that it will not be validated in the
place where it is made. It is not unreasonable that the Agency's liability under a
guarantee should only arise in relation to a judgment or an award which is capable of
enforcement. If an award plainly falls short of the required standards and is denied
enforcement, or there are reasonable grounds to think that it will be denied
enforcement, the Agency should feel reluctant to compensate for the pecuniary
obligations arising pursuant to the award. It should be pointed out that the annulment
of an award at the place where it was made is, under the New York Convention on
the Enforcement of Foreign Awards, a ground for refusing enforcement. 59
 There is
a strong case for saying that if an award fails to meet international minimum
requirements for enforcement it should be regarded as falling below the standard
entitling it to compensation by MIGA.
D. Settlement of Disputes
Articles 56-58 of the Convention envisage principally three types of disputes:
(i) (a) Disputes between the Agency and a member country concerning the
interpretation of the Convention. This type of disputes are to be determined by the
Board of the Agency, with scope being given for reference, if required by a member,
to the Council of Governors, whose decision on the matter is fmal. Article 56(b)
allows the Agency, where appropriate, to continue to act on the basis of the decision
of the Board pending the determination of the reference to the Council.
(b) Disputes between the agency and a member country other than those
concerning the interpretation of the Convention, or between the Agency and a state
which has ceased to be a member are to be settled in accordance with the negotiation
and arbitration procedure set out in Annex II of the Convention. The Annex requires
the Agency and the member or former member (as the case may be) to resolve the
dispute by negotiation and, failing that, by conciliation or submit to arbitration. The
submission to arbitration is governed by the rules of arbitration of the ICSID. In
Artic1e V(1)(e)
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resolving the dispute the tribunal applies the provisions of the MIGA Convention, any
rules agreed upon by the parties, MIGA's by-laws and regulations, international law
and the domestic law of the state concerned. Article 4(j) of the Annex requires all
member states of the Agency to recognise an award rendered pursuant to the Annex
as binding and enforceable within their territories, although its execution is governed
by the relevant laws in each member state. It would be the position, too, that even a
state that has ceased to be a member remains under obligation, in accordance with
Article 53 of the Convention, to enforce the award.
(ii) The second main category of disputes envisaged by the Convention concern
differences between the Agency and a guarantee holder. The Convention provides that
such disputes are referred to arbitration in accordance with such rules as specified by
the parties in the contract of guarantee. The parties could do so by reference to already
established set of rules. Paragraph 2.16 of the Operational Regulations contemplates
the use of the rules of arbitration of the ICSID with such modification as may be
required, having regard to the fact that the ICSJD rules were established to deal with
disputes between states and private persons. Shihata points out that the reference to
ICSJD rules is only in the Agency's standard contract of guarantee, which need not
necessarily be the case in every contract. The Official Commentary on the Convention
(paragraph 77) also contemplates the use of other institutional rules, such as those
established by the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law
(UNC1TRAL), and the rules of arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.
Shihata, however, expresses a preference for the ICSID rules to the exclusion of other
institutional rules on the basis that the Operational Regulations do not refer to the
possibility of agreeing to the use of the latter. He points out that the ICSID rules were
specifically referred to in the Regulations because of the familiarity of the staff of the
World Bank with them, without failing to mention, however, that although the rules
derive from a system of arbitration which is not subject to judicial supervision by
national courts and, therefore, preferable, that advantage will not be available for
arbitration proceedings outside the scope of the ICSID Convention even if conducted
in accordance with its rules.
Paragraph 2.17 of the Regulations requires a tribunal set up to resolve a dispute
between the Agency and a guarantee holder to apply the terms of the contract, the
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provisions of the MIGA Convention, and, to the extent that issues in dispute are not
covered by either, to have recourse to "general principles of law". No reference is
made to the domestic law, whether of the investor or of the host country, as the laws
most connected to the underlying investment. It would be the case, however, that in
ascertaining the substance of the applicable general principles of law, the tribunal will
bear in mind the relevant domestic laws, in combination with such other sources as
arbitral case law, investment treaties, and international law. Shihata expresses that
view in the following terms:
[n]aturally, the tribunal would have in such instances to undertake the
task of ascertaining the substance of such general principles, using
comparative law analysis. While this will not be confined to the laws
regulating investment guarantees, applicable principles will normally be
deducted from the rules pertaining to this particular business which
may be ascertained through an analysis of relevant domestic law, the
practice of national agencies, inter-Arab Investment Guarantee
Corporation and private insurers as well as such arbitral and other
judicial decisions as may be available.60
The practice of the Inter-Arab Guarantee Corporation is referred to by the author as
the first international organisation of its kind to deal with foreign investment
insurance. The award is binding on the parties and each member of MIGA is required
to recognise it as fmal and binding.
(lii) Next, the Convention deals with disputes arising from claims by the
Agency, as subrogator of a compensated guarantee holder, against the defaulting
member state. Article 57(b) directs that such disputes be settled in accordance with
Annex II which provides for negotiation and, if unsuccessful, for arbitration, following
the procedure set out in Article 4(a) to (k) of the Annex or any agreement between
the Agency and the state concerned, with the procedure of the Annex serving as the
basis of such agreement. Under Article 4(g) the arbitral tribunal set up pursuant to the
Annex shall apply "... the provisions of [the] Convention, any relevant agreement
between the parties to the dispute, the Agency's by-laws and regulations, the
60Miga and Foreign Investment, p. 278.
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applicable rules of international law, the domestic law of the member concerned as
well as the applicable provisions of the investment contract, if any."
Article 4(g) raises the usual but important question about the relationship
between the relevant domestic law and international law, if they are in conflict. A
parallel has been drawn with the corresponding provisions of the ICSID Convention
(Article 42) on which Article 4(g) of the Annex was patterned 6 ' and the view
expressed, in accordance with the construction of Article 42 of the ICSH) Convention
by tribunals set up thereunder, that international law has a dual function: first, it is
complementary, in that it is the law to which reference should be made to supplement
for any gaps in the domestic law, and secondly, that it is corrective, in the event that
the domestic law of the state is not consistent with internationally acceptable
standards. Aron Broches states the position in the following terms in relation to Article
42 of the ICSID Convention:
[t]he tribunal will normally first look at the law of the state party to the
dispute. Then the result of the application of that law will be tested
against international law. That process will not involve the confirmation
or denial of the validity of the host State's law, but may result in not
applying it where that law, or action taken under that law, violates
international law.62
It is now taken as settled that the statement represents the correct view on the
relationship between domestic and international law and has been approved by
arbitration tribunals constituted pursuant to the ICSID Convention. 63
 The Ad hoc
Committee in the Amco v Indonesia annulment proceedings took the view that Article
42(1) of the Convention "... authorises an ICSID tribunal to apply rules of
international law only to fill up lacunae in the applicable domestic law and to ensure
precedence to international law norms where the rules of the applicable law are in
61 Shihata, note 13, P. 267-68.
'Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other
States of 1965: Explanatory Notes and Survey of its Application" (1993) XVIII Yearbook Comm.
Arb'n., 627, at 668.
63See for example Klockner v Cameroon, Ad hoc Committee award of 3 May 1985 [1994] 2 ICSID
Reports, 95, p. 122; (1986) 1 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ, 89 P. 112; Letco v Liberia (1987) 26 1LM, 647 658;
Amco v Indonesia, first annulment award of 16 May 1986 [1993] 1 ICSID Reports, 509, p. 515
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collision with such norms."' When the case was re-submitted for another hearing,
the newly constituted tribunal emphasised the primacy of international law with even
more force. In its view, "[i]f there are no relevant host-state laws on a particular
matter, a search must be made for the relevant international laws. And, where there
are applicable host-state laws, they must be checked against international law, which
will prevail in case of conflict. Thus international law is fully applicable and to
classify its role as "only" "supplemental and corrective" seems a distinction without
a difference. In any event, the Tribunal believes that its task is to test every claim of
law in this case first against Indonesian law, and then against international law."65
It therefore appears that a tribunal constituted pursuant to Article 4(g) Annex II, as
required under Article 57(b) of the MIIGA Convention, will give precedence to
international law and is in fact required by the Official Commentary on the Convention
to do so. The Commentary directs that "[un the case of a conflict between rules of
international law and rules unilaterally issued by either of the parties to the dispute,
international tribunals apply rules of international law." The supremacy of international
law in this area is explained on the basis that
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it may nevertheless be
argued that the host state by accepting an international tribunal for the
settlement of disputes under an investment agreement, implicitly
undertakes to have the application of its national law to the foreign
investment considered in view of the applicable principles and rules of
international law. An international tribunal cannot be expected to
remain blind to the international obligations of the host state, and the
reference of a dispute to an international tribunal carries with it the
expectation of both parties that the tribunal will recognize the
applicable principles and rules of international law unless the parties
1bid p. 515.
65Re-submitted award of 5 June 1990 [1993] 1 ICSID Reports, 569, p. 580.
Para. 78.
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have expressly excluded the recourse to international law.67
It should be noted that the corresponding provisions for disputes involving the
Agency and a guarantee holder refer to "general principles of law" in the place of
rules of international law and the domestic law of any particular country. The reason
for that difference in the applicable substantive standard is not quite obvious. It may
be that the difference was intended to emphasise the fact that the application of rules
of international law in a dispute involving the Agency, as subrogator, and a host state,
is to check the effect of the law of the host state which, under the MIGA Convention,
has no relevance in disputes between the Agency and a guarantee holder,
notwithstanding that as the law underlying the investment contract it might be the
closest system of law to the contract of guarantee. What seems clear is that the search
for "general principles" is necessarily wider than that for "rules of international law".
It is also comparative and more likely than not, to involve an inquiry into, amongst
other sources, both international and any relevant domestic laws. It follows therefore
that a tribunal set up pursuant to Article 58 of the Convention and pargraph 2.17 of
the Operational Regulations (both of which deal with disputes between the Agency
and a guarantee holder) will be well advised if it adopted that approach.
The decision of a tribunal constituted under Article 57 and Annex II is not
subject to appeal or any review. Unlike the ICSID Convention, the MIGA Convention
does not provide for an internal review procedure. The tribunal's award is therefore
fmal and binding on the Agency as the subrogator of an investor and on the host
country concerned. All member countries are required to recognise the finality of the
award and to enforce it. The execution of the award is governed by the law in force
in each contracting state.
Chapter conclusion
There is an obvious link between the ICSID and the MIGA Conventions. The
basis and the principal innovation of the MIGA Convention is the recognition of the
67Jaenicke, G., "The Prospects for International Arbitration: Disputes between States and Private
Enterprises" in International Arbitration: Past and Pros pects (ed. Soons, A. H. A.), Martinus Nijhoff,
Dordrecht, 1990, 155, p. 158.
Shihata, Miga and Foreign Investment, p. 47.
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Agency's right to subrogation. It is as a result, in part, of the failure of the ICSID
Convention in translating the right of subrogation into a multilateral treaty that the
need for an insurance Convention arose. 7° MIGA probably stands out as a more
ingenious device to overcome the problems reflected in the prohibition in Article 27
of the settlement of investment disputes Convention. Article 27 is concerned with the
substitution of the private investor by his home state. It prohibits the home state from
giving diplomatic protection to its national. It does not refer to subrogation by another
private person, national of a contracting state. The question that arose, and for which
MIGA was in a sense intended as a response, is whether if a private insurer of another
contracting state indemnifies the investor, the insurer, as subrogator, could bring
arbitration proceedings against the respondent state under the dispute settlement
Convention. The question arose either as a matter of subrogation or as one regarding
the standing of the insurer, not being a party to the arbitration clause, to bring
proceedings before the Centre.
With regard to subrogation, although the orthodox view 7 ' is that "... there is
no reason to consider the assignment is not permitted", 72 our own view is that the
correct approach would be one which allows the issue to be examined under the
applicable law of the contract. That law will determine whether, and to what extent,
the private insurer can be subrogated to the rights of the investor.
As far as the ICSID Convention itself is concerned the issue is one of
interpretation of Article 25, regarding the consent of the parties, the question being
whether by agreeing to arbitration with the investor, the host state is to be regarded
as impliedly consenting to arbitration with any assignee or other successor in interest
of the private investor. The staff of the Centre once appeared to be of the view that
under Article 25(1) the consent of the investor and the host state relates "... only to
Amerasinghe, C F "Jurisdiction Rarione Personae under the Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States" (1974-75)47 BYIL, 227, particularly
pp. 241-42.
70Meron, (1975) 47 BYIL, p. 309.
71Meron, ibid. pp. 305-6.
Ibid p. 306, citing Broches, "Arbitration Clauses and Institutional Arbitration, ICSJD: A Special
Case", in Commercial Arbitration, Essays in Memoriam Eu genio Minoli, 1974, 77.
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the dispute itself and not necessarily to the identity of the other party, ..."" and, as
a result, the state could be considered as impliedly bound to the insurer or other
transferee. Such a view remained questionable in the light of the importance of
consent as "the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre" 74
 For that reason the
staff recommended that parties state expressly that the arbitration clause shall also
apply to any successor in interest of the original parties "... should there be any
possibility of the identity of one or both parties changing during the term of the
agreement " An express clause in the contract will ensure that the transferees
remain bound to the same extent as the original parties. In view of the fact that from
the point of view of the host state the acceptance of the capacity of a private person
to proceed directly against a sovereign state in an international forum involves the
waiver of an immunity and the loss of liberty, 76
 together with the fundamentally
"consensual character of the Convention", 77
 it becomes obvious that without an
agreement of the state to the contrary its consent to arbitration could only be regarded
as directed to a specific investor but not with some other party. That being so the
assignee could not bring proceedings against the state, hence, the importance of the
assignment clause as suggested by the staff of the Centre. If the receiving state
consents to such a clause it becomes bound to the assignee subject to the provisions
of the Convention. If it does not, the difficulty remains.
The advantage of the MIGA Convention is that it overcomes these difficulties
by providing for the automatic subrogation of the Agency to the rights of the private
investor without further requiring the consent of the host state. The consent of the
state is assumed from the time it becomes a member of the Agency by signing the
'3See ICSID, Model Clauses Recordin g
 Consent to the Jurisdiction of the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Doc. ICSID/5, (1968?), p. 9.
74Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of other States" (1972) 136 Hague Acad. Courses, 331, 351-52, citing the accompanying report of the
Executive Directors of the World Bank, para. 23.
75Above, note 73.
16Fox, Hazel "States and the Undertaking to Arbitrate" (1988) 37 ICLQ, 1.
Broches, (1993) 18 Yearbook Comm Arb'n., 627 where the author does not also fail "... to stress
the overriding significance of consent not merely as a formal requirement for the jurisdiction of the
Centre, but as an essential characteristic of the entire system of the Convention" (emphasis added).
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Convention. MIGA therefore resolves a problem which the ICSID Convention could
not, irrespective of whether the problem is characterised as one of subrogation or as
a matter of construction of the Convention's consent provisions, and in particular,
Article 25.
Both Conventions also fail to meet the expectations of host countries. They are
extremely one sided, having been inspired by one and only one concern, the protection
of private foreign investments in a well defined group of countries. They proceed on
the assumption that the investor, more than the host, is in need of protection. 78
 In
fact the MIGA Convention does not even envisage the possibility that host states also
require an insurance against the default of corporations. A corporation could also be
in breach of, or repudiate, a contract, within the meaning of Article 1 l(a)(iii). Like the
ICSID, it failed to cover the host state acting in good faith against an uncooperating
investor. That concern is also reflected in the treatment of the question of the
applicable law in state contracts, to which we revert in the next chapter.
78Fatouros A. A. "Investissément Etranger et Arbitrage entre Etats et Personnes Privées - La
Convention BIRD [IBRD] du 18 Mars 1965" (1970) 59 Rev. Crit. Dr. mt. Priv., 580.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE LAW APPLIED BY ARBITRATION TRIBUNALS
In this chapter we examine the choice of law methods applied in arbitrations
regarding contracts in which developing countries have been involved with private
foreign parties. We conclude that the trend here undermines the domestic systems of
law of these countries and does not, therefore, encourage their participation in the
process. In the first part of the chapter we outline the traditional choice of law rules
in contracts. In the second part we demonstrate that there has been a shift from those
principles in arbitrations involving developing countries so as to isolate the contracts
from their systems of law. Arbitration tribunals have taken the view that the increasing
presence of those states in international transactions dictates a shift from the
presumption in favour of the law of the state in dispute' to another presumption, in
favour of international law, 2
 even in cases where the parties expressly provide for the
application of the domestic law of the state.3
The question of the law applicable in an arbitration generally involves
considerations of three types, the first of which concerns the law governing the
proceedings of the arbitration tribunal, the so-called lex arbitri. The second set of
considerations deals with the law applicable to the merits of the dispute (the proper
law) under arbitration and the third involves the selection of the conflict of law rules
to determine the law applicable to the merits of the dispute. There may be included
a fourth, which is the law governing the arbitration agreement and its performance.
We are concerned primarily with the third element, the conffict of law rules to
determine the proper law of the contract although reference to the second element is
made from time to time for clarification. However, we also briefly consider the first
aspect of the question to remove any confusion that may arise.
'The Serbian Loans case PCU Selected Judgments, Series A No. 14 at p. 42; Barcelona Traction
case, ibid p. 121.
2Aramco v Saudi Arabia [1963] 27 ILR, 117.
3Letco v Liberia [1993] 2 ICSID Reports, 343.
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I. The Law of the Arbitration
The lex arbitri is the law of the arbitration. It generally determines the validity
of the arbitration proceedings. As arbitration takes place within the territory of a
country, the law which governs the arbitration is, subject to the agreement of the
parties, normally the law of the seat of the proceedings, the lex fori. Since the law
regulating arbitration is not the same in all countries, matters governed by the lex
arbitri would vary in the arbitration legislation from country to country, although in
general they cover essentially procedural issues. There are a few exceptions of
substantive issues which might in certain jurisdictions be governed by the procedural
law, such as the validity of the arbitration agreement itself and its scope, including
matters of arbitrability. On the whole, however, the matters governed by the lex arbitri
would include issues as the appointment and replacement of arbitrators, the effect of
failure by one of the parties to appoint an arbitrator, interim measures of protection
and other measures intended to give judicial assistance to the proceedings, the
challenge of the arbitrators, their jurisdiction, the manner in which the proceedings
should be conducted, matters which can be submitted to arbitration, the form and
validity of the award and several other issues of a similar nature.
Some of these matters may also be subject to the law of a jurisdiction other
than that of the seat of the proceedings. For example the courts of the place of
recognition or enforcement of an award may re-examine the validity of the agreement
and the award, including the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, if requested to do so. The
parties may also subject the conduct of the proceedings to a law different from that
of the seat of the arbitration in accordance with the freedom to choose the applicable
procedural law, to the extent permitted by the law in force in that jurisdiction,
although subject to the mandatory rules of the place where the proceedings take place.
The freedom to select any rules of procedure, including the rules of another country
altogether, is generally recognised in the domestic and international arbitration laws
of most countries. Article 1693 of the Belgian Judicial Code 4 for example provides
that the parties may decide on the rules of arbitral procedure and, failing that, the
4Part 6, dealing with arbitration.
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arbitrators may do so. The new French code of civil procedure 5 allows the parties to
determine the manner in which the arbitrators should conduct the proceedings, and,
in the absence of agreement by the parties, the arbitrators may make the determination
either by setting out the rules themselves or by reference to some other well
established rules.6
Although the different Acts in force in England and Wales do not refer to the
arbitration procedure, there is no doubt that in English law the parties are at liberty
to determine the procedure for the conduct of the proceedings and the arbitrators
required to act accordingly, subject to public policy.7 The exact position in English
law was stated by Dicey and Morris as Rule 57(2) in the following terms:
[t]he law governing arbitration proceedings is the law chosen by the
parties, or, in the absence of agreement, the law of the country in
which the arbitration is held.8
The commentary to the sub-rule adds that "it is for the parties to choose not only the
law which is to govern their agreement to arbitrate, but also the law which is to
govern the arbitration proceedings." In the words of the present editors of Russell on
Arbitration,9
 "... subject only to questions of matters contrary to the public policy of
the system of law which as [has?] the power and ability to police the arbitration, the
parties have, potentially, the ability to control every aspect of arbitration procedure."
In the Whitworth Street case the House of Lords clearly stated that the courts should
give effect to the parties' choice of the applicable procedural law. The parties can
express the choice either directly, for example, by indicating the law of some state or
5Article 1494, Part V of the code, dealing with international arbitration.
6The corresponding provision in Swiss law is in almost the same terms: Article 182(1) of the Swiss
Law on Private International Law, 1987. Many other domestic laws, institutional rules and international
instruments are expressed in similar terms: Article 1039 of the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure;
Article 9, Djibouti; Article V(1), New York Convention; Article 19, TJNCITRAL Model Law; Article
11, ICC Rules; Article 5, LCIA Rules.
'Mustill, Michael J.; Boyd, Stewart, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England,
2nd Edn., 1989, p. 15.
8Conflict of Laws, 8th Edn., 1967, p. 1048 (13th Edn., 1993, Vol. 1, p. 580); approved in Whitworth
Street Estates v James Miller & Partners [19701 A.C. 583.
9Walton, Anthony; Vitoria Mary, Russell on the Law of Arbitration, 20th Edn., Stevens & Sons
Ltd., 1982, p. 243.
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indirectly, by agreeing to ad hoc arbitration in accordance with the rules of an
arbitration institution, or simply by submitting to arbitration by such institution.
However the choice is expressed, the English courts are required to give effect to it.
English law, however, differs from most other systems and the prevailing trend
in international arbitration where the parties express no choice. The position in English
law is that the arbitrators will make the determination for the parties, although in
accordance with a common law rule of conflict of laws expressed in the form of a
presumption. The presumption is stated by Dicey and Morris in terms approved by the
House of Lords in Whitworth Street Estates v James Miller & Partners'° that the "...
proceedings must be considered, at any rate prima facie, as being governed by the law
of the country in which the arbitration is held, on the ground that it is the country
most closely connected with the proceedings." The presumption therefore indicates
that the law of the forum is applicable where the parties fail to specify the governing
law of the proceedings but have, whether by themselves or the tribunal, selected the
seat of the arbitration. Thus, by agreeing to arbitration in England, for example, the
parties are presumed to have selected English law rules of arbitration procedure. In
Bank Mellat v Helliniki Techniki,' 2 Lord Justice Kerr describes the presumption as
a "fundamental principle" according to which under English law rules of
"... private international law, in the absence of any contractual
provision to the contrary, the procedural (or curia!) law governing
arbitrations is that of the forum of the arbitration, whether this be
England, Scotland or some foreign country ...",
on the basis that "... this is the system of law with which the agreement to arbitrate
in the particular forum will have its closest connections."
The difference with the trend in international arbitration practice, including the
new legislation applicable in many other countries, is that in the latter there is no
presumption in favour of the law of the forum. Rather, the tribunal is conferred with
'°Supra p. 607, (per Lord Hodson); 609, (Lord Guest); 612, (Viscount Dilhorne); 616, (Lord
Wilberforce).
Supra.
12(1984] Q.B., 291, p. 301. (C.A.).
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powers to determine the procedural rules as appropriate, failing a determination by the
parties. Under the UNCITRAL Model Law the tribunal may "... conduct the arbitration
in such manner as it considers appropriate." The relevant Article of the Swiss Law on
Private International Law,' 3 which is similar in effect to the corresponding provision
of the Federal law in Canada'4 and the new law governing Arbitration in Scotland'5
(both of which are modelled on the UNCITRAL Law), the Rules of the ICC' 6 and
of the LCIA' 7 empower the tribunal to determine the procedure "... as necessary,
either directly or by reference to a law or set of arbitration rules." The power is
limited only by the agreement of the parties and the mandatory laws of the seat of the
arbitration.
A distinction exists between the legal "seat" of the arbitration and the different
geographical locations at which, for convenience, the hearings may from time to time
be conducted. The Model Law treats the "seat" of the arbitration as the place specified
by the parties or, failing the agreement of the parties, the place specified by the
arbitrators as the place where the arbitration is held. At the same time the Model Law
contemplates, under Article 20(2), that hearings by the tribunal might be at a location
or locations other than at the place designated as the "seat". The distinction is re-
inforced by Article 3 1(3) which, in anticipation of the difficulties that may arise in
relation to the place where an award is made, having regard to the provisions of
Article 20(2) for the purpose of determining the nationality of an award, provides that
the award shall be deemed to have been made at the place designated as the "seat" by
the parties or the tribunal. That place may, under Article 20(2), not be the place or the
only place where the proceedings are held. Since the legal (i.e., designated) "seat" of
the arbitration could also be the place where the arbitration is held, (although under
' Article 182.
'4Article 19.
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990, Schedule 7, Article 19.
'6Article 11.
' 7Article 5.1.
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English Law not necessarily the place where the award is "made" if signed
elsewhere'8), under the Model Law, the competent court of the "seat" retains
supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings within Article 6. That court can, for
example, set aside the award for failure to comply with the procedure as agreed by the
parties unless the parties' agreement is inconsistent with a provision of the law of the
"seat" from which they cannot derogate.
The arbitrators may also be required to have regard to the laws of the different
places where the hearings may take place, especially if mandatory, although they are
not the legal "seat" of the arbitration. The fact that the hearings are moved from place
to place and the tribunal bound to respect the local laws of each of those localities
does not, however, displace the "seat" of the arbitration from the place designated as
such by the parties or the arbitrators. Even in those circumstances "... each move of
the arbitral tribunal does not of itself mean that the seat of the arbitraton changes. The
seat of the arbitration remains the place initially agreed by, or on behalf of, the
parties."9
The recognition of the freedom of the parties, including the power conferred
on a tribunal to select the procedural law, and, therefore, their capacity to subject the
arbitration to a law different from the local law of the forum, has given rise to the
much debated issue of "delocalised" arbitrations, which has an indirect bearing on the
choice of law process in arbitrations involving state parties from the developing world.
"Delocalisation" is designed to free international arbitration from excessive control by
domestic courts. It is argued that the validity of international proceedings and the
resulting award should not necessarily be linked to a specific system of national law
and, in particular, that of the place where it is rendered. If it became necessary to refer
to any law or standards to control the validity of an award, that should in the first
place be the contract of the parties and, second, the law of the place(s) where the
Hiscox v Outhwaite (No.1) [1991] 3 AER, 641, where both the English Court of Appeal and the
House of Lords held that an award was to be regarded as "made" in Paris as the place where it was
perfected, since it had been signed there, although the seat of the arbitration was London and the
proceedings had been conducted there.
Redfern, Alan & Hunter, Martin. Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Sweet
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award may be relied upon for recognition or enforcement. 2° "Control by the lex loci
arbitri",-it is suggested, "should be limited to ensuring respect for traditional standards
of fairness, the limits of the arbitral mission and the rights of third parties."2'
Critics point out that every arbitration exist under the authority of some
domestic law or another. It is by fiat of the law of the place of the proceedings that
arbitration takes place there. The view that the agreement of the parties creates its own
system of law to regulate the conduct of the arbitration is therefore limited both in
theory and practice by the fact that it is the law of that state that gives and determines
the extent of the freedom. The freedom therefore exists and can have only such effect
as allowed by that law.
The relationship between "delocalised" arbitrations and the choice of the law
applicable to the arbitral proceedings is argued on the basis that, if an arbitrator is not
necessarily bound by the lexfori in determining both the procedural and substantive
issues in dispute, the arbitrators should only have regard to international minimum
standards since, as an international tribunal, they should be expected to apply those
standards. That should remain so whether or not the nature of the dispute definitely
fixes it within an identifiable domestic system of law, which, in the absence of the
doctrine advanced, would have provided the relevant rules of law as the system most
closely connected to the dispute and the arbitration.
IL The Applicable Substantive Law: Methods of selection
A. Ordinary Principles of Conflict of Laws
(1). Express Choice
2°Pauisson, Jan, "Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and why it matters"
(1983) 32 ICLQ, 53; "Arbitration unbound: Award Detached from the law of its country of origin"
(1981) 30 ICLQ, 358; but see Mann F.A., "Lex Facit Arbitrum" in International Arbitration: Liber
Amicorum for Martin Domke, (Cd. by Sanders, Peter), 1967, 157.
2tPark, William W., "The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration" (1983) 32
ICLQ., 21.
supra.
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"Perhaps the most widely accepted private international law rule of our time
is that the parties to a contract are free to stipulate what law shall govern their
transaction."23
 That statement correctly reflects the general acceptance of one of the
consequences of the doctrine of party autonomy. Using words intended to convey
exactly the same effect, P.M. North says that "[f]reedom to chose the law to govern
a commercial contract can clearly be supported by authorities going back two
centuries",2' without the need to refer to those authorities. The authorities are
taken for granted not only by North and Weintraub but also by most other modern
authorities on the subject, to many of whom the issue is not so much the principle
itself as its limits and the differences concerning them. Thus, for Ole Lando,
[t]he parties' right to chose the law which governs an international
contract is so widely accepted by the countries of the world that it
belongs to the common core of the legal systems. Differences only
exist concerning the limits of the freedom of the parties. Some
countries seem to allow the parties an almost unrestricted freedom to
chose the applicable law. Others limit their freedom either by
demanding a local connection with the system chosen or by excluding
some questions which are covered by mandatory rules or some
contracts from being affected by the parties' choice of law.26
The doctrine of party autonomy and its corollary, freedom of choice, mean that
in arbitration as in the domain of commercial contract law generally, the parties can
Weintraub, Russell I, "Functional Developments in Choice of Law for Contracts" (1984) 187
Hague Acad. Courses, 239, P. 271.
24"Reform but not Revolution", General Course on Private International law (1990)220 Hague Acad
Courses, 9, p. 153.
In a revised version of the Hague Academy course he however traces the doctrine back to the
sixteenth century French jurist, Dumoulin: Private International Law Problems in Common Law
Jurisdictions, Martinus Nijhoff, Doredrecht, 1993, chapter V, p. 10, note 4. (Hereafter PIL Problems).
J H C Morris, too, traces the origin of the doctrine to civilian writers of the seventeenth century, notably
the Dutch jurist, Huber, whom he represents as having stated that contracts are governed as to form and
substance by the lex loci contractus unless the parties had another place in mind, thus suggesting that
the law of that place will apply: The Conflicts of Law, 3rd Edn., Stevens and Sons, London, 1984,
chapter 15, p. 267.
"The Conflict of Laws of Contracts: General Principles", General Course on Private International
Law (1984) 189 Hague Aced Courses, 225, p. 237.
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select the law governing the substance of their differences. Almost every conceivable
system of law, domestic or international, gives the parties freedom to determine
expressly or impliedly the law to be applied in resolving any dispute. In fact, in
civilian systems of contract law, party autonomy and freedom of choice are expressed
in terms of the capacity of the contracting parties to establish a separate system of law
applicable to their own transaction, subject only to the usual general limitations, such
as public policy and good faith. In that sense the will of the parties retains a creative
force comparable to the law itself. Thus, under Article 1134 of the French Civil Code,
the agreement of the parties in contract becomes their law: "[lies Conventions
legalementformees tiennent lieu de loi a ceux qui les ontfaites", the analogy with the
law being explained on the basis that an obligation willfully contracted "... s 'impose
aux contra ctants avec La même force qu 'une obligation legale." 27 Therefore, in
matters of contract, the parties are allowed to be their own legislators and Article 1134
bears that out by assimilating the agreement of the parties to the law: "[lie contrat
tient lieu de loi aux parties; certes ii n 'a pas La généralité de Ia loi, ce n 'est que la
loi des parties, mais ii en a 1 'autorité, les parties doivent s 'y soumettre aussi bien
qu 'a Ia règle légale et le juge doit en imposer le respect aussi bien que celui de La
loi."28
 However, the law remains overriding where it is mandatory and to that extent
the wifi of the parties as reflected in the contract will continue to be subject to the
specific provision of law which governs it. Yet, where that law is one which can be
derogated from, it can also be displaced by the agreement of the parties:
[dl 'un côté la loi est supérieur au contrat puisque celui-ci doit
respecter les lois imperatives, mais d'un autre côté c 'est le contrat qui
1 'emporte sur la loi, lorsque celle-ci est simplément interpretative ou
supplétive et La théorie de l'autonomie de La volonté interdit en
principe au législateur de modifier les contrats en cours!
The same principle finds support in the common law systems without the need,
2'Mazeaud J., Chabas F., L6cons de Droit Civil, Obli gations: Théorie Génrale, T. 2, 8th Edn.,
Montchrestien, Paris, 1991, p. 854, para. 721.
28Marty, Gabriel & Raynaud, Pierre, Les Obligations, Les Sources, T.1, 2nd Edn., Sirey, Paris,
1988, p. 258, para. 246.
1bid pp. 258-246.
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however, to assimilate a contract to the law or to assimilate the freedom of the parties
to create rights binding on themselves with the binding force of the general law.
Simply, the doctrine is expressed and accepted in terms that the parties can create
rights and obligations enforceable by law. The courts will then ensure that such
agreements are observed like any other legal obligation.
The principle, without doubt, derives from the law of contract and it is
primarily within the law of contract that it has been evolved. It finds particular
application to contracts with an international element since it is owing to that fact that
disputes involving a choice of one amongst conflicting systems of law arise. It is
precisely in the domain of international contracts too that the need for freedom of
choice receives its strongest support, on the basis that such transactions bring on board
many considerations which are best resolved by application of a correspondingly
flexible principle, allowing the parties adequate scope to shape their contractual
relationship as need be. As Lando puts it,
[i]n many international commercial contracts (...) the parties have
creditable motives for their choice. They may want to use a formular
which is internationally known. They may want to submit the contract
to the law of the country that dominates the market. They may want to
select a "neutral" law in which each of them has more confidence than
in that of the domicil of the other party. A certain legal system may be
well developed and well suited to the contract in question. The parties
may wish to refer to a law which they have used in earlier transactions
with each other. The contract may have a close relationship with some
other contract which is governed by a certain law.
All these considerations may justify a choice of law clause, and even
if they are not recognised in inland contracts they must be respected in
international commercial contracts, where the parties are competitors
not only with regard to the goods and services but also with regard to
the legal system they may offer.3°
°(1984) 189 Hague Acad. Courses, p. 285.
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Although the 1980 European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (Rome Convention) does not apply to arbitration and choice of jurisdiction
clauses,3 ' it still has as the basic rule for all contracts to which the Convention
applies, that, they are ••• governed by the law chosen by the parties." The freedom
given to the parties under the Convention is considerably wide. They can change their
choice,32
 or limit the chosen law to only part of the contract, 33
 or choose one law
to determine validity and another law to interprete the terms of the contract, or,
what is more, select a law which is totally unrelated to the contract,35 subject to the
public policy of the forum and the mandatory laws of the system of law with which
the contract is otherwise more closely connected. The Convention, which came into
force in 1993, is applicable in all member states of the European Community and
substitutes the private international law rules of contract hitherto in force in each
member country. It is therefore suggested that the Convention precludes parties to a
contract to which it applies from selecting a system of conflict of law rules which is
independent of it? In some respect the scope of the Convention is very wide. It
applies to contracts "... involving a choice between the laws of different countries",37
i.e., whenever there is the possibility of a conflict between different systems of law.
The situation involving a conflict may be brought about by a choice of law clause,
thus bringing within reach of the Convention even a purely domestic transaction, if
31 Article 1(2Xd).
32Article 3(2).
33A process known as depéçage: Article 3(1).
'Article 3(3).
33North, P11. Problems, p. 183.
Kay, Peter The New Private International Law of Contract of the European Community:
Implementation of the EEC's Contractual Obligations Convention in En gland and Wales under the
Contracts (Applicable Law) Act, 1990, Dartmouth, 1993; North, PIL Problems, p. 127; contra Mann
F.A., "The Proper Law of the Contract - An Obituary" (1991) 107 L.Q.R., 353, who argues that subject
to mandatory provisions, to treat the Convention as having such effect will be inconsistent with the
fundamental character of an instrument which proclaims freedom of choice as its cardinal principle.
37Article 1(1).
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it contains a choice of law clause indicationg a foreign law. 38
 The Convention also
applies irrespective of whether the chosen system of law or the law otherwise
indicated by its rules is the law of a member state of the European Community.39
What is relevant for us is that the Convention adopts in substance the principle
of freedom of choice as already in existence in the different systems of law within the
Community. Outside the Community the principle is also of general acceptance. The
American Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second, Section 187, provides that the
contractual rights and duties shall be governed by the
law of the state chosen by the parties ... if the particular issue is one
which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue.
The position in Australia40 as elsewhere in the common law world is exactly the
same as under English law both before and after the Rome Convention. Switzerland's
Law on Private International Law expresses the Swiss position in terms similar to the
American Restatement: "[a] contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the
parties."4'
The principle also forms part of most other Conventions on commercial
transactions. As one of the early international instruments on the subject the Hague
Convention on the conifict of law rules on the sale of goods provided that "[a] sale
Lagarde, Paul, "Les Limites Objectives de la Convention de Rome (Conflits de Loi, Primautd du
Droit Communautaire, Rapports avec les autres Conventions)" (1993) 29 Riv. Dir. mt. Priv. e Proc.,
33, where the author draws a contrast with the position under the Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1986, which excludes from its scope cases
where the circumstance creating a choice between different laws "... arises solely from a stipulation by
the parties as to the applicable law, even if accompanied by a choice of court or arbitration": Article
1(b). So, although the Rome Convention will apply to a purely domestic transaction in which the only
foreign element is the parties' designation of a foreign law, (subject to the mandatory rules of the
domestic law concerned: Article 17), the 1986 Hague Convention might not. See also Morse, C.GJ.,
"The E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations" (1982) 2 Y E L, 107;
North, PIL Problems, p. 123.
39Article 2.
40Sykes, Edward I.; Pryles, Michael C., Australian Private International Law, 3rd Edn., Law Books
Co., Sidney, 1991, chapter. 16.
41Adopted by the Swiss Federal Parliament in December, 1987, Article 116(1).
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shall be governed by the internal law of the country designated by the parties."42
 The
1955 Convention has been replaced by another Hague Convention on the same matter,
the 1986 Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sale of Goods. Article
7 of the 1986 Convention is in almost the same terms as Article 2 of the previous one.
It states that "[a] contract of sale is governed by the law chosen by the parties." The
rule is then carried into subsequent international instruments such as the Hague
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts of Agency, Article 5 of which
provides for the "... internal law chosen by the principal and the agent ... "to govern
"... the agency relationship between them."
It was also able to fmd its way into the two Hague Conventions of 1964
relating not to choice of law rules but to the substantive rules themselves, respectively,
on formation and on the rights and duties of parties to a contract for the international
sale of goods.43
 The second of the Conventions, which deals with rules on the
formation of international sales contracts, excludes the application of the Convention's
rules whenever "... it appears from the preliminary negotiations, the offer, the reply,
the practices which the parties have established between themselves or usage that
other rules app1y." The Convention therefore recognises that parties to an intended
sales contract can choose to regulate its formation other than in accordance with the
rules of the Convention. Even more clearly stated is Article 3 of the Annex to the first
of the Conventions dealing with the substantive rights and duties of the parties. It
provides that the parties "... shall be free to exclude the application ... of the present
law either entirely or partially. Such exclusion may be express or implied." They are
free to adopt different rules varying the obligation of the parties, such as the duties
of the seller regarding delivery and of the buyer in respect of the payment of price.
On the other hand, under Article 4, the Uniform Law will be applicable where it has
been chosen by the parties as the governing law although they do not satisfy the
general requirement regarding the scope of the Convention, which applies in specific
42Article 2.
43The Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts and the Uniform Law on the InternationaJ Sale
of Goods, both of July 1964.
"Annex I, Article 2(1).
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circumstances set out in the Convention, where the parties have their places of
business or habitual residence in different states. Contracting parties are thus allowed
to bring their transaction within the scope of the Convention, if they choose to, even
in circumstances where it would otherwise not be so. The freedom given to party
autonomy in that case is considerable.
Both Hague Sales Conventions have been replaced by a single instrument, the
United Nations (Vienna) Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
1980. It re-enacts the previous Conventions in substance and retains freedom of choice
in Article 6, by allowing the parties "... to exclude the application of the
Convention..." if they choose to or "... vary the effect of its provisions ...."
(2). Freedom of choice, express choice and international commercial
arbitration
Given that arbitration itself is an extension of the doctrine of party autonomy,
the rule that contracting parties retain the freedom to determine the applicable law also
found its way into the domain of international commercial arbitration. A brief survey
reveals that it has gained widespread support in both developing and advanced
countries as embodied in almost all recent national legislation applicable both to
domestic and international commercial arbitration. It also underlies all international
instruments in force on the subject.
Within the European Community the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations 1980 excludes arbitration from its scope, thus leaving the
issue to be determined under the domestic law in force in each member state of the
Community. In France domestic and international arbitration are governed by the
relevant provisions of the new code of civil procedure. International Commercial
Arbitration is governed by Book IV, Part V. Article 1496 of the code directs an
arbitration tribunal to detemine the rights and obligations of the parties in dispute in
accordance with the rules of law chosen by them: "[ii 'arbitre tranche le litige
conforinement aux règles de droit que les parties ont choisies; a defaut d'un tel choix,
conformement a celles qu 'ii estime appropriées." There is a close similarity there with
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the position under the 1987 Swiss Law 45
 which also requires a tribunal to determine
the dispute between the parties in the arbitration "... sélon les règles de droit choisies
par les parties ou, a defaut de choix, sélon les regles de droit avec lesquelles la
clause prIsente les liens les plus étroits" (Article 187). In the Netherlands, where the
law was revised by the addition to the code of civil procedure of a new chapter on
arbitration in 1986 with a view to modemising the old law, the code recognises the
parties' freedom to determine the applicable law and Article 1054 directs the tribunal
to decide the dispute in accordance with the law chosen by the parties. In Spain the
tribunal is requested, pursuant to Article 62 of the Arbitration Law of 1988, to decide
the dispute in accordance with the law expressly chosen by the parties. Although the
relevant provisions of the Belgian judicial code appear silent on the particular point,
it is accepted that in Belgium, the parties in arbitration are free to designate the
applicable law, the tribunal being required to apply it.
Similarly the Arbitration Acts in force in England are silent on the parties'
choice of the applicable law. The case law however indicates that the parties are free
to decide the applicable law provided the choice is made in good faith and is legal.47
Compagnie D 'Armément Maritime v Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation, 48 for
example, was a case which did not involve an express and clear choice. It was a case
in which the British courts had to determine the applicable law of a contract submitted
to arbitration from a choice of law clause which had been expressed by reference to
the "laws of the flag of the vessel cartying the goods." The intention of the parties
was to be inferred from the terms of the contract as a whole. What is significant,
however, is that the discussion in the House of Lords proceeded on the assumption
that if a choice had been clearly stated it would have been upheld.49 Lord Morris
45Came into force in January 1989.
Huys, Marcel and Keutgen, Guy L'Arbitra ge en Droit Beige et International, Bruylant, Bruxelles,
1981, pp. 577 et seq.
47Vita Food Products v Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C. 277; Whirworth Street Estates v James
Miller & Partners [1970] A.C. 583.
'[ 1971 ] A.C. 572.
49Ibid pp. 583 (per Lord Reid); 585 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest); 603 (Lord Diplock); 577
(submission of counsel).
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parties fail to specify an express choice of law the courts or arbitrators can imply one
on their behalf. The process involves certain presumptions, most of which are drawn
from the terms of the contract itself, or tied to factors established by law (or as
determined by courts), as matters from which a choice can be inferred, such as the
place of performance of the contract, the nationality of the parties and the place
chosen for the arbitration. The process would require the search for "... an actual
intention by the parties, but without any choice of law clause in explicit terms",62
since implied choice does not mean the absence of choice. It is a reference to the
absence of a choice of law clause explicitly stated in the contract or in another
document relating to the contract such as a separately made arbitration agreement. The
choice is regareded as implied on the basis that "[f]rom the express terms of the
contract it is clear that the parties have addressed their minds to the question of what
law should govern the contract and have made a conscious decision even though they
have not written it down in express terms?63 The Giuliano-Lagarde report on the
European Union Rome Conventions indicates that its authors were aware of the fact
that the parties may fail expressly to state a choice although it remains possible from
the terms of the contract that the parties had in fact indicated a choice. For that
reason, Article 3(1) of the Convention enjoins the competent court to give effect to
such a choice if "... demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the
contract or the circumstances of the case." The recognition of that fact was not new
at the time of the Convention. It had already been the subject of Article 2 of the 1955
Hague Sales Convention, which provided for the implied designation of the applicable
law by the parties to "... result without any doubt from the provisions of the contract."
When the 1955 Sales Convention was replaced by the 1986 Hague Convention Article
7 of the latter provided for the choice "... to be clearly demonstrated by the terms of
the contract and the conduct of the parties, viewed in their entirety", following Article
5 of the 1978 Agency Convention, which had been expressed in terms requiring the
62Diamond, Aubrey L., "Hannonisation of Private International Law relating to Contractual
Obligations" (1986) 199 Hague Acad Courses, 233 P. 256.
631bi4.
64Official Journal of the European Communities, 1980, C282.
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choice to "... be such that it may be inferred with reasonable certainty from the terms
of the agreement between the parties and the circumstances of the case."
In all the Conventions implied choice is limited to those situations where it
could reasonably be assumed that the parties had addressed their minds to the question
of the applicable law but simply failed expressly to record their intention. In those
situations arbitrators can draw an inference as to the proper law from the indicators
present in the contract and other circumstances. The discretion to do so is accepted in
domestic and international instruments governing arbitration and in arbitration practice
itself as revealed in awards. The IJNCITRAL Model law, for example, and some of
the national legislation based on it65
 provide for the arbitrator to determine the
substantive law in accordance with any conflict of law rules which he considers
applicable. The European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961
also allows the arbitrators to "... apply the proper law under the rule of conflict that
the arbitrators deem applicable." The rules of the ICC Court of Arbitration 67 give
the arbitrator the power to "... apply the law designated as the proper law by the rules
of conflict which he deems appropriate." The powers conferred on arbitrators under
those provisions are very wide and are accepted as permitting them to imply an actual,
although not expressly stated, choice of law where the facts allow them to do so. The
factors often taken into consideration include the use of a particular standard form of
a contract which is known to be governed by a particular system of law, the
presence of an arbitration or choice of jurisdiction clause, previous dealings between
the parties indicating a particular system of law and the fact that the parties had
conducted their affairs in reliance on a particular law. In the arbitration involving
AAPL, a Hong Kong corporation, and the government of Sri Lanka, the tribunal
decided by a majority to apply the provisions of the Sri Lanka I U.K. Bilateral
Artic1es 28 (UNCITRAL); Sections 47(3), (Nigeria) & 28(2), (Canada)
Artic1e VI1(1).
67Article 13(3).
Giu1iano-Lagarde report on the Rome Convention, supra.
Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v Republic of Sri Lanka, award of 27 june 1990 [1991] 6 ICSJD
Rev.,-FILJ, 526.
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Investment Treaty7° as the primary source of the applicable rules of the dispute on
the basis that the parties had throughout the proceedings, particularly in their
pleadings, "... acted in a manner that demonstrate[d] their mutual agreement to the
application of the Treaty." The dispute arose out of a joint undertaking in Sri Lanka
for the production of shrimp culture. The arbitration was commenced by AAPL after
it suffered loss in its investments owing to operations conducted by the Sri Lankan
security forces against local separatist rebels. Under Article 42(1) of the ICSID
Convention the dispute is settled in accordance with rules of law chosen by the
parties. In the absence of such an expresss choice in this case the tribunal held, by
majority, that subsequent reliance by both parties on the provisions of the Treaty in
their pleadings and submission to the tribunals during the hearings constituted a tacit
choice of the applicable rules for the purpose of Article 42(l).'
(4). Complete Absence of Choice
In this situation the parties have expressed no choice at all. There is no choice
of law clause whether in the contract itself, or in a separate but related document, or
is it possible to infer from the terms of the contract or the dealings between the parties
that they had addressed their minds to the issue. In those circumstances, as in the case
of implied choice, arbitration tribunals are given the power to determine the
appropriate law, the source of such power being in all cases exactly the same as in
cases involving a tacit choice of law. In a case involving, for example, an ICC
arbitration, it will be Article 13(3) of that institution's arbitration rules and for the
UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 28.
The general approach is to apply the law with the closest connection to the
transaction and the parties. The search for the law with the closest connection will
take on board such factors as the place of performance of the contract, the nationality
or domicil of the parties to the transaction, the law of the place where the contract was
made and, of great significance, the nature of the transaction itself. A contract for the
7 rhe application of which had been extended to Hong Kong.
71Contra, award of dissenting arbitrator, [1991] 6 ICS]]) Rev.,-FILJ, p. 574.
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construction and management of an industrial unit should, in the absence of agreement
by the parties, in principle be governed by the law of that country as the system of
law almost exclusively connected with the undertaking. The advantage of the closest
connection approach lies in its flexibility. It makes it possible for the arbitrator to look
at the circumstances of the contract as a whole. It takes many factors into account,
weighing each against the others to determine the system of law which, as a whole,
has the most significant connection with the contract. This contrasts with the method
once in favour in many systems 72
 to refer to rigid rules in determining the law. In
some jurisdictions the law of the nationality of the parties, if common, provides a fast
rule. In others reliance is placed on the law of the place where the contract was made.
Other presumptions include the law of the place of performance, the law of the place
of negotiation and of the location of the subject matter of the contract, and the law of
the place of arbitration or other method of settlement, if indicated in the contract. It
has always been doubted whether all these presumptions, taken separately, can provide
an appropriate link with the transaction, sufficient to determine the proper law.73
What is certain is that they all have to be taken together.74
The American Restatement, Second, on the Conflict of Laws, requires in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties that the dispute be "... determined
by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship to the transaction and the parties ..." The objective of the restatement is
to identify the state having the most significant connection with the particular issue
in dispute and to give effect to that law. Section 188(2) requires the factors to be
taken into account in determining the system of law with the most significant
relationship with the transaction and the parties, "... to be evaluated according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular issue." The European Convention of
1980 (Rome Convention) also expresses a preference for the flexible rule. Article 4(1)
provides for a contract to be "... governed by the law of the country to which it is
most closely connected", although, in applying that test, the Convention still relies on
Ita1y, France.
73Diainond, supra 269 et seq.
'4lbid.
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a number of presumptions for specified type of contracts. For example, contracts of
carriage are presumed governed by the law of the place of the carrier and, for
contracts in which the subject matter involves an interest in an immovable property,
the presumption is for the law of the situs. Since the Convention lays down as a
general rule applicable in all cases, that, for the purpose of determining the law with
the closest connection, the governing law of a contract is the law of the party whose
performance is characteristic of the transaction, the presumptions provided for in the
specified cases must be read only as an indication of the law with the closest
connection. The presumptions are therefore not conclusive. If the law of another
country has a closer relationship to the contract that law is applied. Article 4(5) as a
result provides that the presumptions regarding the specified contracts (contracts
involving carriage and interest in immovable property) should be disregarded "if it
appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected
with another country." In all events if the performance which is characteristic of a
contract cannot be determined the same Article 4(5) refers back to the law of the
country which, from the circumstances as a whole, provides the closest connection to
the transaction and the parties.
Closely associated with the closest connection test is the "policy analysis" test
applicable in many American states. It is also flexible in that it requires the courts to
balance the factors connecting the transaction to the different States whose laws are
in conflict, to determine the state having the greatest interest in the controversy and
which will be most affected by the outcome of the dispute.
(5). Tronc Commun
The "tronc commun" calls for the application of the principles of substantive
law which are common to the national systems of law in conflict. 75 The principal
proponent76 of the doctrine refers to clause 68 of the Channel Tunnel arbitration
75Rubino-Sanunartano, Mauro International Arbitration Law, Kiuwer, Deventer, 1990, pp. 274-276;
"The Channel Tunnel and the Tronc Commun Doctrine" (1993) 10 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 3, 59.
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case77
 as an example of how the "tronc commun" could be brought into operation.
That case provided for the governing law to be "... in accordance with the principles
common to both English law and French law and in the absence of such common
principles by such general principles of international trade law as have been applied
by national and international tribunals." 78
 Under the doctrine, the tribunal will
explore all the systems of law concerned for principles of law common to them and
relevant to the settlement of the matters in dispute. An important shortcoming of the
doctrine is that if the parties fail to provide for an alternative, the tribunal might be
unable to proceed with its search for the applicable law in the absence of principles
of law common to the different systems. The Channel Tunnel arbitration clause
provided for principles of international trade law as the residual law. On the other
hand, if the relevant substantive rules and principles of law in both systems are the
same, there is no true conflict since reliance on any of the systems will lead to the
same outcome.
In all events any of the above traditional conflict of laws methods will lead to
the application of a system of law with the most significant bearing on the transaction.
However, in arbitrations involving state parties from the developing world, these
traditional methods have not usually been followed for various reasons.
Ill: Choice of Substantive law and Investment Contracts
The problem of the proper law of a contract with international elements has
unduly been complicated in cases where one of the contracting parties is a state or a
public body. The conflict of laws debate has so far proceeded along two lines. First,
it is stated that the contracts are normally governed by the local law of the state but
the result of the application of that law should be denied where the state exercises its
sovereignty to alter "... the local law as to end its obligations under the contract"
"Channel Tunnel Group v Balfour Beatty [1992] 2 AER 609.
78Similar provisions will be found in earlier arbitrations, such as the three Libyan Petroleum awards,
infra.
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before its full duration,79 on the basis that it is contrary to international law. The
question arising thereunder is whether in modifying its domestic law, in principle
applicable to the contract, thus altering the obligations of the parties, the state acts in
breach of international law. Many arbitration awards have answered the question in
the affirmative.80 The discussion then becomes centred on specific issues of
international law, such as a state's sovereignty over natural resources within its
territory, the protection of aliens, the abuse of rights, state responsibility and the tort
of denial of justice.
That approach asumes that international law is automatically applicable in
contracts by governments and private parties. In particular it assumes that international
law provides a higher level of norms applicable to those contracts. The approach was
met with the criticism - valid in our view - that it confuses the separate domains of
public and private international laws, especially by ignoring the well established rules
of conflict of laws referred to earlier. 8 ' The second approach was therefore put
forward on the view that a state contract, like all other contracts, is governed in the
first place by the system of law chosen by the parties. 82 In the absence of an express
indication by the parties of that law the traditional principles of conflict of laws should
be followed to discover what, in the circumstances, could be the appropriate law. The
trend, as indicated above, is to apply the law with the closest connection to the
transaction and the parties.83 If by application of private international law rules a
contract is found to be governed by the law of a state, that law, as the proper law of
the contract, "... not merely sustains but, because it sustains, may modify or dissolve
Jennings, Robert Y. "State Contracts in International Law" (1961) 37 BYIL, 156.
80Sapphire International Petroleum v National Iranian Oil Co., [1967] 35 ILR, 136; Texaco
Overseas Petroleum Company and Caljfornia Asiatic Oil Company (Topco/Calasiatic) v Libya, award
on the merits of 19 January 1977 [1979] 53 JLR 420; Revere Copper & Brass v The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, award of 24 August 1978 [1980) 56 ILR, 258.
81Mann, F. A. "State Contracts and State Responsibility" (1960) 54 AJIL, 572; "The Proper Law
of Contracts Concluded by International Persons" (1959) 35 BYIL, 34; "The Law Governing State
Contracts" (1944) 21 BYIL, 11.
B2Ibid
83North, (1990) 220 Hague Acad Courses, 9.
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the contractual bond." "If, therefore, the debtor [in this case the state] relies on
changes in the proper law, he does what he is entitled to do and cannot be charged
with a breach of contract, his undertaking being limited to perform in accordance with
the terms of the contract as sanctioned by the provisions of the proper law." 85
 That,
in our view, is logical. The position will remain the same even if the state had agreed
to "freeze" the applicable law as existing at the time when the contract was made so
as to exclude the application of subsequent alterations to that law by the state itself
since, in any case, "... it is the proper law of the contract that decides the question
whether the change overrides the clause" 86. As Stephen Toope says, "it is not
possible in international contracts effectively to exclude the application of the
mandatory provisions of the proper law." 87
 The effectiveness of "freezing" or
"stabilisation" clauses was considered in Government of Kuwait v The American
independent Oil Co. (Aminoil)88 and rejected by the tribunal, which thought that a
stabilisation clause could not preclude subsequent nationalisation of the concession
made to the corporation by appropriate domestic legislation. The tribunal recognised
that provided adequate compensation was made, the state could still "take those steps
against which it was the very object of these clauses to protect the concessionaire."89
According to Stephen Toope, stabilisation clauses only emphasise the need to act in
good faith and the requirement of adequate compensation.9°
84Mann, (1960) 54 AJ]L, p. 581, citing Kahier v Midland Bank [1950] A.C. 24, p. 56.
85Ibid.
'Ibid.
Mixed International Arbitrations: Studies in Arbitrations between States and Private Persons,
Grotius Publications, Cambridge, 1990, p. 53.
Award of 24 March 1982 [1984] 66 ILR, 518, where the tribunal held as a matter of principle that
the state could unilaterally modify the terms of the contract, although the other party is entitled to
compensation.
Ibid p. 587.
90Supra p. 53. In Amoco international Finance Corporation v Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran-US
claims tribunal) (199) 27 ILM 1314, the tribunal declined to enforce the clause (Article 30) simply by
not treating it as a stabilisation clause at all since it referred solely to the existing Iranian law and did
not affect future Iranian legislation.
209
For the investing community even the second approach, although it might be
sound in law, leads to an unsatisfactory outcome in that it leads back to the same law
under which the state had purported unilaterally to modify the contract. It therefore
became necessary to add elements to that approach rendering it possible to circumvent
the application of host state laws. This is achieved by "internationalising" state
contracts by a truncated conflict of laws based process which leads to international
law as the proper law of the contracts where the parties fail explicitly to state it. The
trend, according to Professor Toope, "has been for arbitrators increasingly to ignore
the traditional rules of private international law as they seek to determine the proper
law of state contracts."9'
In the view of writers with a developing world outlook, however, the process
has resulted in an attempt to "... build a system of arbitration for the protection of
foreign investment contracts and related business activity u92 based on international
law, a development they find little favour with.93
A. The Rejection of Host State Laws as the Governing Law of State
Contracts
It was originally not disputed that in the absence of an indication of the proper
law the connecting factors weighed heavily in favour of the application of the host
state law as the system of law most closely connected with the particular transaction.
In one of the early oil concession awards between the Petroleum Development (Trucial
Coast) Ltd and the Sheikh of Abu DhabP' the arbitrator recognised that "[i]f any
municipal system of law were applicable it would prima facie be that of Abu
91Jtid p. 46.
Sornarajah, Mamud International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts,
Longman Singapore Ltd., 1990, Chap. 1; "The Climate of International Commercial Arbitration" (1991)
8 J Int'l. Arb'n., 48.
93Maniruzzarnan A. F. M. "State Contracts with Aliens: The Question of Unilateral Change by the
State in Contemporary International Law" (1992) 9 burn. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 4, 141.
Award of August 1951, [1952] 1 ICLQ, 247; (1951) 18 ILR 144.
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Dhabi"95 , as the law of the place where the contract was made "... and wholly to be
performed ... ". A trend soon developed, however, to avoid the application of those
laws. The legal techniques used to achieve the result were numerous.97
(1). Inadequacy of Host State Laws
First, it was suggested that the legal systems of the developing countries
concerned were too underdeveloped to deal with the questions arising under the
contracts. In the Abu Dhabi award the arbitrator held that there could be no principles
of law applicable to the kind of commercial transactions involved to be found in such
a "primitive region", the reference being to the Persian Gulf generally, including the
state of Abu Dhabi itself. In his view "... no such law [could] reasonably be said to
exist [in Abu Dhabi]. The Sheikh administers a purely discretionary justice with the
assistance of the Koran; and it would be fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive
region there is any settled body of legal principles applicable to the construction of
modern commercial instruments." The same ground was relied on in the Qatar
arbitration two years later to reject the application to a similar concession of
principles drawn from Islamic law. The arbitrator was satisfied that the law of Qatar
did "... not contain any principles which [could] be sufficient to interpret [the]
particular contract" 1
 he had to consider. In words admittedly adopted from the
previous award, he stated that "... there [was] no settled body of legal principles in
Qatar applicable to the construction of modern commercial instruments."'0'
[1952] 1 ICLQ p. 250.
96Thid.
'The reasons and stages through which they were developed are described in considerable length
by Sornarajah, supra chapters 1 and 4 and The Pursuit of Nationalised Pro perty Martinus Nijhoff,
Dordrecht, 1986, chapter 2
1bidpp. 250-51.
Ruler of Qatar v International Marine Oil Co., award of June 1953 (1953) 20 ILR, 534.
'°°Ibid p. 545.
'°'Ibid p. 544.
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In both cases the choice of law clauses were similarly expressed in terms
requiring the contracts to be interpreted "in a manner consistent with reason" or, as
stated by the arbitrator in the second award, in accordance with "the principles of
justice, equity and good conscience."°2
 The arbitrator in the Abu Dhabi award read
the clause as requiring "... the application of principles rooted in good sense and
common practice of the generality of civiised nations •••"103 and, although he did
not find English municipal law applicable as such, he still considered and relied on
some rules of English law for being "... so firmly grounded in reason, as to form part
of this broad body of jurisprudence •••" 104 The inference is that there were no similar
general rules of law "rooted in common sense" or consistent with the "modern law of
nature" or "grounded in reason" to be derived from the law of Abu Dhabi or the
region as a whole.
Later developments made it impossible to rely on the assumed inadequacy of
the legal systems of these countries to exclude the application of the laws.'° 5
 The
effect of the enactment of laws governing different areas of domestic and foreign
investments, together with the fact that the general commercial laws of these countries
are in any case based on the laws and practices as inherited from the same European
countries, was to render such assumption baseless. In addition some international
instruments on the subject of foreign investments specifically required the application
of host state laws in the absence of a specification by the parties)° 6
 What is more
express contractual provisions were also being made by the host states for the
application of their laws. According to Professor Georges Delaume,
[i]n the vast majority of state contracts, provisions relating to the
applicable law refer to some municipal law as the applicable law of the
'°2lbid p. 545.
'°3Supra p. 251.
'°4JbicL
'°5Although even in the improved climate of today it is still possible to find occasional expressions
of the same attitude: State of Dubai v Sir Francis Mc Williams, Paris High Court (Tribunal de Grande
Instance) decision of 1 April 1993 (1993) Rev. Arb., 455.
t06See for example Article 42 of the ICSID Convention.
212
contract. When the contract involves primarily transactions that are to
be performed in the country of the state party, the law of that state
normally governs the relationship)°7
The problem with the earlier cases is that the choice of law clauses were too vaguely
worded, thus allowing the arbitrators unlimited scope reading the clauses. Clear and
precise proper law clauses providing for the application of host state laws, backed by
an international Convention to the same effect, such as Article 42 of the ICSID, make
it difficult for tribunals to avoid the laws off-hand. These developments did not,
however, remove the trend against the application of host state laws whether required
by Convention or by the terms of a contract.
In awards rendered pursuant to the 1965 Washington Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, which mandates the application of the host state
law, an avoidance mechanism has been to rely on the civil and commercial laws of
former colonising states as the general and commercial laws of the host states, so as
to exclude the application of the latter. Klöckner v Cameroon illustrates how, in both
the original and the first annulment proceedings,° 8
 the reference to Cameroonian
law as required under Article 42(1) was treated as a reference to French law and the
latter applied in the place of the former. Consequently all references to authorities in
the applicable law were to French jurisprudence, French text writers and French
statutory provisions. It would have been necessary, for example, to refer to the
corresponding Cameroonian statutory provisions, even if the same or similar to the
French statutes relied on.
A stronger expression of the preference for French law is to be found in the
Agip SPA v Con go'°9 award. There, the tribunal held that Congolese law was "...
French law as it was in force at the time of the accession of the country to
' 09"The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria and State Contracts", in Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration (ed.
by Carbonneau, Thomas E), Dobbs Feriy, New York, 1990, 77, p. 79.
t08Awards of 21 October 1983, [1994] 2 ICSID Reports, 9 (excerpts); Paulsson, Jan, "The ICSID
Klöckner v. Cameroon award: The Duties of Partners in North-South Economic Development
Agreements" (1984) 1 J Int'l. Arb'n., 145 (excerpts) and of 3 May, 1985 [1994] 2 ICSB) Reports, 59;
[1986] 1 ICSJD Rev.,-FILJ., 89.
109(1993] 1 ICSJD Reports, 306.
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independence (1960)", so as to apply the provisions of the French civil code."°
Although the commercial laws of the countries concerned in the above awards
are drawn principally from French Law, as a matter of principle, they are no longer
to be regarded as exactly the same as French Law if the purpose for doing so is to
disregard their application in circumstances where they are otherwise applicable. The
dissenting arbitrator in Société Quest -Africaine des Bétons industriels (Soabi) v
Senegal," was pushed by the repeated reference to French Law by the majority in
that award to react that "[a] partir du 4 avril 1960, date de l'independence du Senegal,
le droit Sénégalais s'est détaché du droit Français, celui-ci ne pouvant servir qu'à litre
d'illustration d'une opinion quand ii s'agit de situations postérieures a cette date""2,
a statement which remains valid for the other countries concerned, as recognised in
a subsequent award involving the Government of Guinea.113
The award in Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v Sri Lanka" 4 introduces
another device, which is to treat a treaty separately from the domestic law of the state
into which the treaty has been incorporated, so as to apply the treaty provisions as if
they never formed part of the law of the country involved in the ICSID arbitration.
The intended objective is to consider the domestic legal order as having no bearing
on the transaction as a means to avoid reliance on that law, if the need were to arise.
The technique is highly questionable on the ground that it is inconsistent both with
principle and with the provisions of Article 42(1) of the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes, which makes the application of the domestic law of the state
°See also Benvenuti & Bonfant v Congo [1993] 1 ICSID Reports, 330, where another ICSID
tribunal reached the same conclusion almost word for word as in the Agip case; and, Atlantic Triton
Comp. v Guinea, award of 21 April 1986 [1988] 115 J DI, 181 (excerpts) on a similar attitude towards
Guinean Law.
" tICSID Award of 25 Feb., 1988, [19911 6 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ, 125.
"2Although that was not necessary since the settlement had clearly been made on the basis of
Senegalese law.
"3Maritime international Nominees Establishment v Government of Guinea, award of 22 December
1989 [1990] 5 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ, 95.
114Award of 27 June, 1990 [1991] 6 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ, 526.
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party in dispute mandatory."5
(2). Internationalising the Contracts
As noted earlier it is admitted that international law is made for relations
between states and international bodies and should therefore, in principle, have no
place in contracts between states and private persons." 6 Jennings states that "[t]he
proper law of a State contract is normally the municipal law of the contracting
State." 7
 But since the state can modify that law in its favour without being in
breach of the contract according to its proper law, the contract, it is argued, must be
internationalised. The contract then becomes governed by international law under
certain circumstances whether or not expressly selected or otherwise indicated by the
parties as the applicable law." 8
 The purpose of internationalising a state contract is
fairly well known, and has been objected to, the methods used being highly
questionable. 119
 Rigaux states the reason as being
to protect the foreign contracting party against the exercise by the State
not only of its rights to nationalize the property and contractual rights
of the foreign enterprise (...), but also of its power to modify its own
legislation (particularly with regards to taxation) and, by so doing, to
infringe contractual rights which are held to be sacrosanct.'2°
"5See Elombi, "ICSID Awards and the Denial of Host State Laws" (1994) 11 J. Int'l. Arb'n., Part
3, 61.
6Jennings, (1961) 37 BYIL, 156.
"7lbid.
"8lbid.
Rigaux, François "Transnational Corporations" in International Law: Achievements and Prospects,
(ed. Bedjäoui, Mohammed), Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1991, 126.
' 20Jbid p. 126. The policy arguments for intemationalising are fully discussed by Sornarajah, The
Pursuit of Nationalized Property, Martinus Nijhoff, 1968, pp. 86 et seq. In Sapphire International
Petroleum v National Iranian Oil Co., award of 15 March 1963 [19671 35 LL.R., 136, p. 171, the
arbitrator thought that owing to the size in financial and technical assistance brought into the host
country by the investors it seemed "... natural that they should be protected against any legislative
changes which might alter the character of the contract, and that they should be assured of some legal
security. This could not be guaranteed to them by the outright application of Iranian law, which it is
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The writer does not however fail to point out that
[however] audacious it may seem, the roundabout invocation of
international law can be explained by the desire to justify the
considerable restrictions thus placed upon state power, by appealing to
a higher legal order than that of the State."
The range of circumstances under which the contract will come under international
law are numerous'21.
(i). General principles of law and the internationalisation of the contracts
First, it is said that the insertion into the agreements of a proper law clause
referring to "general principles of law" ought to lead to the application of international
law, since "general principles of law recognised by civilised nations" constitutes a
source of international law under the statute of the International Court of Justice.'22
According to F.A. Mann, "... an express reference to public international law will
usually be embodied in a clause providing for the application of general principles of
law."23 The use by Mann of the term "express" is a contradiction since what he
regards as "express" is not express but, in his own words, "embodied" elsewhere (in
"general principles of law") from where it is to be "inferred". That which is "express"
cannot be "inferred" at the same time. Mann's reason for inferring an "express" choice
of public international from a clause requiring the application of "general principles
of law" is that if, by referring to "general principles of law", only those principles are
assumed to have been intended,
then the internationali[s]ation of a contract would not be different in
within the Iranian State to change.
The result of these considerstions is to reduce the likelihood of Iranian civil law being applied
to the interpretation and perforance of the agreements."
'21Apart from Sornarajah, ibid p. 90 et seq and International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem
of State Contracts, Chap. 1, see also Nadn, Horacio A. Grigera Choice of Law Problems in International
Commercial Arbitration, JC.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen, 1992, pp. 114 et seq; Topco/Calo.siatic
v Libya, award on the merits of 19 January 1977 [1979] 53 ILR, 420.
Topco/Ca1asiatic v Libya, ibid p. 452.
Op. cit. [1959] 35 BYIL, 34 p. 51.
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character from a contract which the parties have submitted, say, to
Roman law or into which they have embodied the Sale of Goods Act,
1893: the parties would have done no more than to provide for the
incorporation of certain rules of public international law, however far-
reaching or extensive they may be, and the contract as such would
remain subject to the legal system applicable to it, so that, to mention
only one of several consequences, changes introduced in that legal
system would affect it.'24
But why, if that were the proper inference, should the parties not be taken to
have intended no more than an incorporation of "general principles of law" to the
exclusion of the rest of international law? Mann's response is that, if that were so,
"[one] of the main purposes of a true 'internationali[s]ation' of a contract would fail
in that the contract would be subject to rather than exempt from interference from its
proper law. (...[t]he reference to the general principles of law will not usually be mere
incorporation, but will be tantamount to a reference to or a choice of public
international law as the governing law.. although he points out that this is not
necessarily so, without however indicating in what circumstances it may not be. René-
Jean Dupuy, the sole arbitrator in the Topco/Calasiatic v Libya award also justifies the
assumption on the "need for the private contracting party to be protected against
unilateral and abrupt modifications of the legislation in the contracting State ••"126
For the same reason it has also been said that even words of a very general
character, such as the choice of law clause in the Abu Dhabi award' 27 stating that
the agreement was based on the "good will and sincerity of belief of the parties",'28
'24Ibid p. 44.
'1bid.
126[1979] 53 ILR, 420, p. 454. If the suggestion there is that the private investor would be without
protection if the contract were not internationalised, it is an error. Protection exists under public
international law, on the basis of which the home state of the investor may intervene on his behalf for
injury done to its national: see Brownlie, Ian The Princi ples of Public International Law, 4th Edn.,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 518-552, particularly pp. 531-552; Shaw, Malcolm N International
Law, 3rd Edn., Grotius Publications, Cambridge, 1991, p. 504
'27August 1951 [19521 1 ICLQ, 247; (1951) 18 ILR 144.
128(1951] 1 ICLQ p. 250.
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and that it should be interpreted "in a fashion consistent with reason",' 29
 should be
regarded as a sufficiently clear reference to public international law.' 3° The view is
supported by reference to both the Abu Dhabi and Quartar arbitrations, where the
arbitrators regarded those general words as prescribing "the application of principles
rooted in the good sense and common practice of the generality of civiised nations -
a sort of common law of nature." 13 ' The common practices of civiised nations are
then taken as a reference to public international law.
The assumption that "general principles of law" is the same as international law
is based on the direct connection which the movement in support of internationalising
state contracts draws with Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, without indicating by what legal process the connection is established. Article
38(l)(c) treats "general principles of law" as one of the sources of international law,
such that, in the context of the statute, "principles of international law" is regarded as
wider in scope than "general principles of law",' 32
 which together with other sources
form part of the former. The flaw in that view is that it assimilates one source of
international law to international law itself,' 33 thus confusing the "principles of
international law" with the "general principles of law".'' That flaw is revealed with
striking force by the proper law clauses in the three Libyan oil nationalisation
Ibid.
3oMann (1959) 35 BYIL, 34, p. 52. Contra, Delaume, in (Carbonneau ed., Op. Cit. p. 82) who says
that a reference to "good faith", "good will", "good conscience", or related phrases is "merely a
reminder of an elementary rule of contract law", i.e., the obligation to perform contracts in good faith.
See also Amoco v Iran (Iran-US claims tribunal chamber 3) award of 14 July 1987 (1987) 27 ILM
1314, P. 1356 pam. 169. Elsewhere Delaume had asked why "a different solution [should] prevail when
the contracting state is a developing nation whose law is capable of supplying the basic legal framework
of the transaction?": (1981) 75 AJIL, 784, p. 800.
' 31Supra note 128 p. 251.
' 32Topco/Calasiatic v Libya [1979] 53 ILR. p. 452, para. 41.
'33Jbid para. 41, where the arbitrator states: "[t]herefore, the reference which is made mainly to the
principles of international law and, secondarily, to the general principles of law must have as a
consequence the application of international law to the legal relations between the parties."
'See also Lalive, Pierre in, Transnational Rules in International Commercial Arbitration (Ed.
Gaillard, Emmanuel) ICC Publication No. 480, Paris, 1993 p. 56.
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arbitrations) 35 The clause in each case provided for the concession to be governed
"in accordance with the principles of the law of Libya common to the principles of
international law and, in the absence of such common principles, ... in accordance with
the general principles of law, including such of those principles as may have been
applied by international tribunals." The clause brings in the general principles of law
as residual norms to which the tribunal should have recourse to supplement for the
absence of principles common to Libyan and international law. It could therefore only
have meaning if international law is not treated as the same as general principles of
law since, if they were the same, and having already been used up in the search for
rules common to Libyan and international law, the general principles could not
possibly be invoked again to supplement for the absence of principles common to
itself (as international law) and Libyan law. Once "general principles of law" have
been used up as part of international law to determine what principles of the latter are
common with Libyan law, it would be impossible to rely on "general principles of
law" again as residuary law in the event that the first step proved unsuccessful.
Another difficulty with equating general principles of law to international law
arises from the fact that, since Article 38(1)(c) of the statute of the International Court
of Justice was intended to deal with inter-state relationships only, the Article could
only have contemplated the principles of public international law. Meanwhile there are
general principles of private law and private international law recognised in the
systems of law of civilised nations which do not form part of public international law.
The principles of private law and of private international law, although more
appropriate to contracts of the type we are concerned with, stand to be excluded if the
reference to "general principles of law" in the contracts is treated in international
commercial arbitration as a reference to public international law.
What is paradoxical is that the reference to "general principles of law" in
Article 38(l)(c) of the statute of the ICJ is in fact regarded by many writers as a
reference to "... municipal jurisprudence, in particular of private law ••"136 although
'35See for example the same award of Professor Ren-Iean Dupuy in Topco/Calasiatic v Libya
[1979] 53 ILR, 422, p. 450.
Brown1ie, op. ci:. p. 16, refering to Guggenheim, "Contribution a L'Histoire des Sources du Droit
des Gens" (1958) 94 Hague Acad Courses, 1, Pp. 78-9.
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limited to the extent to which they may be applicable to relations between states.'37
Brownlie further says that the limitation to only such of those rules as may be
applicable to relations between states is "... worthy of emphasis." 38
 Article 38
therefore points to the domestic law of the various countries as the source of the
general principles,'39
 at any rate of such of the principles as may be relevant to
relations between That, according to Guggenheim, is what is supposed to
represent the true meaning of the reference to "general principles of law" in Article
38(1)(c) such that the reasoning that rejects the application of domestic law in
preference of international law itself, on the basis that the reference to "general
principles of law" in Article 38(1)(c) warrants the direct application of public
international law, would be erroneous. Relying on the drafting histoiy, Guggenheim
concludes in respect of Article 38(1)(c)'s "general principles", that:
[iji doit donc s 'agir de principes juridiques appliqués in foro
domestico et ii n 'est pas possible de leur assimiler - comme on 1 'a
souvent prétendu - [footnote ommitted] les principes généraux de droit
qui n 'ont pas de caractère de règle de droit interne. Ii s 'agit du reste
de principes qui avaient déjà été consacrés en partie dans la
jurisprudence arbitrale antériure a la creation de Ia Cour [the ICJJ.
Cette jurisprudence arbitrale, lorsqu 'elk s 'était trouvée en situation
d 'appliquer les principes généraux du droit, s 'était elle aussi limitée a
emprunter aux droits internes certaines principes qu 'elle y trouvait
unforinément appliqués [footnote ommitted] et qui étaient susceptibles
d'être transposes dans les relations interétatiques ... L'opinion
contraire, selon laquelle les principes généraux ne devraient rien a
I 'analogie des ordres internes, mais auraient un caratère universel, en
tant que man jfestation directe de l'idée du droit, est - c'est lemoins
'37Thid.
Ibid.
See also Verdross, Alfred "Les Principles Gdndraux de Droit dans le Système des Sources de
Droit International Public", in Recueil D'Etudes de Droit International en Hommae a Paul
Guggengeim, Faculté de Droit de Génève, 1968, 521, p. 523-26.
°Do1zer, Rudolf "Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property' (1986) 1 ICSID Rev.,-FILI, 41, p. 59.
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qu 'on puisse dire a ce sujèt - en opposition avec les travaux
preparatoires rélatzfs a l'introducrion de cette troisième source du droit
applicable dans le statut de la Cour.'4'
It is strange, therefore, that whereas Article 3 8(c) itself directs the ICJ to look
to domestic laws for such of their domestic principles and rules as may be relevant
to relations between states and of universal acceptance, commercial arbitration
tribunals and some authorities in the field of arbitration have distorted its application
by drawing on traditional international law, particularly the law of treaties.
If arbitrators and writers had been confined to private law principles the
problems created by equating general principles of law to international law would be
avoided under clauses such as those in the three Libyan arbitrations. The clauses show
that the principles of international law are, contraly to what is suggested in awards and
by some writers, not exactly the same as "general principles of law." There would be
no need to refer to the latter to supplement for the inadequacy of the the former if
they were the same. Although within the context of the statute of the ICJ the
principles of international law may be wider in scope than general principles of law,
since the latter is only one of the sources of the former, that is not necessarily so out
of the context of Article 38. Beyond that context general principles could not possibly
be confined to either public or private law. They should embrace both domestic and
international.' 42
 In fact the Libyan clauses suggest that the sources of "general
principles of law" could be wider, although, under Article 38(l)(c), limited to
domestic laws. The general principles could be drawn from the other sources of
international law, the laws of all nations (private and public), including, in the case
of commercial arbitration, the practices of international trade.
(ii). Arbitration clauses as a basis for internationalising the contracts
Next, it is suggested that the presence of a clause submitting such contracts to
'41lbid.
'42Friedmann, Wolfgang "The Uses of 'general principles' in the Development of International Law"
(1963) 57 AJIL, 279, p. 284.
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international arbitration leads to international law as the applicable substantive law of
disputes arising under the agreements. René-Jean Dupuy in the TopcolCalasiatic award
against Libya takes the view that even if the choice of international arbitration does
not lead to the exclusive application of international law, "it is one of the elements
which makes it possible to detect a certain internationali[s]ation of the contract."43
For that view he relies on the Sapphire International Petroleum v National Iranian Oil
Co. award', where the arbitrator also held that even if no definite conclusion could
be drawn from a submission by the state to international arbitration, it remains
possible at the very least to "infer a negative intention, namely to reject the exclusive
application of Iranian law." 45 The contracting-out of the jurisdiction of the domestic
courts of the state concerned, together with its acceptance of international arbitration,
is regarded as internationalising the contract, since, by submitting to an international
tribunal, the state must be assumed to have submitted to the law normally applied by
international tribunals. There seems to be everything wrong with that view.
The view assumes that in matters of contracts international arbitration tribunals
have a law of their own in the same way that local courts have domestic law and the
ICJ, for example, is bound to apply international law. That assumption is highly
questionable.
The view is also based on two other equally doubtful assumptions. In the first
place, it assumes that an arbitration tribunal is necessarily an "international tribunal".
A tribunal does not become international in the public international law sense only
because, by composition, it includes members of different nationalities. The fact that
such a tribunal is also required to adjudicate on a matter involving international trade
and parties from different countries or parts of the world will still not make it an
international tribunal for the purposes of public international law.
Second, even assuming that an international commercial arbitration tribunal is
' 43Ibid p. 455.
' TMAward of 15 March 1963 [1967] 35 ILR, 136.
'45lbid p. 172.
'Jaenicke, G."The Prospects for International Arbitration: Disputes between States and Private
Enterprises", in International Arbitration: Past and Present Pros pects (ed. Soons, A.H.A) Martinus
Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1990, 155, p. 158.
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an "international" (in the public international law sense) tribunal, it does not follow
that submission to it amounts to submission to public international law. Party
autonomy and the doctrine of the proper law of a contract have swept away the
presumption expressed in the maxim, qui eligit judicem eligit jus.' 47 An arbitration
clause merely indicates a choice of jurisdiction, not of law.'48 In England, for
example, the suggestion that a choice of jurisdiction clause automatically invites a
choice of law is wrong.' 49
 Party autonomy and the doctrine of the proper law
mandate the application of the law chosen by the parties. In the absence of a chosen
law, the prevailing trend is for the law with the closest connection to the transaction
to apply, that law being arrived at by a process which involves weighing the different
factors involved in the case. The choice of a forum remains only one of such factors.
What is more in most cases the parties involved in an international commercial
arbitration do not select a forum, they create one for themselves. There is, therefore,
logically no law of "a forum" which the parties are to be presumed to have elected
before "the forum" is brought into existence, particularly when, as here, tribunals are
created ad hoc as disputes arise from time to time.
(lii). Other Factors
The other main method used to internationalise the contracts is to describe
them as "economic development agreements", "international development contracts",
"self-governing", etc. and, therefore, subject to international law.' 5° In the view of
the majority of the tribunal in Revere Copper & Brass v The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation,' 5 ' investment contracts are "... basically international in that
'47Delaume "State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration" (1981) 75 AJIL, 784, p. 798.
Bowett, Derek William "State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on
Compensation for Termination or Breach" (1988) 59 BYIL, 49, p. 52.
'49Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation v Compagnie D'Armément Maritime [1971] A.C. 572
(House of Lords).
°McNair "The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations" (1957) 33 BYIL, 1.
' 51 Award of 24 August 1978 [1980] 56 ILR, 258, p. 271.
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they are entered into as part of a contemporaiy international process of economic
development, particularly in the less developed countries." The Topco/Calasiatic v
Libya award points out that the subject matter of the agreements is very broad: "...
they are not concerned only with an isolated purchase or performance, but tend to
bring to developing countries investment and technical assistance, particularly in the
field of research and exploitation of mineral resources, or in the construction of
factories on a turnkey basis." 52 The same award points to the long duration of the
contractual arrangements as a basis for internationalising them. The Sapphire award
states that the transaction "creates rights which are not merely 'contractual' but are
concessions giving Sapphire, for the time being, possession and, to a certain extent,
control over the territory. These concessions give the contract a particular character,
which lies partly in public law and partly in private law ... the contract involves
special tax arrangements ... which are evidence of its public character.""
Apart from such general and in many cases disputable assertions about the
significance for the development of the host countries of the transactions, it has never
been demonstrated how, in the absence of agreement by the parties, the importance
of the contracts as tools of development makes international law relevant to disputes
arising under the contracts. On the contrary the pronounced public character of the
transactions ought, in our view, to bring them closer within the control of the state to
ensure that their execution fuffils the public purposes for which they would have been
intended in the first place. What should therefore be asked (although it is often not,
but if at all, without the same emphasis,) is why the unique character of that particular
category of contracts is recognised only to assert the rights of the investor, but fail to
emphasise the overriding public interest of the country concerned. Jaenicke says that
no cogent reasons can be found why the dimension of the investment should be
sufficient justification for treating such agreements differently from other transnational
contracts, and there are no precedents for such a privileged treatment except in those
cases where the parties have manifested their intention to remove the investment
agreement from the local jurisdiction by providing for the submission of their disputes
i52[1979) 53 ILR. p. 456.
'[1967] 35 ILR, p. 171.
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to international arbitration." To the extent that Jaenicke considers the submission
of those disputes to arbitration as a reason for internationalising them,' 55
 we
disagree, for the reasons stated in (ii) above. Bowett himself, referring to
Fatouros,' says that "the fact that Western, developed States concluding the same
type of so-called 'development' contracts involving investment by foreign investors
do not accept the theory of 'internationali[s]ation' inevitably raises the question why
such contracts are only 'intemationali[s]ed' if concluded by developing states."57
He describes the theory as "an essentially self-serving theory designed to support a
very partisan, capitalist approach to contractual disputes." 58 "For it is important",
he says, "to grasp the essential aim of this theory ...: first, to remove the contract from
the control of the law of the contracting State (i.e., by substituting international law
as the proper law) and, second, to deprive the State of the right to change its law and
thereby affect the contract (i.e., by invoking the international law maxim pacta sunt
servanda."59
B. Internationalising State Contracts and Article 42 of the ICSID
Convention
What is peculiar about the regime of the World Bank Convention is that it
makes international law undeniably relevant. In the absence of choice by the parties,
the Convention requires the tribunal to apply the domestic law of the host state and
"... such rules of international law as may be applicable." Article 42(1) is in the
''Consequences of a breach of an Investment Agreement governed by International Law, by
General Principles of Law, or by Domestic Law of the Host State" in Forei gn Investment in the Present
and a New International Economic Order, (ed. by Dicke) 1987, 177, p. 180, cited by Bowett, op. cit.
p. 51.
'"He expresses the same view in a subsequent contribution: "The Prospects for International
Arbitration ..." op. cit. p. 158.
'""International Law and the Internationalized Contract" (1980) 74 AJIL, 136.
'370p. ci:. p. 51.
'"Ibid.
'Ibid pp. 51-52.
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following terms:
[t]he tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of
law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement,
the tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the
dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of
international law as may be applicable.
The accompanying report of the Executive Directors of the Bank' 6° says that the
term 'international law' as used in Article 42 "... should be understood in the sense
given to it by Article 38(1) of the statute of the International Court of Justice ...",
which suggests that the makers of the Convention had public international law in
mind, although limited to such of its rules as may be relevant. That limitation was
made in recognition that public international law is only relevant to disputes between
sovereign states and does not contain rules dealing with contracts. Thus, the report
specifies that the ICSID tribunal should bear in mind and make allowance for the fact
that Article 38 of the ICJ statute is intended to apply to inter-state disputes only.
Article 4(g) of Annex II of the MIGA Convention also makes international law
directly relevant to disputes involving the insurance agency after it has become
subrogated to the rights of a compensated investor, against a host state.
The significance and, for the proponents of internationalisation, the advantage
of Article 42 is that it provides a plain and clear rule as to the relevance of public
international law in matters of contracts governed by the Convention. It makes it
unnecessaiy for an ICSID tribunal to have to rely on any of the questionable grounds
discussed earlier to bring a state contract within the sphere of public international law.
The Convention, therefore, not only facilitates the task of a tribunal wishing to
internationalise such contracts, it in fact mandates the application of public
international law, albeit jointly with the law of the receiving state of the investment.
Yet, the joint application of the host state's law and public international law
may lead to the familiar difficulty arising when, exceptionally, relevant rules of public
international law are asserted but found to be inconsistent with the domestic law of
the host state. The position of ICSID tribunals in those circumstances has so far been
'60Para. 40.
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to treat international law as overriding. The process by which that conclusion has been
arrived at involves two aspects.
(1). International law as "supplementary"
First, it is asserted that in the relationship between international law and the
domestic law of the contracting state party to the dispute, international law assumes
a "supplementary" role. The tribunal, it was said in the first Amco v Indonesia ad hoc
committee award, must begin with the law of the host state. Recourse is made to
international law only to "fill up lacunae in the applicable domestic law" 6' of the
state receiving the investment. The re-submitted award also envisages the application
of international law in its 'supplementary' role only "[i]f there are no relevant host-
state laws on a particular matter" 62, in which case, "a search must be made for the
relevant international laws."63
That interpretation does not, in our view, correspond with the plain wording
of Article 42. Its provisions mandates the application of the "law of the Contracting
State party to the dispute (...) and such rules of international law as may be
applicable." In its plain meaning Article 42 requires that the application of the relevant
domestic law and international law be made concurrently. Therefore, in the absence
of choice, the ICSJD tribunal should state the applicable rules of the domestic law
concerned, then search for such rules of international law as may be recognised
relevant to contracts. The two sets of norms are applied concurrently and, if they are
similar in nature and lead to the same result, the tribunal's function under Article 42
is fully and properly discharged. This is reminiscent of the proposed "tronc commun"
approach so strongly advanced by some writers.IM In our view, the Convention does
not, in the absence of agreement by the parties, treat international law as a secondary
source of the applicable norms, whether described as "residual" or "supplementary".
'61Awj of 16 May 1986 [1993] 1 ICSID Reports, 509 p. 515, para. 20.
'62Award of 31 May 1990 [1993] 1 ICSJD Reports, 569, p. 580, para. 40.
'63Jbjd
Rubino-Sammartano, op. ci:.
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Like the host State law it remains primarily applicable and, what is more, also
mandatory, provided it contains rules relevant to the contract. The fact that the host
state law is stated first does not, for this particular purpose, indicate that international
law is secondary or that the domestic law of the state is hierarchically superior.'65
The tribunal in the Amco re-submitted award therefore correctly describes it as "fully
applicable".'
(2). International law as "corrective"
Next in the process of asserting the supremacy of international law under the
Convention it is said both in the awards and by commentators that the role of
international law is also "corrective". In the view of the tribunal in the Amco re-
submitted award, the applicable laws of the host state party to the contract "... must
be checked against international laws, which will prevail in case of conflict." 67 The
ad hoc Committee before it stated the role of international law in situations of conflict
with domestic law as being "... to ensure precedence to international law norms where
the rules of the applicable domestic law are in coffision with such norms." The
corrective function attributed to public international law under the Convention
completes the process of subordinating the domestic law of the host state to
international law.
The difficulty with that view is that it is not supported by the plain wording
and meaning of the provisions of Article 42(1) or does any other provision of the
Convention, directly or indirectly. In fact it is significant that of all ICSID tribunals
'65Broches, (1972) 136 Hague Acad. Courses, p. 390, although he however thinks (incorrectly as
we attempt to show below) that the reverse is true.
'Supra p. 580, para. 40. The tribunal regarded the description of international law as "only'
'Supplemental' and 'corrective'" as a distinction without a difference. That might have been so if the
tribunal had limited the remark to the former. The reference to the role of international law as
'corrective', if accepted, suggests a distinction with a significant difference. However, as argued below,
we do not also accept the "corrective" role ascribed to international law in the intepretation of Article
42.
' 6'Award of 31 May 1990 [1993) 1 ICSJD Reports, 569 p. 580, para. 40.
First annulment proceedings award of 16 May 1986 [1993] 1 ICSID Reports, 509, p. 515, pam.
20.
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that have dealt with the point none has relied on the wording of Article 42 itself to
reach the conclusion which gives precedence to international law. So far, only one
ICSID tribunal has attempted to fmd support for that view in the Convention as a
whole (although not on Article 42 itself) and its legislative histoiy.' The other
tribunals have been content merely with asserting the supremacy of international law.
Unfortunately Article 42 itself gives no guidance as to which of the laws, if in
conflict, is to prevail. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that ICSJD tribunals
have not attempted to rely on its provisions in support of the conventional view. In
the first Amco annulment proceedings, however, the tribunal justified its preference
for international law on the basis of the tribunal's own "overall evaluation of the
system established by the Convention", under which, in the tribunal's view,
[t]he law of the host State is, in principle, the law to be applied in
resolving the dispute. At the same time, applicable norms of
international law must be complied with since every ICSID award has
to be recognized, and pecuniary obligations imposed by such award
enforced, by every Contracting State of the Convention (Art. 54(1) ...).
Moreover, the national state of the investor is precluded from
exercising its normal right of diplomatic protection during the pendency
of the ICSJD proceedings and even after such proceedings, in respect
of a Contracting State which complies with the ICSID award (Art. 27
...). The thrust of Art. 54(1) and Art. 27(1) of the Convention makes
sense only under the supposition that the award involved is not
violative of applicable principles and rules of international law.'7°
That statement of what the tribunal considers to be the overall scheme of the
Convention regarding the role of international law is seriously misleading. In the first
place Article 42 states no "principle" proclaiming the primacy of any of the applicable
sets of norms. It does not provide that in the event of a conflict international law
should prevail or, for that matter, should the domestic law of the host state in dispute.
It simply states a "rule", which does not also provide that "[tjhe law of the host State
'Amco v indonesia, first annulment proceedings, ibid paras. 21 & 22.
°ibid para. 21.
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is ... the law to be applied in resolving the dispute." On its plain terms Article 42(1)
merely directs that both laws be applied together: "the tribunal shall apply the law of
the Contracting State party to the dispute (...) and such rules of international law as
may be applicable." The use of the conjunctive "and" clearly indicates the concurrent
application of the applicable domestic and international laws. The fact that the host
state law is stated first is not relevant for this purpose.
Second, the tribunal's reasoning suggests that a Convention state is bound to
enforce an ICSID award under Article 54(1) only if the award complies with
international law. Ultimately that might be so, since failure to apply the relevant rules
of international law, (if any), as part of the applicable law, may be a ground for
annulment provided it is manisfest.' 7 ' But that merely begs the question since the
award must also comply with the host state law as part of the applicable law too.
Moreover, the Convention nowhere requires that international, domestic, or/and
both laws be "complied" with for the award to be enforceable. It requires that the
tribunal "apply" domestic and international law. Non-compliance with, (in the sense
of misapplication of) the applicable law, unless it is manifest, 172
 is not a ground for
the annulment of an ICSID award and therefore not also a ground for refusal to
enforce an award under the Convention. The only grounds on which a Convention
state may decline to enforce a Convention award are, pursuant to Article 53(1), those
exhaustively provided for in Article 52. If those limited grounds are satisfied, every
Contractiong state is under obligation to enforce the award under Article 54(1). It
would be irrelevant that the tribunal misconstrued Article 42, or any other provision
of the Convention. With respect to the proper law, the only relevant grounds for
annulment will arise either where the tribunal "manisfestedly exceeds its powers"
(Article 52(1)(b)) or "fails to state the reasons on which it is based" (Articles 52(l)(e)
and 48(3)). In the first Klöckner v Cameroon annulment proceedings'73
 the Ad hoc
Committee drew a distinction between 'non-application' and 'mistaken application'
of the applicable law so that only non-application would constitute a ground for
'7tArticle 48.
' 7 KIöckner, Amco; Mine etc.
'[1994] 2 ICSJD Reports, 95, p. 97, para. 3; p. 119, para. 60,
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annulment, although the committee itself failed to appreciate the consequence of the
distinction in its ultimate determination of the dispute, by setting aside the original
award for "mistaken application" of the proper law! The Amco v Indonesia Ad hoc
Committee in the first annulment proceedings also acknowledges the same distinction
and draws the correct conclusion from it when it states that only "[f]ailure to apply
[the proper law pursuant to Article 42(1)], as distinguished from mere misconstruction
of that law, would constitute a manisfest excess of powers ... and a ground for nullity
under Article 52(1 )(b) of the Convention."74
Third, the passage also suggests that international law must prevail as what is
given in return for the preclusion of the national state of the investor under Article 27
from exercising the right of diplomatic protection during and after the proceedings.
Article 27 does not suggest that view at all. Article 27 itself provides the quid pro quo
for the preclusion of the practice of diplomatic protection in the host state's consent
to submit to arbitration under the Convention and, in particular, to cooperate in the
proceedings and "to abide and comply with the award rendered ..." The host state's
submission to ICSID arbitration cannot therefore be regarded as a submission to
international law by virtue of Article 27. The exercise of diplomatic protection does
not depend on compliance by the ICSID tribunal with the provisions of Article 42(1).
In fact, nothing an ICSID tribunal does will affect the right of the state of the investor
to interfere diplomatically. The exercise of that right under the Convention is
determined entirely by the attitude of the host state.
Finally, the thrust of Articles 54(1) and 27(1) has no bearing on the question
as to what set of the applicable norms ought to take precedence in the event of a
conflict. It has to do with the obligation of the contracting states to give full effect to
'(1993] I ICSID Reports, 509, p. 515 para. 23. But the Committee soon falls into error again
when it treats "misinterpretation of the applicable law as a ground for appeal" if, by so saying, the
Committee suggests that an ICSID award can be "appealed" against in the domestic courts of
Convention States. It will be noticed that the Convention excludes any remedy by way of an "appeal"
before domestic courts and further excludes "any other remedy except those provided for in this
Convention": Article 53(1). The only remedies provided for in the Convention are those of
interpretation, revision, annulment and stay of enforcement under Articles 50-54. The most important
remedy is that of annulment, for which the Convention provides its own internal procedure, under
Article 52. The only weapon available to the court at which enforcement is requested is to insist that
the party seeking enforcement should supply an authenticated copy of the award, which, under Article
54(2), is a copy properly "certified by the Secretary-General" of the Centre. That should not be difficult
to obtain.
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ICSID awards, and in particular, with the duty of host states to cooperate in the
proceedings and after. Questions of compliance with the award do not arise until after
the tribunal has, in the first place, determined what obligations have to be complied
with. To do so, the tribunal needs to apply a system of law and until the problem of
the applicable law is resolved, and the dispute determined accordingly, no obligation
arises for which non-compliance might activate the exercise of the right of diplomatic
protection under Article 27. The Ad hoc Committee's reasoning "sets the cart before
the horse."
The Committee then relies on the legislative history of the Convention' 75 to
say, wrongly, it seems, that there was overwhelming support at the meeting of the
Legal Committee during the preparation of the Convention for the view which gives
prevalence to international law in the case of conflict with the law of the investment
receiving state. What was at issue, and in favour of which a vote was taken, was
whether international law should in the first place have been made applicable to those
transactions.' 76 A vote was not taken to determine whether international law should
override the relevant domestic law in the case of a conflict. In fact the chairman of
the discussion specifically adviced against a text "couched in terms whereby
international law would become applicable where the domestic legislation of the host
state was inconsisitent with it" even though it was obvious that reflected his, as
well as the view of, the delegates of capital exporting countries.' 78 That explains
why that position is not plainly or clearly stated in the text of the Convention. The
question whether that should have been done was raised at the Geneva meeting of
legal experts'79 but the then General Counsel of the World Bank and chairman of
the meetings of legal experts had always thought it "preferable not to state the position
"5History of the Convention, Vol 2, part 2, p. 804.
'76Jbid pp. 802-804.
mlbid p. 804.
'78lbid part 1, pp. 418-21 & 571.
Ibid p. 420.
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too specifically", a preference which is reiterated later' 8° without saying why. The
reason, it seems, is that the chairman, together with most other experts who saw the
proposed Convention primarily as a means of protecting foreign investments, thought
that not to state the position too specifically will not result in any difficulties in
practice, since, in any event, the view which gave precedence to international law
merely reflected the attitude and practice of arbitral tribunals' 81 ; a practice which
was intended to remain the same after the Convention. In that way, even if the
Convention failed to spell out the position in clear terms, tribunals to be set up
pursuant to the Convention could nevertheless be trusted to reach that conclusion. It
was therefore not absolutely necessary to state the position plainly, particularly as the
making of the Convention also involved a careful balancing act and the compromise
which was required to secure the general acceptance of the Convention by host nations
could itself be compromised if the position was stated too specifically.
However, the question of the proper law of investment contracts touched on
the very sensitive issue of substantive standards, about which there were, and remain,
serious disagreements. What the makers of the Convention had chosen to overlook is
the fact that the ICSJD Convention was never intended, whether directly or indirectly,
to deal with the issue of substantive standards for the treatment of private foreign
investments. At least in public the then President of the World Bank and all those
associated with the making of the Convention never failed to emphasise that it was
to "... have only limited scope. It would provide machinery but it would not make the
use of that machinery compulsory. Nor would it lay down substantive rules of law
regarding the treatment of foreign investments. I do not consider that it would be
realistic to try for a more far-reaching agreement at this time" 82(emphasis added).
The position was consistently repeated by the General Counsel through out the
preparatory stages of the of the Convention' 83
 and after.1M It is unambiguously
Ibid part 2, p. 804.
' 81Ibid part 1, p. 420.
Note to the Executive Directors of the Bank, History of the Convention, Vol 2, part 1, p. 6.
'83lbid pp. 309, 369, & 462.
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implicit in Article 1(2), which states "[t]he purpose of the Centre [as being] to provide
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting
States and nationals of other Contracting States ..." (emphasis added). Facilities ought
to have meant facilities, no more, given the background to the Convention. The
preamble also bears that out. The reason for not attempting a "more far-reaching"
solution was that previous attempts at resolving the problem of foreign investments
based on substantive standards had lead to more confrontation between the different
interest groups. To avoid poisoning the investment climate further, the ICSID's
solution to the problem was envisaged only within a procedural framework. It was not
intended to involve substantive issues.
A choice of law provision in the Convention does precisely that. It addresses
the issue head-on and therefore falls well beyond what was intended to come within
the scope of the Convention. In those circumstances it would have been absolutely
necessary to specify which set of legal norms were to prevail under Article 42(1) in
case of a conflict. The failure to do so renders Article 42(1) abortive in the context
of this particular Convention, not simply for lack of clarity, but particularly because
any attempt at rationalising that provision would lead to the consideration of the same
issues, including a solution, which are not to be countenanced within the framework
of the Convention. In hoping that eventually tribunals to be set up under the
Convention will determine the issue one way or the other, specifically, in favour of
international law, the makers of the Convention overlooked the fact that the principle
embodied in Article 42(1) or any other applicable law provision goes far beyond the
purpose of a Convention which, as was stated by a Chinese expert at the time of the
preparatory works, had been limited to dealing with the problem of investment
disputes 'from a procedural angle only"" (emphasis added).
In those circumstances the only juridically sound solution would be for an
'Broches, "Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States" in,
World Peace through Law, the Geneva World Conference, The World Peace through Law Centre, 1969,
258, p. 260: "[i]t is worth stressing finally, that the Convention is limited to matters of procedure. It
contains no rules of substantive law governing the mutual rights and obligations of governments and
foreign investors. In other words, the Convention is not concerned with the merits of investment
disputes, but solely with the methods for solving them" (emphasis added).
' 85Vol 2, part 2, p. 800
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ICSID tribunal to fall back to the traditional principles of conflict of laws to determine
the applicable law of the contract.' 86
 In the majority of ICSID cases, although not
all, that will be the law of the host state both as the law which bears the closest
connection to the transaction and as the law of the only state which is affected by the
outcome of the dispute. Any interpretation which gives precedence to one system of
law or the other will be attempting to deal directly with an issue which the
Convention could not address. We would only add that if the Convention itself could
not address the issue, tribunals deriving their authority and jurisdiction from it cannot
do so. ICSID tribunals should not be allowed to assume such powers.
That should not, as we pointed out earlier, assume that in an appropriate case
the investor wifi be without a remedy. Such a remedy would exist within the
framework of international law itself.' 87 If the authors of the Convention had been
hoping to re-introduce the same into the Convention through Article 42, it was clearly
against the spirit of the Convention. In addition, they failed effectively to achieve that
objective, given the difficult climate in which they operated. That explains why
Schwartzenberger describes that provision of the Convention as the weakest link in
its chain.' 88
 "This weakness", he said, "[was] not accidental, but was of the essence
of the matter".' 89
 We also think so.
'Bowett, (1988) 59 BYIL, 49, pp. 52.53
Boweu (1988) 59 BYIL, pp. 59 er seq.
"The Arbitration Pattern and the Protection of Property Abroad", in International Arbitration:
Liber Amicorum martin Domke, (ed. by Sanders, Peters), Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 113.
'!bidp. 319.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS
In the previous chapters we dealt with the perception of developing countries
as revealed by factors related to aspects of the first two stages of the arbitration
process. We concluded, on the basis of the trends identified, that the process does not
adequately reflect the concerns toward international commercial arbitration as it affects
their interests. In this chapter we come to a different conclusion. As indicated in the
introduction, and contrary to the main thrust of our argument this far, we note in this
chapter that trends regarding the enforcement and execution of awards in which the
countries are involved do not support the view that the process is entirely one-sided.
We examine those trends by reference to the grounds on which the enforcement or
execution of an award would be granted or denied, or an award set aside, by the
domestic court before which proceedings are brought for any of those purposes.
Owing to the fact that the grounds and, in particular, the circumstances under
which they may be raised to set aside or to resist the enforcement of an award are
numerous, we limit the discussion to a selected number of grounds which have
frequently arisen in court proceedings in which a developing country has been
involved. These are principally grounds recognised under the New York Convention
for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the international
instrument widely in use for the enforcement of non-domestic arbitration awards.
However, although the grounds and cases treated are few, the selection is sufficiently
representative to allow a general view of the situation, since they are all based on the
grounds most often relied on, as reflected in the application of the Convention by
domestic courts.
We begin with what appears to be a general judicial and legislative attitude
towards the review of arbitration awards which, globally, is that there should be very
limited rights of recourse against arbitration awards' and, further, that those grounds
'Redfern and Hunter, The Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd Edn.,
Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1991, p. 417.
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should separately and as a whole be interpreted restrictively. The purpose is to provide
a basis for the finding in the second part that, the application of the same judicial
policy to cases involving countries of the developing world, is therefore not unique.
We demonstrate that the extension to cases concerning developing countries of a
generalised judicial attitude favourable to the enforcement of arbitration awards
discloses nothing to suggest a less favourable treatment to the countries than others
in this domain. We justify that finding on two factors: the absence of a special regime
specifically regulating the enforcement of awards in which third world countries are
parties and, second, the fact that in the first place no need was felt for such a regime,
since the only real obstacle to the enforcement of those awards (the doctrine of foreign
state immunity) in domestic law could otherwise be resolved. In a way the
enforcement of these awards is not seen as creating a particular problem.
I. Pro-enforcement Bias
The enforcement of awards is an important consideration in submitting to
arbitration, given that the process would only make sense if compliance with its
outcome can be secured.2 The disadvantage of an arbitration award is that it does not
have the same effect as the judgment of a domestic court3 since, as Mustill and Boyd
say, "the award does not immediately entitle the successful party to levy execution
against the assets of the unsuccessful party ..." In most domestic systems the award
creditor is first required to apply to an appropriate court to convert the award into a
2lbid p. 416.
31n Mur,nansk Trawl Fleet v Bimman Realty Inc., (unreported), Ontario Court of Justice, General
Division, December 1994 (Lexis, 3751) Somers J., citing Mme Justice Feldman in Schreta v Gasnzac
Inc. (1992) 7 O.R. (3d.) 608, p. 623 said: "[i]t is true that arbitral awards have been viewed with less
confidence than judgments of a court because the procedures of the courts are more regulated and
standardized and judges are sworn to uphold those procedures and to apply the law, while the
qualifications and training of arbitrators may diverge greatly. And it is a concern to a court in this
jurisdiction that a party to a foreign arbitration may feel that justice was not done or that the award is
perverse in law, although the judge declined to re-open the merits of an award in that case on the basis
that "the enforcement procedure of the [UNCITRAL] Model Law [adopted in Canada in 19881 would
be brought to disrepute" if that were allowed."
4The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England, 2nd Edn., Butterworth, London,
1989, p. 416.
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judgment or an order of the competent domestic court. 5
 The process of converting an
award into a judgment of a domestic court generally exposes the award to various
forms of challenge from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, thus rendering it vulnerable in
jurisdictions where the courts may not take a restricted view of the grounds under
which challenges to awards are instituted. Some awards may not even be, in the words
of Professor Pierre Lalive, "worthy of being respected and enforced" 6
 if they are
found completely wanting in every conceivable respect. Lalive thinks that "[n]o more
than there is 'sanctity of contract' ... is there 'sanctity of awards'. The result is that
appeals against awards and the refusal of enforcement can, in certain cases, be
justified, not only for the needs of the case, but also in the general interest of
arbitration and that of a better quality of awards." 7
 However, as pointed out by
Delaume recently, there has been a growing tendency world wide in favour of treating
awards as final and binding 8
 with the result that "the odds have been turned against
the award-debtor" 9
 in a global effort to "ensure the effectiveness of international
awards."° The prevailing judicial attitude in most major arbitration centres is to
interpret the grounds on which awards are challenged or enforcement resisted
restrictively,' 1
 with the overall effect that most awards are enforced.
The Desire to Achieve Finality
That goal has been achieved through the repeated emphasis of the need to see
5lbid; pp. 416 et seq; for the position in France, Articles 1477 (domestic awards) and 1498
(international awards); Switzerland, Articles 44 (Concordat) and 180 (statute on Private International
Law, which merely incorporates the relevant provisions of the New York Convention).
6"Enforcing Awards" in 60 Years of ICC Arbitration: A Look at the Future, ICC Publication No.
412, Paris, 1984, 317, p. 330.
7lbid.
8 "Reflections on the Effectiveness of International Arbitration Awards" (1995) 12 Journ Int'l Arb'n.,
Part 1, 5, p.
9lbid p. 6.
'°Ibid.
' tSee for the United States, for example, Parsons and Whittemore Overseas Co. v Société Générale
de L'industrie du Papier (Rakta) 508 F. 2d, 969 (1974, CA 2d Cir.).
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an end to litigation. In the words of an American Federal Court of Appeals, "[tb
allow undue challenges to arbitration awards would defeat the fmality and speedy
dispute resolution expected of the arbitration procedure and would up set the basic
goal sought by [the United States Congress] in enacting the Federal Arbitration
Act" 2
 of that country. This reflects a concern applicable to litigation and to all forms
of adjudication generally. In the Ampthill Peerage case' 3 in England, which involved
rival claims by the sons of a deceased peer of the Upper House of Parliament over his
titles and honours, following several sets of proceedings each involving long and
extended hearings in the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords,
Lord Simon of Glaisdale felt compelled to state, in what is certainly a clear expression
of the need for finality in litigation, that:
The law itself is fully conscious of the evil of protracted litigation. Our
forensic system, with its machinery of cross-examination of witnesses
and forced disclosure of documents, is characterised by a ruthless
investigation of truth. Nevertheless the law recognises that the process
cannot go on indefinitely. There is a fundamental principle of English
law generally expressed by a latin maxim (going back to Coke's
Commentary on Littleton, p. 330) which can be translated: 'it is in the
interest of society that there should be some end to litigation.' This
fundamental principle finds expression in many forms. Parliament has
passed statutes (...) limiting the time within which actions at law must
be brought. Truth may thus be shut out; but society considers that truth
may be bought at too high a price, that truth bought at such expense is
the negation of justice ... Important though the issues may be, how
extensive whatsoever the evidence, whatever the eagerness for further
fray, society says, 'We have provided courts in which your rival
contentions have been heard. We have provided a code of law by
which they have been adjudged. Since judges and juries are fallible
human beings, we have provided appellate courts which do their own
'2Revere Copper and Brass Inc. v Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 628 F. 2d, 81(1980).
'[ 1977J A.C. 547 (House of Lords Committee of Privileges).
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fallible best to correct error. But in the end you must accept what has
been decided. Enough is enough.' And the law echoes: 'res judicata,
the matter is adjudged.' the judgement creates an estoppel - which
merely means that what has been decided must be taken to be
established as a fact, that the decided issue cannot be reopened by
those who are bound by the judgment, that the clamouring voices must
be stilled, that the bitter waters of civil contention (even though
channelled into litigation) must be allowed to subside.'4
The circumstances giving rise to such a strong statement involved four sets of
proceedings, each reaching the House of Lords, and one intervention by Parliament
through the Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926. Lord Simon
described the proceedings in the following terms:
In the early 1920s there were two long hearings in the Divorce
Division of the High Court, in the first of which the jury disagreed.
Some of the most famous and expensive counsel of the day were
briefed for the petitioner, for the respondent and (ultimately) for no less
than three named co-respondents. The most private and embarrassing
marital intimacies were investigated and extensively regaled to a
salacious public: parliament was apparently so disturbed as in
consequence to pass the Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports)
Act 1926. The decree based on the verdict of the second jury was
appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to your Lordships' House.
New counsel of great eminence were brought in to argue the point of
law. The case was remitted to the Divorce Division for yet a third
hearing. Although this time the proceedings were to prove, ultimately,
formal, famous counsel again appeared. Then there ensued the
legitimacy proceedings with which your Lordships are particularly
concerned.'5
The same concerns have been expressed regarding appeals to courts arising
' 4lbid pp. 575-76.
'5lbid p. 575.
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from dissatisfaction with arbitration awards. Appeals to courts from arbitrations give
more cause for concern because in principle an arbitration is supposed to be a separate
process, sometimes with its own internal appeal mechanism, with further appeals to
the courts creating the lamentable possibility of an added and parallel means of
recourse against awards. Lord Roskill said that in those circumstances "[t]he arbitral
process [becomesi even more protracted than the judicial, with one or sometimes, as
in commodity trade arbitrations, two extra tiers of tribunal added below the High
Court, the Court of Appeal and [the House of Lords]." 6
 Thus, if the decision of an
arbitrator were not allowed to be regarded as final in matters within his remit, but as
the basis for another round of adjudication in the courts, the perceived advantages of
the process, said to lie in speed, less cost (not always), informality and a general
perception of fairness, will largely be lost. Lord Roskill himself lamented in one
case' 7
 how the House of Lords constituted the fifth tribunal to hear the case, thus
bringing the number of adjudicators to fourteen, including six members of the relevant
trade association's board of appeal (GAFFA), one High Court, three Court of Appeal
and 5 House of Lords judges. That, to the senior judge, was a serious cause for
concern.
The concern for fmality is largely reflected in recent developments in domestic
law on appeals from arbitration awards. A selective illustration of the position in a few
major enforcement jurisdictions evidences a strong determination to see an end to
frivolous challenges to arbitration awards by dissatisfied losers.
A. England
England quickly modified its law on judicial supervision of arbitration
proceedings and awards to bring it in line with the liberalising forces in international
commercial arbitration by replacing the previous more permissive law with a "limited
' 6Antaios Compania Naviera v Salem Rederierna (The Antaios) [1985] A.C. 191, p. 208.
'7Bunge Corporation v Tradax Export [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1, p. 11.
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right of appeal to the High Court" 8
 in 1979.' The English system of judicial
supervision of arbitrations and awards in force prior to 1979 had come under severe
criticism for not encouraging finality in arbitrations. 2° The criticism had come not
only from abroad but also from within, 2 ' including in particular the English judiciary
itse1f and some concerned members of the legislature.23
 In fact, the final impetus
for legislative reform came from the same judiciary through the report of the
Commercial Court Committee on Arbitrations 24 with the active involvement of senior
judges in the parliamentary debates leading to the 1979 Act.
It had become obvious since 1922, following the case of Czarnikow v Roth,
Schmidt & Co. 26, that as a matter of public policy the parties to English arbitration
could not by contract exclude judicial review of an award on the merits, much less on
procedural grounds. The High Court intervened extensively to review arbitration
awards on substantive grounds. It retained the power to do so both under statute and
at common law. At common law the jurisdiction of the High Court could be invoked
whenever the party requesting the review could show on the award itself or any other
document forming part of it that there was an error of law. The award would then be
set aside by the High Court for "error of law on its face".27 The error, although
supposedly so obvious as to be detectable on the "face" of the award, could not be
' 8Park, William and Paulsson, Jan "Binding Force of International Arbitral Awards" (1983) 23 Va.
J. Int'l L., 253, p. 272-73.
Through the Arbitration Act 1979, Section 1.
20Commercial Court Committee Report on Arbitration, 1979, Cmnd 7284.
2tSchmitthoff, Clive "The Reform of the English Law of Arbitration" (1977) JBL, 305.
Lord Diplock, "The Alexander Lecture" (1988) 44 Arbitration, 107.
Lord Hacking 'The "Stated Case" Abolished: The United Kingdom Arbitration Act of 1979"
(1980) 14 Int'l Lawyer, 95.
"supra.
Hansard, 12 December 1978; 18 January and 5 & 15 February 1979.
26[1922] K.B. 478, Court of Appeal.
Mr. Justice Donaldson "Future Trends in Arbitration" (1978) 44 Arbitration, 235.
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corrected by the court quashing the award, its great disadvantage being that the
parties had to begin the process all over again.29 William Park says, however, that
arbitration tribunals could prevent awards being reversed by the courts under the
common law for error of law on the face of the award by "failing to include reasons
for the award or by justifying the decision in a document which was expressly not
made a part of the award." 3° "Consequently", Park says, "that particular procedure
became of little practical importance to modem commercial arbitration",3 ' the only
other important means of judicial supervision of awards remaining under statute.
English statutory law also provided a "special case" procedure under Section
21 of the Arbitration Act 1950, whereby a question of law arising out of an award
could be stated for the opinion of the High Court, a procedure often used before 1979
by parties acting in bad faith to delay the process. Section 21 provided:
(1) An arbitrator or umpire may, and shall if so directed by the High Court,
state
(a) any question of law arising in the course of the reference; or
(b) an award or any part of an award,
in the form of a special case for the decision of the High Court.
Sub-section (2) extended the procedure to interim awards, and in all cases, made the
procedure applicable "notwithstanding that proceedings under the reference [were] still
pending." The procedure of Section 21 was always regarded as a right to parties
submitting to English arbitration and in 1973, some 50 years after Czarnikow v Roth
Schmidt, 32
 the Court of Appeal, then presided by the judge now regarded as one of
the most outstanding in England this century (Lord Denning), decided that a case
could be stated over the objection of arbitrators for the opinion of the High Court on
a point of substantive law on the basis that the submission to arbitration is made on
Ibid.
Ibid.
30"Judicial Supervision of Transnational Arbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 1979" (1980)
21 Harv. Int'l U. 87, p. 92.
31Jbid.
32Supra.
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the assumption by the parties that questions of law could be referred to the court for
a decision binding on L" The Court of appeal decided that arbitrators had to
accede to a request to state a case, and, if they declined, the court could order that a
case be stated unless the party making the request was not acting in good faith, but
for some "ulterior motive", such as where he sought to use the procedure as a means
of delaying the arbitration proceedings. Lord Scarman stated that
[t]he discretion conferred by Section 2 1(1) of the Arbitration Act 1950
upon an arbitrator or umpire to state an award in the form of a special
case and upon the High Court to direct one [was] unqualified. The
Statute impose[d] no restrictions, formulate[d] no guidelines: but it
declare[d] the purpose of such an award - to obtain upon the case
stated the decision of the court.
By declaring this purpose the statute [made] plain that our law
offere[d] to those who referre[d] their disputes to arbitration the
opportunity of seeking a decision of the court upon a point of law, the
decision of which [was] necessary to the proper determination of their
dispute.
generally, [the court's] approach appears to have been that, once
satisfied that a point of law needed to be decided, they would not
refuse unless there were special circumstances ...'
Lord Justice Megaw thought that "in the great majority of cases" a case should have
been stated by the arbitrators "on request or, if necessary, directed by the courts"
whenever there was "a clear cut question of law which [was] seriously arguable,
substantial in the sense of being important for resolution of the dispute and to the
parties, and ... raised bona fide and not merely for the purpose of delay ... "
33Halfdan Grieg & Co v Sterling Coal & Navigation Co. (The Lylands) [1973] 1 Q.B. 842.
34Ibid pp. 868-69.
33Jbid p. 865, citing Kerr J., who at first instance had, however, declined to order a case to be stated
on the request of the applicants.
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Sir Michael Kerr, an outstanding authority on English and international
arbitration, later said of the decision that it "virtually removed any remaining
discretion [of the judges] to refuse applications for orders that arbitrators make their
awards in the form of a special case" 37 That was even more so in relation to any
discretion of an arbitrator to refuse, upon request by one of the parties to the
arbitration, to state his award in the form of a special case. Lord Diplock commented
that following the decision of the Court of Appeal it had become "notorious" that "if
such request were made it was virtually impracticable for an arbitrator to refuse it."38
Michael Kerr further described the case as having "opened the flood-gates to what was
already an increasing trend",39
 that being the misuse of the special case procedure to
"delay the outcome of commercial arbitrations."4°
The prohibition against excluding judicial review of arbitration awards for error
of law made by sit arbitration tribunal was also regarded as unique to English law,
Lord Diplock describing it as "peculiar to England and those present and former
Commonwealth countries, such as Australia, Canada and South Africa where
arbitration statutes have followed the English pattern", 4 ' and Sir Michael Kerr that
it still has "no counterpart in the United States or in civil law systems." 42
 It is that
fact, and the adverse publicity that it brought, including the fear that it might cause
a loss of substantial invisible earnings from commercial litigation in London, that
prompted the reforms of 1979.
The 1979 Act (Section 1(1)) repeals the statutory and common law procedures
for review of awards:
His decision in that case was the subject of the appeal and was reversed by the Court of Appeal.
37"The Arbitration Act 1979" (1980) 43 Mod L. Rev., 45, p. 46.
Pioneer Shipping LtcL v B T P Tioxide (The Nema) [19821 A.C. 724, p. 740.
39Supra.
10Ibid.
41"The Alexander Lecture", supra p. 107.
42Supra p. 45.
43Bentil, Kodwo J., "Making England a more Attractive Venue for International Commercial
Arbitration by Less Judicial Oversight" (1988) 5 Journ Int'l Arb, Part 1, 49.
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the high Court shall not have jurisdiction to set aside or remit an
award on an arbitration agreement on the ground of error of fact or law
on the face of the award.
In their place, it substitutes a single statutory regime set out in Section 1(2), (3), (4)
and (8) which confines appeals to questions of law, the appeal being limited to
proceedings to confirm, vary or set aside an award or to remit an award to the
reconsideration of the arbitrator: Section 1(2). Section 3 allows parties to arbitration
in England to exclude by contract the statutory right of appeal under Section 1, except,
(by Section 4), in matters falling within the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court
or arising out of contracts of insurance or a commodity contract. Exclusion agreements
do not apply to domestic arbitration agreements (Section 3(6)) and in other cases must
be entered into after the commencement of the arbitration in relation to which the
award was made, or, the award relates to a contract not governed by English law:
Section 4(1)(c)(i) and (ii).
The principal innovation of the 1979 Act is that it abolishes the right to
judicial review of arbitration awards on the merit. Even its new statutory appeal
regime based on reasoned awards is not available as of right. An appeal may only be
brought by leave of the High Court or with the consent of all the parties to the
reference to arbitration, the policy of the Act being to discourage recourse to the
courts as a means of delaying arbitrations or flouting the original intention of the
parties to avoid the courts, in submitting to arbitration. In the result, finality is
encouraged by curtailing the exposure of awards to challenge even at the risk of
certainty of the law. Lord Diplock said in The Nema" that
in weighing the rival merits of finality and meticulous legal accuracy
there are, in [his] view, several indications in the Act itself of a
parliamentary intention to give effect to the turn in the tide in favour
of finality in arbitral awards (particularly in non-domestic arbitrations
), at any rate where this does not involve exposing arbitrators to a
temptation to depart from "settled principles of law.45
"[1982] A.C. 724.
45Ibid pp. 739-40.
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It was further said by counsel in The Antaios that "[i]t is to be remembered in this
field that the parties have chosen their tribunal, namely arbitrators, and their decision
should be the end of the matter"
Although the movement towards greater finality and increasing party autonomy
is not too obvious on the face of the Act, the policy has been carried through by the
courts. In both The Nema and The Antaios, the House of Lords repeatedly warned
judges of the lower courts against allowing any practices which may have the effect
of "frustrating the intention of parliament" in enacting the Act. In The Nema, Lord
Diplock took the view that the Act further leans to finality by creating a statutory right
to exclude by contract what remains of the limited right of appeal on a point of' law.
He states that
Section 3 gives effect to a reversal of public policy in relation to
arbitration as it had been expounded more than half a century before
in Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co. ... Exclusion agreements, which
oust the statutory jurisdiction of the High Court to supervise the way
in which arbitrators apply the law in reaching their decision in
individual cases, are recognised as being no longer contrary to public
policy.49
The most significant contribution, however, of the English Arbitration Act of
1979 is in the wider liberalising tendency it ushered into the English law of arbitration
and its practice. In contrasting the position of English arbitration law prior to the Act
with the changes it introduced, Professor Rhidian Thomas says that the Act "has
created a judicial mood significantly more greatly committed to a hands-off style of
judicial supervisory management. The fmality of awards and the autonomy of the
arbitral process, although to some degree ever present in the modem law, have in the
[1985] A.C. 191.
47lbidp. 197.
Even attempts to "frustrate the intention of parliament" by limiting the stringent Nema guidelines
to commercial cases was rejected by Lord Donaldson in the Court of Appeal in Jpswich Borough
council v Fisons plc. [1990] Ch. 717.
49Supra p. 740.
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result become values more firmly implanted in the philosophical bedrock of the
law."5° He says that English judicial attitude and philosophy toward arbitration as a
whole contrasted "sharply with many foreign systems of arbitration law where the
judicial role was more reserved and with greater emphasis given to arbitral autonomy.
English law subscribed to the maxim 'arbitration for better or for worse' but it proved
to be a maxim more revered in the breach than the adherence."5'
That attitude has been changed by the passing of the Act, whose new
philosophy has been carried through by the courts ceasing on its initiative, although
on its face limited to the specific area of judicial review and challenge of awards, by
extending its underlying philosophy to other areas of English international commercial
arbitration. Step by step the courts have come to recognise alongside other laws in
Europe, and what is now the orthodox view in international arbitration, that, for
example, an arbitration clause may survive the invalidity of its main contract52
because powerful commercial reasons so dictate and no higher policy consideration
requires that the situation be otherwise. Arthur Marriott points out along the same
lines that the case of Ashville Investments Ltd. v Elmer Contractors 53 is also
important in its liberal interpretation of arbitration clauses in deciding what matters
may come under the jurisdiction of an arbitrator and expresses the wish that the "case
sweeps away the academic and sterile debate over the meaning of phrases in
arbitration clauses such as 'under', 'arising from', 'in connection with', and the
like . tlM
 What is important, he thinks, is that the courts have regard and give effect
to the original intention of the parties, which is to have their disputes referred to
arbitration."
5°The Law and Practice relatin g to Aypeals from Arbitration Awards, Lloyd's of London Press,
London, 1994, p. 64.
51lbidp. 3.
52HarbourAssurance Co. (UK) Ltdv Kansa General International Insuarance (1993) Q.B. 701. See
also Clause 3(2) of the draft arbitration bill. For a recent commentary see Gross, Peter" Separability
comes of Age in England: Harbour v Kansa and Clause 3 of the Draft Bill" (1995) Arbitration
International, 85.
[l989] Q.B. 488.
5"Changes in Arbitration Law and Practice" (1993) 59 Arbitration, 41, pp. 44-45.
55Ibid.	 248
Another example of the liberal attitude is reflected in the Court of Appeal
decision in Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft v R 'as Al Khaimah National
Oil,56 where Lord Donaldson, MR. expressed a willingness to enforce an arbitration
award made on the basis of general principles of law (or lex mercatoria) without
reference to any particular system of municipal law. 57 Although it might be that the
law in England will not recognise as valid or, at any rate, give effect to an "equity"
or ex aequo et bono clause58 purporting, in the words of one judge, "... to free
arbitrators to decide without regard to the law and according, for example, to their
own notions of what would be fair it seems that on the whole English law will
regard as valid an arbitration clause which permitted the arbitrator to decide the case
without insisting on a strict application of the law and by having regard more
generally to commercial considerations, to give effect to the purpose of the
contract.60
 Even though the enforcement of awards not based on any particular
system of law has been common practice elsewhere, 6 ' that did not appear to be the
conventional view in England, and, even today, it is still uncertain whether an English
court will recognise an award made ex aequo et bono.
The House of Lords, however, recently took the liberalising attitude to the
extreme by declining to review an award made pursuant to proceedings conducted
entirely in London, the seat of the arbitration, on the basis that the award was not a
"domestic award" under the New York Convention as in force in England since it had
[ 1990] 1 A.C. 295; reversed on another ground, ibid.
'Ibid pp. 312-3 16.
58Marriott, op. cit. p. 49. For a criticism see Goode, Roy "The Adaptation of English Law to
International Commercial Arbitration" (1992) 8 Arbitration International, I, p. 7.
Per Parker U., in Home and Overseas Insurance v Mentor Insurance Lt. [1990] 1 WLR, 153,
p. 161.
60Ibid pp. 162 (Parker Li.); 163-167 (LLyod Li.) and 167 (Balcombe Li.).
61E.g. France: Valenciana [1992] ID! 177; Fougerolle v Banque du Proche Orient, Court of
Cassation decision of 12 September 198111982] Rev Arb, 183; Pabalk Ti caret Sirketi v Norsolor Paris
Court of Appeal of Paris decision of 4 March 1981 (1981) 108 JDI, 836; and same case in Austria
where the Supreme Court accepted the same practice [1984] 10 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n. 161. See
generally Rivkin, David W "The Enforceability of Arbitral Awards Based on Lex Mercatoria" (1993)
9 Arbitration International, 67.
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been signed in Paris, and, therefore, "made" there.62 The House reasoned that an
award is "domestic" to the place where it is "made" and "made" where it is
"perfected", that being in that particular case Paris, as the place where it was signed.
Marriott concludes that as a whole the development since 1979 suggests
"continuing support, encouragement and development by the judges of the autonomy
of the arbitral process."63 As far as challenges to awards are concerned, the tendency
toward finality is now deeply rooted and has probably come to stay. In declining to
reverse the award of an arbitrator on cost, Lord Bingham, M.R., (dissenting) in
Evergiade Maritime Inc. v Schjffahrtsgesellschft Detlef (The Maria) TM stated that the
"effect of the Arbitration Act 1979 has been (in the absence of misconduct and
procedural irregularity) to limit challenges to arbitral decisions to cases of more or less
clearly demonstrable legal error. Whether those who framed the legislation fully
intended that effect is not now a practical issue: the House of Lords decisions [in The
Nema and The Antaios] laid down rules which have been followed for over a decade
and appear to have been well received. It is generally accepted that those who entrust
decisions to arbitrators do so because they wish to rely on the judgment, skill and
fairness of those arbitrators. If a decision of the courts was what the parties had
wanted they would not have chosen to arbitrate."63
B. The United States
The liberalising tendency favouring the finality of arbitration awards had long
since been in place in the United States. It has always been the view of the courts
62Hiscox v Outhwaite [1992] 1 A. C. 562. It has also been held in the United States that an award
made within the territory of that country could be "non-domestic" under Article 1 of the Convention
if it involves foreign parties and the transaction envisages performance abroad: Bergesen v Joseph
Muller Corporation 710 F. 2d. 929 (1983. 2d. Cir.). The Advisory Committee in its second draft has
recommended a change which in effect reverses the decision in the Hiscox case. Clause 52 recommends
that unless otherwise agreed by the parties "an award shall be treated as made at the seat of the
arbitration (...), regardless of where it was signed, despatched or delivered to any of the parties."
63op. Cit. p. 46.
(l993) 3 All E R 748.
65Ibid p. 754.
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there that the challenge of an arbitration award "is not available for every party who
manages to find some generally accepted principle which is transgressed by the
award" and that an award "must be upheld unless it is completely irrational."67
But, like the English courts, American courts also had to rely on the provisions of a
statute to carry forward that policy. In their case it was the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) of 1925 as amended from time to time. The American courts have
consistently interpreted the provisions of that Act as indicating a federal policy in
favour of arbitration.69 In Saxis Steamship v Multfacs Int'l Trades 7° the Court of
Appeals for the second circuit took the view that "extensive judicial review frustrates
the basic purpose of arbitration, which is to dispose of disputes quickly and avoid the
expense and delay of extended court proceedings." 7 ' The result is that the review of
an arbitration award by American Courts is extremely limited.72 In Andros Compania
Maritima v Marc Rich,73 the Court of Appeals stated that "[w]hen arbitrators explain
their conclusions (...) in terms that offer even a barely colorable justification for the
outcome reached, confirmation of the award cannot be prevented by litigants who
merely argue, however persuasively, for a different result."
What further facilitated the U.S. attitude towards fmality is the fact that the
grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards in the United States, both domestic
and foreign, are fully laid down in the FAA. Section 10 provides only four grounds
68Revere Copper and Brass Inc. v Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 628 F. 2d. 81, (1980)
p. 83.
67Nelson J. in James French v Merrill Lynch, 784 F. 2d. 902, P. 906 (1986, 9th Cir.), citing Swift
Industries v Botany Industries 466 F. 2d. 1125, p. 1131(1972, 3rd Cit.).
689 U.S.C.
See for example Fukaya Trading Co. v Eastern Marine Corp. 322 F. Supp, 278 (1971, E D
Louisianna), where the District Court held that the purpose of the FAA is neither to "dilute the general
advantage of speedy and effective resolution of disputes by arbitration nor to weaken the traditional
reluctance with which courts view efforts to re-examine awards", ibid p. 281.
70375 F. 2d. 577 (1967).
11Ibid p. 582.
Nordell International Resources v Triton Indonesia 999 F. 2d. 544 (1993, 9th Cit.); Mobile Oil
Indonesia v Asamera oil 487 F. Supp, 63 (1980, SDNY)
73579 F. 2d 691, p. 704 (1978, 2d Cu).
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for setting aside (vacating) an arbitration award, namely: "(1) where the award was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality
or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty
of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient course shown, or
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehaviour by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; (4) where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final,
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." Since the Act
is regarded as codifying the general law on arbitration, those four grounds are treated
as exhaustive. To succeed, an application brought to challenge an award must come
within one of those grounds. 74 Moreover, the grounds are narrowly construed, so as,
in the words of the District Court in Barbier v Shearson Lehman Hutton, 75 "to avoid
frustrating the basic purposes of arbitration: disposing of disputes quickly and avoiding
the expense and delay of litigation."76
C. France and Switzerland
France and Switzerland too adopt an attitude to the judicial review of
arbitration awards which encourage fmality by limiting the grounds for review to those
specifically mentioned in the relevant statutes77 French law is probably the most
progressive on questions of appeals against arbitration awards. Unlike English and US
law, appeals on substantive issues, whether on a point of law or fact, are totally
excluded78 even in cases where there has been a "manifest" disregard of the law by
74Otrley v Schwartzberg 819 F. 2d. 373, p. 375 (1987, 2nd Cir.).
752 F. Supp, 151 (1990, SDNY).
761bi(i p. 159, repeating the Court of Appeals in Saxis Steamship v Multjfacrs Int'l Trades, supra.
Article 1502, pursuant to article 1504, Code of civil procedure (France); and Article 180 Swiss
statute on Private International Law which adopts the New york Convention grounds.
ig1 fact it seems that the prohibition against appeals on points of law had always existed in Sweden
following the introduction of the Swedish Arbitration Law of 1929: Paulsson, Jan "Arbitrage
International et Voies de Recours: La Cour Supreme de Suede dans le Sillage des Solution Beige et
Helvétique" (1990) JDI 589, in which he describes the Swedish law as "un modCle de liberalism"
because of the wide powers it confers to arbitrators, but more so in its early recognition of the finality
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the arbitration tribunaL79 There is therefore no room for even a limited ground of
appeal. As Gaillard states, "... la cour d'appel [the competent court for enforcement
of foreign awards] ne saurait, a l'occasion d'une instance en annulation ou en
exequatur, se livrer a une revision au fond de la sentence qui lui est soumise." 8° The
parties cannot also contract in a right of appeal on the merits. 8 ' The only grounds for
the challenge of a non-domestic award rendered in France are the same as the grounds
for resisting enforcement of a foreign award and are confmed to a limited number of
procedural grounds intended as a safeguard against procedural unfairness. The
grounds, as set out in Article 1502 of the new code of civil procedure, are concerned
with matters related to the inexistence of the arbitration agreement, public policy, fair
hearing, the constitution of the arbitration tribunal and where the tribunal exceeds its
authority or falls to exercise its jurisdiction in full in accordance with the submission.
An award cannot be denied enforcement on any other ground than those provided for
in Article 1502, and, further, the grounds are interpreted restrictively.82
In Switzerland the grounds of appeal are exactly the same as in France, the
new Swiss statute on private international law of 1987 having, as a matter of
of the decision of an arbitrator over issues properly within his jurisdiction, a fact which, as Paulsson
informs us, makes the Swedish Act the forerunner to recent domestic legislation on the subject. The
Swedish Supreme Court itself did not fail to re-assert in Soleh Boneh International v Uganda and the
National Housing Construction Corporation of Uganda (decision of 18 April 1989 [1991] 16 Yearbook
Comm. Arb'n., 606) that "[u]nder Swedish law, a party to arbitration proceedings may not file an
appeal on the merits of the arbitral award before a court. The Swedish Arbitration Act is based on this
principle": ibid p. 609 (emphasis added).
Société Fougerolle v Socidté Butec Engineering, Court of Cassation decision of 20 December 1993
[1994) Rev. Arb., 126; Court of Cassation decisions of 15 June 1994 in Société Sonidep v Société
Sigmoil and Communauté Urbain de Casablanca v Société Degrémont, both [1995) Rev. Arb., 88. In
commenting on the last two decisions Gaillard states that in France "... une fausse application du droit
applicable au fond du litige, même grossière, ne constitueraient paz un chef de recours en annulation
au sens de l'article 1502(3) du nouveau code de procedure civile", ibid p. 95. For a general treatment
of challenges of awards under French law see Gaillard, TMArbitrage Commercial International: Sentence
Arbitrale: Contrôle Etatique" in, Juriclasseur de Droit International, Vol. 11, Fasc. 586-10 and 586-11,
(Looseleaf, 1992 re-issue).
Ibid Fasc. 586-10, para. 44.
81lbid.
Ibid where, relying on the Court of Cassation decision in Southern Pacjfic Properties Ltd v
Republic of Egypt (1987) Rev. Arb., 469, Gaillard states that "1 ha mission de Ia cour d'appel saisie
en vertu des articles 1502 et 1504 du Nouveau code de procedure civile est limité a l'examen des vices
enumérés par ces textes."
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legislative policy, been intended to "discourage as much as possible the number of
appeals disguised as challenges" 83 (emphasis added). Swiss law therefore does not
also allow even limited appeals on points of law, and goes further, by allowing the
parties to the arbitration to contract out of the right to challenge the award if they are
not domiciled or resident or established there.M
Even more far reaching is the position under the law of Belgium, where the
courts are prevented by law from entertaining proceedings for any form of judicial
review of an international award, whether or not made in Belgium, unless one of the
parties to the arbitration proceedings is a Belgian national or resident or a company
incorporated or with a place of business there.85
The trend in France and Switzerland to confine appeals and challenges to
arbitration awards to narrow procedural ground are totally in line with the international
trend toward according fmality to awards, as is reflected in Articles 34 and 36 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on international commercial arbitration, which do not at all
countenance the possibility of judicial review of an award on the merits. The Model
law has been adopted in many countries in the same spirit, the grounds for reviewing
or resisting enforcement being equally narrowly circumscribed. 86
 The grounds under
all these new domestic legislation and international instruments 87
 are much the same
as those under the older New York Convention of 1958 which, notwithstanding its
already low threshold for enforcing awards, encourages member states to adopt an
even lower threshold by allowing domestic courts, pursuant to Article VII of the
Convention, to grant award creditors the benefit of a more favourable domestic law.
French courts have accepted the invitation and enforced awards annulled at the place
where they were made on the basis that the grounds for resisting enforcement under
French law, following the 1981 changes in the arbitration provisions of the civil
83Bucher, Andreas & Tschanz, Pièrre-Yves, International Arbitration in Switzerland, Helbing &
Lichtenhahn, Basle, 1988, p. 135.
Artic1e 178(1).
85Article 1717(4).
See Nigeria, Sections 29 & 30; Canada, Articles 34 & 36; Scotland, Law Reform (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1990, Schedule 7, Articles 34 & 36; Djibouti, Articles 21 & 24.
See for example Article 5 of the Inter-American Convention on Commercial Arbitration 1975.
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procedure code, are more favourable to enforcement than the new York
Convention.
It is with this background of an overall favourable attitude to the enforcement
of awards that we approach the grounds for enforcement and execution of awards in
arbitrations involving developing countries in the cases discussed below. In some cases
enforcement or execution has been ordered against the countries and in others they
have obtained enforcement of awards issued in their favour. In all cases, however, the
emphasis of the courts called to enforce awards has been on the need to ensure that
awards are honoured, subject to minimum safeguards. There is nothing that can be
referred to as a development particular to arbitration in which the countries are
involved with or without a view to advantage or disadvantage them.
II. Grounds for Enforcing or Denying Enforcement of Arbitration Awards
A. Absence or Invalidity of the Arbitration Agreement
To challenge the existence or validity of the arbitration clause brings the entire
proceedings into question. Arbitration is based on an agreement by the parties to the
submission and its existence or invalidity necessarily invalidates the award itself.
Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention allows the courts of a contracting state
to deny enforcement of an award made pursuant to a void arbitration agreement.
Questions regarding the invalidity or inexistence of the arbitration agreement may
arise in several ways. In Société Bomar Oil N. V. v Entréprise Tunisienne D 'acvitivités
Pétrolières (ETAP)89 the question was whether an arbitration clause in the Tunisian
state corporation's standard term contract was properly incorporated into the main
contract by a mere reference in the latter. Bomar Oil was the buyer of some 65000
tons of petroleum from ETAP, the Tunisian state oil corporation. The contract was
evidenced by a number of telexes, the first of which was the offer sent by the sellers
to the buyers and referring to the state oil corporation's standard contract containing
88Infra; Sociétd Hilmarton v Société OTV Court of Cassation decision of 23 March 1994 [1994] Rev
Arb, 327.
(1987) Rev. Arb., 482.
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an arbitration clause under ICC Rules in Switzerland. In a counter-offer Bomar Oil
varied some of the conditions of sale and, in its return telex, requested that the
remaining terms be subject to the "Standard Industry Practice." Some of the terms of
Bomar Oil's counter-offer were accepted and others rejected, including in particular
the reference to the "Standard Industry Practice", in place of which ETAP referred
back to its own standard terms and conditions in a third and final exchange of telexes
between the parties. The parties subsequently varied the seat of the arbitration to Paris
and subjected the proceedings to French law. The main contract contained a clause
allowing for renegotiation of the contract price in line with changes in the spot market
for oil. The parties then commenced performance on the basis of the terms in the
telexes.
Following disagreements over the correct interpretation of the renegotiation
clause ETAP commenced ICC arbitration in Paris and obtained an award in which the
arbitrators determined, on a preliminary point, that there was a valid arbitration
agreement. Bomar Oil instituted proceedings before the Paris Court of Appeal for the
annulment of the award on the ground that the arbitration clause contained in the state
corporation's standard terms and conditions of contract, incorporated by a mere
reference in the telexes, had not been signed by the parties and, therefore, did not
satisfy Article 11(2) of the New York Convention requiring an "agreement in writing"
"signed by the parties or contained in a telegram (which would be read to include a
telex and other modern means of communication) or an exchange of letters. The
question was whether it is possible under the New York Convention to provide for an
arbitration by reference to a second document containing the clause, although that
document had not been signed by the parties. As the Convention does not directly
answer the question the Court of Appeal of Paris chose to give effect to what it
regarded as the primary purpose of the Convention, that parties who had committed
themselves to arbitration should be held to their agreement and domestic courts should
facilitate the enforcement thereof. On the facts, the court held that the arbitration
clause, although contained in a document which had not been signed, but read together
with the telexes constituting the main contract, had properly been incorporated into the
latter as argued by the Tunisian parties.
It seems that courts in many other jurisdictions would have come to the same
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conclusion.9° That does not appear to be in doubt as far as the domestic laws are
concerned. 9 ' In England, for example, the Court of Appeal has held in relation to
Section 32 of the Arbitration Act 1950 that, "an arbitration agreement need not be
signed and that the definition in s. 32 of the Act [requiring arbitration agreements "in
writing"] is satisfied provided there is a document or documents in writing which
'recogni[s]e, incorporate or confirm the existence of an agreement to submit'." The
Court was concerned with the incorporation of an arbitration clause in a GAFTA
standard form of contract by reference in a broker's note. The question remained
whether the law would be the same under the New York Convention as enacted in
England to govern the enforcement of foreign awards.
In Zambia Steel & Building Supplies v James Clark & Eaton Ltd93 the Court
of Appeal in London, like that of Paris in Bomar Oil, was dealing with Article 11(2)
of the New York Convention as enacted into law in England?4 The matter in dispute
was whether terms of sale printed on the reverse of a contract quotation (which was
not the offer) and containing an arbitration clause were properly incorporated into a
purchase order made pursuant to the quotation. The Court applied its previous decision
in the St. Raphael and held that the requirements of Sections 1 and 7(1) of the
Arbitration Act 1975 are satisfied if the document containing the arbitration clause to
which reference is made in the main contract is in writing, even though unsigned. That
appears to be consistent with Article 7(1) of the 1975 Act, which defines an arbitration
agreement simply as "an agreement in writing", omitting the words "signed by the
parties" as contained in Article 11(2) of the New York Convention. On that basis the
90See the cases referred to by Loquin, case commentary (1987) JDI, 941.
91Under Article 1443 of the new French code of civil procedure the document containing the
arbitration clause and to which reference is made in the main contract need not be signed. It is sufficient
that the arbitration clause is in writing (which is not a problem if it is contained in a "document") and
it is incorporated by reference into the main contract. Articles 32 and 7 of the English Arbitration Acts
1950 and 1975 defining an agreement neither require that the document to which reference is made is
signed nor do they even require that the arbitration agreement itself is signed! It is sufficient that it is
in writing.
Excomm Ltd v Ahmed Abdul-Qawi Bamaodah (The Sr. Raphael) [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep, 403, p.
409.
[1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep, 225.
Arbitration Act 1975, Sections 1 and 7(1).
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Court of Appeal stated, correctly in our view, that the omission of those words by the
English -legislature "was intended to leave the requirement the same as it is under S.
32 of the 1950 Act",95 in effect leaving the position under English law unaltered by
the Convention. What is necessary is that it appears sufficiently from the reference in
the main contract that the existence of the arbitration clause, to which reference is
made in writing, even though in a separate and unsigned document, is self-evident
having regard to all the documents read together. What must be established is certainty
of the existence of the clause. There should be no room for ambiguity. As the Court
of Appeal of Paris cautioned, "... la Convention [of New York] n'admet l'adoption de
Ia clause compromissoire par reference que dans la mésure oà l'accord des parties
ne represente aucune equivoque."96 Article 7(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law too
only requires the reference to be "such as to make the clause part of the contract"
between the partiesf7 Once it can be established with certainty that the document to
[1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep, p. 234.
(l987) Rev. Arb., p. 486.
'It seems, on the other hand, that the Supreme Court of Germany has gone further and decided that
an arbitration agreement can be implied into a contract by trade usage where the parties failed expressly
to include it: Claimant v W. S. KG (Ill ZR 30/91) [1993] 8 Int'l. Arb'n. Rep., No. 8, p. 9. The contract
in that case had been concluded on the basis of a standard contract that did not contain an arbitration
clause. That notwithstanding the German Supreme Court held that if arbitration in that particular trade
had developed into a commercial custom, the parties should be referred to arbitration to settle their
dispute whether or not they had specifically referred to an arbitration agreement in their contract. In the
words of the court:
if the trade contract concluded by the parties is typical for that branch of trade and
the parties are active in this market on a regular basis, they are presumed to have
knowledge of the custom and the normative force of the trade custom pertaining to
dispute settlement by arbtration applies to their contract irrespective of a prior
agreement of the parties" (ibid p. 10).
Although the decision was apparently well received as reflecting a progressive tendency toward
arbitration in Germany (Berger, Klaus, ibid p. 10), it has been seriously criticised elsewhere for
undermining the contractual basis of arbitration (Carbonneau, Thomas "A-Legality" and Arbitration:
The German Supreme Court joins the Fray" (1993) 4 Am. Rev. mt. Arb., 217) in that it reverses the
fundamental assumption that arbitration is resorted to as an exception to the inherent jurisdiction of the
courts. According to Carbonneau, the German Supreme Court decision leads to the result that even the
absence of an arbitration agreement in certain trades "is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. Indeed,
in order to avoid the automatic reference to arbitration, a party doing business in the area would need
to include express language in the contract rejecting the arbitral remedy" (ibid p. 223) since the
arbitration agreement is implied into the contract by law. We agree with Professor Carbonneau that this,
indeed, would be a strange development since it woud follow that not one, but even both parties, can
thus be compelled to arbitration by the court unless they expressly contract out of an implied arbitration
agreement!. That will reduce arbitration to a process based on compulsion, not consensus.
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which reference is made contains an arbitration clause and that document can properly
be read- together with the main contract, the courts, it seems, will not allow the
arbitration to be frustrated by an unwilling party. It follows that an award made
pursuant to it will not be set aside for lack of an arbitration agreement or for its
invalidity as Bomar Oil learned, to the advantage of ETAP, the Tunisian state oil
corporation.
The desire to hold parties who have committed themselves to arbitration to the
award has also led French courts to enforce an award even though made pursuant to
an arbitration agreement which might have been void under its proper law and under
the proper law of the underlying contract. In Municipalité de Khoms El Mergeb v
Société Dalico,98 the Local Authority of Khoms El Mergeb in Libya had contracted
with the Danish company, Dalico Contractors, for the construction of a drainage
system. The arbitration clause was contained in an annex to the Local Authority's
standard terms and conditions of contract which, together with the documents inviting
tenders, were referred to in the main contract. Clause 32 of the standard terms and
conditions of the Local Authority was both a choice of law and choice of jurisdiction
clause providing for the contract to be governed by Libyan law and for the jurisdiction
of Libyan courts in the event of a dispute. The annex to the standard terms modified
clause 32 by providing for ICC arbitration, the contract remaining subject to Libyan
substantive law. Neither the annex nor the Local Authority's standard terms and
conditions of contract were signed by the parties and on that basis, it seems, the annex
was void under Libyan law. The arbitration tribunal nevertheless made an award in
favour of the Danish company which the Local Authority challenged. The Court of
Appeal of Paris upheld the award and the Court of Cassation confirmed on the ground
that by virtue of a substantive rule of international arbitration, the arbitration clause
is "indépendante juridiquement du contrat principal qui la contient directement ou par
reference, et son existence et son efficacite s 'apprécient, sous reserve des regles
imperatives du droitfrancais et de l'ordre public international, d'après la commune
volonté des parties, sans qu 'ii soit nécessaire de se referer a une loi etatique. "
Court of Cassation decision of 20 December 1993 [1994] Rev. Arb., 116.
1bidp. 117.
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One commentator'°° says that the significance of the decision lies in the fact
that, unlike Bomar Oil, Dalico involved not one but a double reference, first, to the
standard conditions of contract, then to its annex (containing an arbitration
arrangement modifying clause 32 of the standard terms and conditions and, it seems,
supplementing a reference to arbitration in the material published inviting tenders from
the public), none of which had been signed. Also significant is the fact that the
decision of the Court was made not by reason of the character of the defendant in the
award (a Libyan Local Authority) but by reason of, and consistently with, the already
liberal attitude of the French judiciary in relation to the principle of severability,'0'
by which an arbitration clause is now regarded as autonomous from its underlying
contract.'°2 Nothing that affects the validity of the contract itself will invalidate the
arbitration clause. But, by disregarding the rules of private international law which
would otherwise be applicable, the French courts probably take the principle too far
in treating it as applicable irrespective of the law governing the arbitration
agreement)°3 In the words of the Court of Appeal of Paris:
en matière d'arbitrage international, le principe de l'autonomie de
Ia clause compromissoire est d'application générale, en tant que règle
matérielle internationale consacrant la liceité de la convention
d'arbitrage, hors de toute reference a un système de conflits de lois, la
validité de la convention devant être contrôlée au regard des seules
"°Gaudemet-Tallon, Hélène, (1994) Rev Arb, pp. 118-125.
'°'See for example two decisions of the Court of Appeal of Paris of 14 November 1991 in both of
which the Court states: "... Ia clause compromissoire est licite en tant que telle dans l'ordre
international, en vertu du principe general d'autonomie de Ia convention d'arbitrage, regle matérielle
qui lui assure une efficacite propre indépendammenr de Ia loi applicable au contrat dans lequel elle
est stipulée ou au.x parties a ce contrat, sous Ia reserve de I 'ordre public international" : Crs. Legrand
v Société European Country Hotels Ltd and Forestier v Epoux Drif [1992] DaIloz, Informations
Rapides, p. 57.
'°2For the position in England see Harbour Assurance v Kansa General International Insurance
(1993) Q.B. 701.
'°3Especially when we bear in mind that Article V(lXa) of the New York Convention states just
the contrary by providing that enforcement of an award may be denied if the arbitration agreement
pursuant to which the award was made "is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected
it..."
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exigences de l'ordre public international.'°4(Emphasis added)
This is a rather dangerous trend since it might lead to the enforcement in
France of an award made pursuant to an arbitration agreement which is invalid by its
applicable domestic law'° 5 even if that were French domestic law on arbitration
which, under Article 1443 of the new code of civil procedure, for example, states that
an arbitration agreement (the "clause compromissoire") must be regarded as void if
it does not designate the arbitrators or fails to indicate the method by which they are
to be appointed.
Yet, the same French Courts have often exercised restraint in declining to
uphold arbitration agreements and awards even in circumstances where what is in
issue is not the existence of the arbitration agreement itself but whether it is binding
on the parties to the submission, although a decision recognising the award could quite
easily have been justified on one of the traditional reasons in support of the need for
fmality. In Southern Pacfic Properties Ltd v The Arab Republic of Egypt,'° 6 the
government of Egypt successfully challenged an ICC award on the ground that the
State was not a party to the underlying arbitration agreement between Southern Pacific
Properties and the Egyptian General Organisation for Tourism and Hotels (EGOTH),
a separate legal entity of the Egyptian State, even though the government had
"approved, agreed and ratified" the contract between SPP and EGOTH containing the
arbitration agreement. The government and EGOTH, on the one hand, first entered a
head agreement with SPP for the construction of a tourist site close to the ancient
pyramids of Egypt. The Head agreement did not contain an arbitration clause and
turned out to be the only agreement to which the government was a party with the
SPP. Pursuant to the head agreement, EGOTH alone subsequently signed a
supplementary agreement with SPP creating a local company, the Egyptian Tourist
Development Company (ETDC), effectively charged with the construction of the
projects. The supplementary agreement contained an ICC arbitration clause including
'°'Decision of 17 December 1991 in Gatoil v National Iranian Oil Company [1993] Rev Arb, 281,
pp. 284-85.
'°5That should however not come as a surprise since French courts will also enforce an award
already set aside at the place where it was made: infra.
'°6Decision of 12 July 1984 [1985] JDL, 129; [1986] Rev. Arb., 75.
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a statement recognising that EGOTH's undertakings under the agreement could not
become- effective until validated by the competent government authorities. The
Egyptian Minister of Tourism duly validated the agreement by signing the same with
the indorsement "approved, agreed and ratified" on behalf of the government. On that
basis, and on other grounds not directly relevant here, SPP successfully persuaded the
arbitrators that the government was a party to the supplementary agreement between
the tourism organisation, EGOTH, and the Southern Pacific Properties company. The
government argued that its validation of the state tourism organisation's undertaking
did not render the government a party to the contract. It was a mere administrative
formality without which EGOTH's commitments to SPP would have no legal effect.
The Court of Appeal of Paris accepted the government's submission and
annulled the award on the ground that the arbitration agreement was not binding on
the state and the annulment confirmed by the French supreme court.'°7 It would have
been quite conceivable for the Court of Appeal to refuse to annul the award by
conceding the so-called "unified contractual scheme" argument accepted by the
arbitrators in the award,'°8 according to which, it was submitted by the Southern
Pacific Properties Company, both the Head agreement and the supplementary
agreement were so closely connected that although the government did not sign the
supplementary agreement as a contracting party, nevertheless, it should have been
regarded as bound when both agreements are read together, so as to bring the
government within reach of the arbitration clause contained in the supplementary
agreement it did not sign.'°9 Both agreements were to be read as one transaction so
that, in the view of the tribunal, "[i]rrespective of specific rights and obligations cast
upon each individual party under each of the said agreements (...), the three parties
were to be involved throughout the venture; 	 The tribunal had accepted that the
°7Court of Cassation decision of 6 January 1987 (1987) Rev. Arb., 469.
'°ICC award No. 3493 of 16 February 1983 [1984) IX Yearbook Comm. Arb'n, 111, p. 115.
'°9The Paris Court of Appeal decision in this case is consistent with a previous decision of the same
Court in Société Swiss Oil v Société Petrograd & Republic of Gabon of 16 june 1988 [1990] 29 JLM
562 where it held, upholding an ICC award, that the Gabonese state oil corporation (Petrograd) was not
a party to the agreement between the state and Sociét Swiss Oil, on the basis that Petrograd had been
involved in the transactions as an agent for the state.
'10Ibid.
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government was bound because "there was an essential governmental identity between
EGOTH and the Government." The Court of Appeal of Paris rejected that view,
although the claimants obtained enforcement in the Netherlands," 2
 where the District
Court of Amsterdam held that the government was a proper party to the ICC
arbitration clause for the reasons set out in the arbitration tribunal's award, which the
District Court was content to adopt." 3 It was not willing to review the award on the
merit. The District Court of Amsterdam did not accept the fact that the award was
subject to annulment proceedings in Paris as relevant in determining whether or not
to enforce it in the Netherlands. In the view of the Court, the need to encourage
finality would be defeated if the annulment proceedings in France were accepted as
a ground to suspend or deny recognition of the award in the Netherlands.
What the different treatment of the same award in France and the Netherlands
suggests is that there is no discernable trend in the enforcement or annulment of the
awards.
B. Public Policy
The public policy ground is that most frequently in use to resist the
enforcement of arbitration awards or to challenge their validity. This is so because
unlike other grounds, it would embrace not only the substantive aspects of an award,
including in particular its contents, but also the procedure by which the award was
made." 4
 In civilian systems it would also cover the mandatory rules of the domestic
court which the parties to the arbitration cannot contract out of. It also seems to be
that by which the courts are least likely to annul an award. Although public policy is
"Ibid p. 114.
"2Decision of 12 July 1984 [1985] 10 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n., 487.
"3lbid pp. 488-89.
4de Enterria, GarcIa J, "The Role of Public Policy in International Commercial Arbitration" (1990)
21 Law & Pol Int'l. Bus., 389.
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a very elastic concept," 5
 capable of application to a limitless range of circumstances,
domestic courts have generally taken a restricted view in its application to challenges
of arbitration awards. American courts, for example, limit its application to cases
where there has been a serious violation of the "most basic notions of morality and
justice","6
 thus clearly indicating that they will take a strict attitude to proceedings
for annulment based on public policy, particularly when brought to disguise a
substantive point of law. The French attitude, as reflected in the legislation" 7
 and
decisions of the 18 goes further by creating a distinction between domestic
and international public policy. If domestic public policy is strictly construed, more
so is the case in the context of international transactions.
The various ways in which public policy may be pleaded by a party resisting
the effect of an award made in favour of the other party to the dispute are wide. The
ground for resisting enforcement of the award in Imperial Ethiopian Government v
Baruch-Foster Corporation" 9 was the alleged bias of the arbitrator. Ethiopia had
requested confirmation of an award made in its favour under the New York
Convention. Baruch-Foster claimed that the chairman of the arbitration tribunal,
Professor René David of France, was at the relevant time (between 1954 and 1974)
so closely connected to the Ethiopian government as to raise a reasonable suspicion
of bias, thus disqualifying him from serving as an arbitrator. The link arose from his
involvement with the drafting of the Ethiopian civil code. Baruch-Foster corporation
requested extensive discovery to establish that the link was sufficiently material to
warrant the disqualification of the arbitrator. Both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals for the 5th Circuit refused to accede to the request on the basis, at least as
115de EnterrIa says that the concept defies any attempt at a clear definition and approves its
description as "one of the most elusive and divergent notions in the world of juridical science", ibid p.
401, citing Ferrante, "Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Italy and Public Policy" in Hommae
a Frederic Eisemann, 1978, p. 86.
"6A,,can Construction v Mechanised Construction of Pakistan 659 F. Supp, 426, p. 429 (1987,
SDNY), aff,rmed 828 F. 2d 117 (1987, 2d. Cir).
"7Sections 1484 and 1502(5) of the new civil procedure code.
8For example the Paris Court of Appeal decisions of 12 March 1985 (1985) Rev Arb., 299 and
21 March 1986 [1991] Rev. Arb., 350.
119535 F. 2d. 334 (1976, 5th Cir.).
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far as the appellate court was concerned, that the corporation had failed "to come
forward with anything tending to show that the claim was asserted in good faith and
for any reason other than the delay." 2° Since the burden of proving a ground for
refusing enforcement under the Convention is on the party resisting enforcement, the
appellate court proceeded to enforce the award in line with what it regarded as the
goal both of the Convention and its implementing legislation in the United States, to
encourage the recognition of arbitration agreements and awards.
In dismissing the challenge to the enforcement of an award made in favour of
the Fertilizer Corporation of India (FCI) in similar circumstances, involving an alleged
bias'2 ' of the FCI appointed arbitrator, another United States court held in Fertilizer
Corporation of India v ID! Management' 22 that, on analysis, the material presented
to establish that the arbitrator had not been independent and impartial did not meet the
court's threshold of what would be required to annul an award on public policy
grounds. Having regard to the need for finality, which the court treated as the
"paramount consideration" 23 in that case, the District Court concluded that the
public policy of the United States had not been offended and on that basis declined
to reverse its previous decision' treating the award as final and enforced it.
In related proceedings,' the same District Court had already decided that
the fact that FCI, applicants for the enforcement of the award, had failed to disclose
their relationship with one of the arbitrators could not on itself so affect the arbitration
proceedings that enforcement of the ensuing award could be denied in the United
States on public policy grounds. Relying on the Court of Appeals decision in
International Produce Inc. v A/S Rosshavet,' 26 the District Court came to the view
Ibid p. 337.
'21Arising from the fact that the same arbitrator had previously acted as counsel for FCL
122530 F. Supp, 542 (1982, S.D. Ohio, W.D.).
'Ibid pp. 545-46.
517 F. Supp, 948 (1981).
'1bid.
638 F. 2d 548 (1981 2d. Cir.).
265
that the public policy defense of the New York Convention should be narrowly
construed so as to prevent awards being set aside out of a mere "appearance of
bias". 127 It also applied the "wise advice" of the same Court of Appeals in another
case' 28
 requesting the courts to "invoke the public policy defense with caution lest
foreign courts frequently accept it as a defense to enforcement of arbitral awards
rendered in the United States." 29
 The court then concluded that the stronger policy
of the United States "is that which favours arbitrations, both international and
domestic "130
The District Court also had to decide in the FCI case whether, notwithstanding
that India (being a party to the proceedings and the place were the award was made)
was a party to the New York Convention, and on the claim that the country would not
have enforced the award had it been made in the United States in favour of IDI, a
foreign corporation, the U.S. District Court should also deny enforcement of the award
made in favour of India. The United States and India adopted the Convention with the
two reservations of Article 1(3) allowing states, in signing to the Convention, to give
effect only to awards made in the territory of another Convention state (the reciprocity
reservation) or in connection with a commercial transaction (commercial reservation).
The Court was convinced that the reciprocity requirement was met since both
countries were and are signatories to the Convention. But the defendants had further
submitted that "Indian Courts had "adopted various evasive devices ... to avoid
enforcement of awards adverse to Indian parties",' 3 ' to which the Court responded
that it was satisfied that "Indian Courts are not engaged in a devious policy to subvert
the Convention by denying non-Indians their just awards", citing some examples in
support.
The claim that the courts of most developing countires are not independent of
Supra p. 955.
'28Parsons and Whittemore Overseas Co v Société General de L 'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508
F. 2d, 969 (1974).
'lbid p. 974.
°Supra p. 955.
''517 F. Supp, 948, p. 952.
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the executive and, therefore, incapable of deciding against their own governments is
quite frequently made. 132 United States courts have had to deal with the same
allegation more than once before and have in all cases rejected the allegations as
unfounded. For example, in Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corporation v Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation,' 33 the foreign corporation claimed that the Nigerian
National Petroleum Company would enjoy "great advantage before the High Court in
Nigeria" on the basis that the country is "not a democratic country but is ruled by the
military and its principal foreign assert earner is NNPC", a claim to which the District
Court for the Southern District of New York responded that "[w]ild accusations made
without any basis in fact are of little persuasive value ..." The award in that case
had been rendered in Nigeria in favour of the foreign company by a panel of two
arbitrators of Nigerian nationality, one of whom was a former Major-General of the
same military regime. The NNPC instituted proceedings before the High Court in
Lagos, Nigeria, to set aside the award on the ground that the Caribbean Trading
company was not a party to the underlying contract. The CTFC requested confirmation
of the award by the District Court in New York and the NNPC applied for a stay of
the New York proceedings pending the outcome of the challenge in Lagos. The New
York Court granted a stay and held that the American corporation's "fears of receiving
unfavourable treatment in the Nigerian courts [were] belied by the treatment it [had]
received thus far" 35 both from the Nigerian arbitrators and from the High Court of
Lagos. There was therefore no basis for alleging that it would receive less than fair
treatment from a Nigerian court. Similarly, in Sonatrach v Shaheen, Shaheen, the
U.S. corporation against whom the Algerian national oil marketing corporation
instituted proceedings in New York to enforce an ICC award obtained in its favour
had attempted to resist enforcement on, among other grounds, the claim that if the
'32Paulsson, "Third World Participation in International Arbitration" (1987) 2 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ, 19.
'[1991 ] 6 Int'l Arb Rep, Part F-i.
Ibidp. 17.
'35lbid.
Socié:é Narionale pour La Recherche, La Production, le Transport, La Transportation et La
Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures v Shaheen Natural Resources, 585 F. Supp, 57 (1983, S.D. New
York), affirmed 733 F. 2d. 260 (1984, 2d Cir.).
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award had been in Shaheen's favour it would not be enforced against the Algerian
party by an Algerian court. The District Court described the argument as "wholly
without merit"37
 and, in any case, not a ground on which enforcement of an
arbitration award can be denied within the limits of the New York Convention. It
further appeared from the affidavit of counsel that, as a matter of fact, Algerian courts
would enforce an ICC award rendered in a New York Convention country regardless
of the nationality of the parties. There was therefore no ground for claiming that
United States public policy would be violated in enforcing the award. In both cases
the decisions respectively to deny enforcement and to enforce the awards were in
favour of the parties from the developing world and nothing suggests that the
decisions were based other than on the determination to check unnecessary challenges
of arbitration awards by the loosing side.
C. Award Judicially Challenged or Set Aside where it is made
This ground is covered by Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, which
provides that enforcement of an award may be refused if
the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which,
or under the law of which, that award was made.
That Article gives much importance to the place of the arbitration. It is generally
accepted that, under the Convention, only the place where, or under the law of which,
the award was made can set aside an award. It thus would follow, logically, that if an
award is set aside at that place, the rights created by the award become extinct, thus
conferring considerable significance to the law and the courts of the place where the
award is made. It had been suggested, on that basis, that the so-called "floating award"
(i.e., an award that is not attached to any particular state or system of law) cannot
benefit from the favourable enforcement regime of the New York Convention since
'37Jbid p. 64.
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its regularity cannot be judicially supervised anywhere.' 38 At the same time Article
VII(l) provides that the Convention should not be read to deprive a party to an
arbitration "any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner
and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such an
award is sought to be relied upon." Article VU(1) is interpreted as indicating that an
award creditor can rely on the more favourable provisions of the domestic law of a
state, such that in the context of Article V(l)(e) an award may still be enforced in a
country where, under the domestic law, that would still be possible notwithstanding
that it has been set aside elsewhere.' 39 The French courts have consistently taken
that view of Article Vll(l) of the New Convention to enforce awards even though set
aside or pending challenge proceedings at the place where the awards were made.'4°
In Polish Ocean Line v Jolasry,'4 ' in declining to reverse a lower court decision to
enforce an award made in Gdansk but suspended there, the French Court of Cassation
stated that the fact that an award might have been annulled at the place where it was
made is no bar to its enforcement in France, since the more favourable provisions of
Article 1502 of the new code of civil procedure'42 do not require that the award
should not have been set aside at the place where it was made. In the words of the
van den Berg, Albert "Non-domestic Arbitral Awards under the 1958 New York Convention"
(1986) 2 Arb. Int'l, 191; van Houtte, Hans "La Loi Beige du 27 Mars 1985 stir L'Arbitrage
International" (1986) Rev. Arb., 29.
t Société Pabalk v Société Norsolor, Court of Cassation decision of 9 October 1984 [1985] Rev
Arb, 431. See generally Gaillard "Arbitrage Commercial International, Sentence Arbitral: Contrôie
Etatique" in Juriclasseur de Droit International, Vol. 11, Fasc. 586-11, (Looseleaf, 1992 re-issue) paras.
24-31. However, in Belgium, an award creditor seeking to benefit from the more favourable Belgium
domestic law under Article Vll(1) may have to request enforcement exclusively on the basis of Belgian
domestic law or some other applicable treaty to the exclusion of the New York Convention itself:
Storm, Marcel and Demeulenaere, Bernadette International Commercial Arbitration in Bel gium, Kluwer
Law & Taxation Publishers, Deventer, 1989, P. 114-15. In Germany too, a court has held that the most
favourable right principle "does not justif' combining more favourable individual provisions taken from
different legal systems [regimes?]. On the contrary, a legal system [regime?] should be applied in its
entirety": Danish Buyer v German Seller, decision of the Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeal) of
Cologne of 10 June 1976 [1979] 4 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n, 258, p. 260.
'40For a recent example see the Court of Cassation decision of 23 March 1994 (1994) Rev Arb.,
327, affirming the Court of Appeal of Paris decision of 19 December 1991 in Société Hilmarton v
Société 0Th' [19931 Rev. Arb., 300.
'41 Decision of 10 March 1993 (1993) Rev. Arb., 255.
'42Governing the grounds for setting aside an international award in France.
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French supreme court, since Article VII of the New York Convention
ne prive aucun intéressé du droit de se prevaloir d'une sentence
arbitrale, de la manière et dans la mésure admise par Ia legislation du
pays oil la sentence est invoquée; ii en resulte que le juge francais ne
peut, lorsque Ia sentence a été annulée ou suspendue par une autorité
compérente du pays dans lequel elle a été rendue, refuser l'exécution
pour ce cas qui n 'est pas au nombre de ceux énumérés par 1 'article
1502 NCPC, bien qu 'ii soit prévu par 1 'article V 1, e) de la Convention
de 1958 "a
That decision is clearly in line with the pro-enforcement bias of the
Convention. It makes it possible to enforce an award in one country although the same
award has been set aside at the place where, or under the law of which, the award was
made if the law of the place of enforcement is more liberal. Although that view of the
New York Convention has been criticised,'' it appears to have judicial support in
some other major enforcement jurisdictions. In the Netherlands the District Court of
Amsterdam held in Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd v Egypt' 45 that the
fact that the award rendered against Egypt by an ICC tribunal was still subject to
proceedings for annulment in France, the place where it was made, was no bar to the
enforcement of the award in the Netherlands on the basis that it might defeat the pro-
enforcement policy of the New York Convention. The District Court reasoned that
"[hJaving regard to the purpose of the Convention to enhance the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by subjecting the recognition and enforcement
to a minimum number of conditions, the recours en annulation initiated by respondent
[government of Egypt] is no reason for [the Court] to adjourn the decision on
enforcement." Like the French courts, the District Court of Amsterdam seems to
have been saying that it would not deny enforcement to an award where enforcement
is permitted under the domestic law, irrespective of whether the award is still subject
143[993] Rev. Arb., 255, p. 258.
van den Berg (1986) 2 Arbitration International, 191.
'45Decision of 12 July 1984 [1985] 10 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n, 487.
"Ibid p. 490.
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to proceedings for annulment at the place where, or under the law of which, the award
was made. The French attitude is also based on the rule that the enforcement of an
award made abroad (and, a fortiori, in France,) in a dispute with an international
dimension is always subject to the control of French courts.'47
On the other hand it is clear that under statute an award will not be enforced
in England if it has been annulled at the place where it was made.' 48 A New York
Convention award will be denied enforcement in England if, in accordance with
Section 5(2)(f) of the Arbitration Act 1975,' the award creditor can establish that
the award "has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country
in which, or under the law of which, it was made." A foreign award which is not a
New York Convention award' 5° may, pursuant to Section 37(l)(e) of the Arbitration
Act 1950, be denied enforcement in England if the competent English court is satisfied
that the award "has been annulled in the country in which it was made." Where a
foreign award is also a New York Convention award it is only enforceable under the
1975 Act'5 ' and will therefore be denied enforcement in accordance with Section
5(2)(f) if it has been annulled at the place where, or under the law of which, it was
made. However, Section 6 of the 1975 Act gives effect to the more favourable
domestic law option of Article Vll(1) of the New York Convention when it states that
nothing in the Act "shall prejudice any right to enforce or rely on an award otherwise
than under [the same Act] or part H of the Arbitration Act 1950." Meanwhile, under
Section 5 of the 1975 Act, an English court may, if it thinks fit, adjourn proceedings
for the enforcement of an award which is still subject to annulment at the place where,
or under the law of which, it is made but should order the award debtor to give
security on the application of the award creditor. The interplay of those various
provisions was considered by the Court of Appeal in Soleh Boneh International Ltd
'47Ste Unichips Finanziaria v Gesnouin, Paris Court of Appeal decision of 12 February 1993 (1993)
Rev. Arb., 255.
'Arbitration Act 1975 Section 5; Arbitration Act 1950 Section 37(2)(a).
Which gives effect in England to the New York Convention.
Fhat would be the case if it is not made in the territory of another Convention state.
1 Section 2, Arbitration Act 1975.
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v Government of the Republic of Uganda and National Housing Corporation,'52
where the Court laid down what, for now, would be the position of awards which are
still subject to challenge at the place where, or under the law of which, they were
made.
In that case Soleh Boneh had obtained an ICC award in Sweden, subsequent
to which the government applied for the award to be set aside there on the ground that
the award was not binding on the state. Soleh Boneh contended that the Swedish
District Court had no jurisdiction to examine the validity of the award, a contention
accepted by the District Court but reversed by the Court of Appeal. Soleh Boneh's
appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed and the case remitted to the District Court
for a decision on the validity of the award. Thereafter, Soleh Boneh instituted
proceedings in England for leave to enforce the award ex parte under Section 26 of
the Arbitration Act 1926 or Section 3(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act 1975. The High
Court declined to grant leave to enforce the award as requested and adjourned the
application. The Court however made an order for security to be given by the State
pursuant to Section 5 of the 1975 Act. The government applied to set aside the order
but the application was refused. They appealed. The Court of Appeal varied the order
(by substituting the sum ordered as security with a smaller sum) but further held that
if security was not provided as varied, within four weeks, leave would be given to
enforce the award as requested.
Giving judgment for the Court of Appeal, Staughton U said that the need for
uniformity in interpreting an international instrument made it necessary to have regard
to the practice elsewhere, although there was no uniformity in interpretation among
the different foreign jurisdictions to which they had been referred, regarding that
particular issue. One attitude, depicted by the Swedish case of AG Gotaverken v
General National Maritime Transport Company,' 53 shows that the existence of
proceedings to challenge the award did not by itself prevent its enforcement. On the
other hand, in the Cayman Island case of Republic of Gabon v Swiss Oil
152 [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 208.
'(1980) Rev. Arb., 524.
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Corporation,' TM proceedings for enforcement had been suspended and security for
cost refused on the ground, among others, that there was a strong case for setting
aside the award and that a decision on its validity was expected elsewhere.' 55 The
Court noted that the general tendency was to order security and did not accept the
view of Michael Tupman' 56 that " ... it is difficult to think of any circumstances in
which security would not be warranted." 57 Tupman took that view on the basis that
"security is the essential guarantee that whatever harm might result from any delay in
enforcement is counterbalanced, theoretically by the certainty that there will be known,
fixed assets against which to recover if and when the award is confirmed in the
country of origin."58 The Court of Appeal stated that "[i]f, for example, the
challenge to the validity of the award is manifestedly well-founded, it would be
quite wrong to order security until that is demonstrated in a foreign Court." 59 The
Court of Appeal then stated what it considered should be the general approach of
courts in England. It said:
two important factors must be considered on such an application
the first is the strength of the argument that the award is invalid, as
perceived by a brief consideration by the Court which is asked to
enforce the award while proceedings to set it aside are pending
elsewhere. If the award is manifestedly invalid, there should be an
adjournment and no order for security; if it is manifestedly valid, there
should either be an order for immediate enforcement, or else an order
''(1988) Int'l Arb Rep,
'"See also Société Norsolor v Pabalk Ti/caret Sirketi, Paris Court of Appeal decision of 15
December 1981 [19831 Rev Arb, 409, where the Court declined to enforce an award still subject to
challenge in Austria in anticipation of the consequences of conflicting decisions, in the event that the
award were to be set aside in Vienna: "... si Ia sentence arbitrale etait annulée par Ia Cour de Vienne,
la présente demande d'exéqua:ur deviendrait sans objet;", ibid p. 472.
'"Staying Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under the New York Convention" (1987) 3 Arbitration
International, 209.
'"Ibid p. 223 "(e]ven though", he says, "under Article VI of the New York Convention a court
petitioned with enforcement has discretion to require security": ibid.
Ibid.
'[l993] 2 Lloyd's Rep, p. 212.
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for substantial security
The second point is that the Court must consider the ease or difficulty
of enforcement of the award, and whether it will be rendered more
difficult, for example, by movement of assets or by improvident
trading, if enforcement is delayed. If that is likely to occur, the case for
security is stronger; if, on the other hand, there are and always will be
insufficient [sufficient?] assets within the jurisdiction, the case for
security must necessarily be
The courts in England will therefore not take a blanket attitude as in France
or the Netherlands to enforce the award irrespective of the existence of proceedings
for annulment elsewhere.' 6 ' If they would not do that, it follows, a fortiori, that they
will not also enforce an award which has already been set aside at the place where,
or under the law of which, it was made. This should be so since even the mere giving
of security should, according to Lord Justice Staughton, not be ordered if " ... the
challenge to the validity of the award is manifestedly well-founded which by
necessary inference should be the case where the award has already been successfully
challenged and as a result set aside by a competent court.
In the United States it is not entirely clear whether the courts will enforce an
award which has been set aside or is pending proceedings for annulment at its place
of origin. In one case'63 the District Court enforced an award made in favour of FCI,
although the American corporation resisting enforcement had instituted proceedings
for annulment in India itself, the place where the award was made. The District Court
°Ibid.
16I. my own view is that section 5(5) means precisely what it says, namely that in a situation in
which the enforcing court does not know whether the appropriate court is going to annul the award, the
enforcing court - that is to say the British Court in this case - can order the respondents to the
arbitration to give security" per Lord Donaldson, M.R., in Southern Pacjfic Properties Ltd. v the Arab
Republic of Egypt and Others [1985] 10 Yearbook Comm. Arb'n., 504, p. 507.
"Supra p. 212.
'63Fertilizer Corporation c!f india v IDI Management, 517 F. Supp, 948 (1981, District Court,
Southern District Ohio).
274
took the view, citing Professor Gerald Aksen' with approval, that an award should
be "considered 'binding' for the purpose of the [New York] Convention if no further
recourse may be had to another arbitral tribunal (that is, an appeal tribunal). The fact
that recourse may be had to a court of law does not prevent the award being 'binding'.
This provision should make it more difficult for an obstructive loser to postpone or
prevent enforcement by bringing or threatening to bring proceedings to have an award
set aside or	 165
The United States courts take an even more hostile attitude to a defense against
enforcement of an award on the basis that the award has been set aside at a place
other than where, or under the law of which, it was made. In American Construction
v Mechanised Construction of Pakistan' the award had been made against a
Pakistani state corporation in favour of a Cayman Island corporation in Geneva, and,
in the view of the New York Court, pursuant to Swiss law. The state corporation
obtained judgment in Pakistan invalidating both the arbitration clause and the
proceedings, the pakistani Court having asserted jurisdiction to do so on the basis that
the supplementary agreement to the main contract had provided for the governing law
of the main contract to be that of Pakistan. The arbitrator had found that New York
law governed the main contract, after fmding that the supplementary contract was
invalid under New York and Pakistani law. The District Court declined to reverse the
arbitrators's decision on the effect of the supplementary agreement, stating that could
only be done if the arbitrator had been manifestedly irrational. The Court then held
that since the award had been made pursuant to Swiss law its enforcement in the
United States could not be refused by virtue of a Pakistani judgment invalidating the
arbitration agreement and the proceedings.
ifi. Immunity Against Enforcement and Execution
'"American Arbitration Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards" (1971) 3 Sw. U. L. Rev, 1,
p. 11.
517 F. Supp, p. 958.
'659 F. Supp, 429 (1987, S D New York).
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The only serious obstacle to the enforcement or execution of arbitration awards
against states is the defence of sovereign immunity, available in most jurisdictions,
although only to the extent allowed by the particular domestic system of law. In most
major enforcement jurisdictions the doctrine is limited in its application, so that the
defence is not available if enforcement or execution is requested against assets of the
state used for commercial purposes.'67 With respect to enforcement specifically,
sovereign immunity arises at two stages. First, it will be necessary to establish whether
the domestic court has jurisdiction over the state to entertain the proceedings. That is
a preliminary question for, if the state is entitled to jurisdictional immunity, the court
cannot hear the case.' Although it would have been expected that jurisdictional
immunity is not available in respect of proceedings related to the submission of a state
to arbitration,' 69
 that is not necessarily so in all major enforcement jurisdictions. In
England the State Immunity Act 1978 provides in clear terms that
[w]here a State has agreed in writing to submit to a dispute which has
arisen, or may arise, to arbitration, the State is not immune as respects
proceedings in the courts of the United Kingdom which relate to the
arbitration,'7°
I67 for example the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, Section 1605 (United States); State
Immunity Act 1978, Section 3 (UK); Bucher, Andreas & Tschanz, Pierre-Yves "International Arbitration
in Switzerland, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1989, pp. 176-179.
'NIt seems that in Switzerland the courts draw no distinction between immunity from jurisdiction
and immunity from enforcement or execution. Since the latter derives from the former, the courts take
the view that once immunity from jurisdiction is resolved against the state, it also ceases to enjoy
immunity from execution: Bernini and van den Berg, "The Enforcement or Arbitral Awards against a
State: The Problem of Immunity from Execution" in Contemporary Problems in International
Arbitration, (ed. Lew, Julian D.M.), Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College,
University of London, 1986, 359. p. 364. But the courts will order enforcement or execution of an
award against a state only if the arbitration has some relevant territorial connection with Switzerland,
which might not arise merely from the designation by the tribunal of a Swiss location as the place of
arbitration: Liamco v libya, decision of the Federal Court of 19 June 1980 [1987] 114 JDI, 994,
although if the location results from the choice of the parties the relevant connection might exist:
Bucher and Tschanz, op. cit. p. 178.
Which appears to be the position in Australia: Section 17(2)(a) & (b) of Australian Foreign States
Immunities Act 1985; that seems to be the position too in Sweden: Lia,nco v Libya [1981) 20 ILM, 893,
Svea Court of Appeal and in France: SociétI Européene D 'etude et D 'entreprises (SEEE) v Yougoslavie,
Court of Cassation decision of 18 November 1986 [1987] 114 JDI, 120 and, Bourel Pierre "Conflits de
Jurisdictions: Inununités de Juridiction et D'exécution', in Juriclasseur de Droit International, Vol 9,
Fasc. 581-50 (Looseleaf, 1993 re-issue) para. 182.
°Section 9(1).
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so that the jurisdiction of an English court to entertain proceedings to enforce the
arbitration agreement or for judicial review of the award, for example, exists by virtue
of the state's submission to arbitration.' 7 ' However, that is not necessarily so with
respect to the enforcement of the award itself,' 72 which is the primary concern here.
Section 9(1) exists as an exception to the general rule that a foreign state is immune
from the jurisdiction of United Kingdom courts (Section 1). The present editors of
Dicey and Morris take the view that the exception does not apply to the enforcement
of arbitration awards, apparently, on the basis that the parliamentary bill which
resulted in the Act said so expressly.' 73 If that were correct, it would follow that an
English court's in personam jurisdiction over a foreign state to enforce an award
against the state is not automatic, unless the state expressly waives that immunity.
The position in the United States now appears to have been clarified by a 1988
amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act,' 74 following conflicting
decisions by U.S. courts based on Section 1605(a)(l) of the original Act,' 75 which
provided that a state could not be immune from the jurisdiction of American Courts
in any case where the state had "waived its immunity either explicitly or by
implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may
purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver." One U.S. court
took the view that a submission to arbitration, even when it does not include an
express waiver of immunity before U.S. courts, could be the basis of such a waiver
"by implication", thus rendering the state amenable to the jurisdiction of United States
171Dicey and Moms Conflict of Laws, Vol. 1, 13th Edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1993, p. 256.
1bid.
'"Mann thought that the Section applies to all proceedings arising from the arbitration agreement,
including an arbitration taking place outside the U.K.: Further Studies in International Law, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1990, 302, p. 319. For an assessment of both views see Fox, Hazel "States and the
Undertaking to Arbitrate" (1988) 37 ICLQ, 1; "Sovereign Immunity and Arbitration", in Contemporary
Problems in International Arbitration, supra 323.
'74Section 1605(a).
'"Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 Section 1605(a)(1).
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courts for the purpose, among others, of enforcement of the award against the
state.'76
The only difficulty that arose in the United States was whether the agreement
should have contemplated arbitration within the United States. Initially the courts
appear to have taken the view that it would not have been necessary for the arbitration
to take place there) But in Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v Libya'78
the original agreement provided that any ensuing arbitration should take place in
Tripoli, Libya. That particular clause of the contract was, on the proposal of Liamco,
subsequently amended for arbitration either where the parties agreed or at a place to
be determined by the arbitrators. In the event the proceedings were held in Geneva.
Although Ipitrade v Nigeria had resulted in the enforcement of an award made outside
the United States,' 79 the judge in the Liamco case appeared to have been under the
impression that immunity was waived only if the arbitration had some bearing with
the United States. He accepted jurisdiction only on the basis that "[a]lthough the
United States was not named, consent to have a dispute arbitrated where the arbitrators
might determine was certainly consent to have it arbitrated in the United States"8°
presumably on the ground that the arbitrator might well have selected a U.S. venue
for the conduct of the proceedings. He therefore accepted jurisdiction only on that
likelihood. The implication is that if the parties had specifically excluded the
possibility of the proceedings taking place in the United States the judge would not
have admitted jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court declined to express a view on the issue when
given the opportunity.' 8 ' The Supreme Court expressly declined to "decide whether,
by waiving its immunity, a foreign state could consent to suit based on activities
' 76Birch Shipping Corporation v The Embassy of Tanzania, 507 F. Supp., 311(1980, DDC).
mipitrade International v Federal Republic of Nigeria 465 F. Supp, 824 (1978, DDC) where the
agreement was for arbitration under ICC Rules in Paris in accordance with Swiss Law.
'482 F. Supp, 1173 (1980, DDC).
'79We should point out that the award in the Birch shipping was enforced by the same Judge (John
Lewis Smith Jr.) who heard the Liamco case and had been made in New York.
'Suprap. 1178.
' 81 Verlinden B.V. v Central Bank of Nigeria, 76 S. Ct Reports, L. Ed, 2d, 81 [1985].
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wholly unrelated to the United StateS",' 82 although the view would have been obiter,
since the case was not directly involved with proceedings arising out of an
arbitration.'83 The action had been brought for anticipatory breach of an irrevocable
letter of credit issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria in connection with an underlying
cement supply contract made by the government of Nigeria. The question was whether
Nigeria had implicitly waived its immunity to jurisdiction in respect of an action in
court to collect on the letter of credit. The District Court held that the State had not,
on the ground that Nigeria's waiver of immunity under the contract (the underlying
cement supply contract containing the arbitration agreement) could not bind a state
instrumentality - the Central Bank - under a different obligation (arising out of the
letter of credit), particularly as the Central Bank itself was not a party to the
underlying arbitration agreement.' TM That case should therefore properly be regarded
as one in which there was no arbitration agreement binding on the parties directly
involved in the proceedings in court, viz, the Central Bank and the foreign
company.'85
There was a divergence of judicial opinion in the United States even as regards
the ICSJD Convention. The Convention itself, to which the United States is a party,
specifically confers enforcement jurisdiction to domestic courts of member states
under Article 54. In fact Article 54 creates an obligation for member states to
recognise and enforce an ICSID award, such that, in the context of the Convention,
immunity from enforcement jurisdiction is not available to a state. It is on that basis
that the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York accepted
jurisdiction in Letco v Liberia.' 86 The Court stated that "as a signatory to the
Convention" Liberia "waived its sovereign immunity in the United States with respect
Ibid p. 90, note 15.
83See District Court, Southern District New York, 488 F. Supp, 1284.
184Jbidp. 1301.
'The District Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, on another ground, that,
the transfer of jurisdiction to Federal Courts operated by the Federal Sovereign Immunity Act was in
violation of Article ifi of the U. S. Constitution: 647 F. 2d. 320 (1981); reversed by the Supreme Court:
76 S. Ct. Reports, L. Ed, 2d, 81 [1985].
'65O F. Supp, 73.
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to the enforcement of any arbitration award entered pursuant to the Convention."87
The arbitration proceedings in that case appear to have been conducted at more than
one location, including Washington, London and Paris. Meanwhile in declining
jurisdiction in the case of Maritime international Nominees v Republic of Guinea,'88
the U S Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia took the view that an ICSID
arbitration agreement could not implicitly waive the immunity of the state, because,
as the agreement did not contemplate a role for U S courts in compelling arbitration
if that became necessary before or during the proceedings, the ICSID arbitration clause
did not have any relation to the United States even though the arbitration might have
taken place there.' 89 It should be pointed out, though, that instead of ICSID
arbitration as provided for in the contract, the claimant in that case chose to refer the
case to American Arbitration Association (AAA) arbitration under that associations'
rules, pursuant to which the award concerned was made in its favour. In those
circumstances it would have been improper to enforce the ensuing award since by
compelling arbitration other than in accordance with the contract, the claimant was not
only acting in breach of the arbitration agreement but appeared at the same time to be
subverting the very purpose of the ICSJD which states that
submission to ICSID arbitration is to "be deemed consent to such arbitration to the
exclusion of any other remedy."9'
It was as a result of the above uncertainty in judicial pronouncements that an
amendment was introduced to the U S Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in
1988 providing that a foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of U S courts
in any case
in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by
the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to
Ibid p. 77.
'693 F. 2d. 1094 (1982, 2d dr.).
Contra, Delaume "ICSfl) Arbitration and the Courts" (1983) 77 AJIL, 784, pp. 790-92.
Sul1ivan, Gary B "Implicit Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by Consent to Arbitration: Territorial
Scope and Procedural Limits" (1983) 18 Texas Int'l. L. J., 329; Chukwumerije, Okezie "ICSID
Arbitration and Sovereign Immunity" (1990) 19 Anglo-American L. Rev., 166, p. 176.
'91Article 26.
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arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise
between the parties with respect to a defmed legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award
made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration
takes place or is intended to take place in the United States, (B) the
agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other
international agreement in force for the united States calling for the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, (C) the underlying
claim, save for the agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in
a United States court under this section or section 1607, or (D)
paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise applicable.'
The second stage at which the immunity of a state is relevant arises when, and
whether, having claimed jurisdiction over the state, a domestic court could exercise
that jurisdiction to enforce the award and, subsequent to that, to order execution
against identified or identifiable assets of the state. As far as enforcement is concerned
Article 54 of the JCSJ]) Convention mandates all member states to do so. Since, if it
did not have jurisdiction, a court cannot ensure the enforcement of a Convention
award pursuant to the duty imposed by Article 54, that Article must therefore also be
read as conferring in personam jurisdiction, discussed above.'93
In the cases referred to below we are concerned with situations where, having
asserted that it has jurisdiction, a domestic court at the place of enforcement has
proceeded to exercise that jurisdiction either to enforce or order execution of the
award on the basis that the state concerned does not enjoy immunity against
enforcement and execution, or denied enforcement or execution on the ground of
foreign sovereign immunity.
The cases suggest that there is no established trend across, and, sometimes,
Section 1605 (a)(6). Section 1607 deals with cases where the state itself brings a Suit and there
is a counter-claim and paragraph (1) of sub-section (a) concerns cases of express and implied waivers.
In both situations the state is not immune from jurisdiction.
'93Letco v Liberia, 650 F. Supp, 73 (1986, SDNY); Senegal v Soabi (1990) 119 JDI, 141, CA Paris;
rev'd on another ground: (1991) Rev. Arb., 639, Court of Cassation; Benvenuti & Bonfant v The
Government of Congo, (1981) 108 JDI, 843, CA Paris.
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even within the same jurisdiction. Some courts have enforced awards against the states
and others have withheld enforcement.
Of the United States cases referred to above, Ipitrade v Nigeria and Letco
v Liberia' are cases in which the courts enforced awards against the states on the
ground that the original submission to arbitration constituted a sufficient waiver of
immunity against enforcement of the resulting award. However, in Letco, the court
declined to order execution against specific assets of the government against
which the award was to be collected on the ground that they were not used or
intended for commercial purposes. They were to be applied toward the operation and
"maintenance of governmental functions", stated by the Court to be clearly in
"exercise of powers particular to a sovereign." 97 In Birch Shipping Corporation v
Tanzania, 1 the judge issued an order against a "checking account" (current account)
held by the Tanzanian embassy with a US Bank on the ground that although the
account was used to "pay the salaries of the staff' and for services incidental to the
operation of the embassy, that description was within the meaning of the definition of
"commercial activity" under the US FSIA 1976. A state's assets used for commercial
activities are not generally immune from execution in the United States and
elsewhere.' The Court also took the view that it did not matter that the account
was not in use solely for commercial activities.2 In Liamco v Libya'°' the award
was not enforced against Libya on the ground that the subject matter of the underlying
dispute "was not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the [United
'645 F. Supp, (1978).
650 F. Supp, 73 (1986).
Tonnage and registration fees and other taxes due from Liberian registered shipowners to the
Liberian government.
1bid p. 78.
198507 F. Supp, 311(1980, DDC).
See for example Section 3 of the UK State Immunity Act 1978.
200Supra p. 313.
201482 F. Supp, 1175 (1980, DDC).
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States]",202
 because the nationalisation decree of the Libyan government abrogating
the contract came under the "act of state doctrine", under which, in the view of the
District Court, the Courts of the United States will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another country.203
Of the greatest significance is a 1988 amendment to the FSIA 1976 which
permits the execution of arbitration awards against a sovereign state on the very basis
that the state had submitted to arbitration. 204
 The effect, as George KahaLe puts it,
is that the "same agreement which supports jurisdiction ... will now suffice to remove
immunity from execution." 205
 This means that the enforcement of an arbitration
award in the United States against a foreign state is easier than the enforcement of a
United States court judgment against the same.206
In France the result has been almost similar to the United States with some
awards being enforced and others denied enforcement on the ground of the states'
immunities. Benvenuti and Bonfant v Con go207 was an ICSID award made in favour
of the foreign corporation. The French Court did not feel constrained in enforcing the
award pursuant to Article 54 of the ICSJD Convention, to which France is a
contracting state. However in Soabi v SenegaP' the same Court declined to enforce
202By virtue of Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention as enacted in the United States: US
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. Section 207.
3 UnderhiIl v Hernandez, S. Ct. Reports, L. Ed, 456 (1897); Alfred Dunhill of London v The
Republic of Cuba, 48 L Ed., 2d. 301; KirkPatrick & Co. v Environmental Tectonics Corporation, 107
L. Ed., 2d. 816 (1990); but see FAA as amended in 1988, Section 15, which provides that
"[e]nforcement of arbitral awards, confirmation of arbitral awards, and execution upon judgements based
on orders confirming such awards shall not be refused on the basis of the Act of State doctrine."
204Section 1610(a)(6). It provides that the property of a sovereign state used for commercial
activities is not immune from execution if "the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral
award rendered against the foreign state, provided that attachment in aid of execution, or execution,
would not be inconsistent with any provision of the arbitral agreement."
203"New Legislation in the United States Facilitates Enforcement of Arbitral Agreements and Awards
against Foreign States" (1989) 6 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., part 2, 57, p. 64.
Joly, F "Etat-Unis: Une Réforme de 1988 Restraint le Domain des Immunitds des Etats Etrangers
en Matière D'Arbitrage" (1990) Rev. Arb., 607. For an overview of the changes in the United States
see O'Neill, Philip D. "American Legal Developments in Commercial Arbitration involving Foreign
States and State Enterprises" (1989) 6 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., part 1, 117.
207Paris Court of Appeal decision of 26 June 1981 (1981) JDI, 843.
208Decision of 5 December 1989 (1990) 117 ID!, 141.
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another ICSID award against Senegal on the ground that the State had not waived its
immunity to execution pursuant to Article 55 of the Convention. Article 55 of the
Convention preserves the immunity of states against execution, subject to the laws in
force in the state where such measures are requested. The decision was criticised for
failing to draw the distinction between enforcement, as required under Article 54 and
immunity to execution retained under Article 55,209 a distinction that had already
been pointed out by the same Court in Benvenuti. 21° On appeal, the decision was
reversed by the Court of Cassation,21 ' which stated that so long as the award creditor
had merely requested leave to enforce (exequatur), the state could not properly assert
immunity which, under the ICSID Convention, could not arise until at the subsequent
stage of execution.
What the treatment of enforcement of awards probably suugests is that any
attempt at creating a special international regime for the settlement of state contracts
by arbitration, such as the ICSID, may create more problems than those it may be
intended to resolve.
209See Gaillard (1990) 117 JDI, 144; Broches (1990) Rev Arb, 638.
2t0Supra.
21tDecision of 11 June 1991 (1991) Rev. Arb., 637.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
Arbitration is about processes. It is not law, and it is not also the product of any
principles or rules of law. It developed spontaneously from a basic desire to see to it that
disputes are settled. That says much about what ought to be its true nature. I take the view
that the character of the process should not be explained in terms of the extended
jurisdictional authority of the state or in terms of contract. As it arises from the basic
desire to resolve disputes, arbitration should be analysed in those terms, in the same way
that business enterprises are analysed in terms of the need to produce goods and services.
The fact that the state intervenes from time to time to determine the limits within which
the institution functions ought not, in itself, or in any other way, distort the fundamental
character of arbitration. Business organisations and other institutions, too, are subject to
the pervasive nature of state control as the state exercises its powers to regulate. A
business unit, nevertheless, remains defined as a mechanism to produce goods and services
for profit although, like arbitration, its activities are regulated by the state in different
ways, including by means of the law. The law regulates business associations for the same
reason that it regulates other institutions, in the interest of order; and yet the need to
produce goods and services, on its own, sufficiently justifies the existence of business
associations and other units created for similar purposes. The same should apply to
arbitration. The need to resolve disputes, in itself, explains the existence of arbitration and
provides the basis for compliance with its outcome.
The fact that parties consent to have disputes resolved by arbitration does not
necessarily imply that the process is based on 'contract', or should the doctrine of
'contract' be allowed to over-influence its functioning; after all, contract as mere 'consent'
or 'agreement' is inherent in most other acts of day-to-day activities. The fact that the
process of arbitration could also be 'procedural' is not particularly significant. It could
have been any of several other mechanisms, provided the operation of the chosen
mechanism is consistent with the need for social cohesion. It is not entirely inconceivable
that modern technology may provide mechanisms to determine disputes if fed with all the
elements, including the contentions of the disputants, provided such mechanisms are able
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to take into account non-tangible factors, such as the need to preserve business good will..
Disputants may well prefer such mechanisms in their search for objective or ideal justice.
Arbitration, however, operates in the complex sphere of social and human relationships
and cannot thus be simplified. The analysis of its nature based on 'contract' (as a 'binding'
arrangement) or on the jurisdictional authority of the state, in my view, limits the meaning
and may in fact undermine the true character of arbitration as primarily a means of settling
disputes.
The merit of emphasising the basis of arbitration on the need to resolve disputes is
that it obviates the difficulties associated with inflexible concepts or theories founded on
contract and drawn from rules and principles of law. If the outcome of arbitration is then
binding, it is so by virtue of the fact that it is sensible that differences are resolved speedily
and without disrupting harmonious relationships, and not necessarily on the basis that it
arises from a contract. The legitimacy or legality of the process, thus, arises directly in
response to its perceived social function. The choice of a particular procedure or device
may well only be a matter of practicality, in the general sense of the word.
Inherent in the nature of arbitration, therefore, is the perception that ought to
emphasise what Cappelletti describes as 'mending justice',' including flexibility, a much
preached and much desired, although in the present climate much less practised, virtue of
arbitration. One must admit, however, that there is a growing recognition of that
alternative perception of the function of arbitration through the development of the
multiple techniques of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). ADR is now very developed
in the United States2 and is in an advanced stage of acceptance in England,3 where it
appears to have had a favourable reception by the judiciary, the bar and the academic
'Cappelletu: "Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the world-wide Access-
to-Justice Movement' (1993) 56 MLR 282, p. 287.
2 Goldberg, Sander, & Rogers: DisDute Resolution: Ne2otiation. Mediation, and Other Processes, 2nd
Edn., Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1992; Murray, Rau & Sherman: Processes of Disnute Resolution: The
Role of Lawyers. Westbury, New York, 1989. For a short history of the ADR in the United States see
Salem, "The Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement An Overview" (1985) 40 Arbitration
International, No.3 pp. 3-11. An extensive bibliography on ADR is provided by Hinchcliff: Disnute
Resolution: A Selective Bibliography. American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.
3 See Dispute Resolution: Civil Justice and its Alternatives, special issue, MLR, volume 56 No. 3 (May
1993)
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community.4 Brown and Marriott say that it arose from the dissatisfaction with the
traditional methods of dispute settlement. 5 What is common to the several techniques of
ADR as developed in the United States and England is the shift from adversary tactics, to
dispute solving by consensus; and we know that same approach, Le., dispute settlement by
consensus, has for centuries been inherent in the perception of adjudication and dispute
resolution as a whole in other parts of the world, including many parts of the developing
world. In fact, one cannot fail to mention the (conscious or unconscious) influence of
China, Japan, and South East Asia in general as important players in international
economics, in that development. What at one time may have been condemned as a
backward perception suited only to small communities in underdeveloped economies, and
therefore not adequate for use in an industrialised complex society, is in relation to China
and Japan described as just another way of doing things and, therefore, worthy of
emulation. The successful economic performance of China, Japan, and the East has
contributed to a better understanding of the generally conciliatory approach to resolving
conflicts in that part of the world. Gradually, too, the contribution of the less industrialised
regions of the world to this other perception of adjudication is also being acknowledged.
Professor Mauro Cappelletti says in that respect that Western countries "should be humble
enough to recognise that [they] might have a lot to learn from African and Asian
traditions" 6 on this "conciliatory", "non-contentious" alternatives to dispute settlement.
That approach applies to private, as well as to state party arbitration. The absence
of material on the participation of third world private parties in international arbitration
makes it difficult to form any view on their experience with the process. Similarly, the
absence of a developed regime of commercial arbitration within the countries themselves,
(notwithstanding the sudden explosion of arbitration statutes enacted in the same countries
through-out the 1980s and 1990s with a strong international coloration), makes it
impossible to come to an accurate view of their attitude to domestic commercial
4 See Lord Woolf: Access to Justice: Final Renort to the Lord Chancellor on Civil Justice S ystems in
England and Wales. HMSO London, July 1996; The General Council of the Bar: Renort of the Committee
on Alternative Disoute Resolution. November, 1991; Brown & Marriott ADR Princinles and Practice,
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1993.
5 lbid.p. ix.
6 
supra.
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arbitration. What the absence of a developed practice of commercial arbitration within the
countries suggests, however, is that as participants, whether as individuals, as corporations
(private or public), or in their capacity as states, they became involved with the process
before they had experimented with it in the domestic commercial setting. The result is that
they were inexperienced in arbitration of the type practised in international trade, and that
was bound to affect their attitude.
With respect, however, to the arbitration of state contracts, it should be pointed
out that states (underdeveloped and industrialised alike) have ordinarily been resistant to
submit to arbitration with private parties. Haxel Fox states that a submission to arbitration
was often regarded as a loss of liberty. 7 If it was so regarded, it is not surprising that new
states also adopted a similar attitude. In the particular case of state contracts by
developing countries, arbitration clauses were intended as a contractual device to protect
the investor. That distorted the role of arbitration, for, the impression created has not been
one that portrays arbitration as a neutral facility to which both parties have recourse
whatever the outcome, but as a means of safeguarding the position of one of the parties in
dispute. In the circumstances, it would not have been surprising or unreasonable for the
countries to ask, as did Professor Lowenfeld in a related context, whether developed
states and private investors who requested and insisted on arbitration "... simply made a
choice of forum, with the expectation that that choice had no effect on the substance of
any dispute that may arise, or whether some difference in the source of law as well as in
the decision-making process is part of the understanding
The answer would appear to have been in the positive, at least in relation to the
creation of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, (ICSID), as
the only international mechanism set up specifically to deal with state arbitration with host
countries, and also in relation to the application of international law a the governing law of
the transactions by arbitration tribunals. The background to the making of the Convention
suggests that it was taken for granted that the choice of forum indicated both the choice of
law and the substance of the outcome of the process. Although the creation of the Centre
"States and the Undertaking to Arbitrate" (1988) 37 ICLQ 1. The position has, however, improved.
8 "Lex Mercatoria An Arbitrator's View" (1994) 6 Arbitration International, 133, p. 149.
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was to be merely a choice of forum, it is obvious that the choice was intended to affect the
substance of disputes, and nothing that has happened since then suggests otherwise. 9 It
would of course be a matter of pure guesswork to assess the impact of ICSID and its
sister institution, MIGA, on the overall flow of investment capital to host countries,
especially as such an impact could only be indirect. What seems clear, unfortunately, (as
far as one can tell from the nature of the transactions so far involved in ICSID arbitration),
is that the Centre and the Agency have been concerned not with 'investment' transactions,
in the sense of transactions which generate a flow of capital to developing countries,
(since that was the stated purpose of both instruments), but with transactions producing a
net outflow of investment resources from the countries concerned, such as construction
contracts.'° Most other ICSID cases concern petroleum and other natural resources
contracts, which commercially hold-out a strong attraction of substantial profits often
outweighing the risks involved. They are in most cases transactions which investors would
undertake irrespective of the jurisdictional and fmancial guarantees of ICSID and MIGA.
That the subject of state contracts by many of the countries may be expropriated,
nationalised, confiscated, or the obligations under such contracts unilaterally modified by
the regimes concerned, is ultimately not so much a matter of legality and financial
guarantees as a problem of democracy and the accountability of those in power.
Govermnent officials who negotiate contracts in disregard of their own domestic laws",
and who too frequently infringe upon the basic human and property rights of their own
citizens, are likely to behave similarly towards others.
As far as the future of commercial arbitration in the same countries is concerned,
the solution may lie, in the first place, in encouraging its use within the countries
themselves by business and industry with a view, ultimately, to generate a genuine belief in
its merits at the international level.'2
creation of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MIGA, reflected a SimiI2r concern, i.e.,
the protection of investments.
'°Nathan: "Submission to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in Breach of the
Convention" (1995) 12 J. Int'L Arb'n., part 1, 27.
Paulsson: "Third World Participation in International Investment arbitration" (1987) 2 ICSID Rev.,-
FLU, l9 p. 60.
12 Bornbi "L'arbitrage Commercial International dans le nouveau Code Tunisien" (book review) (1996) 8
Air. J. Int'l. Comp. Law 278, pp. 279-80.
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APPENDIX I
IcslD Awards and the Denial of Host
State Laws
George ELOMBI
The emergence of developing countries as participants in international
commercial arbitration was met with a robust rejection of the application oftheir laws
to what are now known as "State contracts". In the early State arbitrations, it was
claimed that the legal systems of the countries concerned were too under-developed to
deal with the complex nature of the transactions involved. It was suggested, as
reflected in the now too well-known phrase of the arbitrator in an award involving
Abu Dhabi, a Gulf State,' that it would, as regards the proper law of the contract, have
been 'fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive region there (was) any settled body
ofiegal principles applicable to the construction of modern commercial instruments."
Parallel with that development, it was also argued that the very nature of the
transactions, 2 together with the fact that they usually contain a submission to
arbitration by the host State concerned, necessarily brings the contracts within the
realm of internationa' law. In the vocabulary of the trade, they become
"incernationalised". This approach to the question of the proper law of State contracts
was criticised on the ground that it confuses the separate domains ofpublic and private
international laws. If. under the relevant private international law rules, a contract is
found to be governed by any particular law, that law, said FA. Mann. as the proper
Law, ".. . not merely sustains but, because it sustains. may modify or dissolve the
contractual bond."3 Mann however recognised that a State contract could still be
internationalised, although only by means of the same private international law
process. Nothing stops parties to the State contract from making international law the
governing law of the contract, by agreement. In the absence of an express or implied
choice, the same traditional principles of conflict oflaws might lead to the application
of international law, particularly as Maim not only expressly denied the existence of
the presumption in favour of the host State law, but also warned against overrating its
significance, if it exists' His critics also admitted that the contracts are normally
• LLM. (London); Ccirnv for Commercial Law Studies. Queen Mar y Collem. University olLondon. U. K.
Prm4cis,s Did'prnnzr (Tn....,! Coast) Ltd. s'. Thr SheiL4i of .41'.. Dlwh,. iward of August. 1951. I l952 I
ICLQ. 247.
It ms said thu th .rc contracts susi.rnens. onmetimes regarded as a nvatv. sonmeunmes as a quasi-irncnvanon.il
contract, or an eeoflom,c .kvdopnment a.rccnwnt. ow n, to ch size ot'the fitiancul commitment ot the investor,
or as a s f-contained contract, and trw those reasons subject to international law.
Saw Contra.is and Si.nr Rcsp.itihiIiry (196fl) 54 AJIL. 572 at 5411. cuing Khkr ... .Iid1jnd Bank. 11954)1 AC..
24 at 56.
Thc Proper Lan .'fCt'mra.is C,'ii,Ii,ded 1'> !ntcrn,ukwjl Prrs.',is (1959) 35 BYIL. 34.
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governed by the local law of the host State, but argued that the result of the application
of that law should be denied where the State exercises its sovereignty to alter "the local
law as to end its obligations under the contract " before its full duration, on the basis
that it is contrary to international law. This view received the growing support of
arbitration awards!'
Thus, at the time the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (lcslD) Convention came onto the scene, two views were prevalent. One
directly rejected the application of host State laws on the basis that they were lacking
in sophistication. The other did so indirectly, both by treating international law as the
governing law of State contracts and by subjecting the local law to international law.
Both grounds were, of course, not acceptable to the countries concerned. The ICSID
Convention did not resolve the issue. In what has always been regarded as a
compromise solution, it made both systems of law—domestic and international—
relevant to investment disputes to which the Convention applies. The question, thus,
is whether, nearly thirty years since the Convention, the then prevalent trends have
been modified in favour of the much acclaimed compromise.
I. THE CONVENTION: ITS AWARDS AND THE INADEQUACY OF HOST STATE LAWS
Three factors rendered the application of host State laws directly relevant to the
type of contracts to which the World Bank ICSID Convention applies. First, Article 42
directs that, in the absence of agreement by the parties regarding the proper law of the
contract, an lcslD tribunal should "apply the law of the Contracting State party to the
dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws)." Next, as noted by Sornarajah,'
the States themselves began to introduce legislation to cover the area of investments
generally, and that of natural resources in particular. Finally, express contractual
provisions were also being made by the countries concerned for the determination of
the disputes by reference to their laws. In those circumstances, it became increasingly
impossible to suggest that the State laws could not be applied because they were not
adequately developed. However, IcSID tribunals have, in many cases, found other
legal techniques to avoid the laws.
In cases where the reference is to the general law as against a specific legislation of
the receiving State, an avoidance mechanism has been to refer to the principles of
commercial law of the former colonial power of the State concerni'd on the ground
that the host State's laws are drawn from the former, and the dispute determined
accordingly. In K1ckncr v. Ga,,,croon, the Tribunal found that the relevant
Cameroonian law was derived from French law and on the basis of that finding, felt
Jinning. Ssaic Co.uraas iv, J,,rcr,,.zri,',wI L.a..' (1961) 37 BYIL. 156.
See (or exarnpk. Sapphire 1,,ren.aruinal Parok..m L.jJ. ,'. .\a,i,'nal Ira,,ia,, Oil Co., award of IS March 1963
11967135 I.L.R.. 136.
l,,:crnasi,',jal Co,n,,,ercial .4rb:rrario,,: The Pr,vl,lcin of S rare C.'nrraas. Lo,i.rnan Singapore Ltd.. 1990. at p. 20;
The Climate of I,,ren,ario,,al C,'mmrrcial	 14 J
.
 Ini. Arb. 2. June 19') 1. 48.
Award o121 October 1983 published in excerpts: seejan Paulsson. Tlic h:s,,, Klöckncr v. C,n,,croo,, .ju'ard:
th. Dunes 
.'f Paniucr it: .".o,rl,—S,ii.nh Ec.m,',.,k Der'e&'pvneui .4,rrc,,jc,us. IJ. Inc. Arb. 2. JuI 1984. 145.
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comfortable to draw directly on French law without any further reference to
Cameroonian law. Thus, to deal with the duty of good faith (full disclosure), the
Tribunal "took for granted" that the duty is a "basic principle of French law, as is
indeed the case under other national codes" (emphasis added) without the need for
reference to the position in Cameroonian law. There is no suggestion as to whether
the Tribunal should have had regard to the local jurisprudence and statute, if any, on
the duty of full disclosure.
In considering the second legal issue involved in the dispute, the defence of
exceptio non adimpleti contractus, extensive citation and discussion of French case-law is
made and relied upon, together with general principles of English and international
law, as systems which both reach similar conclusions on the defence as under French
law. For that purpose, a good section of the award is concerned with the discussion of
"[general] principles under French, English and international law".'° Nowhere in the
award is reference made to Cameroonian jurisprudence, academic writing or statutes
on the principle of good faith, its resulting duty of full disclosure and the defence of
excepzio non adimpleti conrractus.
It is clear both from the award and the ensuing annulment proceedings that all
parties to the award were concerned not with Canieroonian law based on French law
but with French civil law. Thus, Klöckner's application for annulment against the
original Tribunal's award on the question of full disclosure, alleging that the Tribunal
had failed to apply the law of the contracting State in accordance with Article 42 of the
IC5ID Convention, was not based on the absence of reference to Cameroonian law
itself, but on the Tribunal's assumption that partners in a close contractual relationship
must deal in good faith is a "basic principle of French civil lau'" (emphasis added)." In
the application for annulment, it was claimed that such an assumption was not
founded on a "specific principle of' French lau', but on a sort of declaration, as general as
it is imprecise, of principles which are allegedly universally recognized." (emphasis
added).' 2
 The objection was accepted by the Ad Hoc Committee, which pointed out
that the original Tribunal:
does not claim to ascertain the existence (of a rule or principle) but asscrts or postulates
the existence of such a 'principk' which.. . the Tribunal assumes or takes for ,ranted that it is
a basic principle of Frcnch Ia,,'." (emphasis added).'
The Committee then questions whether without "reference whatsoever to
legislative texts, to judgments, or to scholarly opinions"' 4 (presumably French), the
assumed "basic principle" can be held to exist in French positive civil law. By way of
contrast, the Ad Hoc Committee points to the fact that in considering the defence of
exccprio non adimpleri contra cr,s, the Tribunal made extensive references to French case-
Ibid.. p. 157.
" Ibid.. p. 159.
"Ibid.. p. 157.	 -
' .4d Hot Committee firtt aniwlment award of 3 May 1985 I 19861 1 Ics,u Rev.. FlU. 89, p. III.
pararaph 67.
Ibid.
Ibid.. p. 113. paragraph 71.
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law and academic writing, and expresses the view, without however denying the
existence of the duty to disclose, that, as regards that duty, the Tribunal:
either began a similar search for authority but found it unproductive or. more likely.
thought that a search for positive law was unnecessary."
The Committee then held that:
fin] any event, in the absence of any information, evidence or citation in the award, it
would seem difficult to accept. and impossible to prewnie. that there is a general duty under
French civil law, femphasis added] or for that matter other systems ofcivil law, for a contracting
party to make a 'lull disclosure' to its partner. If we were to presunte anything. it would instead
be that such a duty (the basic idea of which may. of course, be accepted as it follows from the
prinaple of good faith...) must, to be given effect in positive law, have conditions for its
application and limits!" (emphasis in original)."'
It then concludes that:
"[it] is not the responsibility ofthe ad hoc committee under Article 52" to determine instead of
the Tribunal what rules of French civil lau' might be applicable, to insert them in some a
pc'srcriori way into the Award... "(emphasis added)."'
The repeated reference to French law points to the fact that the tribunal was not
concerned with Cameroonian law at all.'9
What is objectionable about that process is that it fails to acknowledge that the
general laws of these countries, including their commercial laws, although drawn
from, are nor exactly the same as French law. Although the laws are similar in general
principles, they show some significant differences in detail, owing not only to the fact
that the local courts evolved a separate jurisprudence before and after independence,
alongside modifications introduced by new local statutes, but also to the method by
which French law was extended into the then colonies. In response to the extensive, if
somewhat unnecessary, reference to and reliance placed on French law as the basis for
the applicable domestic statutes, in another case 2 ' the dissenting arbitrator felt
compelled to state2 ' that as far as the particular State party to the dispute, Senegal, was
concerned, French law remains relevant only for the purposes of illustration:
... Il partir dii 4 avril 1960. date de l'indpendence du Sén$gal. k droit Snégalais s'est
dtt2ché du droit Français, celui-ci ne pouvant servir qu'à titre d'illustration d'une opinion
quand ii sagit de situations postérieures a certe date." ("Upon attaining independence on
4 April 1960. Senegalese law became separated from French law, which, in relation to causes
arisrng thereafter, remains relevant only for the purpose of illustration. "—translated by the
author).
Ibid.
" lbid. paragraph 73.
Which sets out the grounds of appeal against an lcsw award.
"' Op. a:.. footnote 12. p. 113. paragraph 73.
The same approach is adopted in A.ip i'. Cess.' I I993J I IcaiD Reports. 31)6. and &,,,'c'nuri & B',:f',ir i'.
C'nc'c'. ibid .,330 where the Tribunals concluded that the rekvaiii Congolese law wj the same as the law of France
in force in thc country at the time of independence. omitting an further reference to the law of the Congo. See also
Atlantic Tnrt'u Cii. ,'. Guinea, award of2l April Iô. I9l*( I l5J.D.l.. II (excerpts).
" St'ci,W Oucsr'.4frkaine des &:g,ns Indu.qrith (SOABIi i. Scneai. Icsi award of 25 February 198g. I I991 6
IcsmRev. FlU. 125.
Although that was not necessary, since the settlement had clearly been made on the basis of Senegalese law.
See footnote 2(1. supra. p. 242.
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The point would appear to have been taken, seeing that in a subsequent lcsia Ad
Hoc Committee award involving the State of Guinea, the Committee recognized "the
fact that Guinean law is independent of French law, although derived from it." It
noted that prior to independence, French law was applied in Guinea, as elsewhere in
the French colonies under certain conditions, and in due course rapidly replaced the
local customs In civil and commercial matters:
"... [neverthelessj. French laws and rcgulations were not automatically applicabk in the
colonies in these matters. They had to be introduced in accordance with the principle of
sp&ialitt 1fqislativc.. . and the modifications locally enacted were not necessarily the same as
those applicable in France. Consequently, certain discrepancies may be found bccwecn French
law as applied in France. and local Guinean Law.
although that was not the situation in relation to the particular provision of law
involved in that case,
It is necessary to bear that in mind and, therefore, to undertake a proper search of
the applicable domestic laws in each case, as indicated by the parties and the provisions
of such Conventions or other legal instruments as are in force requiring the
application of host State laws. In any event, since independence, the laws of the
former colonial powers are only a source of, and not the actual laws of the "new"
States. The attempt to undermine these laws by over-emphasising the link with the
European laws from which they are drawn so as to apply the tatter, without doubt
suggests a thinking process based on the assumed inferiority of the legal systems
concerned. It also indicates a determined attempt to subordinate these laws to a
different and preferred legal order—an objective which has been so well achieved by
the process of intemationalisation.
That process assumes a curious form where the law concerned is a special piece of
legislation governing foreign investments, particularly if it takes the form of an
international agreement, such as a bilateral investment treaty. The technique, as used
in the award in Asian Agricultural Products AAPL v. Sri is to treat the particular
treaty separately from the rest of the law of the host State, so as to ignore the latter.
The award was concerned essentially with the interpretation of a Sri Lanka-United
Kingdom Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which had been extended to Hong
Kong. The contract between the AAPL and the government did not contain an
applicable law clause. In the arbitration, both the claimant and the State relied heavily
on the provisions of the Treaty, and on that basis, the majority of the Tribunal thought
that the Treaty constituted the primary source of the applicable legal rules for the
determination of the dispute. In the view of the majority, the existence of the Treaty
and the parties' reliance on it, together with the fact that the parties had failed to select
the proper law in advance, meant that the Tribunal could not determine the applicable
law in accordance with the scheme set out in Article 42. In those circumstances, the
' .%ari,i,nc b,ra,,atit,ual ."o,,,i,icrs Esiablislunens p. C ' i'cvnrnc'm of Guinea, award o122 December 1989j 19901 5
Icsrn Rcv.. FlU, 95.
Ibid.. p. 112.
Award o(27 June 1w). 1199116 IcalD Rev., FlU. 526.
294
66	 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
proper law fell to be determined "by observing and construing the conduct of the
parties throughout the arbitration proceedings." 2
 Reliance by the parties on the
Treaty provision was therefore construed by the majority of the panel as indicating
"their mutual agreement" as to the proper law of the contract for the purposes of
Article 42.
As pointed out by the dissenting arbitrator, that approach to the issue is flawed in
many respects, the principal one being that it is inconsistent with the scheme of Article
42, which, in the absence of choice, mandates the application of the host State law,
together with the relevant niles of international law, if any. If, as was submitted by
the defendants in that case, the Sri Lanka—United Kingdom BIT provisions were
relevant to the determination of the dispute and relied upon by the parties, it could
only be on the basis that the Treaty had become part of the law of Sri Lanka. This
approach would, as stated by the dissenting arbitrator, have emphasised the
importance of the domestic law of the State as the primary source of rules on the
protection of property or governing all forms of investments in receiving States. The
majority did not seem to appreciate that treaties signed by the government of Sri
Lanka became applicable in that country by virtue only of Article 157 of its
Constitution, which incorporates them into the domestic law.
To consider the Treaty as part of the law of Sri Lanka would still not have made a
difference in the outcome of the particular proceedings since in any case the Tribunal
would have been led to the same Treaty provisions as the relevant rules of the
applicable law of the contract. What is at issue, however, is a question of principle
regarding the place of the domestic law in resolving these disputes. In failing to
interpret the provisions of the Treaty as part of the law of the State party to the
contract, the Tribunal undermines the significance of that law and in particular, of
Article 42. The majority of the Tribunal appeared to be under the impression that to
admit the Treaty provisions as applicable only as part of the law of Sri Lanka would
have amounted to a recognition of host State laws as governing investment contracts,
at a time when the main current of legal opinon is still against such a view.
II. THE CONVENTION: ITS AWARDS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The rejection of the laws of the State party to the contracts under Article 42 is
supported on the basis that, in the relationship between that law and international law,
Article 42 envisages that international law shall be overriding in the event ofa conflict.
Aron Broches states the position in the following terms:
The tribunal will normally first look at the law of the State party to the dispute. Then the
result of the application of that law Will be tested against international law. That process will
not involve the confirmation or denial of the validity of the host State's law, but may result in
not applying it where that law, or action taken under that law, violates international law.
Ibid.. p. 333. paragraph 3).
-. Cons'c',::ioa, i',, thc Scukrnc,z: of Ip,r'rsuncnt Dispt.rrs b,,ni .rc,, Sr,nc ,znj .\'a,i,,njh of' Or1,cr Stairs ,f 1965:
Explanatory Notes and Sun'cy of its .ipplkanti (l')93) XVIII Yearbook Comm. Arb'n., 627 at 668.
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The view has received the overwhelming support of lcszD tribunals. The
conclusion reached in lcsID awards is that international law is the superior norm,
against which the suitability of the domestic law of the investment receiving State is
checked. If the law of the State fails to meet the required standard, it must be denied
application.
Without doubt, the role and significance of international law under Article 42 of
the IcsID Convention is one of interpretation. The Convention did not, however, set
out to undermine the laws of host States. The compromise in Article 42 is that both
domestic and international law are made relevant to a legal dispute to which the
Convention applies. The wording of Article 42 itself does not indicate a preference
for any of the laws potentially in conflict. Against the interpretation which favours
international law and with which ICSID tribunals have so far found favour, it must be
pointed out that Article 42 does not assume that international law is relevant and
applicable in the same way that domestic law is. The application of the law ofthe State
party to the dispute is stated first, and juridically, as a matter olcourse " International
law, on the other hand, is made to apply concurrently with the law of the host State
only to the extent that it contains rules which are appropriate to such contracts, since
international law is normally relevant only in relationships between sovereign States.
The wording ofArticle 42, for that reason, calls for the application only, of"suth rules
of international law as niay be applicable." (emphasis added). If it had been intended
otherwise, that is, as is suggested in the awards, the makers of the Convention would
have done so by providing clearly for the application of "rules of international law".
However, if, exceptionall y, such appropriate rules of international law relevant to
contracts governed by the Convention were discovered, but found to be inconsistent
with the relevant domestic law, the letter of Article 42 unfortunately does not provide
the solution. It fails to indicate what set of rules should take precedence. Therefore,
any view which seeks to give precedence to one system or the other cannot be
supported by reference to the wording of that Article. In those circumstances, the
solution would lie in the spirit both of the Article and the entire Convention. The
spirit of the Convention calls for the search for a compromise in all events.
Where, unfortunately, that compromise is absolutely impossible to achieve, the
ICSID tribunal must fall back to the ordinary principles of conflict of laws. No doubt,
in the majority of ICSID cases although not all, those principles will lead to the
application of the law of the host State, both as the law which bears the closest
connection to the transaction, and as the law of the only State whose interests are
significantly affected by the contract and the outcome of the dispute. It must be
' See for example. KIkncr p. Czmrroou. footnotes 14 and 12 supra: .4 guc,. t.	 .4d Ho Commicwt' and
re-submitted awards of 16 May 19146 and 31 May 1991)119931 I k.sw Reports. 54") and 569. rcspectivdv.
Article 42(1) provides: Th tribunal shill decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be
agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State
party
 to th dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be
applicable. -
In the absence ofchoice and without the provision ofthe Convention, ordinary principles oflaw will lead to
the host State law.
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remembered that the ICSID Convention, in the first place, never intended to deal with
the controversial issue of substantive standards applicable to foreign investments. Its
stated objective was limited to providing "facilities for conciliation and arbitration of
investment disputes." 31
 The substantive standards which such a forum would have
had to apply are a consideration which was expressly admitted not to be within the
scope of the Convention, but which, it must be regretted, Article 42 indirectly
attempted to deal with. Not surprisingly it failed in that objective, which could not be
achieved merely by juxtaposing international and domestic laws as relevant to those
disputes. Where, therefore, a genuine conflict arises between the applicable host State
law and such rules of international law as may be found relevant to contracts of that
nature, however described, the tribunal should declare that part of Article 42
inoperative, 32
 and on that basis, fall back on well-established principles of private
international law. That would be juridically sound.
The approach which seeks to give precedence to one set of the competing
norms—in this case international law—is based entirely on considerations of policy.
The policy involved is the protection of foreign investments by the use of such
substantive standards as may be available in international law. Unfortunately, the
ICSID Convention itselfwas built on the realisation that previous attempts at resolving
the issue of foreign investments through the formulation ofsubscantive standards had
met with little success. Drawing on that failure, the makers of the Convention
therefore opted for a procedural solution, based exclusively on providing a iieutralforum
for the settlement of investment disputes. The then President of the World Bank made
it clear that the Convention was intended to:
have only limited scope. It would provide machinery but it would not make the use of
that machinery compulsory. Nor would it lay down subszantii'e rules ofIan' regarding the treatment of
foreign investments. I do not consider that it u'ould be realistic to try for a morefar-reaching agreement a,
this time." (emphasis added)A.
The argument here is that if the Convention itself could not do something
directly, lcsin tribunals cannot do it indirectly. The forum for the discussion of that
issue must therefore be elsewhere.
" Article 1(2) of thc Convention.
'- In that it fails to disclose th intention, whatever that might have been. of the makers of the Convention.
' Note to the Executive Directors of the Bank, History of the Convention. Vol. 2. Part I. P. 6. See also the
General Counsel's opening statements at the consultative meetings of legal experts in Santiago. Geneva and
Bangkok. and of the Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Africa. at the Addis Ababa meeting. ibid..
pp. 301. 369, 462 and 239. respectively.
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APPENDIX II
CUSTOMARY ARBITRATION: A GHANAIAN TREND
REVERSED IN NIGERIA
GEORGE ELOMBI
The majority decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of Agu v.
Ikewibe' has, for Nigeria, put an end to a trend introduced in Ghana over the
nature of customary arbitration. The Supreme Court held that arbitration in the
customary law of Nigeria is the voluntary submission of a dispute to a third party
fcc a solution based on the subsequent (and not prior) acceptance of his decision,
which becomes binding only upon such acceptance by the parties to the dispute.
The issue has arisen in mainly two ways before the courts of Nigeria and Ghana,
including the former West African Court of Appeal. 2 In one set of cases, the
question arises indirectly, when it is pleaded as an estoppel. Agu v. Ike-wibe falls in
this group of cases. The question has been whether the customary dispute settle-
ment processes involved can be regarded as an "arbitration" in the English law
sense of the word, leading to a final and binding award which may then become
available to one of the parties to the proceedings to preclude the other party from
re-litigating the same matter. As an incidental issue, the courts have had to
determine whether a party in those proceedings can withdraw from the process at
any stage before or after the award.3
While declining to lay down any general principles on the second point, the
Privy Council nevertheless held in Kwasi v. Larbi4 that in the absence of suffi-
cient evidence to the contrary, a right so inconsistent with the very nature of
arbitration, especially where it allowed one party to resile after the award, did not
exist in the customary law of the Akan in Ghana. The decision was expressly
stated to have been made in the absence of evidence to suggest the contrary.
Presumably, the Privy Councillors would have recognised such a right if there
had been sufficient evidence to that effect. However, in rejecting the suggestion
advanced for the appellants in that case, that under the customary law, a party
who had voluntarily submitted to arbitration still retained the right to withdraw,
the Priv Council. and the West African Court of Appeal before it, thought such a
view would be repugnant to good sense. The Court of Appeal had looked up to a
previous decision of its own in Foli v. Abeng Akese 5 for authority to reject the
Maitrise-en-Droh (Yaounde); LL.M. (London)
1. (1991)3 N.W.LL, 385; followed in Ohiaeri v. Akabezi (1992)2 N.W.L.R., 1. (Sup.Ct.of Nig.)
2. Otherwise known by its acronym, W.A.C.A.. an Appeal Court for the former Bntisb Wesi African
colonies of Nigeria, including the part of Cameroon then under British administration - Ghana,
Sierra Leone and Gambia, with final appeals being made to the Privy Council in London.
3. See for example. Kwasi v. Larbi(1956)13 W.A.C.A.. 76, Privy Council.
4. Ibid.
5. (1930)1 WACA, t reversed on another ground: (1934)2 WACA, 46. Privy Council.
5RADIC (1993)
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same suggestion. in the latter case, Deane CJ., who gave the decision of the
Court, stated in relation to the guiding principles which the courts should follow
in setting aside the award of an arbitrator that, "... as the parties choose their own
arbitrator to be the judge of the dispute between them, they cannot when the
award is good on its face, object to his decision, either upon the law or the facts.'6
In response to a similar argument by the appellants before the Court of Appeal in
Kwasi v. Larbi, Blackall, P., who also delivered the judgment of the Court,
admitted that it would no doubt be true under the custom that a party could resile
but felt compelled to add that "... the general principles of native customary law
are based on reason and good sense and it would take a lot to convince me that
Akan customary law is so repugnanz to good sense7 as to allow the losing party to
reject the decision of the arbitrators to whom he had previously agreed." 6 Then,
as now, the language of repugnancy was used in Africa to deny recognition to any
aspect of the customary laws which did not correspond with the judges' perspective
of justice. It is therefore not unlikely that the Privy Council's advice in the case
would have remained the same even if there had been adequate evidence of the
existence of the right to resile in the relevant customary law. That right may have
been tested against the repugnancy doctrine and refused recognition on that ground.
1. THE CENTRAL QUESTION.
The cases made it necessary for the judges to consider the nature and essential
requirements of arbitration under the applicable customary law in each case.
After referring to Foli v. Abeng Akese, Nnaemeka-Agu, J.S.C. (dissentient) in
Agu v. Ikewibe, reviewed the other decisions of the former West African Court of
Appeal on the subject and stated what, in his view, are the requirements of
customary arbitration, as deduced from the cases:
(i) a voluntary submission to the arbitration;
(ii) an express or implied agreement by the parties that the decision in the
arbitration will be final and binding;
(iii) that the proceedings were in accordance with the custom and,
(iv) that the award was published.
The second requirement is that around which much of the difference in opin-
ion in and out of the courts has arisen. It is central to the concept of arbitration in
international law and in European law, as understood in Europe itself, as well as
under the received European laws in force in most Africa countries.9 There was a
difference in opinion between the majority (Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. delivered the
leading judgment-Obaseki, Kawu and Wali, U.S.C. agreeing] and Nnaemeka-
Agu, J.S.C., on this requirement. The leading judgment expressed no opinion on
the fourth. The court was unanimous in its agreement on the first requirement.
6. Ibid,alp.2.
7. My emphasis. All other italics are mine.
8. (1956)13 W.A.C.A.. 81 aX p82.
9. See fcc example, S.2 of the Nigerian Aibtuabon and Conciliation Act. 1988.
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2. AGU V. IKEWIBE AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF CUSTOMARY
ARBITRATION.
In the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the respondent in Agu v. Ikewibe relied on the
outcome of an arbitration under customary law against the appellants. As in most
of the cases in which the question of customary arbitration has arisen, the claim
concerned title over land. The respondent brought the action and relied, among
other grounds, on the arbitration in customary law in which an award had been
made by the chief and elders of the locality in his favour. The appellant denied
that any arbitration had taken place between the parties and that in any case, the
arbitration referred to by the respondent was different from that in which a decision
bad been given for the respondent The High Court of Okigwe dismissed the
respondent's claim. The Court of Appeal of Nigeria (Enugu Division] reversed
the High Court and held that there had been a binding arbitration between the
parties and as a result, the appellant could not deny the respondent's title to the land.
On further appeal to the Supreme Court of Nigeria, two issues arose to be decided:
(i) whether the alleged arbitration had been properly pleaded and on the
evidence, established;
(ii) if so, could it constitute res judicata?
On the first point the court unanimously held that on the pleadings and the
evidence, there had been only one arbitration which had been satisfactorily
established. The Court of Appeal had therefore decided correctly, in reversing the
lower court on that ground. However, the outcome of the arbitration could only
constitute res judicata if, in the first place, the customary law knew of such a thing
as an "arbitration" and second, on whether the proceedings, having been con-
ducted in accordance with the local customary law, could become binding on the
parties in the same way as any other judicial process. Two points thereupon arose
to be considered: does Nigerian law recognise customary arbitration and if so,
what are its characteristics? Second, could it constitute res jisdicaza? We will
consider the second point first
A. Customary "Non-Judicial" Proceedings and Res Judicata
On the second question, the appellants argued that the award could not be binding
because, being a mere decision of a body of elders, it was lacking in the requisite
authority of a body duly constituted and competent to exercise judicial func-
tions.'0 Nnaerneka-Agu, J.S.C., (dissenting) accepted a distinction drawn on the
basis of the case of Equere Inyang v. Simeon EsienU between arbitration by
tO. As distinguished from judicial powers: The question as to whether customary arbiwation would
be a usurpation of the judicial power in the lig)u of the provisions of S.6 of the Nigerian
Constitution of 1979. vesting such powers in the cotnu mentioned in. or established by virtue of
that section, had been answered by the Supreme Court in the negative in Idika v. Erisi (1988)2
NWLR. 563. Ii is an important constitutional question bearing on the effect of S.6 on the validity
of arbiDations as a whole in Nigeria. but which does not fall within the scope of this article.
ii. (1957)2 F.S.C., 39.
299
806 George Elombi
people exercising the judicial function by customary law, such as chiefs, anci
arbitration by persons who lack the authority to exercise such functions. It was
advanced for the appellants that the case of Inyang v. Esien was authority for the
view that a decision by a group of persons acting as a non-judicial body, could not
be binding and that since the body of elders in the present case fell within that
category, their decision could not become res judicata. In Inyang, the action for a
declaration of title had been withdrawn and the case submitted for settlement by
an Iman Council. The Council was not a Customary Court and ii was also said
that it had no powers to make a binding order. The decision of the Iman Council
was rejected by the appellants, as a result of which the action was initiated. It
was held by the then Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria that the decision of the
Irnan Council was not binding. The case has often been cited as having decided
that the decision of such a council or group of elders cannot constitute res judicata
because they are not judicial bodies properly constituted as such. The appellants
therefore submitted that Inyang v. Esien limited the binding effect of out-of
court decisions to those of a judicial body. In dismissing the submission, Karibi-
Whyte, J.S.C., said:
I do not think that it (Inyang v. EsienJ could be so restricted. In my
view the ratio decidendi... was that the parties not having accepted
the settlement of the Iman Council, the arbitration failed. A judicial
tribunal for the purpose of estoppel has been given a more liberal and
broader definition.'2
On the evidence both of the plaintiff and the defendant, its mandate was limited to
the purpose of making peace between the parties. The settlement had simply
failed and the parties could not be held to the outcome of an unsuccessful attempt
at effecting a settlement between, and acceptable to them. After referring to the
record of the appeal on the evidence on both sides, Jibowu, FJ., delivering the
judgment of the Federal Supreme Court' 3
 in that case said:
it [was] abundantly clear that the Iman Council was only in-
structed to bring the parties together and make peace between them.
It follows that whatever decision they gave which was not acceptable
to one of the parties had no binding effect and cannot constitute res
judicata. The evidence showed that the attempt to settle the matter
failed. The plaintiffs reported the failure to the District Officer who
advised them to take a new action, which was accordingly taken and
transferred to the Supreme Court.'4
Inyang v. Esien was therefore a case where the jurisdiction of the Council was
limited. It is doubtful whether it was strictly an "arbitration", even under the
12. Note I,p.4I3.
13. Then, appeals from the Fed.Sup.Ct.Nig. lay direct to the Privy Council in London.
14. Note 11, p.41.
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customary law, since the Council was not adjudicating. That limitation did not
apply to the body of chiefs and elders in the Agu case, where the elders had been
called upon to adjudicate on the dispute and not simply to make peace between
the parties. Although their decision could not become binding until accepted by
the parties, they nevertheless were vested with a wider jurisdiction than the Iman
Council in Inyang.
The question remained whether as a non-judicial body, the group of elders
were competent under customary law to exercise judicial functions. If they were
not, their purported arbitration would still not be binding until subsequently
accepted by the parties to the arbitration. The Supreme Court majority was in no
doubt that they were. Kanbi-Whyte, J.S.C., referred to the WACA case of Kweku
Assampong v. KWEKUAmuaku'5 and said:
I think it is well settled and judicial authority is not lacking for the
view that persons exercising judicial functions in accordance with
native law and custom and are duly authorised to adjudicate among
their community have always been recognised as having such pow-
ers... The provisions of the Constitution of 1979, sections 6 (1) and
(5) have not altered the judicial position...'6
That should be so, since elders, family and quarter heads have normally been
recognised under customary law as having the power to exercise judicial func-
tions out of the framework of a customary law court. They are vested with
adjudicatory power in the same way as an arbitrator in Europe or under the
received European laws in force in many African countries. Kweku Assampong v.
Kweku Amuaku itself involved a dispute as to the ownership of land in circurn-
stances where both the land and the parties to the proceedings belonged to two
neighbouring administrative districts. A group of persons was appointed by the
two chiefs concerned, consisting of members from both sides, in accordance with
custom. It was held that the decision of that body was binding and constituted res
judicata although the group could neither be regarded as a court of law nor as
arbitrators. They were no more than persons exercising judicial functions by
customary law. Kingdom, Ci., put it in the following words:
I think that the evidence establishes that the tribunal consisted of a
body of persons exercising judicial functions by custom, and duly
invested with authority to adjudicate upon the dispute. In loose lan-
guage its proceedings might be spoken of as an arbitration, but there
was no arbitration in the technical English sense, and all the argu-
ments of counsel for the plaintiff based on the assumption that such
was the contention are beside the point.'7
iS. (1930)1 W.A.CA, 192.
16. Notcl.p.412.
Il. Nose 15. p.196.
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The decision of the chiefs and elders in Agu was therefore binding on both
grounds. First, unlike the Iman Council in Inyang v. Esien, their jurisdiction was
neither restricted to a mere attempt to effect a settlement between the parties nor
was it otherwise limited. They were required to adjudicate upon the dispute and
give a decision clear in its terms and definitive. Second, as elders, they remained
vested with authority to exercise judicial functions by, and in accordance with the
custom. That power was not withdrawn by the Nigerian Constitution of 1979.
B. Customary Arbitration in Nigeria: Its Requirements
It was earlier argued for the appellants, on the basis of some statements in a
previous Nigerian Court of Appeal decision in the case of Okpuruwu v.
Okpokam,'8 that the concept of customary arbitration is unknown to Nigerian
law. It was submitted for the appellants that Nigerian law did "... not recognise
the practice of elders or natives constituting themselves as customary arbitrations
(arbitrators?) to make binding decisions between parties in respect of land or
other disputes." That was a bold submission which was treated by the Supreme
Cowi as a "surprise" and, in relation to the Nigerian Constitution of 1979, as a
"... misconception about some of [its) provisions ..., and the freedom between
disputing parties to settle their differences in a manner acceptable to them."' 9 The
Constitution could not be interpreted in a manner which denied individuals the
freedom to determine how best to resolve their differences. The Supreme Court
then went on to describe customary arbitration as a process founded on the
voluntary submission of the disputants to the decision of the tribunal and the
agreement to be bound by such decision or freedom to resile whether or not the
decision was unfavourable. The leading judgment stated:
It is well accepted that one of the many African customary modes of
settling disputes is to refer the dispute to a family head or an elder or
elders for a compromise solution based upon the subsequent accept-
ance by both parties of the suggested award, which becomes binding
only after the signification of such acceptance, and from which either
party is free to resile at any stage of the proceedings up to that point.
This is a common method of settling disputes in all indigenous
Nigerian societies.2°
The Supreme Court considered a series of Nigerian cases at first instance and
some decisions of the former West African Court of Appeal on the subject, out of
which it extracted the following three requirements of customary arbitration in
Nigeria:
18. (1984)4 NWLR. 554.
19. Note I. p.407.
20. Ibid.
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(1) the voluntary submission of the dispute to a non-judicial body for deter-
mination. It is important to note under this heading that the dispute must
have been submitted for determination and not simply to make peace
between the parties or otherwise reach some other loose arrangement.
That is what distinguishes Inyang from the other cases. The role of the
tribunal, (usually elders) must be adjudicatory, i.e., to decide, and not
merely to arrange a compromise settlement, although, as would become
clear under the second and third requirements, that "decision" does not
become binding unless accepted by the parties when pronounced, or
within a reasonable time thereafter. That subsequent acceptance could be
implied or express;
(ii) the willingness of the parties to be bound by the decision or freedom to
reject it if not satisfied,
(iii) that neither of the parties resiles from the decision or, a fortiori, withdraws
from the proceedings before the award is made. It must of course be
assumed as a fourth requirement that the arbitration was conducted in
accordance with the relevant custom.
Prior to the Agu case, the attitude of Nigerian courts, both at first instance and
on appeal had not been altogether consistent. It is not clear why Philip Njoku v.
Felix Ekeocha for example, was considered by the Supreme Court and ap-
proved, although, one would think, the decision in that case was not in some
respects exactly along the same lines as the Supreme Court decision in Agu. The
action was for title and damages for trespass to land. The defendant claimed that
the chief and council of elders had, on the request of the plaintiffs father and the
defendant, allowed the former to produce the customary oath to be sworn to by
the defendants as owners of the land. The effect of the oath in the custom was that
the plaintiffs father would forfeit his claim to the land if the defendant survived
the prescribed period of the oath. He did. Both the plaintiffs father and the
defendant accepted the settlement thereafter. It was held that the settlement
created an estoppel against the plaintiff on the ground, based on the judge's
finding upon the evidence, that the parties had accepted the settlement. The
difference between the decision in this case and the judgment of the majority in
Agu is that the judge, Ikpeazu. 3., regarded the chief and his councillors as being
in the same position as the Iman Council in Inyang v. Esien, i.e., as a body which,
not being vested with judicial authority, its decision could not become binding
until accepted at the time it was given. He explained the legal position of a
decision of such a body in the following terms:
The legal position seems tome to be that where the decision of such a
non-judicial body [although in this particular case, plainly exercising
judicial functions, since its jurisdiction was not, as in Inyang, ex-
pressly or irnpliedly limited] has been accepted by the parties, it will
2!. (1972)2 ECNLR, 199.
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not be open toy of them to turn round at a later stage and reject it.
In such a case the decision will be binding on him, the operative
factor being the initial acceptance of the decision at the time it was
given.
That acceptance having been signified, the decision in this case became binding
on the plaintiffs father and every person claiming through him, including the
plaintiff himself. The plaintiffs father's acceptance of the settlement also oper-
ated against the plaintiff in relation to the second point on which that case was
decided. Ikpeazu, J., held that although the panel of elders, including the chief,
were a non-judicial body they could still sit as arbitrators and their decision,
while sitting in that capacity, will be binding subject to three requirements: that
the parties submitted to the arbitration; that they accepted its terms and thirdly,
that they agreed to be bound by the award. The crucial point here is the third and
the question in relation to that element is whether the agreement could be irrevo.
cably made prior to the delivery of the award. The point did not directly fall to be
decided since on the evidence, the judge was already satisfied that the parties
gave their consent to the settlement after it was made. In Agu, the Supreme Court
thought on the facts, that all three requirements were present and satisfied in
Njoku. It remains doubtful however, whether, in the absence of the specific
finding that the parties accepted the settlement, the judge would still have held the
arbitration binding, on the basis that the voluntary submission to the arbitration
and the acceptance of its terms operated as an implied acceptance of the award,
from which the parties could not withdraw. ft is our view that he may not have
done so, in the light of his own observations in respect of the time when the
parties' acceptance of the decision of a non-judicial body would be operative. The
judge considered the acceptance to be binding when the decision is made, not
before. To that extent, Njoku is similar to Agu.
Nicholas Mbagbu v. Agbarakwe Agochukwu24 was a case in which the court
had to consider which of conflicting decisions of two separate arbitrations was
binding. The decision of the group of elders in the first set of proceedings,
initiated at the request of the plaintiff had been in favour of him. Not being
satisfied, the defendant took the case to what was treated as a higher body,
chaired by a chief and consisting of himself and a group of elders. According to
the plaintiff, the chief in the second arbitration was "a local tyrant who could not
be trusted to do justice..." and had completely failed to give him a fair hearing by
refusing to consider his evidence. Being also dissatisfied with the outcome of the
arbitration by the "local tyrant", he commenced proceedings in court against the
defendant The judge discarded both arbitrations and proceeded to determine the
dispute [over title to land] afresh. With reference to the first arbitration, he
22. Ibid. p.205.
23. Within the judge's understanding of the meaning of that term as explained in Assampong v.
Amuaku, i.e., as a body "not properly constituted as a court". ibid.
24. (1973)3 ECSLR. Part 1.90. Ibid. p.95.
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commented that "... there was no evidence of the identity of the other co-
arbitrators. Nor was there any evidence of the procedure adopted and whether it
was in conformity with the custom of Isi Ake peopJe. In relation to the second
set of proceedings, he said "... it is clear from the evidence of the plaintiff that he
did not accept the decision of Nnadi (the chiefj who according to him violated
rules of natural justice by refusing to consider his case and those of his wit-
nesses? Referring to both arbitrations, he said "... it is not clear how the
arbitrators were appointed and by whom. None of them in my view was vested
with judicial powers and their decisions unless accepted by the parties concerned
could have no binding effect on either party." Nwokedi, i's ruling in this case is
similar in terms to the first ground on which Njoku was decided. In Njoku. as in
Mbagbu. the courts are saying that a decision of elders not vested with judicial
authority cannot be binding unless agreed to by the parties in dispute. In
disregarding the outcome of the arbitrations, Nwokedi J., referred with approval
to the statement of flcpeazu J., cited above and stated that in the case before him, it
was clear from the evidence that both plaintiff and defendant did not accept the
decisions of the councils of elders in the two arbitrations. He did not take the
further step as did Ikpeazu J. in Njoku to consider whether the councils could in
the alternative, be regarded as arbitration panels and if so, on what conditions
their decisions, sitting, as such, would become binding. However, his statement
as to the validity of "any non-judicial body" such as the one he was dealing with,
was wide enough to include a panel of arbitrators. It follows that he would also
have applied as a condition for the validity of the decision of such a panel, the
same two requirements he relied upon to disregard the decisions of the two
councils, namely, voluntary submission to the arbitration and acceptance to be
bound by the award. That step would also have required him to consider at what
stage the acceptance would be operative. Having conceded that the arbitration
panels were in the same position as the Iman Council and the council of elders
and chiefs, i.e., as non-judicial bodies, that stage, one should think, would have
ansen and rendered the acceptance binding only after the making of the award or
upon a reasonable time thereafter. The effect would be that the outcome of an
arbitration in customary law is regarded in the same way as the decision of a
'non-judicial body", as both would not become binding unless accepted by the
parties at the time the decision is handed. We will consider the difference be-
tween customary arbitration and the decision of such a "non-judicial body" later.
Ofomata v. Anoka was a cask of a conditional award. The decision of the
elders had gone in favour of the plaintiffs but provided that if the defendant
deemed it necessary, they could produce the customary oath for the defendants to
25. Ibid. p95.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
2& That is. within the judges' understanding, as a body whose decision cannot be tegarded as that of
a ploperly constituted customary law court.
29. (1974)4 ECSLR. 251.
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swear. Since the oath swearing exercise was an entire part of the arbitration, the
award could not become final and operative until the oath had been taken.
However, some statement of the judge in that case suggest that a party to the
proceedings still retained the right to withdraw at any stage of the process. The
judge observed that,
Although the parties failed to meet for the purpose of oath-swearing
there is no evidence that any party withdrew or resiled before the
arbitrators pronounced their decision arid accordingly it is similarly
easy to hold that there was a properly constituted customary law
arbitration Isubject to the oath swearing exercise referred tol possess-
ing the prerequisites and essentials of a tribunal and upon the basis
that its decisions could be binding on the parties thereto".3°
The suggestion that the parties could still resile after a valid submission is the
main consideration here and, it will be recalled, the one in relation to which both
the Privy Council and the WACA in Kwasi v. Larbi had held that if conceded,
would render customary arbitration repugnant to good sense.
Another line of Nigerian cases however went the other way. Oline v. Obodo'
was a judgment of the former Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria.' 2 In that case,
the validity of the arbitration was challenged on the basis that it was merely a
settlement which was not binding on the parties. Quashie-Idun, Ag.FJ., who
delivered the unanimous judgment of the court rejected that submission in plain
terms. He followed the Privy Council decision in Kwasi v. Larbi and held that,
'i ... where the parties submitted their dispute for settlement by arbi-
tration in accordance with Native Customary Law and one parry
withdrew from the arbitration before it was completed the award of
the arbitration was nevertheless binding on all the parties. In the
present case there is a finding of fact against the appellants that they
attended the arbitration and that they agreed to be bound by the award
of the arbitrator.""
This is therefore a case where the court held that a submission to arbitration in
customary law is irrevocable and the resulting award binding on the parties
without the need for a subsequent acceptance. Thus stated, that ruling is at odds
with the passage in Ofomasa v. Anoka quoted above and the statements of the
High Court in Njoku v. Ekeocha. in relation to the validity of the decision of a
council of elders constituted as arbitrators. The passage in Ofomara and the
statements in Njoku are also inconsistent with the decision of another first
30. Ibid. 253.
31. (1958)3F.S.C., 4.
32. It replaced the WACA as a Court of Appeal for Nigeria, including Cameroon. with further
appeals being refened to the Privy Council in London.
33. Noe3l,p.86.
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tance court in Ekweme v. Mohamed ZakarP which involved a claim for a sum
of money as part of the returns for a joint venture.
In that case, the plaintiff claimed that there was an arbitration binding on the
defendant. The judge invalidated the arbitration on the ground that the jurisdic-
tion of the arbitrators was limited to an attempt to arrange a settlement between
the parties and that attempt failed when the defendant refused to accept the
decision of the panel and, further, that there had been no prior agreement by the
disputants to be bound by the award. The trouble with this case is that it was not
clear whether the court was dealing with an arbitration under customary law. It
was submitted for the plaintiff that it was an arbitration under the common law
and nor under custom and for the defendant, that the parties could only be bound
by an arbitration under statute. [Cap. 10 of the then Laws of Eastern Nigeria.] The
judge himself stated that there was no evidence of the applicable custom, if he
was to rely on any, since the difference in the places of origin of the parties gave
rise to a problem of internal conflict of laws. The defendant was a Northern
Nigerian and the plaintiff, an lgbo, but no evidence was lead on any of the
customary laws potentially in conflict. The judge may however have regarded the
case as one under customary law since all the authorities cited on customary
arbitration are Nigerian and Ghanaian. He reviewed the cases 33 and accepted the
requirements of customary arbitration as stated in them, namely, a voluntary
submission and a prior agreement by both parties to accept the award of the
arbitrators. That agreement being absent, the outcome of the purported arbitration
could not be binding. In the judge's view, it was not an arbitration at all. It was a
failed attempt at a negotiated settlement. The material part of this judgment is
consistent with Oline v. Obodo and the line of the WACA cases referred to, in so
far as they decided that an arbitration under customary law is binding on the basis
of a prior agreement of the parties to accept the award.
Although in Joseph Aguocha v. Edward UbzjP the judge had already found as
a matter of evidence, that the defendant, by his brother,, had accepted the outcome
of the second of three arbitrations, thus making that particular arbitration binding,
be nevertheless stated that parties who have voluntarily submitted to an arbitra-
tion of their differences by a third person cannot be allowed to withdraw from his
decision simply on the basis that it did not favour them.
Agu and Ohiaeri in a sense reversed this second line of first instance cases,
including the former Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria case of Oline v. Obodo, to
the extent by which they decided that a prior agreement to be bound by the
outcome of an arbitration is an element of customary arbitration. The two cases
have resolved that it is not and that the proceedings will be binding in the same
way as an arbitration under statute only if the parties accepted the decision after it
has been pronounced. Before such acceptance, which could be express or
34. (1972)2 ECSLR, 631.
35. Awasi; inyang: Ank,ah v. Dabra (1956)1 WALR. 89: Twwnasi v. Badu (1957)2 WALR, 204 and
Akumanyi v. Peprah (1957)2 WALR, 112.
36. (1975)5 ECSLR, 221.
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implied, each of the parties retained the freedom to resile whether or not the
award favoured him. Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C., treated a submission to arbitration in
customary law in Agu as an "... agreement to be bound by such a decision (of the
arbitrators) or freedom to resile where unfavourable." In Ohiaeri, Akpata. J.S.C.,
re-stated the four requirements of customary arbitration as stated by Nnaemeka.
Agu (dissentient) in the Agu case and added a fifth, that being, "... that the
decision or award was accepted at the time it was made."37
It must be the position therefore, that the line of the WACA cases referred to
above, including Oline v. Obodo are no longer good law in Nigeria. It is surpris-
ing that the Supreme Court did not appear to be aware of those cases at the time it
delivered the judgments in Agu and Ohiaeri, including the dissenting opinion in
Agu. for which Oline v. Obodo, being an appeal court decision, taken together
with the WACA cases, (although not binding on the Supreme Court of Nigeria
itself) would nevertheless have provided a strong line of authorities. Aguocha v.
Ubiji could be explained as a case in which on the evidence, the parties had
already indicated their acceptance of the award and Ekweme v. Zakari was said by
the judge himself to be one in which the function of the arbitrators was limited by
the parties to negotiating a settlement between them. It was therefore decided
along similar lines as Inyang. as explained in the leading judgment in Agu. The
judge might also have had the common law arbitration in mind since he clearly
did not rely on any of the local customs in conflict. The line of the WACA cases
from Ghana refened to, supported a view of customary arbitration which is
consistent with arbitration under common law. He may therefore have assumed
the two to be the same, hence, the failure to make a specific finding on the
practice in, and to resolve the conflict over the applicable custom. Oline v. Obodo
was on the other hand, plainly decided on the basis that the settlement involved an
arbitration under customary law, since the former Federal Supreme Court re-
jected the argument that the arbitration could not be binding for non compliance
with the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 13 of the Laws of the Federation, 1958)
requiring the submission to be in writing. The Court held that the parties were
natives and there was nothing to stop them from agreeing to have the dispute
settled in accordance with the customary law, which recognises an oral agree-
ment to arbitrate. The Court reasoned that the oral agreement and the process
arising from it would be governed by the custom of the parties, who in this case
were from the same area. It then proceeded to decide the case on that basis,
relying, as in Ghana, on Kwasi v. Larbi and a long line of cases by the WACA
which all decided that arbitration under customary law is neither based on post
award acceptance nor is a party entitled to withdraw before the award.
37. Nnaemeka-Agu. J.S.C., agreed with Akpatis leading judgment in that case. The matter would in
fact have been laid to rest with his agreement, were it not for the opinion of the judge in the
subsequent case of Awosile v. Sorunbo (1992)5 NWLR. 514. in which be expressed a vew in
terms similar to his dissent in the Agu case. It is unhelpful that the judge failed to refer
specifically to the difference between his position and that of the majotity in Agu. and in
particular, to the leading judgment in Ohiaen with which he agreed, so as to clatify his own
frequent change of mind.
308
Cus:omay Arbitration: A Ghanaian Trend Reversed in Nigeria 815
3. KWASI V. LARBI, CUSTOMARY ARBITRATION AND THE
ATTITUDE OF THE COURTS OF GHANA.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Kwasi v. Larbi, dismissed the
appellant's case and upheld the decision of the then WACA, which had approved
a previous decision of its own in which it had attempted to lay down the
requirements of arbitration according to customary law. The custom in question
was Akan and the action, involving title to land, having been started in a custom-
ary court, was withdrawn by the elders of the area and with the consent of the
litigants submitted to a panel of eleven elders for an out of court settlement. At
some stage, the appellants dissociated themselves from the proceedings and
asked for the refund of the sum of £12 which they had advanced to signify their
agreement to submit to the process. The report of the case makes it plain that it
was not clear whether the money was refunded but the appellants thereafter
withdrew and an award was given in favour of the respondents. The case came
back before the customaxy court and the respondents moved for the enforcement
of the award, as having finally determined the issue. The appellants argued that
they had withdrawnfrom the proceedings and could not thereafter, be bound by
the decision of the elders.
Before the WACA and the Privy Council, it was contended for the appellants
that the proceedings were not an arbitration but a mere negotiation for settlement,
which could not be binding and that even if there had been an arbitration, it had
been conducted in accordance with customary law, which, it was argued, is
different from arbitration in common law. It was submitted for the appellants that
in the particular custom, a party in an arbitration could withdraw from the
proceedings before or after the award is pronounced unless, subsequent to it, he
had signified his acceptance. The Privy Council rejected the plaintiff's case and
held that since the parties had consented to arbitration without reserving the right
to withdraw, the appellants had not established that a right, so inconsistent with
the basic conception of arbitration, existed in customary law and that the appel-
lants had therefore not made out their case. In the Board's view, in the absence of
evidence as to whether there was a right in customary law to withdraw before the
award, such a right did not exist.
Kwasi v. Larbi was the high water mark of a new concept of arbitration said to
be in accordance with the local customary laws [particularly Akan and Fanti]
introduced into the then colony of the Gold Coast by non-native courts estab-
lished under colonial statutes. The Supreme Court of the Gold Coast and the
WACA took the lead in the development of that concept. In Agu v. Ikewibe,
Nnaemeka-Agu J.S.C. attributed the origin of the elements of the concept and
their introduction into the customary law of Nigeria to the WACA case of Foil,
referred to above. The case, in effect, decided that parties who had submitted to
arbitration could not withdraw from the process. In that case, the appellant had
3$. Omanhene Kobina Foli v. Ohene Abeng Akese (1930) 1 WACA. I; reversed on another ground:
(1934)2 WACA, 46, P.C..
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obtained a judgment from a Circuit Judge. The defendant appealed and on the
matter coming before the Full Court of the Gold Coast, the dispute was referred to
arbitration on the application and consent of both parties. An order was made by
the Court pursuant to Order 52 of the then Rules of the Supreme Court and a
judge of that Court appointed to sit as arbitrator. The judge, as arbitrator, pub-
lished his award and the appellant moved to set it aside. It is not clear on what
ground that case could be regarded as providing guidance on the nature of
customary law arbitration. There is no evidence that the WACA had been dealing
with a case involving it. Quite the contrary, for, although the dispute involved two
local communities over title to land, and some of the observations of the court are
broad enough to cover all forms of arbitration, the appointed arbitrator was a
judge of the Supreme Court [in 1929). Then, the courts were required under
Order 52 of the Rules [Cap. 158 of the Laws of the Gold Coast] to refer matters in
dispute to arbitration if the parties had applied to the court, and to appoint an
arbitrator if the parties could not agree on a nomination or if the person or panel
chosen refused to accept the appointment. Arbitration proceedings brought under
Order 52 were governed by the provisions of that Order, which, as it were,
reflected the law and practice under the received English law on the subject. Any
action brought in relation to such proceedings was subject to the same law? 9 Foil
v. Abeng Akese should therefore have been read in the light of those circwn-
stances and the observations of the court as to the "general rule" that the initial
submission of the parties was binding, limited to common law arbitration as
received in Ghana and within Order 52. It is significant that no reference is made
to any custom in that case and that all the other authorities cited are English
decisions. Fuller v. Fenwick.4° to which both Deane C.!. and the dissenting
opinion in Agu v. Ikewibe refer with approval, had no connection either with the
colony or its laws and it is further doubtful whether in referring to it, Deane C.!.
had intended to use the case in support of any principles relating to the require-
ments of customary arbitration, which were not in issue. The circumstances of the
case suggest that in making those statements, the Chief Justice bad in mind
arbitration under statute or the common law as in force in the country.
Both the Privy Council and the WACA nevertheless relied on this case in
Kwasi v. L.arbi and cited Ekua Ayafle v. Kwamina Banyed as having laid down
that "...where matters in dispute between parties are investigated at a meeting,
and in accordance with customary law and usage, a decision is given, it is binding
on the parties..." The report of that case is rather scanty and discloses nothing as
to whether the judge had been presented with, and carefully considered evidence
of the Fanti custom. In a series of appeals however, the WACA also relied on
both its own and the Privy Council's decision in Kwasi to rule from case to case
39. See for example. Yamike Kweku v. Annor Adjayc. (1926) AC., 755; Omahene Owababio liv.
Kofi Aigin (1921-25) Div. Coun, 38; Kobena Angoe v. Kobena Nketsio (1923) Full Coun, 1920-
21, 75. P. C.
40 (1846) 16L.J.C.P.,79.
41 SARBAM. 3., Fanü Law Repons, 2nd Edn. London, 1904. pp.38-39.
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that the initial submission to an arbitration in customary law, if valid, remains
binding throughout the proceedings and a party could neither withdraw before the
award nor, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, retain the right to reject
the award. What is essential is the prior agreement of the parties to accept the
award of the arbitrator. 42 The trend was adopted by Ghanaian courts which,
unlike the courts in Nigeria. have since then been consistent in their decisions to
the same effect. In 1958, the Court of Appeal of Ghana held in Yaw v. Amobie43
that there was no right to resile once the parties have submitted to arbitration by
customary law. The Supreme Court of Ghana also held in Manu v. KontreM that
the parties to an arbitration in customary law cannot resile from it, and was
followed by the Court of Appeal on three separate occasions in 1977, in one of
which the court stated that the important point to note in relation to customary
arbitration is that its requirements are "...satisfied not at the time of the award
when an adverse decision may cause one of the parties to reconsider his participa-
tion in the proceedings, but at the opening of the proceedings."4' The court
further noted that an arbitration involves "... an agreement to be bound by the
decision made as a precondition for the arbitration taking place." 47
 That trend
resulted in treating customary law arbitration in exactly the same way as statutory
and common law arbitration. That in turn made it necessary for the courts to
distinguish between the former and conciliation, or what they termed "a negotia-
tion for settlement."
4. CUSTOMARY ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION.
The distinction was drawn on two grounds, both of which are related in terms of
their bearing on the distinction between arbitration under the received law and
arbitration in customary law. It is the view, in relation to the first ground on which
the distinction is made, that a conciliation is generally understood not to include a
clear-cut adjudication of the issues between the parties, a feature inherent in the
nature of an arbitration, since the arbitrator is required to consider the substance
of the issues in dispute and to reach a decision based on the respective merits of
the parties' cases. Customary arbitration, to the extent that the arbitrator is
required to make a decision, whether or not accepted, - and not merely to find a
compromise solution for the parties - would, in this regard, be similar to arbitra-
tion in common law. In Budu If v. Caesar,' 011ennu, .1. stated in respect of that
similarity: "The words "on its merits" mean arbitration according to customary
law is not an arbitrary decision. It is exactly the same thing as arbitration under
42 Anbah v. Dabrah (1956)1 WALR., 89 and Twur,zasi v. Baa (1957)2 WALL 204.
43 (1958)3WALL406.
44 (1965) G.LR.. 375.
45 Nyaosehrithwe v. /tflbiyeson. Akunor v. Okan and. Zogli v. Ganyo, all (1977)1 G.LR.. pp.21.173
and 297 respectively.
46 Akwzor V. Okan. supra, at p.l7&
47 16cm.
48. (1959)3G.LL.410.
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English law. It is the reference of a dispute or difference between not less than
two parties, for determination after the hearing of both sides in a judicial manner,
by a person or persons other than a court of competent jurisdiction..." The
statement, adopted from Halsbury, represents the position in English law, which
we think, on the particular point, also reflects the position in customary law,
although the judge's reference to English arbitration in those terms has elsewhere
been misunderstood as a reference to arbitration under the common law as a whole.5°
That statement could not have been intended as a complete definition of
arbitration whether under customary or common law, in that it leaves out the
requirements and effect of the process, to be dealt with elsewhere in the judg-
ment. The statement is limited to, and adequate as a description of the basic
nature of the concept in terms of the functions which the arbitrator exercises in
that capacity. His mandate as an arbitrator whether in customary or common law
involves the exercise ofjudicial functions 5 ' which, among others, requires him to
give both parties a fair hearing and to reach a decision on the merits of the parties'
cases based on the evidence. The arbitrator's duty in that respect is the same both
in custom and in common law but different from that of a conciliator, given that
the conciliator's mission is limited to guiding the parties to reach a compromise
solution of their differences. Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C., in Agu, explained the decision
in Inyang on that ground. He treated Inyang as a case in which the duty of the
Iman Council was limited by the parties themselves to arrange a settlement for
them. To consider arbitration in customary law in the same way as arbitration
under statute or the common law in this regard, comes to no more than that a valid
submission to arbitration under both systems will result in constituting the arbi-
trator, like a judge of a regularly constituted court, but not a conciliator, a person
exercising judicial functions. To that extent, arbitration in customary law is
exactly the same as arbitration in common law.
The difference between arbitration in both systems on this particular ground
does not, as a result, become completely lost. It remains, by analogy, in the
difference between judicial proceedings in a customary law court and a common
law court set up under statute. That difference lies in the court's, or, with respect
to arbitration, the third party's perspective of the role of a body called upon to
adjudicate between parties in dispute. It has been said with respect to Sudan, that1
"...according to the traditional concept of litigation under the customary law, the
court [and surely the arbitrator] must look beyond [the) legal rights oft/ic parties
to see what type of relationship is likely to prevail between them 4fter the
adjudication... The idea is that the successful party should not be made to feel
that he is a loser while the other is the victor.. ." Giving allowance for the
flexibility of arbitration under both systems, in contrast to the rigidity of proceed-
49. Laws of England, Vol.2,3rd Edn., p.2. pare. 1. (4th Edn.. p.332. para. 601)
50. Agbosu, LK., Arbitration under Customary Law (1983-86) IS Rev.Gharia Law. 204.
5L kweku Assampong Caesar, Agu.
52. Makec. John WwoI: The Customary Law of the Dinka people of Sudan. Afroworld Publishing
Co., London. 1988, pp.221.22.
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Ings in court, the third party adjudicator in an arbitration under customary law is,
jike a properly constituted customary Jaw court, more flexible in applying the law
than an arbitrator or a court operating within the common law. The difference in
this respect between arbitration in common law and in customary law would be
not so much in the peculiar nature of the process itself, as in the overall difference
in attitude to the idea of dispute settlement as a whole in customary and common
law. That feature of the customary system of dispute settlement probably shows
one area in which customary arbitration could contribute to the development of
modern arbitration, including even areas as far removed from the customary law
setting as that involving international commercial and investment disputes, where
the need to create an economic and political climate favourable to foreign invest-
ments makes it necessary for arbitrators to bear in mind the effect of the outcome
of awards on the continuing relationship between parties in the international
investment market.
On the second ground, the courts, both in Ghana and Nigeria drew a distinc-
tion between arbitration according to customary law and a negotiated settlement
on the basis that customary arbitration requires a prior agreement to be bound by
the award whereas a negotiated settlement does not. 53 This lead the courts to
ascribe to customary arbitration the same characteristics as arbitration under
common law. Although Agu and Ohiaeri have reversed the trend for Nigeria, the
position remains the same in Ghana, where the courts have distinguished custom-
ay arbitration from what would be an attempt at a conciliation on the basis that
the latter does not include a prior agreement to be bound. In Zogli v. Ganyo, the
Court of Appeal of Ghana stated the distinction in the following terms:
The feature which marks the customary arbitration from the negotia-
tion for a settlement is the requirement that for the arbitration to be
valid, the parties must have agreed before hand to be bound by the
award made. The parties to a negotiation for a settlement do not have
so to agree. It is this feature which leads to the consequential nile that
once the award is made the parties cannot reject it... As compared
with this feature of an arbitration, it is well known that the result of a
negotiation for settlement is not binding on the parties until it is
accepted by both. But once it is accepted, it is as binding on them as
an arbitration award.
The courts also held that a negotiation for a settlement is only binding on the
parties upon their acceptance of the settlement. Therefore, if, as in Agu. a custom-
y arbitration does not also become binding until the parties signify their accept-
ance of the award, then the real distinction in customary law between arbitration
and a negotiated settlement must lie elsewhere. We should think that distinction is
lo be found in the first ground on which we distinguished an arbitration from a
53. See for example, Anbah v. Dabrah; Yaw v. Amobc. Zogli v. Ga,7yo. Supra cited.
54. Note 45. p.301.
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conciliation, i.e., that the jurisdiction or the function of the "arbitrator" in a
negotiated settlement is limited to bringing the parties to a compromise. That
limitation is imposed by the parties themselves and is a matter to be ascertained
on the facts and the evidence in each case. The distinction can otherwise be
expressed by saying that the third party in a negotiated settlement is not exercis-
ing judicial functions. That is the basis of Karibi-Whyte's explanation of Inyang,
although we think that it is a distinction without effect. It is without effect
because the position remains all the same in Ghana, as well as in Nigeria, that the
two processes. although different in character, would only become binding upon
their acceptance by the parties. This is particularly truer of Nigeria in the light of
the decision in Agu and Ohiaeri that a customary law arbitration does not become
binding until the award has been pronounced and accepted by the parties thereaf-
ter.
5. THE CUSTOMARY LAW RECONSIDERED.
There is available evidence that the trend adopted by the Ghanaian courts and the
second line of Nigerian cases discussed above never reflected the correct position
in customary law. The Privy Council itself had reached the position it took on the
basis that there was no evidence to the contrary. Subject possibly to the repug-
nancy doctrine, it might have recognised the existence in customary law, if only
the Akan customary law, of the rights alleged in that case. Some of the decisions
subsequently relied upon by the courts of Ghana were themselves not forcefully
expressed. In Gyesiwa v. Mensah55 the WACA clearly refused to lay down any
precise rules on the matter. Mensah v. Takyiampong5' for example, was a case in
which the court below had already found that in accordance with the custom
"...bozh parties [had] agreed to the arbitration, to the award. and to the subse-
quent demarcation of the boundaries." The point was therefore not strongly in
issue and the Court of Appeal went no further than to agree with the lower court's
findings. That should not be surprising since in none of those cases was evidence
considered as to the practice in customary law. Any strong views would have
required some consideration of the practice in the relevant customs. Yardom v.
Minta !1I was not concerned with the requirements of customary arbitration.
What was in issue in that case was the question about whether it is open to parties
to a court judgment, by consent, to vary their rights and obligations under the
judgment by a subsequent submission to arbitration. It was held in that case that
they could. The court assumed that the award-involved was binding, on the basis
that the arbitration had been conducted in accordance with the relevant customary
law. Of more significance to us however, the question did not arise and was not
considered by the court, whether parties to such an arbitration could resile from
the proceedings or reject the award. On the other hand, ii has been argued with
55. (1947) WACA Cyclostyled Judgments, 1947 45..
56. (1940)6WACA. 118.
57. Full Cowl.. 1926-29, 76.
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much evidence in supportss that those features exist in the customary laws of the
particular customs in which most of the Ghanaian cases arose. The existence of
the features is exemplified by a few cases decided by the Gold Coast Divisional
Courts and, after them, the Lands Division of the then Supreme Court, being
courts which, apart from the customary law courts themselves, heard many of the
cases at first instance and had, on each occasion, to make specific findings on the
existence or not of these features.
Although the head note in Okyeaine Kwasi Mire v. Kwasi Dansos 5 for exam-
ple, refers word for word to that in Ekua Ayafle v. Kwamina Banyea. the judg-
ment itself, apart from making no reference at all to it. is completely at variance
with the latter case. The action by the plaintiff was for a sum of money or, in the
alternative, for the delivery of a vehicle for the purchase of which the money had
been advanced to the defendant. The defendant obtained another vehicle but used
one key for both. The plaintiff received no returns from the business for which the
vehicles were being used. The arbitrator awarded that one of the vehicles be given
to the plaintiff by the defendant. Michelin, 3., upheld the arbitration on the basis
of the following fmdings reached by himself on the evidence:
"(a) that an arbitration, valid in accordance with Native Law, was held to
investigate into the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant,
and the defendant consented to the holding of such aibitration and agreed
to abide by the award of the said arbitrators;
(b) that it was ordered by the arbitrators and agreed by the defendant that
one of the lomes should be returned by him to the plaintiff in working
condition;
(c) that the award of the arbitrator has not been carried out by the defendant."
The important fmding in this case was that the defendant agreed to the order and
thereafter became bound. Similarly, in Elisabeth Manu v. Kwabene Kumah.
subsequent to the award, the appellant gave the respondent £1, which she ac-
cepted. She nevertheless brought an action and the defendant pleaded a binding
arbitration. It was held that since the respondent had not withdrawn from the
arbitration but had accepted the £1 to indicate her agreement to be bound by the
award, she was so bound. Spooner, Acting Assistant Chief Commissioner for
Ashanti said: "If as alleged by the Plaintiff -Respondent that certain of her
witnesses were not heard, she could have withdrawn before the award. Instead of
this she signified agreement by accepting the LI from the appellant after the
award. It follows that the award should stand." What is significant about these
cases is the specific finding that the defendant agreed to abide by the awards.
58. Matson, IN., The Supreme Court and the Cu tomary Judicial Process in the Gold Coast [1953] I
1.C.LQ.. 47; Mloti, A.N., Kwasi v. Larbi-Akan Cusromarj Law q 'Arbitration' in the Gold
Coast. idein. 466: Koranteng-Mdow. G., Customaly Arbitration in Ghana. Univ. of London
PLD. Thesis. 1974.
59. Div. Cowt, 1921-25.95.
60. Div. Court (Land) 1938-47. 311.
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Odikro Ntiamoah Rofi v. Kweku Sesu was a case in which the evidence on the
practice in customary law was thoroughly considered by the judge, assisted by an
assessor on the relevant customary law. Jackson, J., considered the evidence of
one of the witnesses on cross examination and observed:
Now, the argument advanced by Mr. Johnson, Counsel for the plain-
tiff, is that on some occasions arbitrators, before retiring to consider
the evidence and their judgment, will ask first whether the parties will
accept their decision as being final and binding and if so they will
then retire, consider the evidence and deliver their judgment. That
request is not made in so many words. It is implied by the demand for
"gontuadzi" before they retire.
On the other hand they may wish to take their hearing fee and leave
it open to the parties to accept or reject their finding. In such cases
"gontuadzi" is not demanded but upon delivery of the award "aseda"
is paid to them by the successful party and the matter is then left open
for the other party to gracefully accept the award and symbolize his
acceptance by reimbursing the successful party with the amount
which he has expended on "Aseda."
The judge then considered the opinion of the assessor on the customary law and
stated:
It is quite clear upon the evidence that the reimbursement of the
"Aseda" by the loser to the winner is the acceptance of the award by
the former. Without that acceptance it appears to be only logical to
assume that custom did not impose any obligation upon the loser to
accept the award in the absence of that re-imbursement and it appears
to me that the payment or non-payment of "gontuadzi" does truly
symbolize whether there had not been an irrevocable intention to
abide by the decision of the arbitration. On this ground alone I am of
the opinion that there has been no award which by customary law can
be regarded as final and binding upon the plaintiff
Thus expressed, those passages reflect the correct position in many customary
laws, as now judicially approved in Nigeria by the Supreme Court decisions in
Agu v. Ikewibe and Ohiaeri v. Akabeze. Apart from the findings of A.N. Allott
and J.N. Matson referred to above, there are statements elsewhere and out of the
reons in support of that position. Kanbi-Whyte refers with approval to a state-
ment of T.O. Elias in which the late judge also asserts that an award did not
become binding until the parties had indicated their acceptance of it, from which
either party is at liberty to withdraw at any time before such acceptance or upon a
6!. Div. Court (Land) 1948-51,91.
62. Ibid. p.94-S.
63. ldem.
64. The Nature of African Cus:oinary Law. Univ. of Manchester Press. Manchester. 1956. at p.212.
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teasonable time after the award. Although judicial opinion is difficult to come by
from other jurisdictions in the continent, it has been extra-judicially stated, with
sespect to the position in Zaire that: U decision des arbitres n'a d'autres force
que celle derivant de La volonte des parties. Celles-ci avaienz Ic droit de refisser de
g'inclinerdevaiu Ia sentence. Lorsqu'elles l'acceptaient, dies faisaient un cadeau
l'arbitre qui constitualt a La fois un salaire at une promessee d'executer La
&cision." It is significant to point out the similarity with the practice in Ghana
as described by Matson and Allott. Not only do the parties retain the right to
reject the award, the "gift" (cadeau) would be the Zairean equivalent of "aseda"
in Ghana and intended to signify the parties' acceptance of the award, including
their willingness to comply with its terms. While describing the same process in
neighbouring Ruanda, one other author states: "Si I'une des parties n'accep:air
par La decision des arbitres, cue pouvait porter Ic djfférent par devant une des
ausres juridictions riguliEres. Lors de l'evocation de l'affaire las arbitrs eta.ient
slots entendu en qualite de temoins." The right to reject the award is therefore
also recognised in the Tutsi and Barutsi customs of Ruanda being described. The
writer however adds that a subsequent action, if instituted as a result of the refusal
of one of the parties to accept the award, invariably resulted in a judgment by the
customary law court similar in terms to the decision at the arbitration. That was
adequate indication to a party to the arbitration of the futility of any attempt to
flout an award solely on the basis that it did not favour him.
It is disappointing to note that in Ghana, the courts have persisted in treating
customary arbitration other than in accordance with its own characteristics as
known to those to whom it applies. Whether those characteristics, as articulated
by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the Agu and Ohiaeri cases are satisfactory
and adapted to the setting in which customary law now operates, is altogether a
separate question. It is certainly time for some of those practices to be reviewed.
It is true, and the Supreme Court of Nigeria did not fail to point out, that
customary law is flexible and can easily be shaped to respond to change. It is a
dynamic law. The role of the courts in that process, like that of all other institu-
tions involved in the development of the law as a whole, is crucial. In this
particular area however, it is our view that such change must be left to be
spearheaded by the institutions of the customary law itself, including its own
courts and arbitrators, with little interference by other legal institutions operating
outside the context of the customary law. Change, even where inspired from
without, is more easily acceptable if carried forward by those for, and by whom
the change is made. One writer, having noted with overall approval, the new
character of customary arbitration as evolved by courts in Ghana under the
influence of English law, observed how it is now possible to say "...that custom-
ary arbitration instead of wearing "batakari" or "kente" now appears in a three
65. SOH1ER, Antoine, Traité Eiémenzaire dii Droiz Counirnier du Congo Beige. 2nd EOn.. Maison F.
Larder S.A.. Brussels. 1954. pp.91 .92. para.106.
6& Sandrart, Georges. Cow-s de Drol: Courwnier, Vol.2,1951, p.206.
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reasonable time after the award. Although judicial opinion is difficult to come by
from other jurisdictions in the continent, it has been extra-judicially stated, with
respect to the position in Zaire that: "La decision des arbitres n'a d'autres force
que cdlle derivant de Ia volonte des parties. Celles-ci avaient le droit de refuser de
s'inciner devant Ia sentence. Lorsqu'elles l'acceptaient. cUes faisaient un cadeau
a I'axbitre qui consntuait a la fois un salaire at une promessee d'executer La
decision."65
 It is significant to point out the similarity with the practice in Ghana
as described by Matson and AIlott. Not only do the parties retain the right to
reject the award, the "gift" (cacleau) would be the Zairean equivalent of "aseda"
in Ghana and intended to signify the parties' acceptance of the award, including
their willingness to comply with its terms. While describing the same process in
neighbouring Ruanda, one other author states: "Si l'une des parties n'accep:air
pas Ia decision des arbitres, dc pouvait porter le djfferenz par devant zinc des
autres juridicrions rCguliEres. Lots de l'evocation de l'affaire les arbitrs ctaient
alors entendu en qualite de temoins."66 The right to reject the award is therefore
also recognised in the Tutsi and Barutsi customs of Ruanda being described. The
writer however adds that a subsequent action, if instituted as a result of the refusal
of one of the parties to accept the award, invariably resulted in a judgment by the
customary law court similar in terms to the decIsion at the arbitration. That was
adequate indication to a party to the arbitration of the futility of any attempt to
flout an award solely on the basis that it did not favour him.
It is disappointing to note that in Ghana, the courts have persisted in treating
customary arbitration other than in accordance with its own characteristics as
known to those to whom it applies. Whether those characteristics, as articulated
by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the Agu and Ohiaeri cases are satisfactory
and adapted to the setting in which customary Law now operates, is altogether a
separate question. It is certainly time for some of those practices to be reviewed.
It is Due, and the Supreme Court of Nigeria did not fail to point out, that
customary law is flexible and can easily be shaped to respond to change. It is a
dynamic law. The role of the courts in that process, like that of all other institu-
tions involved in the development of the law as a whole, is crucial. In this
particular area however, it is our view that such change must be left to be
spearheaded by the institutions of the customary law itself, including its own
courts and arbitrators, with little interference by other legal institutions operating
Outside the context of the customary law. Change, even where inspired from
without, is more easily acceptable if carned forward by those for, and by whom
the change is made. One writer, having noted with overall approval, the new
character of customary arbitration as evolved by courts in Ghana under the
influence of English law, observed how it is now possible to say "...that custom-
ary arbitration instead of wearing "barakari" or "kente" now appears in a three
65. SOHIER, Antoine. TraiN Elimenwire du Droit Cowumier du Congo Beige. 2nd Edn.. Maison F.
Laxvier SA.. Bnsse1s, 1954, pp.91-92. pan 106.
66. Sandran, Georges, Cow-s de Droit Cowwnier, Vol 2,1951. p.206.
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piece suit without a bowler hat and an umbrella." 67
 Meanwhile, referring to
use being made of the new arbitration by those for whom it is intended, the sar
author regrets that customary arbitration is now less resorted to. That should no
have come as a surprise. The users are simply unable to recognise a "... thi
piece suit without a bowler hat and an umbrella." Either it comes complete with
the suit, hat and umbrella and recognised as such, or it appears fully in kente or
batakari. The only other way may be for it to appear in suit, hat and umbrella all
made Out of kente or batakari but above all, designed and manufactured by the
same people who will be required to identify with it. Then, and probably onjy
then, will they return to using it as an attractive alternative to the courts.
67. Kom. Enoch D., customary Arbitration. 11987-88)16 Rev.Ghana Law, 148 at p.167.
319
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. BOOKS
Amin, Saleh H.: Commercial Arbitration in Islamic and Iranian Law, 1988.
Asian-African legal consultative Committee: Report of the Seventeenth, Eighteenth
and Nineteenth Sessions held in Kuala Lumpur (1976), Bagdad (1977) and Doha
(1978), 1978.
Atiyah, Patrick S:
Essays on Contract, 1986.
The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 1979.
Audit, Bernard: International Arbitration and State Contracts, 1988.
Auerbach, Jerold S.: Justice Without Law?, 1983.
Bedjäoui, Mohammed (ed.): International Law: Achievements and Prospects, 1991.
Bernard, Alfred: L'Arbitrage Volontaire en Droit Privé, 1937.
Bernstein, Ronald; Reynolds: Handbook of Rent Review (Looseleaf) February 1995
re-issue.
Born, Gary: International Commercial Arbitration in United States: Commentary and
Material, 1994.
Broches, Aron: Commentary on the UNC1TRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, 1990.
Brownlie, Ian: Principles of Public International Law, 4th Edn., 1990.
Bucher, Andreas; Tschanz, Pierre-Yves: International Arbitration in Switzerland, 19?
Campbell, Denis (ed.) International Execution Against Judgment Debtors, 1993. (in
Five Vols.).
Carbonneau, Jean (ed.): Resolving Transnational Disputes Through Arbitration, 1984.
Carbonneau, Thomas E (ed.): Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, 1990.
Cariston, Kenneth: Social Theory and African Tribal Organization: The Development
of Socio-legal Theory, 1968.
320
Clarke, D N; Adams, J E: Rent Reviews and Variable Rents, 3rd Edn., 1990.
Dalloz: Juri-classeur de Droit International, Vol. 11 (Looseleaf), 1995 re-issue.
David, René: L'Arbitrage dans le Commerce International, 1985.
Derrett, J D M (ed.) An Introduction to Legal Systems, 1968.
Diósdi, Gy: Contract in Roman Law: From the Twelve Tables to the Giassators, 1981.
Dicey and Morris: Conflict of Laws, 13th Edn., 1993; 8th Edn., 1967.
Domke, Martin: The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration, Rev. Edn., 1984.
Dore, Issac : Arbitration and Conciliation under the UNCITRAL Rules: A Textual
Analysis, 1986.
El-Ahdab Abdul Hamid: Arbitration with the Arab Countries, 1990.
Elias, Taslim 0: The Nature of African Customary Law, 1956.
Fatouros, A A: Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors, 1962.
Godley, James: The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine, 1991.
Holdsworth: A History of English Law, Vol. 14.
Holleman, J F: Issues in African Law, 1974.
Holtzmann, Howard M.; Neuheus, Joseph E.: A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration, 1989.
Huys, Marcel; Keutgen, Guy: L'Arbitrage en Droit Beige et International, 1981.
International Chamber of Commerce: 60 Years of ICC Arbitration: A Look at the
Future, 1984.
Johnson, Walter Seeley: The Clause Compromissoire: Its Validity in Québec, 1945.
Kassis, Antoine:
Problèmes de Base de L'Arbitrage en Droit Compare et International, T.1,
Arbitrage Juridictionnel et Arbitrage Contractuel, 1987.
Réflexions sur le Reglément D'Arbitrage de la Chambre de Commerce
International: Les Deviations de L'Arbitrage Institutionnel, 1988.
Klein, Frederic: Considerations sur L'Arbitrage en Droit International Privé, 1955.
321
Koranteng-Addow, G: Customary Arbitration in the Legal System of Ghana,
University of London Ph.D. Thesis, 1974.
Lew, Julian D M:
Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 1978.
(ed.): Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, 1986.
MacNeil, Ian: American Arbitration Law: Reformation, Nationalization,
Internationalization, 1992.
Marty, Gabriel; Raynaud, Pierre: Les Obligations, Les Sources, T. 1, 2nd Edn., 1988.
Mazeaud, J; Chabas, F: Leçons de Droit Civil, Obligations: Théorie Générale, T. 2,
8th Edn., 1991.
McLaren, Richard H; Palmer, Earl E: The Law and Practice of Commercial
Arbitration [in Canada], 1982.
Mustill, Michael J; Boyd, Stewart C: The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration
in England, 2nd Edn., 1989.
Naón, Horacio Grigera: Choice of Law Problems in International Commercial
Arbitration, 1992.
Noda, Yoshiyuki: Introduction to Japanese Law (transl. Angelo, Anthony), 1976.
North, Peter M: Private International Law Problems in Common Law Jurisdictions,
1993.
Nwogugu, E I: The Legal Problems of Foreign Investments In Developing Countries,
1965.
Onuoha, Bede: The Elements of African Socialism, 1965.
Planiol; Ripert: Droit Civil Tome VI: Obligations, 2nd Edn., 1952.
Pritchard, A M: Leage's Roman Private Law, 3rd Edn., 1961.
Redfern, Alan; Hunter, Martin: Law and Practice of International Commercial
Arbitration, 2nd Edn., 1992.
Reisman, Michael: Systems of Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration:
Breakdown and Repair, 1992.
Rousseau: The Social Contract and Discourses (transl. Cole, G. D. H.), 1973.
322
Rubellin-Devichi, Jaqueline: Essaie sur la Nature Juridique de L'Arbitrage, 1965.
Rubino-Sammartano, Mauro: International Arbitration Law, 1990.
Saleh, Samir: Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: A Study in Sharia and
Statute Law, 1984.
Samuel, Adam: Jurisdictional Problems in International Commercial Arbitration, 1989.
Sanders, Pieter (ed.): International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke,
1967.
Sandrart, Georges: Cours de Droit Coutum.ier, Vol. 2 1951.
Schniitthoff, Clive: Commercial Law in a Changing Economic Climate, 1985.
Schwarzenberger, Georg; Brown: A Manual of International law, 6th Edn., 1976.
Schwarzenberger, Georg: International Law, Vol. 1, 3rd Edn., 1957.
Shaw, Malcolm: International Law, 3rd Edn., 1991.
Shea, Donald: The Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter-American and International Law
and Diplomacy, 1955.
Shihata, Ibrahim F I:
Miga and Foreign Investment: Origin, Operations, Policies and Basic
Documents of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 1988.
The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays (eds. Tschofen
Franziska & Parra, Antonio), 1991.
Snyder, Frederick; Sathirathai, Surakiart (eds.): Third World Attitudes toward
International Law, 1987.
Sohier, Antoine: Traité Elémentaire de Droit Coutumier du Congo Beige, 2nd Edn.
1954.
Soons, A H A (ed.): International Arbitration: Past and Prospects, 1990.
Sormarajah, M:
International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, 1990.
The Pursuit of Nationalized Property, 1985.
The International Law on Foreign Investment, 1994.
Starck, Boris: Droit Civil: Obligations, Tome 2, Contrats et Quasi Contrats, 2nd Edn.,
323
1986.
Storm, Marcel; Desmeulenaere, Bernadette: International Arbitration in Belgium, 1989.
Sykes, Edward I And Pryles, Michael C: Australian Private International Law, 3rd
Edn., 1991.
Terre; Simler; Leguette: Droit Civil: Les Obligations, 5th Edn., 1993.
Thomas, Rhidian: The Law and Practice Resulting from Arbitration Awards, 1994.
Toope, Stephen J: Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between
States and Private Persons, 1990.
University of Dijon, France: Investissements Etrangers et Arbitrages entre Etats et
Personnes Privées: La Convention BIRD du 18 Mars du 1965, 1969.
van den Berg, Albert Jan: The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards
a Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 1981.
Walton, Anthony; Vitoria, Mary: Russell on the Law of Arbitration, 20th Edn., 1982.
Watson, Alan: Contract of Mandate in Roman Law, 1961.
LI: ARTICLES
Abbott, Alden F.: Latin America and International Arbitration Conventions: A
Quandary of Non-Ratification (1976) 17 Harv. Int'l. L J, 131.
Agbosu, L. K.: Arbitration under the Customary law (1983-86) 15 Rev. Ghana Law,
204.
Aksen, Gerald: American Arbitration Arrives at the Age of Acquarius: United States
Implements the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (1971) 3 Sw. U. L. Rev., 1.
Allott, A. N.:
African Law, in An Introduction to legal Systems (ed. Derrett, J. D. M.), 1968,
131.
Kwasi v. Larbi(1953) A.C. 164 - Akan Customary Law of "arbitration" in the
Gold Coast (1953) 2 ICLQ, 466.
Alsop, Richard B.: The World Bank's Multilateral Guarantee Investment Agency
324
(1986) 25 Col. J Trans. L, 101.
Arnerasinghe, C. F.: Jurisdiction Ratione Persone under the Convention for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other Staes (1974-
75) 47 BYIL, 227.
Amerasinghe, C. F.:
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes and
Development through Multilateral Corporation [1976] 9 Vand. J.Transnat'l L., 793.
Dispute Settlement Machinery in Relations between States and Multilateral
Enterprises - With Particular Reference to the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes [1977] 11 Int'l Lawyer,
Anand, R. P.: Attitudes of Asian-African States toward certain Problems of
International Law, in Third World Attitudes Toward International Law, (ed. Snyder,
F.; Sathirathai, S.), 1987.
Arfazadeh, Homayoon: New Perspectives in South East Asia and Delocalised
Arbitration in Kuala Lumpur (1991) 8 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 4, 103.
Armand-Prevost, Michel; Richard, Daniel: Le Contrat Déstabilisé (Dc L'Autonomie
de la Volonté au Dirigisme Contractuel) (1979) Rec. Dalloz et Sirey, I, 2952.
Asante, Samuel K. B.: Perspectives of African Countries on International Commercial
Arbitration (1993) 6 Leiden Journ. Int'l.L, 331.
Balekjian, Wahe H.: The Convention of the International Bank on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States [1968] 37/38
Yearbook of the A.A.A., 108.
Beattie, J. H.: Informal Judicial Activity in Bunyoro" [1957] 9 J A A, 188.
Bénabent: Rapport Français, in La Bonne Foi, Travaux de L'Association Henri
Capitant, Vol. 43, 1992, 291.
Berger, Klaus Peter:
The New Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency: Globalizing the
Investment Insurance Approach Towards Development (1988) 15 Syr. J. Int'l L. &
Corn., 13.
The International Arbitrator's Application of Precedents (1992) 9 Journ. Int'l.
Arb'n., part 4, 5.
Bentil, Kodwo: Making England a more Attractive Venue for International
Commercial Arbitration by less Judicial Oversight (1988) 5 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., Part
325
1, 49.
Bergman, Mark S.:
Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: An Examination of the Evolution and
Significance of the U.S. Prototype Treaty (1983) 16 N. Y. U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol., 1.
Bernini; van den Berg: The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against a State: The
Problem of Immunity from Execution, in Contemporary Problems in International
Arbitration (ed. Lew, Julian D. M.), 1986.
Bourel, Pirre: Conflits de Juridictions: immunité de Juridiction et D'Exécution, in Juri-
classeur de Droit International, Vol. 9, Fasc. 58 1-50 (Looseleaf), 1993 re-issue.
Bowett, Derek William: State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments in
Compensation for Termination or Breach (1988) 59 BYIL, 49.
Brandon, Michael: An International Investment Code: Current Plans (1959-60) J. B.
L., 7.
Broches, Aron:
Development of International Law by the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (1965) 59 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l. L., 33.
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States" [1972] 136 Hague Acad. Courses, 331.
Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards [1991] 6 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ,
321.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States of 1965: Explanatory Notes and Survey of its Application
(1993) XVffl Yearbook Comm. Arb'n., 627.
Arbitration Clauses and Institutional Arbitration, ICSID: A Special Case in
Commercial Arbitration: Essays in Memeriam Eugenio Minoli, 1974.
Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSJD Convention: Binding Force, Finality,
Recognition, Enforcement, Execution [1987] 2 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ. 287.
Case Note on the French Court of Cassation decision in Soabi v Senegal [1991]
Rev. Arb., 638.
Aspects Proceduraux de l'arbitrage entre un Etat et un investisseur etranger
dans Ia Convention du ..., in Investissements Etrangers et Arbitrage entre Etats et
Personnes Privées: La Convention BIRD du 18 Mars 1965, 1969, 131.
326
La Convention et l'Assurance-Investissement: Le Problem dit de Ia
Subrogation, ibid, 161.
Settlement of Disputes Arising out of Investments in Developing Countries
[1983] 11 Int'l Bus. Lawyer, 206.
Case Note on Paris Court of Appeal decision in same case, [1990] Rev. Arb.,
167.
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, in World Peace Through Law, The Genever World Conference, 1969.
Carabiber, Charles: L'Arbitrage International entre Gouvernement et Particuliers
(1959) 76 Hague Acad. Courses,
Carbonneau, Thomas:
Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of its Remedial and
Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce (1984) 19 Texas Int'l. L. J., 33.
"A-Legality" and Arbitration: The German Supreme Court Joins the Fray
(1993) 4 Am. Rev. Int'l. Arb., 217.
Carlston, kenneth S.: Theoiy of the Arbitration Process [1952] 17 Law and
Comtemporary Problems, 631.
Chatterjee, S. K.: The Convention Establishing the Multilateral Guarantee Investment
Agency (1987) 36 ICLQ, 76.
Chukwumerije, Okezie: ICSID Arbitration and Sovereign Immunity (1990) 19 Anglo-
American L. Rev., 166.
David, René:
L'Arbitrage en Droit Civil, Technique de Regulation des Contrats, in Mélanges
Offertes a Gabriel Marty, 1978.
David on Arbitration in International Trade in The Art of Arbitration: Liber
Amicorum Pieter Sanders (eds. Schultsz and van den Berg), 1982.
de Vries, Henry P.: International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for
National Courts [1982] 57 Tul. L. Rev., 42.
de Enterria, Garcia J.: The Role of Public Policy in International Commercial
Arbitration (19900 21 Law & Pol. Int'l. Bus., 389.
Delaume, Georges:
327
The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria and State Contracts, in Lex mercatona and
Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law Merchant (ed. Carbonneau Thomas E.),
1990.
State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration [1981] 75 AJIL, 784.
ICSID Arbitration and the Courts [1983] 77 AJIL, 784.
Reflections on the Effectiveness of International Arbitration Awards (1995) 12
Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 1, 5.
Deshpande, V. S.: "Foreign Award" in the 1958 New York Convention (1992) 9
Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., 51
Diamond, Aubrey L.: Harmonisation of Private International Law relating to
Contractual Obligations (1986) 199 hague Acad. Courses, 233.
Doizer, Rudolf: Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property (1986) 1 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ,
41.
Domke, M.; Glossner, 0.: The Present State of the Law Regarding International
Commercial Arbitration in The Present State of International Law, The International
Law Association, The Hague, 1973, 307.
Donaldson: Future Trends in Arbitration (1978) 44 Arbitration, 235.
Driberg, J. H.: African Conception of Law 16 J Comp. Leg. Int'l L (3rd. Series), 230.
Eisemann, Frederic: L"Arbitrage-partie", in International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum
martin Domke (ed. Sanders, Pieter), 1967.
Fancy, Andrew N.: The Convention on the Setttlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States [1966] 5 Duq. L. Rev., 19.
Fatouros, A. A.:
International Law and the Internationalized Contract [1980] 74 AJIL, 134.
The Quest for Legal Security of Foreign Investments - Latest Developments
(1962-63) 17 Rutgers Univ. L. Rev., 257.
Investissements Etrangers et Arbitrages entres Etats et Personnes Privées: La
Convention B.I.R.D. du 18 Mars 1965 [1970] 59 Rev. Crit. Dr. mt. Priv., 580.
Ferrante M.: Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Italy and Public Policy, in
Hommage a Frederic Eisemann, ICC Publication No. 321, 83, 1978.
Fine, J. D.: Continuum or Chasm? Can West meet East? (1989) 6 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n.,
328
Part 4, 27.
Fox, Haxel:
States and the Undertaking to Arbitrate (1988) 37 ICLQ, 1.
Sovereign Immunity and Arbitration, in Contempoary Problems in International
Arbitration (ed. Lew, Julian D. M.), 1986.
Gailiard, Emmanuel:
Case Comment (1990) 177 JDI, 144.
Arbitrage Commercial International, Sentence Arbitral: Contrôle Etatique, in
Juri-classeur de Droit International, Vol. 11, Fasc. 586-11 (looseleaf), 1992 re-issue.
Garro: Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Jurisdiction of Arbitration
Tribunals in Latin America (1984) 1 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., 305.
Gaudemet-Tallon, Hélène: Case Comment (1994) Rev. Arb., 117.
Ghestin, Jaques: L'Utile et le Juste dans les Contrats (1982) Rec. Dalloz et Sirey, I,
1.
Giardina, Andrea: L'execution des Sentences du Centre International pour le
Reglement des Differends Relatifs aux Investissements [1982] 71 Rev. Crit. Dt. mt.
Priv., 173.
Golberg, Tatiana: Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
(1966) 36 Yearbook of the A. A. A., 98.
Goode, Roy: The Adaptation of English Law to International Commercial Arbitration
(1992) 8 Arbitration International, 1.
Goonesekere: Eclipse of the Village Court (1958) Ceylon J. Hist'cal. and Soc. Studies,
138.
and Metzger: The Conciliation Boards Act: Entering the Second Decade (1971)
2 Joum. Ceylon Law, 35.
Gross, Peter: Separability comes of Age in England: Harbour, Kansa and Clause 3 of
the Draft Arbitration Bill (1995) Arbitration International, 85.
Guggenheim Paul: Contribution a L'Histoire des Sources du Droit des Gens (1958)
94 Hague Acad. Courses, 1.
Habscheid, Waither: L'Expertise-Arbitrage: Etude de Droit Compare, in International
Arbitration: Liber Amicorum Martin Domke (ed. Sanders), 1967
329
Hannigan, St. J. J.: The impact of English Law upon the existing Gold Coast Custom
and the possible development of the resulting system [1956] 8(3) J. A. A. 128.
Hayes, Alfred: Specific Performance of Contracts for Arbitration or Valuation (19 15-
16) 1 Cornell L. Q
.
, 225.
Hermann, Gerold:
The UNC1TRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration:
Introduction and General Provisions, in Essays on International Commercial
Arbitration (ed. Sarcevic), 1989.
Presentation of UNC1TRAL Model Law, in Euro-Arab Arbitration ifi:
Proceedings of the Third Euro-Arab Arbitration Congress (ed. Kainicha), 1991.
Jaenicke, 0.:
The Prospects for International Arbitration: Disputes between States and Private
Enterprises in International Arbitration: Past and Present Prospects (ed. Soons, A. H.
A.), 1990, 155.
Consequences of a Breach of an Investment Agreement Governed by
International Law, by General principles of Law, or by Domestic Law of the Host
State in, Foreign Investment in the Present and a New International Economic Order
(ed. Dicke), 1987.
Jarrosson, Charles: Perspectives D'evolution du Droit Francais de L'arbitrage: La
Clause Compromissoire (1992) Rev. Arb., 259.
Jaslow, Craig A.: Practical Considerations in Drafting a Joint Venture with China
(1982) 31 Am. J Comp. L., 209.
Jennings, Robert Y.: State Contracts in International Law (1961) 37 BYIL, 156.
Johnson, Conrad: The Idea of Autonomy and the Foundation of Contractual Liability
(1983) 2 Law & Philosophy, 271.
Joly, Francoise: Etat-Unis: Une Réforme de 1988 Restraint le Domain des Immunités
des Etats Etrangers en matière D'arbitrage (1990) Rev. Arb., 607.
Kahale, George: New Legislation in the United States Facilitates Enforcement of
Arbitral Agreements and Awards against Foreign States (1989) 6 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n.,
Part 2, 57.
Kawashima, Takeyoshi: Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan in Law in Japan:
The Legal Order in a Changing Society (ed. von Mehren, Arthur), 1963, 41.
330
Kellor, Frances: Western Hemisphere Systems of Commercial Arbitration [1946] 6
Univ. Toronto L. J., 307.
Kelsen, Hans: La Theorie Juridique de Ia Convention [1939-40] 9-10 Archive de
Philosophie du Droit, 33.
Kerr, Michael:
International Arbitration v. Litigation (1980) JBL, 164.
The Arbitration Act 1979 (1980) 43 Mod. L. Rev., 45.
Kom, Enoch: Customary Arbitration in Ghana (1987-88) 16 Rev. Ghana Law, 148.
Lagarde, Paul: Les Limites Objectives de la Convention de Rome (Conflits de Loi,
Primauté du Droit Communautaire, Rapports avec les autres Conventions) (1993) 29
Rev. Dir. mt. Priv. e Proc., 33.
Lalive, Pierre: Some Threats to International Investment Arbitration (1986) 1 ICS1D
Rev.,-FILJ, 26.
Lando, Ole: The Conflict of Lws of Contract: General Principles, General Course on
Private International Law (1984) 189 Hague Acad. Courses, 225.
Lane, P. M. M.: The Appointment of an Arbitrator - Contract or Status (1994) Arb.
& Disp. Res. L J, 91.
Layton, Robert: Changing Attitudes toward Dispute Resolution in Latin America
(1993) 10 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 2, 123.
Leboulanger, Philhipe: Case Comment (1992) Rev. Crit. Dr. Int'l. Privé, 331.
Loquin: Case Comment (1987) JDI, 941.
Lord Hacking: The "Stated Case" abolished: The U.K. Arbitration Act of 1979" [1980]
14 nt'l. Lawyer, 95.
Lord Parker: The Development of Commercial Arbitration The Lionel Cohen Lectures,
1959.
Lord Diplock: The Alexander Lecture (1978) 44 Arbitration, 107.
Maniruzzaman, A. F. M.: State Contracts with Aliens: the Question of Unilateral
Changes by the State in Contemporary International Law (1992) 9 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n.,
Part, 141.
Mann, Francis A.:
331
The Proper Law of Contracts concluded by International Persons [19591 35
BYIL, 34.
State Contracts and International Arbitration [1967] 42 BYIL, 42.
The Law Governing State Contracts (1944) BYIL, 11.
State Contracts and State Responsiblity (1960) 54 AJIL, 572.
The Proper Law of the Contract - An Obituary (1991) 107 LQR, 353.
Lex Facit Arbitrum in International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin
Domke (ed. Sanders, Pieter) 1967.
Foreign Awards (1992) 108 LQR, 6.
Maniott, Arthur: Changes in Arbitration Law and Practice (1993) 59 Arbitration, 41.
Matson, J. N.: The Supreme Court and the Customary Judicial Process in the Gold
Coast [1952] 2 ICLQ, 47.
Mbaye, Keba:
The Comtemplementary Roles of Judges and Arbitrations in Ensuring that
International Commercial Arbitration is Effective, in 60 Years of ICC Arbitration: A
Look at the Future, 1984.
The African Conception of Law, in International Encyclopaedia of Comparative
Law, Vol. 11, Chapter 1.
McNair: The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations (1957) 33
BYIL, 1.
Mentschikoff, Soie:
Commercial Arbitration [1961] 61 Col. L. Rev., 846.
The Significance of Arbitration - A Preliminary inquiry [1952] 17 Law and
Contemporary Problems, 698.
Meron, Theodor: The World Bank and Insurance (1975) 47 BYIL, 301.
Mestre: D'une Exigence de Bonne Foi a un Esprit de Collaboration (1986) Rev.
Trim. Dr. Civ., 100.
Mnookin, Robert: Creating Value through Process Design (1994) 11 Journ. Int'l.
Arb'n., Part 1, 125.
332
Morin: Le Devoir de Cooperation dans les Contrats Internationaux (1980) 6 Dr. Prat.
Comm. Int'l., 9.
Morse, C. G. J.: The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (1982) 2 Yearbook European Law, 107.
Naón, Grigera:
ICC Arbitration and Developing Countries (1993) 1 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ, 116.
Arbitration in Latin America: Overcoming Traditional Hostility (1989) 5
Arbitration International, 137.
Nathan, K. V.: Submission to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes in Breach of the Convention (1995) 12 J. Int'l. Arb'n. part 1, 27.
Nattier: International Arbitration in Latin America: Enforcing Arbitration Agreements
and Awards (1986) 21 Tex. Int'l L J., 397.
Noda, Yoshiyuki: The Far Eastern Conception of Law in International Encyclopaedia
of Comparative Law, Vol. II, Chapter 1.
North, Peter, M.: Reform but not Revolution, General Course on Private International
Law (1990) 220 Hague Acad. Courses, 9.
O'Neil, Philip D. American legal Developments in Commercial Arbitration involving
Foreign States and State Enterprises (1989) 6 Joum. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 1, 177.
Ocran, T. M.: International Investment Guarantee Agreements and Related
Administrative Schemes (1988) 10 Univ. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L., 341.
Oyama, Kumiko: Recent Developments in Japanese Arbitration: An Introduction to
the Draft Arbitration Law of Japan (1993) 10 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 2, 55.
Pappas, Athena J.: References on Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties (1989) 4
ICSID Rev.,-FILJ, 189.
Park, William W.:
Judicial Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The English
Arbitration Act of 1979 [1980] 21 Harv. Int'l. L J, 87.
National Legal Syatems and Private Dispute Resolution (1988) 82 AJIL, 616.
The Lex Loci Arbitri and international Commercial Arbitration (1983) 32
ICLQ, 21.
and Paulsson, Jan: Binding Force of International Arbitral Awards (1983) 23
333
Va. J. Int'l. L., 253.
Paulsson, Jan:
Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of its Country of origin
(198 1) 30 ICLQ, 358.
Arbitration Unbound in Belgium (1986) Arbitration International, 1.
Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why it
Matters (1983) 32 ICLQ, 53.
Third World Participation in International Investment Arbitration [1987] 2
ICSJD Rev.,-FILJ, 19.
The ICSID Kiockner v. Cameroon Award: The Duties of Partners in North
South Economic Development Agreements (1984) 1 Journ. Int'l Arb'n., PArt 1, 145.
North-South Arbitration (1984) 50 Arbitration, 37.
Arbitrage International et Voies de Recours: La Cour Supreme de Suede dans
le Silage des Solutions Beige et Helvétique (1990) JDI, 89.
Picot: L'Obligation de Cooperation dans L'exécution du Contrat (1988) JCP, I, 3318.
Raymond, Claude: Where is an Award Made (1992) 108 LQR, 1.
Redfern, Alan: International Commercial Arbitration, Jurisdiction Denied: The
Pyramid Collapses (1986) JBL, 15.
Reisman, W. M. :The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration
(1989) Duke L J, 739.
Rigaux, Francois: Transnational Corporations, in International Law: Achievements and
Prospects (ed. Bedjaoui, Mohammed), 1991.
Rivkin, David W.: Enforceability of Arbitral Awards Based on Lex Mercatoria (1993)
9 Arbitration International, 67.
Roebuck, Derek: The Myth of Judicial Jealousy (1994) 10 Arbitration International,
395.
Rosenfeld, Michel: Contract and Justice: The Relation between Classical Contract Law
and Social Contract Theory (1985) 70 Iowa L. Rev., 769.
Rowat, Malcolm D.: Multilateral Approches to Improving the Investment Climate in
Developing Countries: The case of ICSJD and MIGA (1992) Harv. Tnt. L J, 104.
334
Rubino-Sammartano, Mauro: The Channel Tunnel and the Tronc Commun Doctrine
(1993) 10 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 3, 59.
Rudden, Bernard: Le Juste et L'efficacité: Pour un Non-devoir de Renseignements
(1985) Rev. Trim. Dr. Civ., 91.
Saleh, Samir: The Settlement of Disputes in the Arab World: Arbitration and Other
Methods - Trends in Legislation and CAse Law (1986) 1 Arab L Q, 198.
Sassoon, DAvid M.: Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (1965) JBL,
334.
Sayre, Paul: Development of Commercial Arbitration Law [1927-28] 37 Yale L.J.,
595.
Schimitthoff, CLive:
Defective Arbitration Clauses (1975) JBL, 9.
The Reform of the English Law of Arbitration (1977) JBL, 305.
The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Courts [1966-67] JBL, 318.
Schwarzenberger, Georg: The Arbitration Pattern and the Protection of Property
Abroad in International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum Martin Domke (ed. Sanders,
Pieter), 1967.
Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ignaz: Subrogation under the MIGA Convention (1987) 2 ICSID
Rev.,-FILJ, 111.
Sempasa, Samson L.: Obstacles to International Commercial Arbitration in African
Countries [1992] 41 ICLQ, 387.
Shihata, Ibrahim F.I.: Towards a Greater Depoliticization of of Investment Disputes:
The Roles of ICSID and MIGA (1986) 1 ICSID Rev.,-FILJ
Simpson, Sidney P: Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts (1933-35) 83 U.
Pa. L. Rev., 160.
Soley, David A.: ICSJD Implimentation: An Effective Alternative to International
Conflict (1985) 19 Int. Lawyer, 521.
Soley: ICSID Implementation: An Effective Alternative (1985) 19 Int'l. Lawyer, 521.
Sornarajah, M.:
The Myth of International Contract law (1981) 15 JWTL, 187.
335
The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World Viewpoint (1989) 6 Journ. Int'l.
Arb'n., Part 4, 7.
The Climate of International Arbitration (1991) 8 Journ. Int'l. Arb'n., Part 2,
47.
Sullivan, Gary B.: implicit Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by Consent to Arbitration:
Territorial Scope and Procedural Limits (1983) 18 Texas Int'l. L. J., 329.
Sutherland, P.F.: World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(1979) 28 ICLQ, 367.
Szasz, Paul:
The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America (1970-7 1) 11 Va. J
Int'l. L, 257.
Using the New International Settlement of Investment Disputes (1971) 8 East
African L J, Part 2.
Thomas, Rhidian D.: Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act 1988 (1991) 57
Arbitration, 48.
Touscoz, Jean: L'Agence Multilaterale de Garantie des Investisséments (1987) 13 Dr.
PRat. Comm. mt., 311.
Tschanz, Pierre-Yves:
Tupman, Michael: Staying Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under the New York
Convention (1987) 3 Arbitration International, 209.
van Houtte: La Loi Bèlge du 27 Mars 1985 (1986) Rev. Arb., 29.
Vandevelde, Kenneth J.: The Bilateral Investment Protection Treaty Program of the
United States (1988) 21 Cornell mt. L. J., 201.
Verzjil, J. H. W.: Western European Influence on the Foundation of International Law
(1975) 1 Int'l Relations, 137.
Virally, Michel: Le Dépassement du Droit: Le Droit International en Question (1963)
8 Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 146.
Voss, Jurgen:
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency: Status, Mandate, Concept,
Features, Implications (1987) 21 JWTL, Part 4, 5.
The Protection and Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing
336
Countries: Interests, Interdependencies, Intricacies (1982) 31 ICLQ, 686.
Weintraub, Russell J.: Functional Development in Choice of Law for Contracts (1984)
187 Hague Acad. Courses, 239.
Williams, Glanvill: The Doctrine of Repugnancy -II: In the Law of Arbitration (1945)
60 L.Q.R., 69.
Wilner, G. M.: Acceptance of Arbitration by Developing Countries, in Resolving
Transnational Disputes Through International Arbitration, (ed. Carbonneau) 283.
Wolaver, Earl S.: The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration (1934-35) 83
U. Pa. L. Rev., 132.
337
Addendum: The enactment of the new Arbitration Act 1996 calls for the following:
1. Page 44, footnote 26, add "Now see Arbitration Act 1996 Sections 9(1) & (4) and 86
(for domestic arbitration)".
2. Page 45, paragraph 2, line 8, the sentence "The use of ... by compelling arbitration."
should read "The use of the mandatory "shall" indicates a difference with the discretionary
"may" of Article 4 of the English Arbitration Act of 1950 and clearly points to a
determination to specifically enforce the agreement by compelling arbitration, an objective
effected by Sections 9(4) and 86 of the new Arbitration Act."
3. Page 57, paragraph I line 9, between "an award," and "although", insert "(nor does the
new Act of 1996)"
(ii) line 15, replace "was only concerned" with "has only been concerned"
(iii) at the end of footnote 74 add "See now Arbitration Act 1996 Section 5(1). Writing is
a requirement of all arbitration governed by the Acts. A common law arbitration, i.e., one
pursuant to an oral arbitration agreement, is not governed by the Acts: see Arbitration Act
1996 Section 81 and, by implication, Sections 9(4); 30(1)(a), 66(3) & 67(1) read together;
and 58(1).
4. Page 70, footnote 115 should read: "Section 3. See now Arbitration Act 1996 Section
69(1). Exclusion agreements apply to domestic arbitration only if made after the
commencement of the arbitration: Arbitration Act 1979 Section 3(6); Arbitration Act
1996 Section 87(1)."
5. Page 71, at end of footnote 118 add "They are not also retained in ensuing Act of 17
June 1996."
6. Page 81, line 2, between "1950" and "allows" insert "(see now Sections 9 and 86 of the
1996 Act)"
(ii) in paragraph 2, line 1, for "is" and "can" substitute "was" and "could" respectively.
(iii) in paragraph 2, line 3, sentence commencing "It may be that this situation ..." should
read "It may be that this situation would have been assimilated to a simple refusal by the
party in breach to proceed with the settlement by arbitration, in which case, if he had been
the plaintiff in the proceedings, he may have had to abandon his claim."
(iv) same paragraph, line 7, for" ... may proceed to arbitration and obtain an award ...",
substitute" ... may have proceeded to arbitration and obtained an award ..."
(v) at the end of that paragraph add "Section 9 of the Act of 1996 resolves the matter by
referring to "legal proceedings", thus including out-of-court proceedings."
7. Page 83, footnote 161, after "Section 16" add "(there is no comparable provision in the
new Act of 1996);"
8. Page 108, in paragraph 2 line 8, between "Arbitration Act 1950" and "to stay court
proceedings ...", insert "(now mandatory powers under Sections 9 and 86 of new Act)"
(ii) at the end of footnote 82 add "but omitted in the new Act of 1996."
9. Page 245, paragraph 3 line 1, substitute "repeals" with "repealed"
10. Page 246, at the beginning of line 4, add "Section 81(2) of the new Act is to the same
effect." and, in the place of the words "substitutes" and "confines" (line 5), read
"substituted" and "confined" respectively.
(ii) in line 7, "Section 1(2). Section 3 allows parties ..." should read "Section 1(2); (see
Sections 67 & 68 of the Act of 1996). Section 3 allowed parties ..."
(iii) in line 11, substitute "did" for "do" and the phrase "would have had to" for "must"
(iv) in line 13, substitute "related" for "relates"
(v) at the end of paragraph 1, add "The new Act of 1996 also allows for exclusion
agreements (Section 69(1)) and, ftirther, entirely omits the exceptions relating to contracts
of insurance, commodities, and shipping. Exclusion agreements are also allowed in
domestic arbitration, although valid only if entered into after the commencement of the
arbitration in respect of which they are made."
(vi) paragraph 2, line 1, substitute "... 1979 Act is that it abolishes ..." with "... 1979 and
1996 Acts is that they abolish ..."
(vii) in line 6, substitute "delaying arbitrations or flouting the original intention of the
parties, to avoid the courts in submitting to arbitration." with "delaying arbitration or of
flouting the original intention of the parties, in submitting to arbitration, to avoid the
courts."
(viii) in the same paragraph, line 9, substitute "Lord Diplock said in The Nema that" with
"Following the Act of 1979, Lord Diplock said in The Nema, in terms which would also
be relevant to the new Act of 1996, that". Retain footnote 44 after the name of the case.
11. Page 247, paragraph 2, in line 2 substitute "is not too obvious" with "may not have
been too obvious" and insert "of 1979," between "Act" and "policy"
(ii) paragraph 2, line 5, between "the Act" and the sentence commencing "In The Nema,
..", insert "the same is true of the new Act" and in line 6, insert "1979" between the
words "the" and "Act". In the next two lines substitute "remained" and "stated" for
"remains" and "states" respectively.
(iii) in paragraph 3, lines 1 & 2, substitute the phrase "Act of 1979 is in the wider
liberalising tendency it ushered into English law" with "Act of 1979 and, much so, the new
Act of 1996, is the wider liberalising tendency ushered into English law"
(iv) in the same paragraph, line 3, substitute "prior to the Act" with "prior to 1979"; delete
the word "it" (line 4) and insert "1979" between "the" and "Act" (in line 4).
12. Page 248, paragraph 2, in line 1 substitute "has been" with "was"
13. Page 249, line 5, substitute "be" with "have been"
(i) in line 6, substitute "will" with "would"; insert "have" between "not" and "recognise"
and "give" should read "given"
(ii) in line 9, substitute "will regard" with "would have regarded"
(iii) paragraph 1 lines 15 and 16, the phrases after note 61 should read "that did not appear
to be the conventional view in England where, before the new Act, it remained uncertain
whether an English court would recognise an award made ex aequo et bono. At the end of
that paragraph add "Section 46(1)(b) now makes that possible."
(iv) at the end of footnote 57 add "Section 46(1)(b) of the new Act provides a statutory
basis for that decision."
14. Page 250, at the end of footnote 62, add "See Section 53 of the new Act."
Errata
1. Page 38, para. 2, line 17, substitute "excluding" with "exclusion of'.
2. Page 36, line 1, replace the full stop with a comma.
(i) line 2, "characteris" should read "characterise".
3. Page 45, line 1, insert "not" between "are" and "practicable".
4. Page 62, para. 1, line 10, "off-shot" should read "off-shoot".
(i) para. 2, line 6, delete the first "to" and insert "of' between "disregard" and
"contractual".
5. Page 74, para. 2, line 1, delete the word "to".
6. Page 78, last line, read "courts" for "coutrs".
7. Page 79, line 3, read "resulting" for "resultin".
8. Page 80, para. 3, last line, insert "1" in "controling".
9. Page 83, para. 2, last line, insert "c" in "beome".
10. Page 84, line 9, delete the second "the".
11. Page 218, line 3, read "Qatar" instead of"Quartar".
12. Page 248, para. 2, line 6, delete the commas after "Europe" and "arbitration".
George Elombi
Arbitration of International Commercial and Investment Disputes: Are the
Misgivings of Developing Countries Justified? (Ph.D. Thesis, 1996 - Centre for
Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary & Westfield College, University of London)
CORRiGENDUM (to reflect the provisions of the new Arbitration Act 1996)
1. Page 44, footnote 26, add "Now see Arbitration Act 1996 Sections 9(1) & (4) and 86
(for domestic arbitration)".
2. Page 45, paragraph 2, line 8, the sentence "The use of ... by compelling arbitration."
should read "The use of the mandatory "shall" indicates a difference with the discretionary
"may" of Article 4 of the English Arbitration Act of 1950 and clearly points to a
determination to specifically enforce the agreement by compelling arbitration, an objective
effected by Sections 9(4) and 86 of the new Arbitration Act"
3. Page 57, paragraph 1 line 9, between "an award," and "although", insert "(nor does the
new Act of 1996)"
(ii) line 15, replace "was only concerned" with "has only been concerned"
(iii) at the end of footnote 74 add "See now Arbitration Act 1996 Section 5(1). Writing is
a requirement of all arbitration governed by the Acts. A common law arbitration, i.e., one
pursuant to an oral arbitration agreement, is not governed by the Acts: see Arbitration Act
1996 Section 81 and, by implication, Sections 9(4); 30(1)(a), 66(3) & 67(1) read together;
and 58(1).
4. Page 70, footnote 115 should read: "Section 3. See now Arbitration Act 1996 Section
69(1). Exclusion agreements apply to domestic arbitration only if made after the
commencement of the arbitration: Arbitration Act 1979 Section 3(6); Arbitration Act
1996 Section 87(1)."
5. Page 71, at end of footnote 118 add "They are not also retained in ensuing Act of 17
June 1996."
6. Page 81, line 2, between "1950" and "allows" insert "(see now Sections 9 and 86 of the
1996 Act)"
(ii) in paragraph 2, line 1, for "is" and "can" substitute "was" and "could" respectively.
(iii) in paragraph 2, line 3, sentence commencing "It may be that this situation ..." should
read "It may be that this situation would have been assimilated to a simple refusal by the
party in breach to proceed with the settlement by arbitration, in which case, if he had been
the plaintiff in the proceedings, he may have had to abandon his claim."
(iv) same paragraph, line 7, for" ... may proceed to arbitration and obtain an award ...",
substitute " ... may have proceeded to arbitration and obtained an award ..."
(v) at the end of that paragraph add "Section 9 of the Act of 1996 resolves the matter by
referring to "legal proceedings", thus including out-of-court proceedings."
7. Page 83, footnote 161, after "Section 16" add "(there is no comparable provision in the
new Act of 1996);"
8. Page 108, in paragraph 2 line 8, between "Arbitration Act 1950" and "to stay court
proceedings ...", insert "(now mandatoiy powers under Sections 9 and 86 of new Act)"
(ii) at the end of footnote 82 add "but omitted in the new Act of 1996."
9. Page 245, paragraph 3 line 1, substitute "repeals" with "repealed"
10. Page 246, at the beginning of line 4, add "Section 81(2) of the new Act is to the same
effect." and, in the place of the words "substitutes" and "confmes" (line 5), read
"substituted" and "confined" respectively.
(ii) in line 7, "Section 1(2). Section 3 allows parties ..." should read "Section 1(2); (see
Sections 67 & 68 of the Act of 1996). Section 3 allowed parties ..."
(iii) in line 11, substitute "did" for "do" and the phrase "would have had to" for "must"
(iv) in line 13, substitute "related" for "relates"
(v) at the end of paragraph 1, add "The new Act of 1996 also allows for exclusion
agreements (Section 69(1)) and, further, entirely omits the exceptions relating to contracts
of insurance, commodities, and shipping. Exclusion agreements are also allowed in
domestic arbitration, although valid only if entered into after the commencement of the
arbitration in respect of which they are made."
(vi) paragraph 2, line 1, substitute "... 1979 Act is that it abolishes ..." with "... 1979 and
1996 Acts is that they abolish ..."
(vii) in line 6, substitute "delaying arbitrations or flouting the original intention of the
parties, to avoid the courts in submitting to arbitration." with "delaying arbitration or of
flouting the original intention of the parties, in submitting to arbitration, to avoid the
courts."
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(viii) in the same paragraph, line 9, substitute 'Lord Diplock said in The Nema that" with
"Following the Act of 1979, Lord Diplock said in The Nema, in terms which would also
be relevant to the new Act of 1996, that". Retain footnote 44 after the name of the case.
11. Page 247, paragraph 2, in line 2 substitute "is not too obvious" with "may not have
been too obvious" and insert "of 1979," between "Act" and "policy"
(ii) paragraph 2, line 5, between "the Act" and the sentence commencing "In The Nema,
...", insert "the same is true of the new Act" and in line 6, insert "1979" between the
words "the" and "Act". In the next two lines substitute "remained" and "stated" for
"remains" and "states" respectively.
(iii) in paragraph 3, lines 1 & 2, substitute the phrase "Act of 1979 is in the wider
liberalising tendency it ushered into English law" with "Act of 1979 and, much so, the new
Act of 1996, is the wider liberalising tendency ushered into English law"
(iv) in the same paragraph, line 3, substitute "prior to the Act" with "prior to 1979"; delete
the word "ie' (line 4) and insert "1979" between "the" and "Act" (in line 4).
12. Page 248, paragraph 2, in line 1 substitute "has been" with "was"
13. Page 249, paragraph 1 lines 15 and 16, the phrases after note 61 should read "that did
not appear to be the conventional view in England where, before the new Act, it remained
uncertain whether an English court would recognise an award made ex aequo et bono. At
the end of that paragraph add "Section 46(1)(b) now makes that possible."
(ii) at the end of footnote 57 add "Section 46(1)(b) of the new Act provides a statutory
basis for that decision."
14. Page 250, at the end of footnote 62, add "See Section 53 of the new Act."
